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Foreword
The background of the project PACSDOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-15-2016-00001 entitled “Public 
Service Development Establishing Good Governance” is the fact that the proper functioning 
of public administration and public services is a decisive need of modern European societies, 
and of the public service implementing public interest, respectively.
Good and strong governance must be built on up-to-date scientific knowledge and 
college or university education. This research, whose local research centre is at the National 
University of Public Service, Faculty of Law Enforcement, Department of Immigration and 
Nationality, focusing on migration dynamics as well as the social impacts in the background 
of migration and related public responsibilities properly meets these requirements.
The clearly defined objective of this research is to develop migration administration 
together with making recommendations that are directly connected to supporting the 
migration-related (administrative matters related to aliens as well as asylum policies) 
tasks of public service and public administration in accordance with the international and 
European Union requirements. The research in the above-indicated subject stems from 
the preliminary hypothesis that migration, considering its current trend and dynamics, 
is an evolving phenomenon affecting individual states, societies and the development of 
migration- related  regulations. Both desirable and undesirable manifestations of human 
migration simul taneously represent challenges for the countries of origin, as well as for the 
transit and host countries.
During the research the following are considered: historical overview of migration and 
asylum policies, as well as migration and asylum policies in conjunction with criminal law, 
European public law or law on nationality. Additionally, certain parts of the research (stud-
ies by the members of the research group) allow scope for investigating current migration 
phenomena, the evaluation of subjective feelings of (in)security and criminal impacts caused 
by migration and, last but not least, the necessity to forecast asylum policies.
In addition to fulfilling the above mission, the studies published herein pay particular 
attention to migration-related issues and situations, especially to those that can be imple-
mented by the cooperation of the so-called Visegrád countries. Nevertheless, the main goal 
of the publication is to serve as a source for evaluating the current migration situations and, 
at the same time, to be relevant literature for those readers who wish to learn about the 
social effects resulting from human migration with academic professionalism. Hoping the 
above, I wish you a productive time reading it,
The Editor
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DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
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Characteristics and Dynamics of the Historical Times 
of International Migration
Ilona Szuhai
Introduction
The superficial phenomena of migratory movements in contemporary history are deeply 
rooted in historical processes. The dynamics of those movements can be influenced in longer 
terms.1 Revealing the dynamics of migration in the historical times helps in understanding 
current and future changes of migratory patterns. The fact that about 258 million people 
participate in international migration2 marks its importance. The Research Team has stated 
in the Research Plan that the places of forced migration and the persons in need of inter-
national protection should be found, as well as, the demographic, economic and cultural 
impacts of mass migratory movements should be revealed and analysed in the present 
migratory environment.3 After the recent turbulent years of international migration in the 
interconnected and interdependent world – no wonder – it is easy to forget how the whole 
migration phenomenon started. In what way has the natural process of migration become 
a complex, dynamic and multifaceted movement?
Evolution of humans is in close connection with moving from one place to another and 
with the adaptation to the new circumstances. The theoretical starting point of this chapter 
is Russell King’s thesis that “humans are a migratory species” which statement is still valid 
today.4 His work on history is fundamental in migration research. In his book The History 
of Human Migration King has outlined a trajectory of human mobility from prehistoric age 
to contemporary times. Katharine Donato and Douglas S. Massey have noted that “humans 
spread across the world and no other organism has moved through space and time so wide-
ly or quickly than human beings”. Taking into consideration a contemporary aspect, they 
stated that migration is widely used to adapt to the unequal distribution of risks or political, 
economic, legal and cultural opportunities.5
1 Cseresnyés Ferenc (2005): Migráció az ezredfordulón. [Migration at the Turn of the Millennium.] Budapest–
Pécs, Dialóg Campus. 40.
2 UN DESA (2017): Population Facts. 2017/5. 1.
3 Research Plan of the Research Team on the Dynamics and social impacts of migration. 2016/227/NKE RTK. 
Széchenyi 2020.
4 King, Russell (2008): Vándorló emberiség. [Humans in Motion.] Budapest, Geographia. 8.
5 Donato, Katharine − Massey, Douglas S. (2016): Twenty-First Century Globalization and Illegal Migration. 
ANNALS, AAPSS, Vol. 666, No. 1. 8.
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According to Russell King, migration is the world history itself. In recent migration 
processes, we can find their historical parallelisms. In King’s example, the cases of Afri-
cans, who risk their lives today by crossing the Mediterranean by vessels in order to get 
to Italy or Spain have deep roots in history, they repeat their ancestors’ more-million-year 
journeys from North Africa to the North, to Europe.6 In other words, history holds a mirror 
to our contemporary world but we should not overlook the lessons of the past. Modern or 
contemporary migration differs from the movements in the past. Therefore, some people 
may claim that migration is a new challenge.7 However, new challenges have often existed 
long before, but those featuring the 21st century are accelerating and they appear more in-
tensely than previous problems. That is why they may look like new.8 The same happened 
to migration in the past decades. Despite its historical continuance, migration has speeded 
up and become more diverse. Mass migration is neither a new phenomenon nor exceptional 
historical event. Moreover, spatial mobility is the characteristic of modern societies.9 In this 
recent accelerated global world, distribution of information takes place in real-time by satel-
lites and the internet. Transportation is faster and cheaper than before which enables faster 
and prevalent movements.10 Despite development, the rise of nation-states and economic 
concentration throughout history made migration a tool of economic and political measures. 
Although, the freedom of migration remained only an illusion11 for many people because 
the economic, political, human rights and demographic inequalities divide the world.12
This essay highlights the characteristics and dynamics of international migration in 
most important historical times. Although, we will never be able to measure the complex 
dynamics of global migration as a whole13 – according to the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) –, the second half of the essay introduces the current trends in interna-
tional migration, based on the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ 
(UN DESA), and the IOM’s latest migration reports.
Historical Characteristics of Migration
Migration in response to demographic growth, economic needs, lack of health or education-
al opportunities or climatic change has always been a part of human history.14 Due to the 
dynamic relationship between migration and history, they influence each other. Migration 
has made history, and history has promoted various forms of migration.15 As scholars sug-
6 King (2008): op. cit. 8.
7 Ibid.
8 Rada Péter (2006): Átalakuló biztonsági kihívások. [Transforming Security Challenges.] Grotius. 1.
9 Cseresnyés (2005): op. cit. 64.
10 King (2008): op. cit. 8.
11 Ibid.
12 Papademetriou, Demetrios G. (2003): Managing Rapid and Deep Change in the Newest Age of Migration. 
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 1. 57.
13 IOM (2017): World Migration Report 2018. Geneva, IOM. 2.
14 Castles, Stephen (2000): International migration at the beginning of the twenty-first century: global trends 
and issues. UNESCO. Global Trends and Issues, Vol. 52, No. 165. 273.
15 IOM (2004): Essentials of Migration Management – A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners. Migration 
Management Foundations, IOM. Vol. 1. 3.
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gest, in order to understand recent migratory processes, we can find parallel movements 
in history. Therefore, it is worth studying the characteristics and dynamics of migration in 
significant historical times. First, it is important to make a distinction between the terms of 
migration and international migration. The Treaty of Westphalia is the line of separation. 
Human migration has been existing since prehistoric times, though, “international migra-
tion has been occurring since the establishment of the world system of states, the Treaty of 
Westphalia of 1648”.16 However, the European integration, the single European space altered 
the concept of international migration, according to Russell King.17 Stephen Castles and 
Mark J. Miller have noted that international migration has become significant since 1945.18 
As Demetrios G. Papademetriou has pointed out, recorded human history is “full of ages 
of migration from the Greek colonies and Roman military conquests through the Byzantine 
and Ottoman empires, and from the European colonisations to the great migrations of the 
19th and early 20th centuries”.19
Barbara Lüthi has stressed that it is necessary to distinguish between the various forms 
and geographies of mobility20 as the geography of international migration has changed in 
recent decades. There are several ways for periodization of human history. I follow the 
periodization of Cohen,21 Donato and Massey,22 Lüthi,23 McKeown24 and the IOM25 in sum-
marising migration periods and events. Besides, I separate the details of migratory patterns 
and trends of the early 21st century.
• Prehistoric migration
• Conquests, invasions, and population transfers
• Migration within Europe, Africa and Asia
• The age of exploration and permanent settlement in the colonies
• Slavery and indentured labour
• Migration to the New World
• Migration in the 20th century
Prehistoric migration
Prehistoric migration is the period before recorded history, before the invention of writing. 
Migratory history of humans goes back to seven million years, to the birth of humankind 
when our first simian ancestors evolved from the African woods and populated the savan-
nah. The cavemen lived in the temperate zone grasslands of East Africa for some 5 million 
16 Teitelbaum, Michael S. (2009): The Global Commission on International Migration: Challenges and Para-
doxes. The Center for Migration Studies Special Issues, Vol. 22. No. 1. 116.
17 King (2008): op. cit. 9.
18 Castles, Stephen – Miller, Mark J. (2003): The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in 
the Modern World. Third edition. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 4.
19 Papademetriou (2003): op. cit. 39.
20 Lüthi, Barbara (2010): Migration and Migration History. 3.
21 Cohen, Robin (1995): The Cambridge Survey of World Migration. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
22 Donato−Massey (2016): op. cit.
23 Lüthi (2010): op. cit.
24 McKeown, Adam (2004): Global Migration. Journal of World History, Vol. 15, No. 2. 155–190.
25 IOM (2004): op. cit.
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years then another hominid appeared which dared to go farther. Homo erectus populated the 
whole of Africa, moreover they started off to discover the globe. Long after its extinction, 
finally Homo sapiens evolved in the same East African cradle.26 Homo sapiens emerged in 
East Africa about 150,000 years ago and through migration settled the entire globe within 
a very short span of geological time, reaching East Asia and Australia about 50,000 years 
ago, Northern Europe about 40,000 years ago, the Americas about 12,000 years ago, and 
the most distant Pacific islands about 2,000 years ago.27
According to historians, even in prehistoric times, climatic shifts have already played 
a key role in inducing large-scale migratory flows. In Europe, there must have been move-
ments southward and northward before and after glaciation, to escape the spread of ice 
sheets. The American continent received migrants from Asia in various waves via the 
Bering Strait.28
Conquests, invasions, and population transfers
Population movements have played an important role in the history of every nation. Re-
corded history shows “complex population exchanges in response to survival needs, or 
demographic change, political circumstances, or military strategy. In many cases, migration 
was a consequence of military conquests”.29 In the medieval period there were large-scale 
movements of peoples. “The Vikings raided all over Europe from the 8th century and set-
tled in many places, including Normandy, the north of England, Scotland, and Ireland. The 
Normans later conquered the Saxon Kingdom of England, most of Ireland, southern Italy 
and Sicily. Muslim Arabs, Berbers, and Moors invaded Iberia in the 8th century, founding 
new Kingdoms such as al Andalus. European Christian armies conquered Palestine for 
a time during the Crusades from the 11th to the 13th centuries, founding three Christian 
kingdoms and settling them with Christian Knights and their families. In the 14th century, 
German military colonists settled the Baltic region, becoming the ruling elite. At the end of 
the Middle Ages, the Roma arrived in Europe (to Iberia and the Balkans) from the  Middle 
East, originating from the Indus River. Internal European migration increased in the Early 
Modern Period. Major migration within Europe included the recruiting by monarchs of land-
less labourers to settle depopulated or uncultivated regions and a series of forced migration 
caused by religious persecution. This phenomenon includes mass migration of Protestants 
from the Spanish Netherlands to the Dutch Republic after the 1580s, the expelling of Jews 
and Moriscos from Spain in the 1590s, and the expulsion of the Huguenots from France in 
the 1680s.”30
The Ottoman Empire had a long migratory history, including emigration, immigra-
tion, and forced migration. Groups of Ashkenazim Jews migrated to the Ottoman Empire 
from Bavaria during the 14th century. Larger movements took place in 1492 when nearly 
100,000 Sephardim Jews were fleeing the Spanish Inquisition and found protection in the 
26 King (2008): op. cit. 15. 
27 Donato−Massey (2016): op. cit. 7.
28 IOM (2004): op. cit. 8.
29 IOM (2004): op. cit. 9.
30 New World Encyclopedia.
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Ottoman Empire.31 Starting from the 14th century, the Serbs began leaving the areas of their 
medieval Kingdom and Empire that was overrun by the Ottoman Turks and migrated to 
north, to the lands of today’s Vojvodina (northern Serbia), which was ruled by the King of 
Hungary at that time.32
Migration within Europe, Africa and Asia (from the 17th century onwards)
Circular migration, which has been deemed recently to be a new pattern of migration move-
ments, was a common feature in Europe, Africa and Asia during the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Circular migration represents an age-old pattern of mobility, which can be rural-urban or 
cross-border. Circular migration is also called “repeat, rotating, multiple, seasonal, cyclical, 
shuttling, or circuit-based migration.”33
In the modern times of history, which was the period between the 15th and the late 
18th century, mobility was stimulated by multifaceted motives: religious reasons, when 
religious groups like the Jews and the Huguenots were persecuted; economic reason, when 
farmers tried to find work in newly emerging industries. Seasonal or circular migration 
was a routine for workers.34
“Africa also has a rich history of population movement that pre-dates the colonial pe-
riod. This included seasonal or circular migration for hunting, agriculture or pastoralism.”35 
People migrated to find security and better life conditions, as well as, to escape natural 
disasters and warfare. In Asia, trade has always played an important role in the mobility of 
people. “Arab and Chinese traders travelled across well-established sea routes to the Malay 
Peninsula and the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos. There were also well-established 
trade routes between India, the Arabian Peninsula and West Africa. Circular migration was 
a common feature of working life for blacksmiths, and acrobats and singers who travelled 
in small social groups within South Asia.”36
The age of exploration and permanent settlement in the colonies (from the 1500s 
to the mid-19th century)
In the history of migration, the discovery of new worlds such as the Americas and Asia was 
a turning point. Trade and strategic aspects like colonization influenced transoceanic migra-
tion. “All major European economic and political powers competed for access to supplies 
of much sought after commodities and control of strategic locations.”37 The  development of 
the European nation-states systems, colonialism and industrialisation resulted in large-scale 
31 Kirisci, Kemal (2003): Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration. 1.
32 New World Encyclopedia.
33 Vertovec, Steven (2007): Circular migration: the way forward in global policy? IMI Working Papers No. 4. 5.
34 A History of Migration. Available: www.striking-women.org/module/migration/history-migration (Accessed: 
10.04.2018)
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 IOM (2004): op. cit. 10.
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migration movements.38 On the other hand, technical developments: detailed and reliable 
geographical knowledge, accurate maps, technologies, navigational instruments, and larg-
er, safer, and faster seagoing vessels, first under sail, later powered by steam fuelled mass 
transoceanic migration movements.39
In line with Katharine Donato and Douglas S. Massey, this was one of the eras of mass 
human migration of modern times, each associated with global economic change. The first 
era was the European colonialization from 1500 to 1800 when European powers colonized 
the Americas, Africa, and Asia and created a global mercantile economy. Consequently, 
there was an increasing need for management to handle the political and economic affairs.40 
“Britain, Spain, Portugal, Germany, the Netherlands and France promoted the settlement 
of their nationals abroad. This migration helped to establish the dominion of Europe over 
large parts of the world.”41
Slavery and indentured labour
As production needs increased in the new colonies, this gave way to the development of an 
entirely new kind of international migration: the slave trade met labour shortages. Some 
researchers confirm that modern labour migration started at that point.42 “Slave trade was 
one of the largest mass migrations of labour, as well as, the largest forced migration in 
human history. The first slave ship sailed from Africa to the West Indies in 1550. It is esti-
mated that over 10 million Africans were forcibly taken from mainly Western Africa to the 
Americas as slaves. Today, it is estimated that around 40 million people in the Americas 
and the Caribbean are descended from slaves. Large-scale slave trading in Africa ceased 
towards the end of the 19th century. Through the 19th century, all forms of slavery were 
abolished through legislation in different countries in Europe, Americas and the colonies.”43
Following the abolition of the slave trade in the 19th century, another system of labour 
migration emerged, the contracted labour, called indentured labour. Indentured labourers 
were free male and female workers who had accepted a contract to work for a specific 
period overseas. In practice, their conditions sometimes were worse than of slaves. Wages 
were meagre, work discipline harshly enforced, and general living standards very poor.44 
“Indentured labourers came primarily from India and China. From 1834 to the end of the 
First World War, Britain had transported about two million Indian indentured workers to 
19 colonies including Fiji, Mauritius, the Caribbean islands, parts of South America, Sri 
Lanka and South East Asia. Chinese indentured labourers were transported to the Americas, 
Philippines and the Caribbean islands. Similarly to slaves during transportation, indentured 
38 Castles (2000): op. cit. 273.
39 IOM (2004): op. cit. 10.
40 Donato−Massey (2016): op. cit. 8.
41 A History of Migration. Available: www.striking-women.org/module/migration/history-migration (Accessed: 
10.04.2018)
42 IOM (2004): op. cit. 10. 
43 A History of Migration. Available: www.striking-women.org/module/migration/history-migration (Accessed: 
10.04.2018)
44 IOM (2004): op. cit. 11.
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workers died during the period of contract. Political opposition to the indentured labour 
system by the Indian nationalist movement grew from the end of the 18th century. Mahatma 
Gandhi, the leader of the Indian independence movement, successfully drew attention to 
the oppression and exploitation of Indian indentured labourers in South Africa. The British 
Government officially ended the indenture system in their colonies in 1917.”45
Ulbe Bosma has pointed out that major migration movements probably started in the 
indentured labour system. America, Canada, Australia, Algeria, Siberia, or Manchuria had 
initial phases of state-engineered migration systems. Australia and Siberia are examples 
of colonies that were created by the deportation of convicts followed by state-assisted mi-
gration. As Bosma noted, it was a universal phenomenon to outsource indenture-ships to 
private recruitment agencies.46
Migration to the New World (1800s–1930)
The indenture labour system was gradually terminated from the end of the 19th century, 
but the wealth accumulated in Western Europe through colonial exploitation provided the 
foundation for an industrial revolution.47 Industrial revolution opened a new chapter in the 
history of migration in the 19th century, and resulted in mass international migration and the 
beginning of urbanization.48 Industrialization in Europe featured the second stage of mass 
migration between 1800 and 1929.49 This was also the first era of global capitalism, when 
nearly 50 million people emigrated from the densely populated industrializing nations of 
Europe to sparsely populated industrializing nations in the Americas and Oceania. Nearly 
60% of the emigrants went to the United States and the rest scattered mainly among Canada, 
Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand.50 From the 50 million, around 8 million 
people migrated from the British Isles. This was partly because Britain was one of the first 
countries to feel the impact of the industrial revolution, and because large numbers left Ire-
land following the potato famine of 1845–1847. From Germany around 3.5 million emigrants 
left poverty behind. The peak of migration was around the turn of the century. Over the 
whole period, – from 1846 to 1939 (age of mass migration) – over 50 million people left Eu-
rope. “Major destinations were the United States (38 million), Canada (7 million), Argentina 
(7 million), Brazil (4.6 million), Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (2.5 million).”51 
This phase of international migration is linked to the rise of the United States of America 
as an industrial power and the industrialisation of Australia and New Zealand. “Migrants 
45 A History of Migration. Available: www.striking-women.org/module/migration/history-migration (Accessed: 
10.04.2018)
46 Bosma, Ulbe (2007): Beyond the Atlantic: Connecting Migration and World History in the Age of Imperialism, 
1840–1940. IRSH, Vol. 52, No. 1. 121.
47 IOM (2004): op. cit. 11.
48 Castles, Stephen – Haas, Hein de − Miller, Mark J. (2014): The Age of Migration International Population 
Movements in the Modern World. Fifth Edition. 5.
49 O’Rourke, Kevin – Williamson, Jeffrey G. (1999): Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nine-
teenth-Century Atlantic Economy. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. Cited by: Donato−Massey (2016): op. cit. 8.
50 Massey, Douglas S. (1988): International migration and economic development in comparative perspective. 
Population and Development Review, Vol. 14, No. 3. 383–414. Cited by: Donato−Massey (2016): op. cit. 8.
51 IOM (2004): op. cit. 12.
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sought to escape poverty and the politically repressive regimes in their home countries in 
Europe, and were motivated by the prospect of economic opportunity settled in the Americas 
and the former colonies in the New World.”52 Nevertheless, “migration to Southeast Asia 
and lands around the Indian Ocean and South Pacific consisted of over 29 million Indians 
and over 19 million Chinese. Most migration from India was to colonies throughout the 
British Empire.”53
Over the period from 1846 to 1939, there was a considerable migration within Europe. 
“While larger numbers were leaving Europe, others were arriving in search of work or 
asylum. While a majority of Irish migrants went to the USA or Australia, some 700,000 
went to England, Wales, or Scotland to find employment in the factories or construction. 
Between 1875 and 1914, 120,000 Jews fled the pogroms of Russia and found asylum in 
Britain. Significant migrant flows, notably from Poland and Ukraine were recorded in 
Germany, where they worked as agricultural workers to take the place of local farmhands 
who had found more remunerative employment in the heavy industries of the Ruhr valley. 
Many of these migrants worked under strictly enforced time-limited contracts, precursors 
to a later generation of guest workers. The foundation for modern immigration legal and 
administrative frameworks was laid during this period.”54
Long-distance and transoceanic migration had been increasing gradually around the 
world since at least the 1820s, though, transoceanic migration accounts for only a portion 
of global migration. “Much migration was temporary or permanent movement to nearby 
cities, towns, factories, mines, and plantations.”55 “The Middle East and ex-Ottoman lands 
were also at the interstices of the main long-distance flows. Much of the movement in this 
region was the kind of labour migration that predominated in much of the rest of the world.”56
“Migration rates increased dramatically around the world in the last quarter of the 
19th century. After the depression of the early 1870s, transatlantic migration boomed and 
clearly surpassed Asian migration for the first time in the late 1870s, although migration 
to Southeast Asia soon picked up in the 1880s. Migration to North Asia followed suit in 
the 1890s.”57 “Transatlantic migration reached a spectacular peak of over 2.1 million in 
1913, and migration to Southeast and North Asia reached unprecedented peaks of nearly 
1.1 million per year from 1911 to 1913. Transatlantic migration recovered after the First 
World War to 1.2 million migrants in 1924, after which immigration quotas in the United 
States severely curtailed immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe. Asian migration 
also reached new peaks in the 1920s, with 1.25 million migrants to Southeast Asia in 1927 
and 1.5 million to North Asia in 1929.”58
52 A History of Migration. Available: www.striking-women.org/module/migration/history-migration (Accessed: 
10.04.2018)
53 McKeown (2004): op. cit. 157.
54 IOM (2004): op. cit. 12.
55 McKeown (2004): op. cit. 160.
56 McKeon (2004): op. cit. 162.
57 McKeon (2004): op. cit. 166.
58 McKeon (2004): op. cit. 167.
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Migration in the 20th century
The First World War closed the period of mass migration in the first era of global capitalism 
in August 1914. The war destroyed massive amounts of land, labour, and capital and left the 
international order in tatters. Nevertheless, the market crash of 1929 ended with economic 
growth.59 Adam McKeown has explained that “world migration reached new peaks in the 
1920s, and the immigration restrictions were part of much longer trends of regulations, 
border control, and nationalism that had grown concurrently with migration since the middle 
of the 19th century.”60 An example for this is that the first general immigration statute of the 
United States was passed by Congress in 1882 and reflected a clear desire to identify those 
who could and those who could not enter the country. The Act specifically prohibited the 
entry of convicts, insane persons, and persons likely to become a public burden. Australia 
and Canada promulgated similar legislations.61
Millions of Christians and Muslims became displaced from their Ottoman homelands 
from the late 19th to early 20th century due to the gradual shrinking of the Ottoman Empire 
and the emergence of new states. Those displaced were “Armenians from eastern Anatolia 
and Greeks from central and Western Anatolia, as well as Muslim Albanians, Bosnians, 
Pomaks, Tatars, and Turks from the Balkans.”62 “The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
and wars with Russia led to an exchange of 4 to 6 million people, with Muslims moving 
south from the Balkans, Greece, and Russia into Turkey, and Christians moving in the other 
direction. Around 1 million Armenians were expelled from Turkey to points around the 
world, and nearly 400,000 Jews moved to Palestine in the early 20th century.”63
Human migration became more complex and diversified during the 20th century. 
“Parallel to disintegration of the multi-ethnic Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov empires, 
nation-states reached their apogee in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.” New pattern of 
migration, the refugee movement became significant as “during the first half of the 20th cen-
tury, the Balkan Wars and the First and Second World Wars triggered refugee movements 
in unforeseen numbers.”64 Muslims moved from the Balkans to Turkey, while Christians 
moved the other way during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 400,000 Jews moved to 
Palestine in the early 20th century. The Russian Civil War caused some 3 million Russians, 
Poles, and Germans to migrate out of the Soviet Union.65
“Whereas the First World War itself generated millions of refugees, the new post-war 
nation-states introduced programs of unmixing peoples or ethnic cleansing. Under the 
nation-state regimes, as states successfully usurped the monopoly of the legitimate means 
of movement, and with the introduction of citizenship and identity documentation, entry 
regulations became more restrictive and demands for military service and loyalty to the 
nation increased. By the end of the First World War, most states of the North Atlantic world 
59 Kershaw, Ian (2015): To Hell and Back: Europe 1914–1949. New York, NY, Viking. Cited by: Donato− 
Massey (2016): op. cit. 8.
60 McKeown (2004): op. cit. 155.
61 IOM (2004): op. cit. 12.
62 Kirisci (2003): op. cit. 2.
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no longer required additional industrial workers, thus ending the prevalence of labour mi-
grants across the globe; wars and national expansion themselves were destroying the lives 
of millions of people.66 Forced migration was not only an effect of wars but also harsh labour 
regimentation following the seizure of power in the Soviet Union, particularly in the 1930s. 
Following the coerced collectivization of agriculture there was a collapse in production that 
led to famine-induced mass migrations.”67
Due to the economic stagnation, political turmoil, the general uncertainty and inse-
curity, international migrations were reduced in the interwar period. “In the depression of 
the 1930s, migrant workers were seen as competitors for scarce jobs, and levels of hostility 
toward them rose. Governments of destination countries responded by introducing legisla-
tion authorizing tighter control of entry procedures, restricting employment possibilities for 
foreigners, and introducing strict penalties against the employment of irregular migrants.”68 
However, the interwar period and the Second World War itself were marked by the mobility 
of millions of displaced persons,69 refugees and people fleeing from the new communist 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, another of its hallmarks was colonization and those 
empires, which served as a foundation for contemporary global migration.70 Stephen Castles 
has noted that “international migration emerged as one of the main factors in social trans-
formation and development throughout the world in the second half of the 20th century.”71
Post WWII migration (late 1940s to 1960s)
“The Second World War is often identified as another important watershed in migration 
history. The devastation created in Europe by the war contributed directly or indirectly to 
the displacement within the continent of between one and two million persons. Many of 
these people were refugees who had been victims of persecution or had had to flee per-
secution. Some found a new place of residence in Europe. Immediately after the Second 
World War, for example, the British Government offered work permits to 90,000 workers 
from refugee camps in various locations. Others moved to Belgium, France, and the Neth-
erlands.”72 “This period of migration took place when labour was needed in the post-war 
reconstruction efforts in Europe and during the economic boom in Europe, North America 
and  Australia. Migrants from former colonies in the Caribbean and South Asia came to 
find work in Britain, migrants from Turkey went to Germany and those from former French 
colonies in North Africa went to France.”73
The traditional host countries, like the United States, Canada and Australia launched 
migration programmes for a large number of displaced persons after the Second World 
66 Lüthi (2010): op. cit. 3.
67 Lüthi (2010): op. cit. 4.
68 IOM (2004): op. cit. 14.
69 See the chapter on Displacement.
70 Lüthi (2010): op. cit. 4.
71 Castles (2000): op. cit. 269.
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War. Those countries used migration as a state-engineering tool to enlarge their population. 
They increased their workforce capabilities at a time when these countries wished to take 
full advantage of the post-war economic boom. Populate or perish was one of the slogans 
commonly used by migration programme proponents to launch major infrastructure de-
velopment projects, for example, dams, hydroelectric plants, and irrigation systems.74 For 
at least two decades after the end of the war, these large-scale immigration programmes 
relied almost exclusively on the willingness of Europeans to detach themselves from their 
war-effected surroundings and start new lives abroad. Legislation and programme criteria 
were specifically formulated to enable migration from Europe and to restrict migration from 
other parts of the world.75 “The Australian Government, in its nation-building efforts, paid 
a grant of £10 to each migrant (hence known as ten pound poms). Many other groups of 
migrants, such as migrants from Turkey to Germany were given temporary visas as guest 
workers. Many of these labour migrants, including South Asian migrants to the UK, went 
on to settle in the receiving country.”76
At this time of the history of migration, permanent settlement was the primary goal of 
migrant workers. Later they brought their family members through family reunification into 
the host country. The case of the Turkish guest workers in Germany is an excellent example 
to monitor how the migration process has been transformed from permanent settlement 
through family reunification and return migration to circular migration by the 2000s. As 
Nermin Abadan-Unat defined the transformation of Turks in Europe in her book,77 they 
turned from guest workers to transnational citizens.
“After the end of the Second World War, decolonization and unequal global terms of 
trade imposed on the southern hemisphere by the global North shifted refugee and labour 
migrations to the global South. The Western countries, which had formerly sent their people 
abroad, now, became the destination of often desperately poor migrants, and, to date, highly 
militarized border controls have mostly proven ineffective. Peoples in the colonies of Asia as 
well as North and Sub-Saharan Africa began wars of independence. By the 1960s, the coun-
tries of Britain, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium were forced to abandon most 
of their colonies and – mainly because of this decolonization – major refugee populations 
were spawned in Africa. In the 1970s, because of the Vietnam War and conflicts elsewhere 
in Indochina, the geographical focus of these refugee movements shifted to southern and 
South-eastern Asia.”78
The definition of the term refugee is laid down in the UN Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. According to the Convention, a refugee is a person who “owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
74 IOM (2004): op. cit. 14
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 habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it.”79
“In addition to the refugee movements induced by decolonization, three major types 
of migration ensued:
• reverse migrations that brought colonizers and their personnel back home,
• displacement migrations as a result of the reordering of societies within the newly 
independent states, and
• income-generating labour migrations abroad to compensate for the disruptions in 
the daily lives of the people and the lack of long-term prospects in the newly inde-
pendent states.
• An emerging global North-South divide institutionalized through unequal terms 
of trades that disadvantaged the South, served to continue earlier forms of more 
direct exploitation and caused continuing migrations. Ever more people – with or 
without official documents – attempted to reach the wealthy job-providing North.”80
This phenomenon is in connection with irregular migration. According to the definition of 
the IOM, “irregular migration is a movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms 
of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted 
definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries, it is entry, 
stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under 
immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is 
for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international border without a valid 
passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving 
the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term illegal migration 
to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.”81
Returning to the post-war situation, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller have sum-
marized that for centuries Europeans have been moving outward to conquer, colonize, 
and settle foreign lands elsewhere; these patterns were reversed after the Second World 
War. From a prime source of emigration, Europe has been transformed into a major global 
migration destination. As part of the same pattern, Europeans represent a declining share 
of immigrants in classical immigration countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, along with an increase of South–North migration. This also coincided with 
the appearance of a new global pole of attraction for migrant workers in the Gulf region.82 
Within the 20th century, there was a significant shift in the composition of international 
migrants. Before 1925, 85% of all international migrants originated in Europe, but since 
1960, the number of European emigrants has reduced.83
79 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. (1951) Article 1.A.(2).
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Regional systems
The significance of migration as a major factor in societal change lies in the fact that it is 
concentrated in certain countries and regions.84 Over the course of the history of migra-
tion, the relationships widened among continents. Although, migration is a long historical 
process, it shows considerable variances in every continent. The globalization of migration 
means that if control becomes stricter in certain points in the world, it has significant impact 
on other hosting regions, as well.85
Barbara Lüthi has summarized the regional systems. “Several overlapping macro- 
regional migration systems emerged after the Second World War, two South–North systems 
in Europe and North America supplementing the Atlantic migration system. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, post-war reconstruction and economic growth first created a demand for labour 
from Southern to Western and Northern Europe, then expanding into North Africa. The 
North American labour market and the U.S. capital investments transforming their societies 
attracted Mexican and other Latin American and Caribbean migrants.”86 The largest volume 
migration in the world trends toward the U.S. from Mexico.87
“Regional migration systems also developed in the Caribbean and Central and South 
America. Supported by U.S. administrations, right-wing governments triggered large refu-
gee movements in certain Latin American countries. Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina have 
become magnets for migrant groups during different times, and political refugees from the 
former military dictatorships are in part, returning to their former countries.”88 Within Latin 
America, financial crises and political persecution often induce mass migratory processes.89
“In Asia, the fast-growing economies of South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia formed 
a new migration system. After the end of colonial rule, Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia 
were often singled out as scapegoats during times of economic crisis; hundreds of thousands 
were forced to flee. By contrast, the intra-Asian system was supplemented by a new phase 
of the Pacific migration system, which evolved after the end of the race-based exclusion 
in North America. Migrants from China, India, the Philippines and Southeast Asia moved 
mainly to the U.S. and Canada.”90 60% of the world’s population live in Asia. Urbanisation 
is the main characteristic of the inner migration. The number of the Chinese and Indian 
diaspora is growing. The biggest labour exporter of Asia is the Philippines. There was 
a shift from labour-force offer to labour-force demand. Return migration can be observed.91
“The Persian Gulf region attracted experts from the Western world as well as male 
labour from the Maghreb and the Indian Ocean region, whereas female domestic labour 
was specifically recruited from Asian societies. Sub-Saharan Africa developed another 
system in temporarily expanding economies such as Kenya, Somalia and – since the end 
84 Castles (2000): op. cit. 275.
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of Apartheid – South Africa. Nevertheless, obstacles in development due to dysfunctional 
economies as well as disruptive World Bank-imposed cuts in social services triggered 
internal rural-urban moves as well as out-migration to former colonizer countries.”92 The 
Middle East is a big host region of the foreign work-force. After the Gulf war a new period 
started in reception policy. A renationalization program was launched in connection with 
domestic developments. This narrowed the opportunities of foreigners in the economy.93
North Africa is traditionally in close connection with France. Due to its geopolitical sit-
uation emigration is permanent. The Sub-Saharan region is the territory of transit migration. 
In Western Africa and in South Africa both outward and inward migration can be observed. 
The middle part of Africa is the scene of refugee movements and it is a critical area.94
“Finally, socialist Eastern Bloc countries have shown singular migration patterns. 
Collectivization, uneven rural-urban development, economic growth in Hungary and 
Yugoslavia and in parts of the USSR as well as investments in southern Siberia resulted 
in interregional and interstate mobility. A ban on emigration separated this macro-region 
from all other migration regions. New east-to-west migrations occurred, and centres such as 
Moscow and Prague attracted internal, Chinese and Western migrants only at the collapse 
of the system in 1989.”95
Post 1970s migration
By the mid-1970s, migration programme objectives had been adjusted to focus less on the 
ethnic origin of the applicants and more on their qualifications, skills, and work experience.96 
“Since the 1970s, the variety of sending and destination countries has grown phenomenally. 
In addition to the traditional immigration receiving countries in the Americas, Western 
Europe and Australia and New Zealand, a range of other countries attract a growing popu-
lation of migrants. These include countries that have historically been nations of emigration 
such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. Additionally, the escalation of oil prices and the resulting 
economic boom in the Gulf region has led to a massive immigration to these countries to 
meet the demand for labour, though most of this is not permanent migration. There has also 
been a rise in labour migration to newly industrialised countries in Asia such as Thailand, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore from poorer countries in Asia such as Burma and 
Bangladesh. Unlike earlier phases when migration was more likely to end in permanent 
settlement, temporary and circular migration is again becoming more important. People 
are more likely than in earlier periods to migrate more than once in their lives, to different 
countries, and to return to their original country.”97
“Both the demographic makeup and the social composition of the receiving societies 
were substantially transformed. It is also certain that lifestyles and values underwent sig-
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nificant change. The highly industrialized countries of Western Europe turned to temporary 
labour to a lesser or greater extent between 1945 and 1973. European economies, after 
a sluggish start, found their way back to solid economic growth. The first consequence of 
that was a slowing down of the flow of emigrants out of Europe and toward the traditional 
countries of destination, and encouragement of active relocation within the European region 
of workers seeking to take advantage of rapid job creation in countries such as Germany, 
France, Belgium, and Switzerland.”98 Various international and transnational movements 
characterized the second half of the 20th century. Some of those still feature the recent mi-
gratory movements like persecutions and returns as consequences of the Second World War, 
de-colonialization, post-colonial migration, labour migration and movements of refugees.99
In connection with the post-1970 period, it is important to make clear the concept of 
temporary labour migration. “Temporary labour migration is a phenomenon of the workers 
migrating on the basis of temporary work authorizations, which attach the legal status of 
workers to particular employers and/or particular positions of employment. Temporary 
labour migration schemes take on various forms from bilateral and regional agreements for 
the exchange of labour between states to changes in national legislation allowing employers 
easy and accelerated access to temporary migrant workers for varying time periods, to 
provisions in multilateral trade agreements. What is new in the post-1970 period of restruc-
turing in the world capitalist economy is the increased use of temporary migrant labour by 
employers around the world.”100
Migration at the Beginning of the 21st Century
We are currently in the midst of a second era of capitalist globalization.101 “Its foundations 
were laid in the ashes of the Second World War, when the great global powers joined to 
create a new set of multilateral institutions that could maintain peace while promoting global 
trade and investment. The United Nations was created to defuse conflicts and prevent world 
war, the World Bank to finance economic development, the International Monetary Fund to 
guarantee international liquidity, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
to lower barriers to cross-border commerce.”102 Over the course of successive rounds of the 
GATT, negotiations gradually removed obstacles to trade and investment, culminating in 
the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995.103 “This current wave of globaliza-
tion proceeded slowly at first, as the economies of Europe and Japan were rebuilt after the 
war; but the pace of change accelerated after 1970 when the digital revolution advanced to 
create a new, knowledge based economy. With China’s turn toward the market in 1979 and 
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99 Cseresnyés (2005): op. cit. 66.
100 Valiani, Salimah (2013): Temporary migrant workers, globalization, 20th century to present. In Ness, Imma-
nuel ed.: The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration. First Edition. Blackwell. 2922.
101 Williamson, Jeffrey G. (2004): Migration and economic growth: A study of Great Britain and the Atlantic 
economy. Washington, D.C., AEI Press. Cited by Donato−Massey (2016): op. cit. 8.
102 Donato−Massey (2016): op. cit. 8.
103 Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2002): Globalization and Its Discontents. New York, NY, W.W. Norton. Cited by  Donato−
Massey (2016): op. cit. 9.
26 Dynamics and Social Impact of Migration
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a truly global economy emerged and was firmly 
established by the beginning of the new century.”104 Barbara Lüthi has indicated other 
characteristics of the 21st century, “the religious fundamentalism, increasing xenophobia 
in many countries, and so-called homeland security barriers are threatening the migrants’ 
freedom of movement. At the same time, the demand for migrant labour (increasingly 
also for domestic work or old-age care in affluent countries) is growing, just as migrants 
themselves are desperately searching for entry into societies that permit sustainable lives. 
Research data indicate growing disparities between the northern and southern hemispheres 
due to the imposition of tariff barriers and unequal terms of trade by the powerful North.”105
Unlike the first era of globalization, contradictions characterize the second era.106 
Russell King has defined four contradictions which show societal inequalities. One of them 
is that despite the technological advances, people can migrate less freely than a hundred 
years ago. In connection with this, the second contradiction is that the free movement of 
capital, goods and the idea of Western culture does not go together with unobstructed mo-
tion in the globalized world. The third contradiction is that reach countries’ citizens have 
more freedom to migrate than poorer countries’ citizens. Despite strict regulations, people 
find ways to avoid those obstacles. They move illegally often with help of paid smugglers, 
crossing borders irregularly107 or they arrive legally with tourist visa, but later they do not 
leave the country. The governments who are ready to exploit the benefits of cheap immigrant 
labour force play a double game. On the one hand, they emphasize the necessity of strict 
immigration rules in order to silence those inhabitants who fear the incompatibleness of dif-
ferent cultures. On the other hand, they overlook illegal border-crossings as streaming cheap 
immigrant labour force increase the competitiveness of certain industries and economies.108
Massey’s paradox of the 21th century
Going further along the contradictions, Douglas S. Massey has defined the paradox of the 
21st century globalization. “Today, all nations impose restrictions on international migra-
tion, thus constrain the globalization of markets for labour and human capital. Nations seek 
to create and participate in a global market in which only some factors of production are 
mobile. This is the fundamental contradiction of post-industrial globalism.”109 We can see 
parallels in the past regarding migrants’ movements “along pathways well established by 
a shared colonial past, prior guest worker treaties, and ongoing relations of trade, invest-
ment, and exchange. The difference today is that immigrant flows are restricted and unable 
to equilibrate international labour markets because national leaders want to create a global 
economy with selective factor mobility, a core contradiction finessed by the imposition 
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of ever more repressive controls on the international movement of people”.110 According 
to Douglas S. Massey, illegal migration is built into the structure of contemporary global 
economy; therefore, irregular migration is increasing.111
Besides illegal migration and irregular forms of migration, the paradox of the 21st cen-
tury globalization increases inequality among migrants, since in an irregular situation 
they cannot exercise their rights and they can be exploited. This disadvantageous situation 
negatively influences their integration.112
Current trends of international migration
International movement is becoming more feasible, partly owing to the digital revolution, 
distance-shrinking technology and reductions in travel costs.113 Globalization profoundly 
affects migration processes. It fundamentally involves interactions that span multiple 
geographic places, transcending nation-states. These interactions involve ideas, capital, 
goods, services and information, as well as people who virtually and actually connect with 
others across boundaries.114 “Globalization processes are altering aspects of daily life in the 
modern era. Recent advances in transportation and telecommunications technology have 
heralded massive changes in how we access information and interact globally in real time. 
Increasing transnational connectivity is shaping how people move internationally in ways 
that were not previously possible.”115
Migration patterns have not been uniform. Even though innovations in transport and 
telecommunications technology have increased interconnectivity and facilitated movement, 
they have not always resulted in more migration.116 The revolution in telecommunications is 
enabling the creation of unregulated migratory pathways that are fast and affordable for an 
increasing number of people. Telecommunications helped shape the size, composition, speed 
and geography of the migratory flows. Real-time coverage of movements and operations 
enable migrants – refugees, asylum-seekers and others – to access useful information on 
where, when and how to travel. Real-time connectivity enables information to be sourced, 
and verified, particularly where migrants are likely to undertake unsafe journeys or rely on 
smugglers.117 The complex interactions between greater interconnectedness and interna-
tional migration processes have growing importance. While the drivers of migration may 
remain largely unchanged, the circumstances in which people are considering and making 
decisions about their migration options have changed considerably.118 Factors underpinning 
migration are numerous, relating to economic prosperity, inequality, demography, violence 
and conflict, and environmental change.119
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Russell King has explained the two sides of the migration coin.120 One side is migra-
tion, the other side is immobility. One side of the migration coin shows the “fundamental 
historical role of migration as part of human experience from the past to the present and on 
into the future”.121 However, Stephen Castles and Mark Miller called the end of 20th century 
the Age of Migration mainly due to growing political salience of migration. They identi-
fied certain general tendencies besides of politicization of international migration, it has 
“globalised, accelerated, diversified and feminised”.122 From the aspect of this side of the 
migration coin, the latest population facts of the United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (UN DESA)123 has actual numbers and some main characteristics of 
international migrant populations.
The current global estimate is that there were around 258 million international migrants 
in the world in 2017, which means that 3.4% of the global population lived in a country other 
than their country of birth.124 The estimated number of international migrants has increased 
over the past 47 years.
Table 1.
International migrants, 1970–2017125
Year Number of migrants Migrants as a % of the 
world’s population
World’s population* 
(billion)
1970 84,460,125 2.3 3.7
1975 90,368,010 2.2 4.0
1980 101,983,149 2.3 4.5
1985 113,206,691 2.3 4.9
1990 152,563,212 2.9 5.3
1995 160,801,752 2.8 5.7
2000 172,703,309 2.8 6.1
2005 191,269,100 2.9 6.5
2010 221,714,243 3.2 7.0 
2015 243,700,236 3.3 7.4
2017 258,000,000 3.4 7.5 
* World Population Clock.
Source: Compiled by the Author from the IOM (2017) World Migration Report; the UN DESA (2017): 
Population Facts; the World Population Clock
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From 1970 till 1980, the world’s population and the number of international migrants 
gradually grew, while the percentage of the migrants was relatively stable compared to the 
growing of the world’s population. From the second half of the 1980s, the world’s population 
further grew gradually, but the number of international migrants grew faster than in the 
previous five-year-periods due to political events in the world history. At the same time, 
there was a peak in the percentage. This increasing character has been continuing till 2017, 
while the percentage and the worlds’ population remained gradual.
Since 2000, the number of international migrants increased by almost 50%. The 
number of international migrants is growing faster than the global population. In 2017, 
the proportion of international migrants was 3.4% of the world’s population, compared 
to 2.8% in the year 2000. Comparing the numbers of the continents, the UN DESA data 
show that the number of international migrants grew the fastest in Africa. Since 2000, the 
number of international migrants in Africa has increased by 67%. Between 2000 and 2017, 
their number increased from 15 million to 25 million. As a result, the percentage of all 
international migrants residing in Africa increased from 9% in 2000 to 10% in 2017. The 
second largest increase in the number of international migrants was recorded in Asia (62%), 
followed by Oceania (56%), Latin America and the Caribbean (44%), Northern America 
(43%) and Europe (38%).126
Comparing the global North to the global South, significant difference can be observed. 
In the North, almost 12 of every 100 inhabitants are international migrants; at the same time, 
in the South, only two of every 100 inhabitants are international migrants. Looking at the 
data on the global South-South and South-North migration, the UN DESA has published 
that in 2017, 38% of all international migrants were born in a country of the less developed 
regions and were residing in another developing country (South-South migration), while 
35% were born in the South but residing in the North (South-North migration). In connec-
tion with the global North-North and North-South migration, data show that about one in 
five international migrants were born and stay in the North (North-North migration), while 
six percent were born in the North but residing in the South (North-South migration).127
The other side of the migration coin reflects Gunnar Malmberg’s immobility paradox. 
The 258 million international migrants in the world in 2017 represented only 3.4% of the 
world’s population. 97% of the world’s population stays in the country in which they were 
born so they do not participate in cross-border migration.128 An estimation is available 
from 2009, according to which there are about 740 million internal migrants in the world 
who migrate within countries.129 The immobility paradox means that despite of the various 
economic theories and models which explain the causes of international migration, based 
on push and pull factors, the vast majority of people do not migrate.130
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Further characteristics of international migration
The dynamics of international migration is quite complex. On the one hand, it concentrates 
in certain regions. On the other hand, the UN DESA has observed important differences 
across regions and sub-regions. In Asia, migration has been mainly intraregional. Neverthe-
less, in Africa, intraregional migration has always been and remains important, but recently, 
the number of African international migrants has been almost the same as the number of 
intraregional African migrants. In contrast, in Latin America and the Caribbean, emigration 
is the main pattern of migration, especially toward North America. Intraregional migration 
plays a relatively limited role.131 In this context, Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. 
Miller have pointed out that the old dichotomy of migrant-sending and migrant-receiving 
countries has been eroded. Most countries experience both emigration and immigration.132 
In this regard, the IOM has pointed out the complexity of migration dynamics as several 
countries are sending (emigration) and receiving (immigration) countries at the same 
time. Those countries experience large immigration and emigration flows, often driven by 
two-way flows of labour migrants, family migrants and students. It is similar in the case 
of refugees, in some countries, like Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Iraq.133
Continuing the characteristics of the regions, similarly to previous years, today Asia 
and Europe host the largest numbers of international migrants. “Six of every ten internation-
al migrants reside in Asia or Europe. In 2017, Asia hosted the largest number of international 
migrants (80 million), followed by Europe (78 million) and Northern America (58 million), 
Africa (25 million), Latin America and the Caribbean (10 million) and Oceania (8 million) 
combined hosted around 43 million, or 17% of the global number. Between 2000 and 2017, 
the global share of international migrants residing in Asia increased from 29 to 31%, while 
in Europe the number declined from 33 to 30%.”134
Analysing the rate of male and female international migrants, the UN DESA has 
observed that in 2017, the proportion of male international migrants was slightly bigger 
(52%) than the number of females (48%). In the last 17 years, the percentage of female 
migrants increased in all regions except Asia. According to the UN DESA, this increas-
ing in most regions may be the result of population ageing and the greater female life 
expectancy. “The declining share of female migrants in Asia reflects a sharp rise in the 
demand for migrant workers in construction and related sectors in Western Asia.” As 
regards the age of international migrants, seven of every ten international migrants are 
adults of working age. Both in the developed and the developing regions, about 70% of all 
international migrants are between 20 and 59 years of age. From the point of view of age, 
there are also differences between the North and the South. “Older migrants outnumber 
younger migrants in the North, whereas younger migrants outnumber older migrants in 
the South. In the South, 21% of all international migrants are under the age of 20, which 
is more than double the share of migrants aged 60 or over (10%). In contrast, the fraction 
131 IOM (2017): op. cit. 92.
132 Castles–Haas−Miller (2014): op. cit. 14.
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of the migrant population aged 60 or over in the North (21%) is more than double the 
share of migrants under the age of 20 (9%).”135
In the case of intraregional mobility of international migrants, it can be observed that 
most migration takes place between countries in the same region. “Two thirds of all Euro-
pean-born international migrants reside in Europe. In 2017, of the 61 million international 
migrants born in Europe, 41 million resided in Europe. The second largest intraregional 
mobility (60%) took place in Asia, followed by Oceania (58%), and Africa (53%).” There 
is a difference in the case of Northern America (27%), Latin America and the Caribbean 
(16%), as those are the only regions where a majority of emigrants reside in another region.136
Displacement
Displacement with complex drivers has become an emblematic phenomenon of the 21st cen-
tury. It is in close connection with two potential drivers of migration which is typical of 
the 21st century: “the climate change and civil violence” as Katharine Donato and Douglas 
S. Massey have noted.137 The environmental change, underdevelopment, state fragility, 
protracted wars, unsolved conflicts, crises and disasters causing displacement in the world 
put a heavy burden on national economies.138 Data on displacement underpin Donato and 
Massey’s forecast. Every year a significant increasing is recorded in displacement. In 2016, 
there were 31.1 million new cases of internal displacement by conflict, violence and disasters 
which represents an increase of 3.3 million from 2015. It is the equivalent of one person 
displaced every second.139
First, it is important to define internally displaced persons, and what separates them 
from refugees and international migrants. Almost twenty years ago, the UN Commission 
on Human Rights (UN CHR) defined internally displaced persons in 1998, in the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement as follows: “internally displaced persons are persons 
or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of 
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural 
or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State 
border.”140 Before the adoption of the Guiding Principles, forcibly displaced people within 
their own countries did not have specific protection. Roger Zetter calls this a protection 
gap, which stimulated the UN General Assembly to adopt this document, which reinforce 
the principle that “national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide 
protection and humanitarian assistance to IDPs within their jurisdiction.”141
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Regarding the relationship between internally displaced persons, refugees and mi-
grants, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) outlined a possible circula-
tion among them as internal and cross-border movements are connected.142 An internally 
displaced person (IDP) may become a refuge when he/she crosses the border and seeks 
international protection, particularly when the IDP cannot find safety any more within the 
country. If they return but cannot integrate, they may become IDPs again.143 IDPs may 
become international migrants, as well when crossing the border. Roger Zetter defined the 
relationship between displacement and circular mobility. According to Zetter, displacement 
is “no longer a one-way movement” as IDPs can cross the border and regularly return to 
their country of origin or from the internal alternative safe place within their own country 
they return to their place of origin.144
The IDMC distinguishes between conflict-related and disaster-related displacement, 
as well as new cases and total numbers. The number of conflict-related new displacements 
was 6.9 million of which 6.6 million – more than 95% – took place in high-risk contexts, 
most of them in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total number of conflict-related internally dis-
placed people was 40.3 million in the world at the end of 2016.145 According to the IOM, 
since 2003, there has been an average of 5.3 million new displacements due to conflicts and 
violence yearly. “About 15,000 men, women and children are forced to leave their homes 
every day. Between 2000 and 2015, the average was even higher, 7.6 million per year or 
more than 20,000 people per day. The 2016 6.9 million new displacements falls between 
the two averages, reflecting an overall rising trend since 2003.”146 Many of the top source 
countries of refugees also host high numbers of IDPs, like Afghanistan, Colombia, DRC, 
South Sudan, Sudan and Syria.147 In Syria, more than 800,000, in Iraq, almost 680,000, in 
Yemen, nearly 478,000 new displacements were recorded.148
The number of disaster-related new displacements was 24.2 in 2016. A majority of 
these displacements took place in South and East Asia, China, the Philippines and India. 
The total number of disaster-related internally displaced persons is unknown.149 Therefore, 
it can be summarized that in 2016, there were 40.3 million150 internally displaced persons 
due to various conflicts and violence and 22.5 million refugees worldwide. Even the number 
of refugees is nearly half of the IDPs’, much attention is paid to refugees, though only in 
2016, there were 31.1 million new cases of internal displacements due to conflict, violence 
and disasters.151
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Refugees and asylum seekers
According to the UN DESA data, refugees and asylum seekers constitute about 10% of 
all international migrants. In the last 17 years, the number of refugees and asylum seekers 
increased from 16 to 26 million, and their share of the total number of international mi-
grants increased from 9 to 10%. Four of every five refugees or asylum seekers are hosted by 
countries in the developing regions. In 2017, countries of the global South hosted 21 million 
refugees or asylum seekers, representing 83% of the global number. Asia hosted the largest 
refugee population (14.7 million), followed by Africa (6.3 million), Europe (3.5 million), 
Northern America (970,000), Latin America and the Caribbean (420,000) and Oceania 
(70,000). The top 10 countries of asylum host more than half of the world’s refugees. The 
10 leading countries of asylum hosted 62% of the global refugee population, with the largest 
numbers in Turkey (3.1 million), Jordan (2.9 million) and the State of Palestine (2.2 million).
In 2017, refugees accounted for just 3% of all international migrants in the global North. 
In the South, however, almost a fifth of international migrants are refugees (19%), and in 
the least developed countries, refugees constitute more than a third of all international 
migrants (36%). One in every 300 persons worldwide is a refugee. In 2017, about 0.3% of 
the world’s population was a refugee. As a fraction of the total population, Africa hosts the 
largest number of refugees (0.5%), while Latin America and the Caribbean host the smallest 
number (0.06%). In 2017, the countries with the highest percentage of refugees in the total 
population included the State of Palestine (44%), Jordan (30%) and Lebanon (26%).152
The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic has been continuing. The number of refugees 
from Syria reaches approximately 5.5 million. Another major source country of refugees is 
Afghanistan where instability and violence have continued for over 30 years. The country is 
the second top country of origin in the world with 2.5 million refugees. The number slightly 
decreased compared to the 2015 figures (2.7 million), mainly because many Afghans have 
returned from Pakistan. Due to large-scale violence that erupted in South Sudan in the 
middle of 2016, the country has become the third largest country of origin for refugees, 
with over 1.4 million at the end of the year. Refugees from Afghanistan, South Sudan and 
the Syrian Arab Republic comprised 55% of the refugees under the UNHCR’s mandate.153
Conclusion
For future perspectives, Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller have stated 
that international migration is one of the most important factors in global change and have 
mentioned some reasons why the age of migration is expected to continue. First, due to 
the economic inequalities between countries, the aspiration of migration will increase and 
people will search better living standards. Second, political or ethnic conflicts worldwide 
will result in mass migration and will increase the number of people seeking international 
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protection. Third, in connection with labour, new free trade areas will facilitate labour 
migration.154
Migration is a fundamental means of human adaptation to avoid risks and access 
opportunities as Katharine Donato and Douglas S. Massey have summarized.155 People’s 
movements provide states and migrants with opportunities.156 Consequently, seeking better 
opportunities was the main characteristic of mobility in the final decades of the 20th century 
and the first decade of the 21st century. According to Douglas S. Massey, we can expect 
change in the motives and trends of international migration due to climate change and rising 
civil violence. In the course of adaptation, instead of seeking better opportunities, people 
will escape from immediate threats like “civil violence, crime, warfare, family violence, 
natural disasters, political upheavals, and economic catastrophe.”157 These expectations were 
underpinned by the data of international organisations and drew attention to the importance 
of the drivers of displacement like poverty, inequality, underdevelopment, state fragility, 
conflicts, violence, human rights violations and disasters.
Despite the fact that the world’s population will further increase, significant percentage 
of people will not leave the country where they were born, while the share of international 
migrants will grow. Nevertheless, mobility marks our contemporary history. New forms 
of international migration, like temporary or circular migration are not quite new; we can 
find their parallels in the historical times of international migration.
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Factors of Migration from North Africa
Andrea Crisán
“If wealth does not go where people are,
people naturally go where wealth is.”
(Alfred Sauvy)
Introduction
The purpose of the study is to provide a deeper analysis of the migration patterns of the 
North African region (especially Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) and an overview about the key 
factors behind the contemporary migration flows. In particular, it seeks to:
• examine the principal factors determining the decision of North African citizens to 
leave their country (push factors)
• examine the factors which affect their choice of destination country (pull factors)
• describe supporting elements and additional factors to migration
• show the migration profile of North African citizens emigrated
I analyse the recent migration histories of North African countries and show how they are 
related to underlying political and economic factors. It is important to relate current migra-
tion patterns to historical trends by analysing continuities and discontinuities.
Making predictions about future migration trends is difficult both in the start-and-
mid-term level and relatively unreliable, as well: most influential factors are well-known 
and stable, whereas many other assumptions remain speculative in the respective countries 
concerning economic, political and social development. This is especially true for countries 
that experience profound transformational processes or even political crises, such as several 
countries in North Africa.
This complex situation needs elaborated analytical approach and should take into 
consideration the fact that simplification or oversimplification of the migration movement 
is a mistake. We should never forget the migrants’ life stories and personal circumstances; 
however, this study aims to summarize the general push and pull factors behind migration 
patterns, as well.
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General Overview
The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia provoked a wave of uprising for democracy in North 
Africa, and it was followed by the ousting of President Mubarak in Egypt. Also, Libyans, 
Algerians and Moroccans were clearly expressing their will for political change. Millions 
of North Africans make strong demands for more democracy and political participation. 
Although the historical experience of North Africans widely differs, they are all facing 
similar problems and challenges. Why did not we see the upheavals coming? – asked Ann 
Lesch in her study.1
In her opinion one reason was that we overestimated the robustness of some of the 
authoritarian regimes, and underestimated the demands for a better life, measured partly 
in human rights term. We failed to see how quickly it could ignite into a region wide revolt 
that is, a struggle for dignity.2
The Arab Spring transformed the political landscape of an entire region, but the demo-
cratic reforms in the countries were accompanied by some negative impacts. “During their 
early stages, the protests raised hopes of a new wave of democratisation, but these hopes 
were quickly dashed, and the Spring, it seemed, was lost.”3 The events of the Arab Spring 
have affected the countries of the region to different extents. While the uprising in Tunisia 
and Morocco remained relatively peaceful, the violent conflicts in Libya and Syria generated 
large flows of refugees, most of whom went to neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and 
Egypt in case of Libyans and Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and even Libya for Syrians. Never-
theless, the Arab Spring has not radically transformed long-term migration patterns in the 
Mediterranean. Mass flight has been largely confined to Libya and Syria, and there has been 
no major increase of emigration from other North African or Middle Eastern countries.4
“Countries in North Africa tend to experience both inflows and outflows of irregular 
migrants due to their geographical position” – wrote Browne in her study. Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia are primarily countries of origin which rely on labour out-migration to help ease 
unemployment pressure at home and for the economic benefits of remittances.5
North Africa is also a destination region, especially Libya, mainly for Sub-Saharan 
migrants. Some other North African countries have become destination countries by acci-
dent, when migrants have been moving north and have stranded, for instance in Morocco. 
Besides this all North African countries are transition countries for migrants who wish to 
reach Europe to some extent.
1 Lesch, Anne M. (s. a.): Egypt’s Spring: Causes of the Revolution. Middle East Policy Council, Vol. 18, No. 3.
2 Ibid.
3 Leech, Philip (2017): Debunking the Myth of the Arab World. Stratfor, May 19, 2017.
4 Bommes, Michael – Fassmann, Heine – Sievers, Wiebke eds. (2014): Migration from the Middle East and 
North Africa to Europe. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.
5 Browne, Evie (2015): Drivers of irregular migration in North Africa. Birmingham, GSDRC, University of 
Birmingham. 3.
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Push Factors of Migration Flow from North Africa
This chapter analyses the conditions and elements that play a strong role in the decision to 
migrate. “Push factors in North Africa include a mix of proximate causes (the outbreak of 
violence, loss of livelihood or death of a family member) and root causes (such as political 
instability, economic uncertainty or prolonged unemployment).”6
The push factors in different North African countries show similar patterns. All coun-
tries examined are experiencing serious challenges after the events of the Arab Spring. It 
should be noted that motivations may also change over time and the complex combination 
of factors influence the decision to leave. The principal push factors may be categorized in 
the following points:
• Political push factors – this section focuses on the political situation, political crises 
and instability, domestic or community violence and unsatisfactory situation of 
human rights since 2011.
• Economic push factors – this section demonstrates prolonged unemployment, the 
lack of accession to the labour market, economic stagnation and failure of a busi-
ness as main push elements.
• Ecological push factors – this section deals with climate changes and increased 
population pressure on natural resources. In this study these are just mentioned 
without further details.
Some authors emphasise the importance of the demographic push factor and the culture 
of migration. In my opinion these elements themselves cannot be push factors, but can 
be considered supporting or considerable elements behind migration. Therefore, they are 
discussed in the Additional Factors to Migration chapter.
Political Push Factors
In this section the motives for migration on political and security grounds are discussed. 
Generally, in North Africa main factors are the deficient governance, relative political in-
stability and the unsatisfactory situation of human rights.
Obviously the Arab Spring has quite drastically changed the outlook for Arab countries, 
although the extent to which the uprisings have led to real democratisation and increased 
 civil liberties varies across countries. The political transformations in North African 
countries after the “mass protests of 2011 have not yet resulted in the institutionalisation 
of  democratic systems” or the creation of effective mechanism for preventing domestic 
conflicts.7
While Tunisia has turned from one of the most repressive regimes to a nascent de-
mocracy in a very short period, the progress has been slower and more uncertain in Egypt. 
Morocco remained invariably authoritarian as the king enacted constitutional reforms but 
6 Ibid.
7 Bommes–Fassmann–Sievers (2014): op. cit. 185.
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the central positions of power have remained largely unaffected.8 While a popular armed 
uprising in 2011 deposed the long-time dictator Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, Libya is now 
wracked by political, security and economic crises. The plan designed to bring the rivalling 
administration together in a unity government has failed to come to fruition. Algeria has 
been an immovable anchor in a region struggling to find stability after waves of change.
Now we take a look at the present political stability and political violence in the coun-
tries discussed in this study. Concerning the political push factors this part is also touching 
on the area of human rights.
Algeria
“Algeria is one of North Africa’s most quietly influential countries.”9 The government of 
President Bouteflika survived the events of the Arab Spring, but it remains highly dependent 
on oil revenue for its income.10
Political affairs are dominated by a closed elite based in the military and the ruling 
party, the National Liberation Front (FLN). President Bouteflika has been in office since 
1999 and the elections are characterised by fraud and different forms of manipulation.11
The rule of law is severely challenged with bandits operating in the south, terrorists 
present in the north and civil unrest posing a concern in key cities, particularly in the 
 Kabylie region. However the government enjoys the backing of the military.12
“There is a high risk of terrorism mainly from Islamic militants associated with 
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The potential destabilizing effect on the coun-
try has increased with concerns of weapons proliferation in the context of the Libyan civil 
war” – wrote AKE in its assessment.13 Some attacks by terrorist groups has led to rethinking 
of the country’s traditional non-interventionism, prompting a more proactive approach to 
combating terrorism in the region and increased security cooperation with its neighbours 
and the West. An important fact is that the Algerian security forces have demonstrated their 
capacity in carrying out successful military operations.14
Concerning the human rights situation, the Amnesty International (AI) Report 2016/17 
indicated that the main human rights problems are the “restriction of the right to freedom 
of expression, association, assembly and religion and prosecution of peaceful critics in-
cluding human right defenders in unfair trials. Impunity for past serious abuses continued 
to prevail”.15
The US State Department’s human rights report emphasised the lack of judicial inde-
pendence and impartiality.16
8 Ibid.
9 Global IntAKE (AKE), Algeria, Overview, 2017.
10 Ibid.
11 Freedom House (FH), Freedom in the World 2016, Algeria, 14 July 2016. 
12 Global IntAKE (AKE), Algeria, Politics and Economics, 2017.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Amnesty International (AI), Amnesty International Report 2016/17 – Algeria, 22 February 2017. 
16 United States Department of State (USDOS), 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Algeria, 
3 March 2017.
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Morocco
Morocco is a largely stable country, but there are several notable threats to its stability. 
Firstly, it remains a monarchy and the king retains significant powers in the political 
sphere. The country holds regular multiparty elections for Parliament and reforms. It also 
shifted formally some power from the monarchy to the elected legislature in 2011, but King 
 Mohammed VI maintains dominance both in a formal and informal way, and the concen-
tration of power with one individual is inherently unstable.17
There is a risk of political instability in the disputed territory of Western Sahara. 
The Moroccan Government controls all trade and economic activities in the region, it has 
angered the Polisario Front (dominant pro-independency militant group). The referendum 
on the determination of Western Sahara’s fate has been put off continuously over disputes 
concerning voter eligibility, as well as Morocco’s opposition to the referendum for the last 
ten years.18
Terrorism poses moderately low concern, although radical Islamist groups have 
demonstrated the ability to attack targets, particularly those affiliated with foreigners in 
recent years.19
Concerning the human rights situation, the Amnesty International (AI) Report 2016/17 
indicated that the authorities restrict rights to freedom of expression, association and as-
sembly, prosecuting journalists and forcibly dispersing protests.
Women face discrimination in law and practice. The LGBT group is subject of the 
widespread discrimination and harassment and consensual same-sex sexual relations remain 
still criminalized.20
Besides these continuing human rights problems, corruption has a significant role in 
disregard for the rule of law by security forces.21
Tunisia
“Since ousting of the long-time autocrat from power in 2011, Tunisia has transitioned to 
a functioning, if precarious democracy in which citizens enjoy unprecedented political 
rights and civil liberties” – stated FH in its annual report on Tunisia.22
Successful parliamentary and presidential elections held in 2014 marked the end of 
Tunisia’s transition period. There is a low risk of further political instability in response to 
political developments or major security incidents.23 There is a potential for further political 
disputes between Islamists and secular liberals and leftists over political and moral issues, 
17 Global IntAKE (AKE), Morocco, Overview, 2017.
18 Global IntAKE (AKE), Morocco, Politics and Economics, 2017.
19 Ibid.
20 Amnesty International (AI), Amnesty International Report 2016/17 – Morocco/Western Sahara, 22 February 
2017.
21 United States Department of State (USDOS), 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Morocco, 
3 March 2017.
22 Freedom House (FH), Freedom in the World 2016, Morocco, 29 June 2016.
23 Global IntAKE (AKE), Tunisia, Overview, 2017.
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although both sides have demonstrated the ability to reach a consensus on major political 
issues (e.g. finalising of the constitution and electoral law).24
The main political risk concern is civil unrest. The vast majority of demonstrations are 
non-violent, but there is a risk of sporadic clashes. Furthermore, terrorism is a concern and 
there is also an increasing tension on the porous border with Libya. However, the terrorist 
incidents remain infrequent and there have been no mass-casualty incidents in recent years.25
The most significant human rights problems are not only the restriction of the rights to 
freedom of expression and assembly, but also “using emergency powers and anti-terrorism 
laws to impose arbitrary restrictions on liberty and freedom of movement”.26 Furthermore, 
women remain subject to discrimination in law and practice. Same-sex sexual relations are 
still criminalised, and LGBT people face arrest and imprisonment.27
The ‘Safe Country of Origin’ Concept
At this stage of the study the safe country of origin concept should be mentioned which has 
been created a long-term debate at the migration agenda in the EU. The Geneva Convention 
and the asylum laws define the safe country of origin.
According to the Hungarian Asylum Act: “safe country of origin: the country included 
in the shared minimum list of third countries regarded as safe countries of origin approved 
by the Council of the European Union or in the national list stipulated by a Government 
Decree or part of these countries; the presence of the country of origin on any of such lists 
is a rebuttable presumption with regard to the applicant according to which no persecution 
is experienced in general and systematically in that country or in a part of that country, 
there is no threat of generalised violence in the context of international or national conflict 
situations, no torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is applied, 
and an efficient system of legal remedy is in place to address any injury of such rights or 
freedoms.”28
If an asylum seeker comes from such country, the asylum is normally not granted, 
although the individual assess and burden of proof is maintained in his/her application. The 
European Commission has been planning to prepare a common safe countries list; however, 
there is no general agreement on the content of this list among EU Member States.
The preparation of safe countries list is criticised by nongovernmental organisations 
and some opposition politicians in different EU countries, saying that this list could be used 
as an automatic tool during the refugee status determination process.
In the recent past years there were some initiatives to classify Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia as safe countries.
In Austria there is a governmental order of safe countries. Preparing this list the ex-
istence or absence of state persecution, protection from persecution by non-state actors and 
24 Global IntAKE (AKE), Tunisia, Politics and Economics, 2017.
25 Ibid.
26 Amnesty International (AI), Amnesty International Report 2016/17 – Tunisia, 22 February 2017. 
27 Ibid.
28 Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (2016) [Hungary], 1 January 2008.
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legal protection against human rights violations has been primarily taken into account.29 
As per the latest version of the safe countries list, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are on it.30
In Germany the Constitution defines as safe countries of origin the countries “in which, 
on the basis of their laws, enforcement practices and general political conditions, it can be 
safely concluded that neither political persecution nor inhuman or degrading punishment 
or treatment exists”.31 In April 2016 a draft law was introduced by the Government with 
the aim of putting Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia on the list of safe countries of origin. The 
draft was approved by the Bundestag, however on March 2017 the Second Chamber of 
 Parliament (Bundesrat) rejected the designation of these countries32 referring to the situation 
of the LGBT groups and other human rights violations.
The list of safe countries of origin of the Netherlands contains Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia, although some regional courts have ruled that Algeria and Morocco as safe coun-
tries of origin have not been well-founded by the Secretary of State.33
Summarizing the political and security country of origin information on Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia, these countries can be considered as safe countries of origin with 
the exception of LGBT groups. These countries are largely stable with sporadic violent 
incidents. They demonstrate the capability for fighting against terrorist groups and main-
taining public order. Progressive steps were taken towards the implementation of political, 
economic and judicial reforms. In addition, in the above discussed countries, the authorities 
have taken some measures to improve the human rights situation. Nevertheless, the LGBT 
groups are harassed by the oppressive regulatory environment and face discrimination and 
ostracism by the society.
Economic Push Factors
Political and economic factors have exerted a significant influence on shaping contempo-
rary migration patterns. Such structural political-economic forces have often been more 
important in determining migration than migration policy. “The only exception is labour 
recruitment, which has played an important role in establishing new migration patterns by 
linking specific origin countries and regions to particular destinations.”34
Economic reasons are the primary motivations for migration in this region by far. This 
phenomenon is broader than just the experience of living in poverty, but also includes a lack 
of high-skill job opportunities, unemployment, youth bulges, visible inequality and low 
wages in home countries. Limited access or complete lack of access to the labour market 
leads to lower financial status and ultimately poverty, affecting the existence and prospects 
of an individual at a very basic level. The economic situation of North African countries 
discussed in the study will be described as follows.
29 Asylum Information Database (AIDA), Country Report – Austria, 2018 update. 
30 Ibid.
31 Asylum Information Database (AIDA), Country Report – Germany, 2017 update.
32 Ibid.
33 Asylum Information Database (AIDA), Country Report – The Netherlands, 2016 update.
34 Bommes–Fassmann–Sievers (2014): op. cit. 49.
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Algeria
“The economy is confronted with the challenge of social discontent, slow structural trans-
formation, low decentralisation, low female labour force participation, and the management 
of the newly adopted non-conventional monetary policy.”35
In Algeria the energy sector accounts for around 30% of the country’s GDP directly 
and the country’s dependency on hydrocarbons is particularly worrying, since crude oil 
capacity has decreased and gas production has declined steadily over the last decade.36 The 
Government has begun to introduce subsidy reforms as part of reconsidering the economic 
climate in the light of low oil prices, although it continues publicly to deny the urgent need 
to have a sharp change in policy.
Moreover, many Algerians may be sceptical of the Government’s new five-year plan, 
having already experienced the side effects of economic reforms. When the current budget 
year began in January, new taxes on a variety of goods coincided with a 14% cut in gov-
ernment spending, sparking weeks of protests in urban centres throughout the country.37
In the assessment report of the World Bank “the unemployment rate increased by 
almost 2 percentage points, linked to sluggish non-hydrocarbon growth. It stood at 12.3% 
in the 6 months to April 2017 and remains particularly high among youth and women. The 
high level of unemployment among the young is partly explained by mismatches between 
labour market demand and supply, and to the inability of the economy to sufficiently create 
jobs and promote entrepreneurship. The rise in unemployment undermines impressive pov-
erty reduction. 10% of the population is considered vulnerable to fall back into poverty and 
important regional disparities persist with some regions double (Sahara) or triple (Steppe) 
the national rate.”38
Morocco
The AKE is assessing the economic risks in Morocco in its prognosis and states that 
 “Morocco is relatively stable, with solid if not spectacular growth, low inflation, a large 
reserve of foreign exchange, and moderate foreign debt. Although the country has performed 
well in economic terms over the past few years, it still faces structural problems, including 
a heavy reliance on agriculture. Despite increased government spending on salaries and the 
resulting increase in private sector spending a poor cereal harvest can have a major impact 
on growth. Agriculture makes up between 12 to 15% of GDP and with an estimated 55% 
drop in cereal output due to bad weather, growth has slowed and domestic consumption 
will be the main driver of growth in Morocco.”39
35 The World Bank, Algeria’s Economic Outlook – October 2017.
36 Global IntAKE (AKE), Algeria, Politics and Economics, 2017.
37 Algeria Goes It Alone. Stratfor, October 19, 2017.
38 The World Bank, Algeria’s Economic Outlook – October 2017.
39 Global IntAKE (AKE), Morocco, Politics and Economics, 2017.
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Morocco’s economy is dependent on international remittances, especially on European 
states. Therefore it is linked to growth in Europe. Tourism and exports are also at risk of 
falling in the European markets if the EU economic crisis worsens.40
The unemployment rate rose to 9.3% in the second quarter of 2017, especially prevalent 
among the young (23.5%) and educated (17%).41 On the other hand the average inflation 
remained low due to the decline in food prices. Although, delays in implementing key re-
forms including fiscal and structural reforms could increase social discontent and adversely 
impact the external sector.42
Tunisia
Despite the difficulties of the transition, Tunisia is performing better than any other country 
in this region after the regime change, after or during the Arab Spring. However, growth 
could be challenged if the Eurozone crisis worsens, or in case of renewed internal instability.
Tunisia’s economy is reasonably well diversified. Both tourism and agriculture con-
tribute in excess of 10% to the GDP; the export-orientated manufacturing sector contributes 
around 20% to the GDP and the service sector is growing.43 “Many of these sectors are in 
a good position to expand due to the country’s educated population, in addition to well-de-
veloped infrastructure in northern and coastal areas.”44 However, the tourism industry is 
struggling following a series of terrorist attacks.45
The country’s phosphate sector is a potential growth driver, but the operations of 
phosphate mines in the southern parts of Tunisia have been subject to disruption stemming 
from strikes and political unrest.46
Unemployment has declined from its peak of 19% in 2011 to 15.5% in 2016 despite 
a low labour force participation, at about 50%, mainly due to a very weak participation of 
women (26%).47 “Most of the unemployed are low-skilled workers, but university gradu-
ates have the highest unemployment rate, which increased from 15% in 2005 to 23% in 
2010 and 31.6% in 2016 (31.2% in 2017-Q2), while female graduate unemployment reached 
40.4%. Unemployment rates are also much higher in the hinterland compared to coastal 
regions” – stated the World Bank in its assessment report on Tunisia.48
40 Ibid.
41 The World Bank, Morocco’s Economic Outlook – October 2017.
42 Ibid.
43 Global IntAKE (AKE), Tunisia, Politics and Economics, 2017.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 The World Bank, Tunisia’s Economic Outlook – October 2017.
48 Ibid.
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Pull Factors of Migration Flow from North Africa
In this chapter the main relevant pull factors regarding North Africa are presented. It should 
be noted that in some cases the factors occur in mixed ways.
It is not difficult to understand why Western European countries have continued to 
attract migrants. This cannot be exclusively explained by chain migration, but persistent 
economic growth and changing structure of the labour market have generated a greater 
demand for low-and-high-skilled migrant labour in specific sectors.49
The principal factors determining the choice of destination country are mainly eco-
nomic in nature. The possibilities to find legal or illegal work are the main pull factors and 
depend on the profile of migrants.
Political stability in the European Union is also an important pull factor, however, 
the migration policy in Europe may discourage skilled migrants from moving to the EU.
The influence of the diaspora is a crucial element in the facilitation and promotion 
of migration. The diaspora often provides advice or financial support and shows a visible 
success story for prospective migrants.50
Furthermore, the diaspora, the supporting migrant network ties are also determinant 
of destination choice. Social networks and returnees provide knowledge about migration 
and often influence the decision to leave.
In some cases, migration is due to the allure of moving abroad for adventure, the op-
portunities for financial and material success, and the idea of living a different lifestyle. The 
aspirations of accessing employment opportunities are combined with a diffuse dream of 
prospects to be found in Europe. In this regard migration becomes an uncertain, but hopeful 
path to fulfilling own potentials.
An interesting question is, whether the pursuit of a better quality of life is rather a pull 
or push, or even an additional factor to migration. In my view, it is not a classical pull factor, 
it is rather an important element of the personal decision to migrate.
Finally, the impact of media and social technologies should be mentioned, as well. The 
television, internet and social media have led to an increasingly globalised outlook among 
young people in sending regions, together with an acute awareness of the inequalities be-
tween their own countries and the developed countries in Europe.51
Additional Factors to Migration
In addition to the classical push and pull factors, we should take into consideration other 
elements of migration having significant effect on moving. As I mentioned at the beginning 
of this study, the demographic factor cannot be seen as a push factor itself, although the 
crucial combination of highest population growth within an insufficient frame for economy 
and governmental action are important push elements.
49 Bommes–Fassmann–Sievers (2014): op. cit.
50 Browne (2015): op. cit.
51 Ibid.
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Neither emigration from North Africa nor immigration into Europe can be adequately 
explained by the demographic theory. For instance, high natural population growth in the 
Arab Gulf countries has not coincided with increased emigration.52
Nevertheless, a look at the demographic indicators is necessary. North Africa shows 
a significant population growth. The rate of natural increase is at 1.6%, the total fertility 
rate lies at 2.6 children per woman. Furthermore, North Africa has, in general, a very young 
age structure: 32% of the population is younger than 15 years old, 20% are between 15 and 
24 years old. Until 2050, the North African population will grow from 209 million (2010) 
to 322 million, until 2100 the region will count 344 million people.53
For some decades, Western policymakers considered North African states stabilised 
and reliable partners in the future. But quite early, sociologists and demographers diagnosed 
an impaired situation in these countries, where population growth and economic progress 
are not in tune.54
However, the absolute number of persons is not the major factor: the key factor is the 
distribution of the population in the available areas. While considering other factors and 
possibilities of the region, governments must create jobs and provide education/training 
compatible with demands of the labour market. These aspects greatly influence the scale 
and social consequences of the inordinate population growth.55
The crucial issue here is that the non-economic dimension also tends to increase the 
aspirations to migrate, as people would like to improve their lives. A feeling of inequality 
is often more influential, than the absolute need in the decision to migrate, which is why 
many migrants on the Western Mediterranean route were not the worst-off in their home 
countries.56
Some authors pointed out a phenomenon that is a bit controversial: an improvement of 
living conditions in the countries of origin can paradoxically rise the migration pressure, 
because the number of persons being willing and able to migrate increases in better times.57
For other migrants the tipping point comes, when they observe returnees who come 
back in a better situation or when friends who returned from abroad decide to migrate again 
and offer to take them along. Risk information does not seem to change the decision to 
migrate, as the perceived opportunity abroad continues to outweigh the risks and the most 
trusted information comes from social networks, not government sources.58
Another factor is the lowered price for reaching Europe. IOM explained that before 
the Syrian crisis the price that emigrants paid to smugglers to go to Europe was estimated 
approximately 3,500 to 4,000 EUR. At the time of the mass migrant flow in 2015, prices 
had drastically gone down to approximately 1,000 EUR.59
52 Bommes–Fassmann–Sievers (2014): op. cit.
53 Schmid, Susanne (s. a.): Migration Potential from North Africa to Europe.
54 Browne (2015): op. cit.
55 Bommes–Fassmann–Sievers (2014): op. cit.
56 Browne (2015): op. cit.
57 Ibid.
58 Browne (2015): op. cit.
59 Danish Immigration Service, (DIS), Morocco: Situation of Unaccompanied Minors, 2/2017.
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The brief analysis by BAMF also noted that “over time, the financial costs and duration 
of travel to Germany have fallen”.60 During the first six months of 2013 the refugees spent 
an average of € 7,229 to reach Germany, those who left their country of origin or transit 
countries in the first six months of 2015 spent around € 6,900. By the second half of 2015 
the average costs had been already reduced to € 5,232.61
Mobility and the culture of migration can play a role in perpetuating migration from 
North African countries and the pressure to support parents and relatives can distribute 
the decision to leave. The flow back of social remittances, consisting of ideas, behaviours, 
positive outlook on Europe are also likely to stimulate subsequent migration patterns along 
established pathways.62
Finally, the liberal migration laws and regular legalisation campaigns should be men-
tioned as additional factors, as well. The stricter entry requirements and border controls 
have also affected the choice of the destination country.
In my point of view, the present migration flow and patterns have complicated the well-
known push factors. It is really difficult to identify the main factor behind the individual 
cases. As I mentioned in the Preface many speculative elements make it difficult to prepare 
a reliable analysis on the present situation. Therefore, we have to devote more attention to 
the additional factors of migration.
Migration Profiles (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia)
Algeria
“There was no mass emigration from Algeria, neither labour-driven, despite constant un-
employment, nor forced, notwithstanding the tragic events in that country in the 1990’s in 
the last three decades.”63 In that period, French family-reunification caused some migration 
movement. A new wave of Algerian labour emigration has been observed since 2000 as 
a consequence of the gradual liberalisation of the Algerian economy. However, there still 
has been high unemployment, especially among the highly-skilled workforce.64
According to the MPC Migration profile in 2012, 961,850 Algerian migrants resided 
abroad, that is 2.6% of the population residing in Algeria.65 “The majority lived in France 
(75%) and Spain (6.4%) and in other countries (7.6%), particularly in Canada (3.5%).”66
In OECD countries Algerians are more likely to have a low level of education (51.9%) 
and an intermediate occupational profile (30.7% are employed as technicians or profes-
sionals, 24.4% as craft and related trade workers or as service and market sale workers and 
14.1% in elementary occupations).67
60 BAMF Brief Analysis 05/2016.
61 Ibid.
62 Bommes–Fassmann–Sievers (2014): op. cit.
63 European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre (MPC), Migration Profile: Algeria, 2013.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
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Most recent data on outward flows confirm an upsurge in Algerian emigration in the 
2000s. Growing numbers are found in Algerian flows directed to Spain, France and Canada. 
The phenomenon of harragas68 is on the rise, meaning that increasing numbers of Algerians 
are being exposed in the Mediterranean. They risk not only death, bit also risk the collapse 
of their health en route or jail and exploitation on arrival.69
Morocco
According to the statistical data from September 2014 only 0.2% of the total Moroccan 
population (33,848,242) were foreign immigrants. First generation, Morocco-born migrants 
residing abroad stood at 2.8 million and were in Europe as of 2011. Moroccans Residing 
Abroad (first generation, born-abroad second and third generations) are estimated between 
4 and 4.5 million.70 In comparison with other North African countries Morocco has the 
highest share of its population living abroad.
Emigration flows to Europe have been continuous. The first labour migration to 
 Western Europe was in the mid-1970s, and Moroccan workers went mainly to France. At 
that time Morocco pursued an active policy of labour export and control of expatriates. 
“From the 1980s to the late 2000s the profiles and destinations of Moroccan migration flows 
diversified.”71 Established Moroccan communities increased through family reunification. 
The accession of Spain to the European Union in 1986 and the development of labour-in-
tensive activities through the 1990s attracted large flows of low-skilled, often irregular 
Moroccans either to Spain or to Italy. Tertiary-educated students and highly-skilled workers 
have mainly migrated to the United States and Canada.72 This migration pattern is similar 
to the other North African countries.
In addition to this, Morocco has been an immigration country since the 1990s and 
even more, it has become a transit country for Sub-Saharan African migrants stranded at 
its border or territory of Morocco.
Morocco was put under pressure to control irregular migration to the EU; on the other 
hand it faced the need to facilitate mobility for its citizens, so Morocco signed the Mobility 
Partnership as the first Mediterranean country with the EU and nine Member States in June 
2013. The Partnership covers migration question such as: mobility facilitation of Moroccan 
nationals; support of Moroccan diaspora, cooperation in the field of human trafficking and 
asylum.73
As to the migration profile, more than half of Moroccan citizenship holders live in 
France (57%) and Spain. Beside these large communities in Europe, small communities 
of Moroccan expatriates are also formed in North America and in the Gulf States. Most 
Moroccan migrants are males (54%) and 46% belong to the working age group; still, there 
68 Harragas are North African migrants who attempt to illegally migrate to Europe or to European-controlled 
islands in makeshift boats. The word harraga derives from Algerian Arabic, designating those who burn.
69 European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre (MPC), Migration Profile: Algeria, 2013.
70 European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre (MPC), Migration Profile: Morocco, 2016.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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are some differences among destination countries. France hosts older age groups: 55% of 
the Morocco-born are 45 and above. “The second typical profile is found in Italy and Spain 
with male predominance and an above-average share in working age groups (50 and 52% 
in the age group of 25 to 44).”74 The third profile of Moroccan migrants can be found in 
Canada. Migrant gender distribution is more balanced and age group distribution suggests 
some degree of family reunion.75
As regards education levels, Moroccan migrants have mostly low education (59% of 
those aged 15 and above). Only 17% of them are highly educated.
An interesting fact is that Moroccans in Spain and Italy are less educated than non-mi-
grant Moroccans in the same age group. The vast majority, meanwhile, of the 58,000 
Moroccans in Canada are highly educated and unsurprisingly, they perform highly-skilled 
professions in general.76
Concerning flows, it can be stated that the propensity to migrate remains high in 
 Morocco: in 2011–2012, 42% of the population between 18 and 50 expressed the intention 
to migrate. Among young people aged 18 to 29 years, 69% desired to migrate.77
Tunisia
According to the statistical data from April 2014 only 0.5% of the total Tunisian population 
(10,982,754) were foreign immigrants. “First-generation, Tunisia-born migrants residing 
abroad stood at around 543,000, of whom 81% were to be found in Europe that year.”78 The 
first-generation migrants and born-abroad second and third generation Tunisians numbered 
about 1.2 million, therefore the country is primarily an emigration country.79
Tunisian migrants in Europe, mostly originating from the urban coastal region, rapidly 
integrated to local trade facilities and services. In addition, as oil exploitation was taking off 
in Libya, it emerged as a major destination for Tunisian migrant workers. In the mid-1980s 
85,000 Tunisians worked in Libya; they originated mostly from the border areas and from 
the poor, steppe regions in west-central Tunisia (Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, Kairouan). 
They were overwhelmingly employed in construction, infrastructure development and 
agriculture.80
In the 1980s Italy became a new outlet for Tunisian workers, due to its geographical 
proximity to Tunisia and to new opportunities in the country’s informal economy. From 
the time Europe restricted its visa regime and strengthened border controls in the 1990s, 
irregular entry and overstaying increased among Tunisian migrants in addition to permanent 
settlement. “Tunisian migration destinations further diversified towards the Gulf states, 
after bilateral agreements for technical cooperation were signed with Saudi Arabia, Qatar 
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre (MPC), Migration Profile: Morocco, 2016.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
51Factors of Migration from North Africa
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
and UAE.”81 Tunisians are mostly skilled and highly skilled (e.g. teachers, engineers). More 
recently, new flows of students and tertiary-educated, highly-skilled Tunisians found new 
outlets in Germany and North America.82
Tunisia’s migration policy under the presidency of Bourguiba and Ben Ali (ousted 
in January 2011) had two principles: encourage migration and monitor the migrants. The 
Tunisian governments rapidly acknowledged that the economy was unable to absorb all 
the available labour force and that remittances from abroad were an indispensable source 
of foreign currencies.83
In the 2000s the socio-economic and political tensions grew. The younger Tunisian 
generation have benefitted from the generalisation of higher education, but the employment 
venues drastically decreased, especially in the government sector, a traditional employer of 
university graduates. In addition to it the wage stagnation and predominantly low skilled, 
low value-added activities on offer were becoming less attractive for educated youth. In 
Tunisia in 2010, 23% of graduates were unemployed; as of 2012–13 ILO estimated that 
around 32% of Tunisia’s youth aged 15–29 were neither in employment nor in education 
or training.84
The 2008 financial crisis further reduced both job prospects at home and legal migra-
tion opportunities for youth in Europe.85 The start of the Arab uprising, in December 2010, 
spurred an immediate but moderate emigration from Tunisia through irregular channels. 
However, an accelerated repatriation agreement signed between Italy and Tunisia at the time 
curbed the Tunisian emigration to the European Union by 92% in 2012.86
As to the migration profile, most migrants are males; 77% are in working age groups 
(15 to 65 years and 32% in the 25 to 44 age category). However, these aggregated figures 
cover the Tunisian migrants’ diverse demographic and socio-economic profiles by the 
country of destination.87
Summarizing the migration profiles of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, it can be estab-
lished that they show similarity. Taking advantages of the geographic proximity, the low-
skilled migrants emigrate to South Europe and high-skilled persons mostly settle down in 
North America. The other common point is that the remittances create an important source 
of revenues.
Conclusion
In the North African region, migration is partly driven by fleeing from political conflicts 
and crises, and partly by the demand for labour and search for livelihoods, jobs, and bet-
ter opportunities. Furthermore, natural disasters and environmental degradation are the 
other factors of migration, while the high level of population growth and socio-economic 
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
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shortages might further increase the migration potential, as well. Moreover, the next new, 
educated and aspiring generation being frustrated by mass unemployment, dictatorial rules 
and corruption has also increased both emigration and the revolutionary potential of the 
Arab societies.
North African countries are a region from which international and domestic con-
flicts trigger migration and refugee movements currently and in the foreseeable future, as 
well. Therefore, the governments of the North African states must deal with the political, 
economic, social and cultural factors of migration. Persistent reforms and measures for 
the North African development need to be implemented in an efficient way, since only 
a developmental policy can open future opportunities for the youth and would be the only 
reasonable alternative to emigration. However, successful political and economic reforms 
will not lead immediately to the downturn of emigration.
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Integrated EU Migration Management in the Frontline –  
From the Asylum Perspective1
István Ördög
Triggering Operationalization
On 19 April 2015, a deadly accident in the Mediterranean2 made the headlines of all 
 European media: a fishing boat capsized during a rescue attempt, leaving 800 persons 
drowned. The testimonies of the 28 survivors shed light on the inhuman conditions of the 
perilous journey to Europe from the African coast. The public outcry demanded a high 
level EU institutional response, pushing the migration agenda to high level discussion in 
Brussels. The legal basis of a common action has already been there, since the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty: “In the event of one or more Member States being confronted with an 
emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the 
Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit 
of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.”3 
(Emphasis added).This has always been a sensitive subject, since controlling the external 
borders is one of the key sovereign areas of the state. While Member States have been ben-
efitting of the Schengen free travel zone, the ultimate responsibility of border control has 
always been kept under national competence. This, as it will be presented later, resulted in 
a deadlock situation where Member States under migratory pressure demanded solidarity 
and assistance while not willing to delegate the control of border management. Due to the 
already stretched and limited capacity of these frontline Member States, the absorption of 
external help became a challenge and the impact of the assistance was lowered significantly. 
All eyes were on Brussels to come up with an ambitious, but at the same time, realistic 
agenda to address the challenges.
1 Disclaimer: The views set out in this study are those of the author and do not reflect the opinion of EASO. 
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the statements presented below.
2 James Reynolds, BBC homepage, 21 April 2015. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32399433
3 The Lisbon Treaty.
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European Agenda on Migration4
Less than a month after the deadly incident at the Mediterranean Sea, on 13 May 2015 
the European Commission presented a communication. The main focus was on the rein-
forcement of existing rescue operations in order to save lives, stepping up against criminal 
smuggling networks, relocation, resettlement, third country cooperation and new EU tools 
(hotspots, emergency funding). “First, the Commission will set up a new ‘Hotspot’ ap-
proach, where the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol will work on the 
ground with frontline Member States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming 
migrants. The work of the agencies will be complementary to one another. Those claiming 
asylum will be immediately channelled into an asylum procedure where EASO support 
teams will help to process asylum cases as quickly as possible.”5 (Emphasis added). The 
document foresaw EU solidarity (deployments, technical assistance) channelled through 
the relevant EU agencies to the frontline states. The impact therefore depended on various 
factors: the amount of assistance offered (through a voluntary (!) contribution system) by 
Member States not affected directly by the crisis, the capacity of EU agencies to manage the 
submitted resources and the absorption capacity of the frontline states themselves. Should 
one of the links of the chain be compromised, the whole operation would be in jeopardy.
Hotspots
On 29 September 2015, the European Commission presented a description of the hotspot 
approach.6 “A ‘hotspot’ is an area at the external border that is confronted with dispropor-
tionate migratory pressure. Examples are Sicily and Lampedusa in Italy or Lesbos and 
Kos in Greece. It is in these ‘hotspots’ where most migrants enter the Union. It is here 
where the EU needs to provide operational support to ensure that arriving migrants are 
registered, and to avoid that they move on to other Member States in an uncontrolled way. 
It is through the EU Agencies Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office and Europol 
that the Union provides operational support to Member States, under the full control of the 
host Member State. The approach is an operational concept to maximise the added value of 
this support through Migration Management Support Teams (…) The Support Team does 
not operate reception centres (…) the host Member State has to provide well-functioning 
(…) first reception and pre-removal centres. The existence of sufficient reception facilities 
is also a necessary precondition for relocation, and the EU provides substantial financial 
support to Member States to build this infrastructure.”7 (Emphasis added.) Special attention 
should be given to the section, where the EU support is connected to a prerequisite that the 
persons’ movement is under control. This in practice could ultimately result in detention, 
since the frontline Member States are usually reluctant towards the arriving migrants. In 
4 The European Agenda on Migration, European Commission website. 
5 Idem. 6.
6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: 
Managing the refugee crisis: immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the European 
Agenda on Migration.
7 Idem. 3.
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an ideal world, it would have meant that the persons are swiftly identified and channelled 
into a procedure, which results either in relocation or return. However, the overall respon-
sibility for accommodation and control of movement lies with the host Member State and 
there was nothing concrete on where the applicants should stay during the assessment 
period. This would later be criticised by various institutions and stakeholders. There was 
also an important element, which made a distinction and clarified the relation between 
relocation and hotspots, frequently erroneously presented in the media: “The approach 
will also facilitate the implementation of the Decisions to relocate persons in clear need of 
international protection from Italy and Greece. The identification, registration and finger-
printing of migrants upon arrival is a precondition for relocation to work, and the approach 
provides the necessary support for this. However, the approach functions independently 
from relocation, and the Commission is ready to apply it in additional Member States that 
face disproportionate migratory pressure at its borders.”8 (Emphasis added.) This means 
there can be further hotspots established in other countries without relocation connected 
to them. This makes sense, when the migratory pressure consists of persons coming from 
countries of origin, which are normally not in need of international protection, therefore 
there is a need for identification and registration only.
Relocation
In 2008, the EU adopted a mechanism to enable a joint EU response in cases where a Mem-
ber State’s particular geographic or demographic situation comes under migratory pressure 
resulting in disproportionate pressure. In these cases, the mechanism would allow for 
the physical transfer of beneficiaries of international protection to another Member State 
via a process known as intra-EU relocation.9 Under the European Refugee Fund (ERF) 
Community Actions, in 2010–2011 an EU Pilot Project on Intra-EU Relocation from 
Malta (EUREMA) was implemented which resulted in the transfer of 227 persons from 
Malta to six EU Member States. On the verge of the migration crisis in 2015, the European 
Agenda on Migration announced the triggering of this mechanism to tackle the migration 
crisis and show solidarity towards frontline Member States. The pilot was to be expanded 
from 227 to 160,000 persons.
There were already some bitter lessons learned during the implementation of the pilot 
and it’s follow-up (EUREMA II.), which were clearly not taken into consideration. Namely, 
the persons eligible for relocation refused to be transferred to Eastern European states and 
showed clear preference towards Western European countries. In September 2015, two 
decisions were adopted by the European Council: Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 and 
(EU) 2015/1523. The decisions constitute the legal and financial framework of the emer-
gency temporary relocation mechanism: scope, number of persons to be relocated (40,000 
+ 120,000), prioritization of vulnerable persons especially unaccompanied minors (UAMs), 
eligibility: 75% recognition rate based on quarterly EUROSTAT data, 6,000 EUR lump sum 
for the Member State of relocation and 500 EUR for the host Member State, for the travel 
8 Idem. 3.
9 European Resettlement Network.
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costs. There are particular elements, which later on became the bottlenecks of the implemen-
tation, namely: “(32) National security and public order should be taken into consideration 
throughout the relocation procedure, until the transfer of the applicant is implemented. In 
full respect of the fundamental rights of the applicant, including the relevant rules on data 
protection, where a Member State has reasonable grounds for regarding an applicant as 
a danger to its national security or public order, it should inform the other Member States 
thereof.” The idea was that national security and public order clearance will be the only 
exceptional ground for rejecting a submitted relocation case. In reality, the reports on the 
implementation of relocation presented by the European Commission would paint a different 
picture, as we will soon see. “(34) The integration of applicants in clear need of international 
protection into the host society is the cornerstone of a properly functioning Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System (…) specific account should be given to the specific qualifications 
and characteristics of the applicants concerned, such as their language skills and other 
individual indications based on demonstrated family, cultural or social ties which could 
facilitate their integration into the Member State of relocation (…) consideration should be 
given to the capacity of the Member State of relocation to provide adequate support to those 
applicants and to the necessity of ensuring a fair distribution of those applicants among 
Member States. With due respect for the principle of non-discrimination, Member States 
of relocation may indicate their preferences for applicants based on the above information 
on the basis of which Italy and Greece, in consultation with EASO and, where applicable, 
liaison officers, may compile lists of possible applicants identified for relocation to that 
Member State.”10 This provision has opened up Pandora’s box, Member States came up 
with unrealistic and sometimes discriminative expectations (Christian religion, university 
diploma etc.). “(10) The relocation procedure provided for in this Article shall be completed 
as swiftly as possible and not later than 2 months (…).”11 (Emphasis added.) From the very 
beginning, there were significant delays in the implementation of the relocation decisions. 
First on the side of the host Member States (Italy and Greece), since it took a long time to 
build up a pool of prepared cases for submission for relocation. Later the delay was due 
to the low number of pledges from the relocation states. The logistics (organising transfer 
flights) also became a serious bottleneck. Here are two quotes from the Thirteenth report 
on relocation and resettlement12 dated on 13 June 2017, almost 2 years after the relocation 
started and just 3 months before it’s expiry (sic!): “Despite repeated recommendations 
in previous reports and several bilateral exchanges on various levels, Slovakia continues 
with its policy of strict preferences leading to disproportionately high rejection rates. 
Such a policy is not in conformity with the Council Decisions on relocation, which allow 
rejections on grounds related to national security or public order. It is imperative that this 
is now changed. All Member States should avoid excluding vulnerable applicants from 
their preferences since they are to be relocated as a priority. It is also vital that Member 
States create the capacity to accommodate particularly vulnerable applicants. All Member 
States should be ready to welcome all types of asylum seekers (large families, single male 
applicants) and their fair share of vulnerable applicants, including unaccompanied minors 
10 Ibid. 84.
11 Ibid. 84.
12 European Commission: Thirteenth report on relocation and resettlement.
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and persons with significant health problems. Estonia and Ireland have not relocated from 
Italy yet because of Italy’s strict policy regarding additional security interviews by Member 
States of relocation, while Bulgaria and Slovakia have not relocated from Italy, given their 
very strict preference policies (…) In order to ensure relocation of all the eligible applicants 
in the coming months, a solution on organising additional security interviews by Member 
States of relocation should be found.”13 (Emphasis added.) The report provides a glimpse 
into the operational reality of relocation: 20 months after the start there are still a lot of 
open questions, lack of commitment from Member States and different approaches towards 
security interviews by Italy and Greece.
“Mene, mene, tekel, ufarsin”14 – The Assessment of the Hotspot 
Concept
European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)15
One year ago, in December 2016, ECRE published a study on the implementation of the 
hotspot approach in Italy and Greece. The overall assessment of the situation is more or 
less objective, the challenges enlisted are based on facts and field visits (lack of information 
for migrants, need for more interpreters), however, the conclusions fail to provide a full 
diagnose down to the level of stakeholders. The study remains only an echo of complaints 
and reservations that NGOs have been repeating for years. One example is questioning the 
use of coercive measures to take fingerprints, which has been and still is the only effective 
tool against asylum shopping.16 Another example is ECRE’s condemning of the earlier 
screening of asylum applicants in comparison to other migrants. Similarly, making an initial 
assessment based on nationality, is considered by ECRE as a discriminatory method. In fact, 
filtering the cases is the most basic tool of prioritization of certain categories (e.g. vulnerable 
Syrians), which in the operational reality of a mass influx ensures fast access to the asylum 
procedure. Taking each case in order of arrival would result in a violation of the rights of 
persons with special needs. It is true, that case-filtering and prioritization means that the 
cases of certain categories are postponed, however, this does not mean denial of access for 
asylum. Similarly to a hospital emergency room, certain cases need to be fast tracked. When 
in certain days 5–10,000 persons have arrived to one hotspot, the idealistic approach of 
individual case assessment and immediate access for all, remains a floating idea, detached 
from reality. Specially, that none of the recommendations of the study provides an alternative 
solution (unless the alternative is to deploy thousands of case-workers in each hotspot…). 
“The hotspots, as implemented today, are a pilot model of a more permanent registration 
and identification mechanism at the points of arrival that selects between those seeking 
asylum and those to be returned. Yet, the hotspots currently apply certain practices and 
13 Ibid. 4.
14 “You have been weighed on the scales and found deficient.”
15 European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE): The implementation of the hotspots in Italy and Greece.
16 The phenomenon where an asylum seeker applies for asylum in more than one EU State or chooses one EU 
State in preference to others on the basis of a perceived higher standard of reception conditions or social 
security assistance.
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standards that are either inadequate or contrary to the EU asylum and immigration acquis. 
As this is a hybrid EU-Member States tool, responsibility for human rights protection and 
safeguards relates to both levels. The hotspots have certainly not helped in relieving the 
pressure from Italy and Greece as was their stated objective: instead, they have led to an 
increase in the number of asylum applicants waiting in Italy and Greece, consolidating the 
challenges and shortcomings already inherent in the Dublin system. The hotspots approach 
has also led to more repressive measures, often disrespecting fundamental rights, which 
are applied by national authorities as a result of EU pressure to control the arrivals; yet 
despite EU pressure, it is the Member States that are held ultimately responsible for this 
implementation. The implementation of the EU-Turkey deal is a prime example of this EU 
pressure shifting responsibilities to the national level.”17 (Emphasis added.) It is not clear 
yet if the hotspot approach will indeed evolve into a permanent mechanism. In general, 
the feedback is positive from the perspective of the national authorities of Member States, 
since the number of unregistered persons involved in secondary movements has been sig-
nificantly decreased. However, the fact that during relocation Member States keep insisting 
on conducting national security interviews with people already screened by frontline Mem-
ber States shows that the trust is limited at best. This is a dimension, which could reshape 
the whole approach. The positive impact of the ECRE study is that it recommends certain 
improvements of the hotspot concept, which are reinforced in other reports of different 
stakeholders: monitoring, guardianship, adequate reception facilities. Unfortunately, the 
recommendations do not tackle the real challenges, and they do not provide a better concept 
or viable alternative solutions.
European Parliament
In May 2016, the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament published a study On the 
frontline: the hotspot approach to managing migration18 which concluded with several 
recommendations, including on future legislative actions. “The main overall challenge 
was stated to lie in the uneven implementation rate among participating countries, with 
some countries pledging regularly and in proportion to their allocation, while others pledge 
irregularly or not at all. This resulted in a slower than desired rate of implementation of the 
mechanism. While relocation of vulnerable applicants is a priority clearly indicated in the 
relocation decisions, there were several difficulties impeding the process, related to selective 
pledges made by some countries who declared no availability for vulnerable applicants, 
such as married minors, the need to put in place solutions regarding guardianship arrange-
ments, and the assessment of the best interest of the child in the case of unaccompanied 
minors. Other challenges included incorrect use of preferences by Member States (asking 
for relocation candidates only from certain nationalities or profiles or otherwise refusing 
certain candidates in an unfounded way), lengthy response time to relocation requests, and 
unjustified rejections of candidates for arbitrary reasons. In Italy, challenges were noted 
regarding facilitating additional security checks.” (Emphasis added.) The above statements 
17 Ibid. 4.
18 European Parliament: On the frontline: the hotspot approach to managing migration.
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describe merely the symptoms and not the root causes for the painfully slow implemen-
tation of relocation. There has been a vocal resistance towards the relocation initiative by 
the Visegrád Four from the very beginning. This lead to the challenging of the European 
Council decisions before the European Court of Justice by Hungary and Slovakia. Mean-
while, Greece and Italy were not able to process a sufficient number of cases to fulfil the 
open pledges, Austria and Sweden asked for temporary suspension of their obligations due 
to the high number of cases in their asylum systems, and Germany was struggling with 
a backlog of a hundred-thousand of cases. The difficulties connected to the lack of recep-
tion and legal representation capacities with regard to unaccompanied minors had already 
existed both in Greece and Italy. The incapability of both countries to prioritize the cases 
only pushed the gaps into the spotlight. “By providing a binary choice between protection 
or return, the hotspot approach over-simplifies the complexities involved in status determi-
nation, disregarding basic guarantees, and with the potential to hamper access to asylum. 
The coexistence of the relocation scheme with Dublin transfers is internally inconsistent 
and structurally flawed. It leads to perverse outcomes, with incoming Dublin transfers 
outnumbering relocation figures, wasting resources and compounding strain on benefi-
ciary Member States.”19 (Emphasis added.) Indeed, the relocation decisions were another 
desperate attempt to mechanically intervene and set up a kind of an artificial balance in an 
already chaotic setting. Without overwriting the Dublin procedure’s logic, already bleed-
ing from multiple wounds, they simply forced another formula, which was far away from 
reality. In a set up where there is de facto free movement of persons (Schengen zone) the 
expectation that newly arriving migrants will patiently wait for their status determination 
at overcrowded facilities, sometimes spending 6 to 9 months without interviews while their 
family members had already reached their destination (Germany and Sweden in most cases) 
was unfoundedly optimistic. Another twist came up with the temporary re-establishment 
of the intra-Schengen border controls which further worsened the situation20 at the Brenner 
pass where the Austrian border police started returning migrants to Italy, sometimes the 
same person multiple times, on the same day. The relocation decisions did not tackle the 
issue that Italy and Greece as large Member States how many refugees should accept in 
their national system, outside of relocation? In 2017 the main countries of origin of arrivals 
to Italy (Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast) consisted of nationals, not eligible for 
relocation. “A centralised organisation of the overall Dublin regime, including through the 
collection of applications at Union level and a central distribution of responsibility by EASO 
(or its successor Asylum Agency) would contribute to the rationalisation of the system, 
reducing bureaucratisation, duplication of efforts, and waste of procedural and material 
resources. Pre-Dublin admissibility and security checks could them be eliminated, with 
direct allocations of responsibility according to predetermined distribution rates. This 
would concretise relocation as an ex ante element of responsibility allocation, rather than as 
an ex post, emergency-driven, corrective tool as currently designed, diminishing the odds 
of a crisis developing and addressing the structural unfairness inbuilt in the ‘first-country-
of-entry-rule’ system – whereby responsibility attaches to geographical proximity to the 
19 Ibid. 60.
20 Europe migrants: Austria builds Brenner border centre despite criticism. BBC, 12 April 2016. Available: www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-36022914 (Accessed: 20.12.2017)
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external borders of the EU – in far better alignment with Article 80 TFEU.”21 (Emphasis 
added.) The above statements portray relocation as an overly-bureaucratic, resource-wasting 
procedure. In November 2017, the Commission presented a staff working document22 on Best 
practices on the implementation of the hotspot approach. None of the recommendations 
were new, no structural change in the concept was foreseen. This would not only mean 
a major investment into building detention capacity, but would also entail the observation 
of a number of procedural aspects. Most importantly, the host Member State would need 
to fulfil its obligations under the EU acquis on restriction of movement of asylum seekers 
(until their claim is rejected by a final instance) while at the same time complying with 
the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights. This would mean a massive 
burden on administrative and judicial bodies.
The Vivisection of Relocation
The relocation workflow shows a clear and simple logic, but unfortunately it was poorly 
implemented. Or maybe, the reason of failure was imbedded in the solution itself? Could 
it be that the proposed solution was too simple for a complex situation? As stated in the 
introduction of this study, there was a presumption that all stakeholders would diligently 
perform their tasks and cooperate in goodwill. To summarize, the overall expectations were:
• Host Member States (Italy and Greece) were expected to open and equip hotspots 
on a timely manner; have clear Standard Operating Procedures; be able to absorb 
deployed experts of FRONTEX and EASO; prioritize UAMs. Reading the reports 
of the European Commission, none of the conditions were fulfilled, even after years 
of implementation.
• Relocation Member States were expected to deploy sufficient number of experts 
to the EU Agencies; continuously pledge for relocation places; pledge for vulne-
rable places including UAMs; act in goodwill (not having unrealistic expectations/
not rejecting persons for reasons other than national security). Relocation became 
a highly politicised subject. Member States, who have not been affected by migration 
related challenges since years, suddenly found themselves in the frontline due to 
an obligation to relocate applicants for international protection. For Member State 
governments (in many cases based on coalitions of political parties with different 
agendas) there was an immanent risk of losing popularity due to rising xenophobia 
fuelled by terrorist attacks in Europe. This had a significant impact on the general 
attitude towards the implementation of relocation and led to over-securitization of 
the process. The migrants were expected to wait for their processes to be concluded, 
to avoid illegal secondary movement. The relocation concept was based on a rather 
idealistic then realistic scenario, following the same virtual reality, like the Dublin 
concept. In a post M.S.S. vs Belgium era we already know that a chain is as strong, 
as its weakest link. It might be an interesting, albeit purely academic experiment 
to build a hypothesis on what would be the critical number of persons under which 
21 European Parliament: On the frontline: the hotspot approach to managing migration.
22 European Commission: Best practices on the implementation of the hotspot approach. 15 November 2017. 
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the system would still function properly. However, managing thousands of arrivals 
per day, would clearly be out of the question. The main problem with the relocation 
concept was that it was a bad compromise: neither soft, nor hard enough. Since iden-
tification and registration was a pre-requisite of the transfers under relocation, this 
already constituted an obligation of a personal interview. Additional questions on 
family ties in the EU, reasons of flight, vulnerability and integration skills turned 
it into a quasi in-merit interview, with all of its time consuming elements. At the 
same time, it did not result in a full refugee status determination: upon arrival to 
the Member State of relocation, the asylum procedure started anew. Duplication 
and a waste of time and resources, as the EP rightfully puts it. Either of the two 
alternative solutions would have been better:
1. A fully fledged asylum interview performed by experts of the Member State of relocation 
(analogic to resettlement selection missions in third countries). It is time consuming, but 
reduces security concerns and also ensures adequate case processing capacity.
2. A very basic registration, perhaps limited to country of origin credibility tests and im-
mediate transfer to Member State of relocation. This would have ensured a fast response 
and would have avoided hold-ups at the preparation for submission of cases.
The way suggested above by the EP LIBE Committee (permanent relocation mech-
anism) would not solve the real issues. Even if a political consensus is reached on a per-
manent allocation mechanism (which does not seem to have had any progress in the last 
2 years), the new concept is still based on a presumption that the persons arriving, would 
not take the first chance at secondary movement. There are various ways of controlling the 
movement of persons:
A. Re-introducing border control. One of the greatest achievements of the EU project is the 
free movement area and completely giving this up would be a political suicide. Even having 
a full traceability of the movement of persons enjoying international protection would not 
change the picture. In the area of free-movement once you are in, you are in. Unless full 
border control is re-established (which does not seem to be working well in Calais), and 
physical borders are built up, there would be no way of controlling people’s movement. Even 
doing so, what would be the sanction for a refugee who tries to change his or her residence 
without permission? If he/she is transported back, they can easily take the next bus/train/
car etc. Attempts at unauthorised secondary movement do not affect the legal status of the 
persons; he or she will not be deported to the country of origin. Finally, the financial impli-
cations of reintroducing systematic border controls go without saying.
B. Establishing reporting obligations (e.g. once a week at a police station). Reporting obli-
gations would be a stigmatizing and counterproductive practice in the integration process. 
And again: the lack of consequences – no Member State authority would issue an arrest 
warrant for a Syrian unaccompanied minor who has failed to report. The administrative 
burden on police forces to follow all reporting and alert all Member States for a fugitive 
are disproportionate.
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C. Sanctions (economic and administrative). Sanctions of an administrative or economical 
nature can only be effective to the extent that they impose a clear disadvantage on the refu-
gee, which would effectively trigger him or her to seek ways to avoid them. At present, the 
sanctions are limited to granting access to social benefits in one single Member State (of 
relocation) and denying them in all others (see European Council decisions on relocation). 
If beneficiaries of international protection are placed against their will in a Member State 
where economic opportunities are lower than in their preferred Member State of destination, 
where they have no family ties or friends, nor a migrant community, where a language bar-
rier exists, these sanctions will eventually fail. The carrot-stick approach would not bring 
any results. The intra-EU mobility driving force, which brings EU citizens to seek better 
economical options in other Member States is even stronger with people who have no roots 
in any of the EU Member States. Family and language will always overwrite an administra-
tive decision for people coming from failed states and – on many occasions – persecution of 
state authorities. Their mentality will not change overnight, trust towards state institutions 
will build slowly. To deter them from unauthorised secondary movement, there would need 
to be no access to the state benefits and the labour market outside the country of relocation, 
including to the illegal labour market. This would mean state control increased to a level 
beyond the capacity of authorities in all Member States. The same applies for all social 
services: children not having access to school, no access to medical care etc. Even if this 
would be implemented with utmost strictness, its effect is questionable. People would still 
follow their preferences and struggle in the limbo. We would build up a marginalized group 
of people who would rather be homeless in their chosen country and create a perfect cradle 
for first and second generation extremism in the heart of Europe. There are many ways to 
influence the movement of persons. Most of the above discussed require a disproportionate 
financial and administrative investment which is the opposite of the desired cost-effective 
approach, and in the long run would not provide for a rational solution.
D. Granting free movement within time (e.g. residence in their country of destination in 
3 years). The idea of establishing a certain deadline for settling down and attending inte-
gration courses in the Member State of relocation, after which secondary movement is legal 
and the acquired benefits are kept and transformed in a new country of residence, can be 
an idea to explore on the long run. However, without proper sanctions, which can actually 
deter irregular movement incentives, this would still not be a game changer. The short term 
benefits of leaving the relocation country must be very low. Experience shows that many 
people would even take the risk of homelessness to reach their destination, therefore much 
bigger effort is needed for objective information provision to this target group. Solution is to 
be found in those cases where beneficiaries would eventually return to the Member State of 
relocation after seeing that there is no Canaan waiting for them in their countries of desire.
E. Financial incentives. Financial incentives are to be considered an effective tool if certain 
conditions are met. If the persons granted international protection are forced to leave the 
accommodation centres without enough financial means to manage their own accommo-
dation and sustain their living, there will be no successful integration and it will only lead 
to secondary movement. But how to determine the necessary financial means? How can 
it be ensured that the state subsidy will not actually keep people back from finding a job? 
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This balance is very difficult to achieve. There are significant differences already in the 
economic opportunities within certain regions of a Member State, and on an even higher 
scale, among the Member States themselves. The financial driven intra-EU migration 
flow does not only affect the EU citizens. If one can buy a bus ticket for EUR 50 and cross 
a few borders in order to gain a salary 5 times higher, many would take the opportunity. 
This is rational enough. And as it has been already mentioned above, for beneficiaries of 
international protection who have zero ties with the country of relocation (neither family 
ties, nor language, nor cultural ties), there is no anchor to keep them from moving on. The 
possibility of ending up in limbo, the risk of homelessness and extremely low quality of 
life is relative for someone running from war and persecution, and in some cases already 
vegetating for years in refugee camps. This needs to be balanced with a positive element: 
providing a realistic, sustainable opportunity to start a new life. In the Member States 
where there is no significant migrant community, this task is even harder. Trust is much 
easier gained if one has a mentor of the same cultural background who already made it, 
and became an example of successful integration. The best chance for a pilot project is to 
have a critical number of people of the same origin (e.g. Eritreans tend to move together 
in the perilous journey through Libya and they keep a strong cohesion even upon arrival 
to Europe), settled within a close geographical space to ensure stability and networking, 
while keeping enough proximity to ensure that interaction with the local population is 
speeding up the integration. Similarly to the experience with humanitarian aid projects, 
careful assessment should be given to the fact, that positive discrimination and financial 
aid channelled only to beneficiaries of international protection is usually fuelling tension 
in the local community. Therefore, priority should be given to mixed enterprises, small 
businesses which improve the economical situation of all local residents including citizens 
of the Member State of relocation. Naturally, since these projects would target economically 
less competitive regions, they would be very resource- demanding. The debate on how to 
tackle migration, which has been dividing European States seems to be solely focused on 
how to stop and manage migration outside, or at the border. However, there seems to be 
an agreement on the necessity to integrate the beneficiaries of international protection. 
Should the political debate shift from the current deadlock, this might create the necessary 
momentum to launch these pilot projects in those countries, where at the moment discus-
sion is limited to apocalyptic visions of Europe running into suicide. We should not forget 
the positive examples of integration. Since the people who have protection status will stay 
with us, we have no other option but to include them into our communities and make sure 
that their potential is fully utilized. This is in their best interest, and also in ours, since the 
alternative is the creation of parallel societies. However, this also means that the political 
short-sightedness needs to be overcome and the scenario to maintain a hostile anti-refugee 
environment at home in order to make people leave and then watch from the side-lines how 
other Member States struggle with integration challenges needs to end. The public, and 
therefore governments will only be ready to embrace these ideas, once they feel involved in 
the process and once assurances are given that the number of arrivals will be manageable, 
and not a distant ivory tower forcing quotas without upper limitations. Success stories with 
small numbers are desperately needed first to regain public trust in the capabilities of the 
European melting pot (in a good sense), without the sword of Damocles (repetition of the 
influx in 2015) hanging in the air.
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Conclusions
Hotspots and relocation were an immediate answer to a pressing issue, the migration crisis. 
The European institutions were under pressure to relieve the burden on frontline states and 
channel financial and administrative assistance. Two years in the migratory crisis, Europe 
is more divided than ever in the last decade. The position of Member States on solidarity 
seems to be detached from the migration management. The communication on the Delivery 
of the European Agenda on Migration23 presented by the European Commission in Septem-
ber 2017, does not foresee major revision of neither the hotspot approach, nor the relocation 
concept. There are ongoing initiatives on revising the mandate of the European Border and 
Coast Guard and the European Asylum Support Office; however, the host Member States 
will remain in control, ultimately they would still be the ones running the show. Time will 
tell if the contributions of Member States will reach to a level where enough experts would 
be available for deployments, or it will remain a painful exercise to maintain presence in 
sufficient numbers at all operation locations. One of the positive effects of the crisis was 
that it speeded up the evolution of joint operations in the field of asylum. Joint processing 
of asylum cases, which was a highly debated subject and seemed like a futuristic approach 
in 2014, nowadays has become a standard practice. This helps streamlining procedures 
and harmonising the approach of Member States at the operational, non-academic level. It 
has also an impact of building trust within the community of case-workers, and this effect 
cannot be praised enough. With the EU Turkey Statement and the cooperation with the 
Libyan Coastguards, the European Union bought some time to figure out how to handle 
the next – inevitable – influx of migrants to its external borders. In the current legislative 
environment, Europe has limited room for manoeuvre. Should someone arrive to the EU 
external border asking for international protection, access to procedure has to be given. 
While the procedure is pending, the person will be accommodated at the hotspots, inside 
the country, in a transit zone at the border, at a detention or an open centre. At the end, if 
a protection need is established, the person must receive access to the territory and there is 
no upper limit above which access would be denied. This is the ultimate challenge since no 
matter how high scale of an investment is made into the border guard staff and the asylum 
processing capacity, there are millions of people who are eligible for protection and will 
eventually knock on the doors of Europe. It seems that Europe has trouble dealing with 
even a relatively small number of persons to be integrated, while still facing the risk of 
a new influx and crisis. No deals with third countries can solve this on the long run. The 
European model on international protection is generous and the standards are very high. 
This however can only work in an environment where European citizens feel safe and in 
control. Otherwise, it will fall victim of far-right populism and we would step back a hun-
dred years in time. The hotspot concept should not be judged solely on the results: one can 
only take out from it as much as has been invested. Each hotspot must have the necessary 
basic working conditions, gear and staff. Even then, there is always a breaking point: none 
of the hotspots are designed/capable to manage the constant arrival of persons on a scale of 
thousands per day. In addition, hotspots cannot be opened and made operational in days. 
23 European Commission: Communication on the Delivery of the European Agenda on Migration. 27 September 
2017.
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The logistics in moving people between hotspots is a major task, and needs a permanent 
crisis activated response team at EU level as well as regular drills. The complexity of the 
asylum procedure and the time-constraints of exhausting appeals can easily delay the pro-
cedures beyond a year. Potential capacity of a hundred-thousand spaces and management is 
not on the horizon. The hotspots are definitely no magic solution. The relocation initiative 
follows the worst traditions of the Dublin procedure, in that it seems detached from reality: 
trying to manage persons against their will in an open space of free movement. Refugees 
arriving to Country A, with a clear preference towards Country B, artificially transferred to 
Country C. Nothing stops them to move to Country B. As a consequence, resources of the 
states are spent on transfers (sometimes back and forth), resources of the refugees are spent 
on travelling, instead of on integration, the end result being that they become marginalized 
and a burden on society. There must be a better way of expressing solidarity to frontline 
Member States… Otherwise relocation remains as it is: a pointless, frustrating logistical 
nightmare that should be called Operation Sisyphus.
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How to Interpret the European Migration Crisis Response 
with the Help of Science
Ágnes Töttős
Introduction
“The EU needs an asylum system which is both effective and protective, based on common 
rules, solidarity and a fair sharing of responsibilities. The proposed reforms will make sure 
that persons in genuine need of international protection get it quickly, but also that those 
who do not have the right to receive protection in the EU can be returned swiftly.”24 In line 
with this purpose, several short and long-term responses have been given or proposed so 
far as regards the EU’s migration crisis.
Such recent developments regarding the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
provide an excellent opportunity to examine the legislative and policy-making procedures 
whether they could be authentically explained by scientific theories on the characteristics 
of European governance. It is also worth to examine whether we can predict the preferences 
of which Member States will dominate when concluding the reforms and whose interests 
will dictate the content of the future legal acts. Even more, it is interesting to see, whether 
after the unsuccessful lobbying of the Central European Member States when immediate 
responses were adopted at EU level, there is a larger potential to make a greater impact on 
the future of the CEAS.
In order to find the answer to such questions, the EU’s short and long-term  responses 
as well as two broad theoretical frameworks, namely intergovernmentalism and the 
 supranational approach will be described, which will be followed by the examination of 
the EU’s responses to the migration crisis from a legislative perspective, and secondly from 
a policy-making perspective. The study will finally discuss the importance of regional 
cooperation, including the Visegrád Group. In its conclusions, the study aims to shed light 
on the future prospects of negotiations on the asylum reforms.
24 Speech by First Vice-President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans. Available: http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2433_en.htm (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
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European Migration Crisis Response
Programme setting
In its conclusions of 26–27 June 2014, the European Council defined the strategic guidelines 
for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice. 
The so-called Ypres Guidelines succeeded the Tampere conclusions (1999), The Hague 
programme (2004) and the Stockholm programme (2009) with which the European  Council 
laid down the foundations and indicated the main directions for the development of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Nevertheless, the new Guidelines received many 
critics,25 as they lacked real ambition to propose further reforms at the major policy areas.26
Several Member States were confronted with a significant increase in the total number 
of migrants, including applicants for international protection, arriving on their territories in 
2014 and 2015. When Member States of the EU faced a massive inflow of migrants, it was 
evident that not only national, but also EU level response was needed. Member States com-
mitted to taking rapid action to save lives and to step up EU action in the field of migration 
in a European Council statement of 23 April 2015. The European Council decided, inter 
alia, to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility and committed itself in particular 
to increasing emergency assistance to frontline Member States and to considering options 
for organising emergency relocation between Member States on a voluntary basis, as well 
as to deploying European Asylum Support Office teams in frontline Member States for 
the joint processing of applications for international protection, including registration and 
fingerprinting.
The European Commission was of the opinion that the 2014 Strategic Guidelines did 
not contain elements that could provide effective response to the migration crisis, therefore, 
breaking the tradition of proposing an Action Plan based upon the political JHA programmes 
of the European Council, the Commission itself acted on its own by setting out a new po-
litical and legislative programme regarding migration and asylum policy of the EU. The 
European Agenda on Migration27 adopted by the European Commission on 13 May 2015 
sets out a European response, combining internal and external policies, making the best 
use of EU agencies and tools, and involving all actors. The European Agenda on Migration 
proposes both immediate actions and long-term reforms.
25 See e.g. EPC or MPI evaluations on the document.
26 See De Bruycker, Philippe (2014): The Missed Opportunity of the “Ypres Guidelines” of the European 
Council Regarding Immigration and Asylum. MPC Blog, 29 July 2014. Available: https://blogs.eui.eu/migra-
tionpolicycentre/the-missed-opportunity-of-the-ypres-guidelines-of-the-european-council-regarding-immi-
gration-and-asylum/ (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
27 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions; A European Agenda on Migration, Brussels, 13.5.2015, 
COM(2015) 240 final.
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Immediate actions
As regards urgent matters, already two weeks after the publication of the European Agenda 
on Migration, the Commission set out the immediate response to the emergency situation 
in the Mediterranean. Among the Member States witnessing situations of considerable 
pressure and in light of the recent tragic events in the Mediterranean, Italy and Greece in 
particular experienced unprecedented flows of migrants, including applicants for interna-
tional protection who were in clear need of international protection.
On 27 May 2015, the Commission, in order to assist Italy and Greece, proposed to use 
the emergency response mechanism under Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). This provision, which was activated for the first time, en-
visioned the relocation of 40,000 asylum seekers28 in clear need of international protection 
from Italy and Greece to other EU Member States over a two-year period. Although the 
Commission suggested the share of relocation among Member States to be calculated based 
on a distribution key, the adopted Council Decision (EU) 2015/152329 of 14 September 2015, 
in line with the April 2015 European Council conclusions, set out that relocation was to be 
carried out on a voluntary basis by Member States making their pledges.
The first relocation decision was soon followed by the proposal for another relocation 
decision after the sharp increase in illegal border crossings in the Central and Eastern 
 Mediterranean, but also on the Western Balkans route. On 9 September 2015, the Commis-
sion proposed the setting up of another emergency relocation for 120,000 asylum-seekers 
in clear need of international protection from Italy (15,600), Greece (50,400) and Hungary 
(54,000). Hungary, on the other hand, expressed its wish not to become a beneficial state 
within the framework of relocation, as a result of which Hungary – contrary to its explicit 
objection30 – became obligated according to the adopted Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 
September 201531 to compulsorily relocate a certain number of persons (quotas) calculated 
according to a distribution key. The annulment of this second relocation decision was sought 
by Hungary and Slovakia,32 yet its validity was confirmed by the Court of Justice of the EU 
in its 6 September 2017 ruling.33
Apart from reacting to the crisis caused by the massive flows reaching the EU, in order 
to share the burden of the countries hosting the biggest share of refugees, on 8 June 2015 
the Commission also launched a proposal asking Member States to resettle 20,000 people 
from outside the EU, in clear need of international protection as identified by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) over 2 years from third countries, 
28 According to Recital (21) of Council Decision 2015/1523 this number corresponds to approximately 40% of the 
total number of third-country nationals in clear need of international protection who have entered irregularly 
in Italy or Greece in 2014.
29 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece (OJ L 239, 15.9.2015. 146).
30 The decision was adopted by the Council by a qualified majority, with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania 
and the Slovak Republic voting against and Finland abstaining.
31 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece (OJ L 248, 24.9.2015. 80–94.)
32 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union.
33 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 September 2017 Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the 
European Union, Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15.
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namely North Africa, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. The proposed resettlement 
scheme used a distribution key based on the same criteria as the emergency relocation 
scheme. The Commission’s proposal was followed by an agreement among the Member 
States of 20 July 2015 to resettle, on a voluntary basis, 22,504 persons in clear need of 
international protection.34
Long-term reforms
“The overall objective is to move from a system which by design or poor implementation 
places a disproportionate responsibility on certain Member States and encourages uncon-
trolled and irregular migratory flows to a fairer system which provides orderly and safe 
pathways to the EU for third country nationals in need of protection or who can contribute 
to the EU’s economic development. (…) For it to work, this system must be comprehensive, 
and grounded on the principles of responsibility and solidarity.”35
In this context, the Commission in its Communication Towards a reform of the Com-
mon European Asylum System and enhancing legal avenues to Europe36 considered that 
there are five priority areas where the CEAS should be structurally improved: establishing 
a sustainable and fair system for determining the Member State responsible for asylum 
seekers; reinforcing the Eurodac system; achieving greater convergence in the EU asylum 
system; preventing secondary movements within the EU; and a new mandate for the EU’s 
Asylum Agency.
In order to make the CEAS more crisis proof in the future, the Commission present-
ed two packages of altogether seven reform proposals in 2016. The first asylum package 
launched on 4 May 2016 includes the reform of the Dublin system by making it more trans-
parent and enhancing its effectiveness, while providing a mechanism to deal with situations 
of disproportionate pressure on the asylum systems of the Member States;37 transforming 
the existing EASO into a fully-fledged EU Agency for Asylum to reflect its enhanced role 
in the new system;38 reinforcing of the EU’s fingerprinting database, Eurodac, in order to 
better manage the asylum system and to help tackle irregular migration.39
On 13 July 2016, the European Commission presented further proposals to complete 
the reform of the CEAS in order to move towards a fully efficient, fair and humane asylum 
policy – one which can function effectively both in times of normal circumstances and in 
times of high migratory pressure. To this end, in order to achieve a common and harmonised 
set of rules at EU level, the Commission proposed the creation of a common procedure for 
international protection by turning the existing Asylum Procedure Directive into a regula-
34 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2015/07/20/ (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
35 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Towards a reform of the 
Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe, COM(2016) 197 final.
36 Ibid.
37 Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for ex-
amining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person (recast), COM(2016) 270 final.
38 Regulation on the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010, 
COM(2016) 271 final.
39 Regulation on the establishment of EURODAC (recast), COM(2016) 272 final.
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tion,40 uniform standards for qualification as beneficiaries of international protection and 
rights granted to them by turning the existing Qualifications Directive into a regulation41 
and the further harmonisation of reception conditions in the EU.42 Overall, these proposals 
aim at simplifying and shortening the asylum procedure and the decision-making, discour-
aging secondary movements of asylum seekers and increasing integration prospects of those 
that are entitled to international protection. On the same day and as a fourth element of the 
second asylum reform package the European Commission proposed an EU Resettlement 
Framework43 to establish a common European policy on resettlement to ensure orderly and 
safe pathways to Europe for persons in need of international protection.
Given the different nature and sensitivity of the seven legislative proposals, the nego-
tiations of the files within and between the co-legislators, namely the Council of Ministers 
and the European Parliament, are going in different pace and showing various degrees 
of progress. On 27 September 2017 the Commission reviewed the progress on the 2015 
 European Agenda on Migration and set out the next steps to put in place the missing ele-
ments of a stronger, fairer and more effective EU migration and asylum policy.44 In order to 
urge further progress and ahead of the EU leader’ thematic debate on migration held on 14 
December 2017, the Commission proposed a political roadmap45 to reach a comprehensive 
agreement by June 2018 on how to pursue a sustainable migration and asylum policy. The 
Commission’s view is that the discussions on the reform proposals to overhaul the CEAS 
have progressed very slowly, so it is essential that the European Council unblocks the debate 
and endorses a revision of the Dublin regulation as part of a wider agreement on all the 
reforms proposed by June 2018.
Theories
Given the fact that although many reforms have taken place since the start of the migration 
crisis, the finalisation of the long-term reforms is still ahead of us, it is worth examining 
whether we can predict whose preferences will dominate when concluding the reforms and 
whether we can foresee, whose interests will dictate the content of the future legal acts. 
Even more it is interesting to see, whether after the unsuccessful lobbying of certain Central 
40 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a common procedure in 
the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, COM(2016) 467 final.
41 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Council on standards for the qualification of 
third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted 
and amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents, COM(2016) 466 final.
42 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down standards for the reception 
of applicants for international protection (recast), COM(2016) 465 final.
43 Regulation establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the 
European Parliament and the Council, COM(2016) 468 final.
44 Communication on the delivery of the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2017) 558 final.
45 Communication: Commission contribution to the EU Leaders’ thematic debate on a way forward on the 
external and the internal dimension of migration policy, COM(2017) 820 final.
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European Member States when immediate responses were adopted at EU level, there is 
a larger potential to make a greater impact on the future of the CEAS.
In the book entitled The Political System of the European Union46 two broad theoretical 
frameworks are introduced for understanding EU politics.47 The first theoretical framework 
described is known as intergovernmentalism and is represented mainly by Hoffman and 
Moravcsik.48 Its core assumption is that EU politics is dominated by the governments of 
the big Member States, such as Germany and France. They have clear preferences about 
what they wish to achieve at the European level in each of the main policy areas of the EU, 
although Moravcsik also states that the preferences of Member States can vary over policy 
areas and over time.49 Big Member States are also in an advantageous situation because 
they have sufficient resources and information at their disposal, so they can at an early stage 
of policy-making use such information to influence the political and legislative decisions. 
Delegation of powers and tasks to EU institutions is therefore a careful and conscious pro-
cess, and at the end of the day, the supranational institutions are practically agents of the 
dominating Member States. “Bargaining outcomes reflect the relative distribution of power 
in the Council and can thus hardly result in outcomes detrimental to the preferences formed 
domestically by the larger and more influential Member States.”50
Contrary to intergovernmentalism, according to the supranational politics approach, 
represented among others by Kohler-Koch, Eising and Stone Sweet, individual governments 
are not so powerful. Their research aimed to show that intergovernmentalist theories of Eu-
ropean integration – which emphasized the centrality of state officials and their preferences, 
and downplayed transnational and supranational actors – were seriously flawed, failing to 
explain many of the most important market and political developments.51 They claim that 
there is, increasingly, a transfer of decision-making authority from the national level to 
the more complex system of European multi-level governance. In such a complex system, 
apart from governments of Member States EU institutions and private interest groups also 
play a major role in shaping the EU policy agenda. As regards European legislative proce-
dures, because of the rules governing decision-making such as the rules of co-decision and 
qualified majority voting, the outcome cannot always be predicted by dominating Member 
States. Consequently, EU policy outcomes can be different from the original intentions of 
the governments.
46 Hix, Simon – Høyland, Bjørn (2011): The Political System of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillian.
47 Ibid. 16–18.
48 Stanley Hoffman first presented his theory of intergovernmentalism in The State of War: Essays on the Theory 
and Practice of International Politics, which was later built upon by Andrew Moravcsik with his theory of 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism. See Bache, Ian – George, Stephen (2006): Politics in the European Union. 
2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
49 Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism is a three-step model, which merges, firstly, the liberal theory 
of national preference formation with, secondly, an intergovernmental model of EU-level bargaining, and 
thirdly, a model of institutional choice underlining the role of international institutions in providing credible 
commitments for member governments.
50 Tsarouhas, Dimitris (2009): The Open Method of Coordination and integration theory: are there lessons 
to be learned? The 11th European Union Studies Association Biennial Conference, Los Angeles, California, 
23–25 April 2009. 4. Available: http://aei.pitt.edu/33149/1/tsarouhas._dimitris.pdf (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
51 Sandholtz, Wayne – Stone Sweet, Alec eds. (1998): European Integration and Supranational Governance. 
Oxford–New York, Oxford University Press.
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Both broad theoretical frameworks have the potential to authentically explain European 
policy-making and legislative processes in certain policy areas, the question is which one 
describes more genuinely the EU’s actions as regards the short and long-term responses 
given to the migration crisis. In order to find the answer to this question, the responses 
are examined firstly from a legislative perspective, and secondly from a policy-making 
perspective.
Legislative Perspective
Many times politicians, but even researchers urge the reforms to be carried out in a quick 
pace, forgetting or just not willing to acknowledge that reforms take place in the form of 
legislation that has its special framework within the EU. In order to genuinely understand 
why the adoption of legislative reforms take so much time and why their content many times 
shows compromise to a great extent, we need to be familiar with the legal framework of 
legislative processes in the EU. The latest modification of the Treaties, the Treaty of Lisbon, 
has brought prominent changes including the move from unanimity to qualified majority 
voting in at least 45 policy areas in the Council, a change in calculating such a majority 
to a new double majority, and a more powerful European Parliament forming a bicameral 
legislature alongside the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure.
The Treaty of Lisbon broadened the competences of the EU in asylum issues. Accord-
ing to Article 78 of the TFEU, a common policy on asylum is developed:
“1. The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and 
temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country na-
tional requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of 
non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 
July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other 
relevant treaties.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures for a common 
European asylum system (…).
3. In the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency 
situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on 
a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the 
Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.”52
The Lisbon Treaty therefore brought several changes as regards harmonising legislation 
in the field of asylum. Firstly, there is no mentioning of minimum standards as before, which 
sets the aim to provide convergence. Secondly, such further harmonisation of asylum rules 
shall no longer be carried out by the Council solely, instead the European Parliament has 
an equal voice during the legislative procedure. As a result, any reform taking place after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty means that the EP will have a real influence on 
EU asylum rules for the first time and therefore it is expected that the European Parliament 
52 Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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would definitely demand major reforms pushing for further emphasis on human rights and 
solidarity.
Thirdly, the qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council is introduced instead of 
unanimity, together with co-decision with the European Parliament, and at the same time, 
the newest form of QMV was defined by the Treaty of Lisbon. Previously, “unanimity not 
only made discussions in the Council much more difficult and lengthy, but also diminished 
the level of ambition in the search for a common (often low) denominator among Member 
States.”53 The old QMV system,54 which was also replaced in late 2014, but was available 
on request by Member States until well into 2017, was a triple majority system, having been 
more complex and prone to logjams. Since 1 November 2014, QMV is no longer based on 
weighted votes attributed to each Member State, as had been the case since 1957, instead 
there is a new system to determine if a vote in the Council of the EU will pass or fail un-
der the QMV rules. Article 16(4) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) sets out the 
following provisions: “As from 1 November 2014, a qualified majority shall be defined as 
at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and repre-
senting Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union. A blocking 
minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified majority 
shall be deemed attained.”55
“In the original EC of six Member States in 1957, the system of weighted votes in the 
Council was based implicitly on a rough balance of demographic, economic and political 
elements. (…) This was done for political reasons, to show that the building of a reconciled 
Europe was a common endeavour, based in particular on the equal weight given to Germany 
and to France within the European institutions.”56 Nevertheless, the population criterion 
became a contentious issue during the Treaty reforms. “These issues are indeed at the heart 
of the sui generis nature of the EU, between classic international organisations – which tend 
to recognise, as a principle, the equality of Member States – and a federation of states, where 
the democratic principle of the equality of citizens plays a bigger role”.57 The new QMV 
rules based on double majority clearly reflect this sui generis nature of the EU.
A clear consequence of the new rules on legislations is that due to the new voting 
according to qualified majority in the Council medium-sized and smaller Member States 
now have less weight in the Council, while larger Member States are seen as the main ben-
eficiaries of the change.58 It is because the previous triple majority voting weight threshold 
raised at least two problems, according to Frank Häge: “At the level of individual member 
states, the allocation of a particular voting weight is not linked to any objective or neutral 
53 Piris, Jean-Claude (2010): The Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis. Cambridge Studies in European 
Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press. 175.
54 In brief, the thresholds in the old system are 74% of Member States’ weighted votes, and a majority of Member 
States. Additionally, Member States could request tallying the percentage of the population to be part of the 
criteria, in which case there was a minimum of 62% of the population of the EU. This latter clause, however, 
has never been evoked.
55 Article 16(4) of the Treaty on the European Union.
56 Piris, Jean-Claude (2010): op. cit. 215.
57 Ibid. 217.
58 Changed rules for qualified majority voting in the Council of the EU, December 2014. 1. Available: www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/545697/EPRS_ATA%282014%29545697_REV1_EN.pdf 
(Accessed: 30.11.2017)
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criterion, which raises equality and fairness issues. At the collective level, the high majority 
threshold makes it hard to reach decisions, potentially leading to gridlock and inefficient 
decision-making processes.”59 Therefore, the aim of the new double majority was to speed 
up the negotiation process, since fewer Member States will need to be persuaded to create 
a de facto majority during the bargaining process. Nevertheless, the result of the comparison 
of voting weights according to the old and new voting systems is definitely in favour of the 
larger Member States.60
German think tank Centrum für Europäische Politik called the new system less demo-
cratic and less efficient, compared to the previous one. It increases the relative disadvantage 
of countries with a higher population, most notably Germany.61 Furthermore, Stephanie 
Novak notes that QMV creates a reluctance of ministers to be caught in an already-defeated 
minority position, and they are therefore more likely to compromise during the negotiation 
process, and to simply join the majority when the vote goes through.62
Policy-making Perspective
After making it clear that the present rules on legislation favour larger Member States, it 
should also be examined whether apart from legislation, other policy-making steps provide 
a more balanced role for various Member States, or the same tendency could be observed 
there, as well. For such an examination, the 2017 crisis along the Central Mediterranean 
route and the answers to this could provide a good basis.
On 30 June, the Italian Minister of the Interior, Marco Minniti addressed a letter to 
the President of the Council of Ministers, the Estonian Minister of the Interior, Andres 
Anvelt and to the Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos, 
warning that the situation in Italy63 would soon no longer be sustainable.64 After the sending 
out of this urgent request for help on Friday, two days later on Sunday, the Ministers of the 
Interior of France, Germany and Italy, and the European Commissioner for Migration and 
Home Affairs met in Paris on 2 July 2017 to discuss the challenges posed by the increasing 
migratory flow on the Central Mediterranean route.
The small group of leaders expressed strong solidarity with Italy, which faced rising 
numbers of arrivals, and in order to provide increased support to Italy and contribute to stem 
59 Available: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/library-blog/posts/new-council-qualified-majority-voting-rules-in-ef-
fect/ (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
60 Changed rules for qualified majority voting in the Council of the EU, December 2014. 2.
61 Available: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/library-blog/posts/new-council-qualified-majority-voting-rules-in-ef-
fect/ (Accessed : 30.11.2017)
62 Novak, Stéphanie – Elster, Jon eds. (2014): Majority Decisions: Principles and Practices. New York, Cam-
bridge University Press.
63 In 2017 until July: 85,183 arrivals in Italy, more than 2,000 lives lost in the Mediterranean, main country 
of departure: Libya (95%), top five nationalities: Nigeria, Bangladesh, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia. 
Central Mediterranean route: Commission Action Plan to support Italy and stem migration flows, July 2017. 
Available: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-mi-
gration/20170704_factsheet_-_central_mediterranean_route_commission_action_plan_to_support_ita-
ly_and_stem_flows_en.pdf (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
64 Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1882_en.htm (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
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the migratory flow, they agreed on the following measures: 1. Work on a code of conduct for 
NGOs, to be drafted and presented by Italy, in order to improve coordination with NGOs 
operating in the Mediterranean Sea; 2. Enhance support to the Libyan coast-guard by in-
creasing training activities and providing additional financial support; 3. Provide additional 
support to the IOM and UNHCR to allow facilities in Libya to reach international standards 
in terms of living conditions and human rights; 4. Encourage the examination of possible 
concrete options to reinforce border controls at the Southern border of Libya; 5. Reinforce 
the EU strategy on returns as well as of the agreed coordinated reassessing of visa policy 
toward third countries in order to enhance readmission rates; 6. Accelerate the agreed EU 
relocation scheme in order to strengthen relocation of persons in need of protection.65
Another two days later, on 4 July 2017 the Commission presented its Action plan on 
measures to support Italy, reduce pressure along the Central Mediterranean route and 
increase solidarity.66 Not surprisingly, the Action Plan set out recommendations along 
the lines determined by France, Germany and Italy a couple of days before. The issue of 
migration in the Central Mediterranean was on the agenda of the informal meeting of the 
Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs of 6 and 7 July 2017. The discussion of the Ministers 
of the Interior was then based on the Commission’s Action Plan developed along the lines 
set out by the large Member States in order to allow swift progress in support of Italy.
Regional Forms of Cooperation
Both the legislative and the policy-making perspective showed that large Member States 
dominate in EU decision-making. Given this context, the primary task of small or medi-
um-sized Member States is to find out how they can find a way to influence European trends, 
and secondarily, if the processes take a direction not preferred by them, how to block the 
forming result of a legislative process. The rules on legislation specifically identify the 
criteria for blocking minority, which requires a certain percentage of the population of 
the EU and the cooperation of at least four Member States. All these provisions result in 
the necessity to form alliances.
Several forms of cooperation, whether formal or informal, are visible throughout these 
processes. A German–French alliance is dominating in basically all the processes, the 
Scandinavian states tend to prefer similar solutions, the Mediterranean states face similar 
challenges as regards migration and therefore enforce their claims together, the Benelux 
countries already had established cooperation before the EU, while the Baltic states also 
tend to have similar systems and preferences. The tendency of subregionalism, or simply 
said, overlapping of regional integrations can therefore be especially observed in the Eu-
ropean Union.67
Given these existing alliances, it was high time that the Central European countries 
also revived their cooperation and make it more visible in the field if migration and asylum, 
65 Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-1876_en.htm (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
66 Action plan on measures to support Italy, reduce pressure along the Central Mediterranean route and increase 
solidarity, Brussels, 4.7.2017 SEC(2017) 339.
67 Cihelková, Eva – Hnát, Pavel (2006): Subregionalism Within the EU with Special Regard to the Groupings 
of which the Check Republic is a Member. Prague Economic Papers, No. 1. 50.
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as well. The Visegrád Group (also known as the “Visegrád Four” or simply “V4”) reflects 
the efforts of the countries of the Central European region to work together in a number of 
fields of common interest within the all-European integration. “Czechia, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia have always been part of a single civilization sharing cultural and intellectual 
values (…). The V4 was not created as an alternative to the all-European integration efforts, 
nor does it try to compete with the existing functional Central European structures. Its 
activities are in no way aimed at isolation or the weakening of ties with the other countries. 
On the contrary the Group aims at encouraging optimum cooperation with all countries.” 68
The theories on regional cooperation and integration can, among others, be classified 
according to whether the main drivers of region-building lie within (endogenous) or outside 
(exogenous) the region, although many consider both and do not systematically distinguish 
between the two.69 The migration crisis and the European response have provided both en-
dogenous and exogenous challenges for the V4. Hungary and Poland, protecting a huge share 
of external Schengen borders, faced a massive inflow of migrants in 2015 and their asylum 
system was under a huge pressure. The admission of asylum-seekers in an uncontrolled way, 
as well as the compulsory relocation from Italy and Greece set out by the second relocation 
decision were considered a threat to national security and, for example by the Hungarian 
Government, contradictory to the Hungarian constitutional identity.70
Forming regional alliances to balance powerful states instead of going with the flow 
and accepting their dominant role in European policy-making and legislation regarding mi-
gration and asylum policy has therefore become a new area for cooperation for the Visegrád 
states.71 Since the negotiations on the long-term reforms of the CEAS is still ongoing, the V4 
should aim at maintaining its cooperation in this field in order to provide a greater influence 
even if the V4 alone cannot establish a blocking minority due to its low demographic weight, 
and should make the voice of this part of Europe also heard.
Conclusions and Future Prospects
As it could be clearly seen by examining the present legislative and policy-making processes, 
there has been a tendency to push for urgent asylum reforms by outspokenly leaving some 
behind, which the legal provisions of the qualified majority voting in the Council explicitly 
68 Available: www.visegradgroup.eu/about (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
69 Börzel, Tanja A. – Risse, Thomas eds. (2016): Theorizing Regionalism: Cooperation, Integration and 
Governance. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. 4–5. Available: http://aei.pitt.edu/78876/1/
Borzel.pdf (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
70 The Constitutional Court declared in its decision No. 22/2016. (XII.6.) AB that Hungary’s constitutional 
identity is rooted in its alleged historical constitution and is “a fundamental value not created by the Funda-
mental Law – it is merely acknowledged by the Fundamental Law.” See in this regard Nagy-Nádasdi, Anita 
Rozália – Kőhalmi, Barbara (2017): Hungarian Constitutional Identity and the ECJ Decision on Refugee 
Quota. Verfassungsblog on Matters Constitutional, 8 September 2017. Available: http://verfassungsblog.de/
hungarian-constitutional-identity-and-the-ecj-decision-on-refugee-quota/ (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
71 As a recent evaluation regarding the Visegrád Four in the EU see Dostál, Vít – Végh, Zsuzsanna (2017): 
Trends of Visegrad European Policy. Association for International Affairs, (AMO), 23.11.2017. Available: 
www.amo.cz/en/trends-of-visegrad-european-policy/trends-of-visegrad-european-policy-203/ (Accessed: 
30.11.2017)
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allows. The question is therefore, whether even in such a legal framework the Member 
States will still try to seek consensus in order to have a higher willingness as regards im-
plementation of EU rules. In this regard, the theory of intergovernmentalism describes more 
authentically how the response to the European migration crisis has so far been adopted, 
nevertheless some major elements of the reform of the CEAS is still ahead of us.
The motto of the EU, unity in diversity therefore raises the question whether diversity 
will still be kept in order to reach a higher level of unity or not. The V4 could therefore bring 
more diversity in the perspectives that need to be taken into account when adopting new 
asylum reforms. Even if providing counterweight to mainstream European asylum policy 
has not always been successful due to the European legislative provisions, the fact that the 
V4 is already considered a regional cooperation to consult when major reforms are planned 
is already a great achievement in itself.
The issue of migration and asylum, with a special focus on the necessary reforms, has 
recently been in the focus of the meetings of the European Council. On its meeting on 22–23 
June 2017 the European Council reaffirmed its previous conclusions on the reform of CEAS 
and stated that “there is a common understanding that the reformed CEAS needs to strike 
the right balance between responsibility and solidarity and that it needs to ensure resilience 
to future crises. The system has to be efficient, be able to withstand migratory pressure, 
eliminate pull factors as well as secondary movements, in compliance with international 
law, fight abuse and provide adequate support to the most affected Member States.”72 The 
European Council once again reiterated this call in its conclusions on 19 October 2017, and 
also set a clear plan by stating that it “will return to this matter at its meeting in December, 
and will seek to reach a consensus during the first half of 2018.” 73
It is interesting to see that although no unanimity would legally be required by the 
Treaties to adopt future reforms of the CEAS, Member States still commit themselves to 
seek consensus. This clearly shows the fact that the immediate actions adopted in 2015 not 
having been supported by some of the Member States could not produce the results the 
majority of Member States aimed at. This would even be more so in the case of long-term 
reforms, consequently, since effective implementation of the reforms is a key aspect, the 
widest support should be a common interest of the Member States for the reforms during 
their adoption.
EU leaders held a debate on the external and internal dimensions of the EU migration 
policy on 14 December 2017. They assessed what has and has not worked in the past two 
years, and discussed how to strengthen the policy. The debate was based on a note circulated 
by President Tusk ahead of the summit,74 which had an unusually honest tone and stated 
that “the issue of mandatory quotas has proven to be highly divisive and the approach has 
received disproportionate attention in light of its impact on the ground; in this sense it 
has turned out to be ineffective.”75 The discussion aimed, amongst others, to pave the way 
towards an agreement on the reform of the asylum system by June 2018. President Tusk, in 
his remarks after the meeting of the European Council also focused on the most controver-
72 Available: www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23985/22-23-euco-final-conclusions.pdf (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
73 Available: www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21620/19-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf (Accessed: 30.11.2017)
74 Available: www.consilium.europa.eu//media/32083/en_leaders-agenda-note-on-migration_.pdf (Accessed: 
20.12.2017)
75 Ibid.
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sial element of the reforms of the CEAS: “Mandatory quotas remain a contentious issue, 
although its temperature has decreased significantly. If only for this reason, it was worth 
raising this topic. Will a compromise be possible? It appears very hard. But we have to try 
our very best.”76
This confirms that Member States shall first and foremost seek consensus, because 
a reform of the CEAS that only bears the support of a qualified majority of states according 
to the preference of the larger member ones cannot provide a result that will effectively be 
followed and implemented by all Member States, especially in case the reforms are contra-
dicting their constitutional identity.
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Institutional Framework of Regulating International 
Migration in the European Union with Special Focus 
on the Migration Crisis in 2015
Ferenc Urbán
Introduction
This study has various aims, firstly, to clarify whether symptoms of the irregular migration 
movements arriving in the European Union, could be really defined as migration crisis based 
on their volume, and secondly, to define the major components of this crisis. Furthermore, 
it aims to find the answer for the question whether the institutions of the European Union 
responsible for border control, asylum affairs and criminal cooperation were able to tackle 
the crisis, and if not what the reasons for the failed crisis management were?
Finally, some recommendations will be formulated about how to ensure better man-
agement of the wide range of international irregular migration movements by the European 
institutions. Throughout the study, the word migrant will be used in the global context as 
“a person who is outside the territory of the State of which they are nationals or citizens 
and who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, 
voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate.”1
The common European framework of managing the international migration crisis sit-
uations is quite limited, although there has been a significant improvement in the European 
Union in the field of Justice and Home Affairs cooperation in the past few years, some fields 
of cooperation have deepened and the institutional cooperation has improved too.
For the security of the citizens of the European Union and for the control of its ex-
ternal borders the Tampere Programme constituted an important step, which aimed at 
synchronising the common policy areas of border control, asylum affairs and visa policy. 
The implementation of the Tampere Programme was realized in 2004, but in the same year 
a decision was taken in order to achieve the new elements of cooperation. In the frame of 
the cooperation of the Hague Programme the need of the establishment of the European 
Border Control Agency (hereinafter FRONTEX)2 has taken shape.
One could observe the improvement of the Common European Asylum Policy3 in re-
cent years, the directives defining the basis of the asylum system have been adopted but the 
1 European Migration Network 2014. 187.
2 Official name: European Border and Coast Guard Agency.
3 CEAS – Factsheet 2014. 3.
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creation of the common asylum policy has not yet been implemented. It can be seen that the 
European Union focuses on the operative support of the Member States (hereinafter MSs) 
partly with strengthening and forming of the European Asylum Support Office (hereinafter 
EASO) from an office to a European agency, instead of establishing a common European 
asylum procedure, which would mean also an advanced level of cooperation between the 
MSs and also the shifting of the responsibilities from the MSs to a higher level, to the agen-
cy. The common asylum procedure would mean on the one hand a unified decision-making 
procedure but on the other hand, this common system should find a solution for the share 
of persons taken under international protection.
Statistics on the Migration Crisis
Although a deep scientific study should be written on the reasons for the events showing 
symptoms of a crisis situation, first it has to be made clear that the number of irregular 
migrants reaching Europe in 2015–16 was unexpected and unprecedented.
According to the statistical data of FRONTEX,4 the number of persons apprehended 
because of illegal border crossing at the external border of the European Union increased 
significantly, twenty-five times between 2012 and 2016, whereas in 2012 there were 72 thou-
sand irregular migrants apprehended, in the peak of the migration crisis year, there were 
already 1.8 million irregular migrants apprehended at the external borders of the European 
Union. The tendency of the increase turned to decrease in 2016.
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Figure 1.
Number of persons apprehended for illegal border crossing at the external borders of the European 
Union 2012–2016
Source: Edited by the author based on the data of FRONTEX, FRONTEX 2016 (A)
The statistical data show that in the field of international migration the main characteristics 
of the year 2015 is that it significantly differs from the previous, but also from the subse-
quent years.
4 FRONTEX 2016 (A) 8.
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Figure 2.
Number of persons found to be illegally present on the territory of the European Union 2010–2016
Source: Edited by the author based on the Eurostat database, Eurostat 2017
The number of persons found to be illegally present on the territory of the MSs shows a pow-
erful four times increase after a slight decrease in the examined period of 2010–2016.5 We 
can draw the conclusion that due to the high volume of irregular migration, the institutions 
responsible for border control and criminal cooperation of the MSs and the European Union 
were affected by an unexpected increase of workload.
Obviously, there is a correlation between the record number of irregular migrants 
(persons found to be illegally present) and the number of asylum applications but it can be 
stated that not every irregular migrant lodged an asylum application in the examined period.
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Figure 3.
Number of asylum applications lodged in the European Union, 2010 January–September 2017
Source: Edited by the author based on the Eurostat database, Eurostat 2017
5 Eurostat database 2017.
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The number of asylum applications lodged in the MSs of the European Union quintupled 
between 2010 and 2015, while there were approximately 260 thousand asylum applications 
registered in the Union in 2010, the number of applications reached 1.3 million in the peak 
year of 2015. In 2016 the decrease of asylum applications was not significant but in the pe-
riod from January to September 2017, the number of applications fell, due to the coherence 
of some political and law-enforcement factors, and the number of applications decreased 
to 426 thousand.6
Statistical evidence suggests that in the two main years (2015 and 2016) characterised 
by the crisis, the extremely high number of asylum applications caused an unexpected extent 
of workload for the MSs, the whole European Union and for its institutions responsible for 
asylum affairs and border control. These institutions had to face challenges in a situation 
when their main structure had not changed effectively in the previous years. Although one 
of the main paths of improvement has to be outlined: the European Asylum Support Office 
was established in 2010 as an operational and methodological support institution.
The year 2015 was affected by an unexpectedly high volume of irregular migration. 
Definitely this high volume of international migration does not only differ in its extent from 
that of the previous years, but also in its quality, or rather in the demographic composition 
and share of different nationalities of the persons taking part in the movement. Previously 
these movements were fragmented in their composition by nationalities, yet they are char-
acterised by a few distinct nationalities originating from crisis areas.
In conclusion, it can be outlined that based on the main variables: the number of de-
tected irregular migrants at the external borders (in and outbound) of the European Union, 
persons found to be illegally present in the MSs and the number of asylum applications, 
definitely the international migration related situation showed a picture of a crisis. In order 
to find the answer for the question whether the European community faced a real migration 
crisis in 2015, a further research is needed.
Asylum Affairs, Asylum Related Situation in Other Parts of the World
According to some hard data, we have studied the characteristics of the irregular migration 
related movements in the European Union. In addition to this, it is important to make an 
outlook to observe the attributes of international migration in other parts of the world in 
the same period.
6 Eurostat database, Eurostat 2017.
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Figure 4.
The ratio of asylum seekers in the different continents in 2016
Source: Edited by the author based on the data of UNHCR Global Trends 2017. 70
In 2016 two-fifth of the total number of asylum applications were registered in Europe. 
Regarding the number of asylum applications, one of the developed continents of the world 
was ranked second, where the number of registered applications was merely half of those 
lodged in Europe; in North-America the total number of asylum applications was one-fifth 
of the total.
These data were generated in terms of absolute numbers and they show that Europe 
was affected by an extremely high pressure caused by irregular migration in 2016. It is 
adequate to examine the ratio between the number of registered asylum applications and 
the level of economic development of the different continents. To describe the correlation 
between them, the internationally accepted variable is used, which shows the relationship 
between one asylum applicant and one USD per capita GDP.
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The ratio between one asylum applicant and one USD per capita GDP in 2016
Source: Edited by the author based on the data of United Nations, National Accounts Main Aggregates 
Database, 2017
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If we take a close look at the ratio of GDP, which stands for the level of economic develop-
ment of the continent, to the lodged asylum applications, it is already apparent, that although 
the highest number of asylum applications was submitted in Europe, taking account of the 
level of economic development, this high number of asylum applicants did not cause as high 
a pressure for the continent as the number of applicants in Africa or in Asia. Examining 
the data of the UN, it is visible that while the number of persons taken under refugee status 
in Europe was 2.3 million persons, this number was in the economically less developed 
Africa almost 5.5 million persons.7
Continuing my examination in the field of irregular migration related movements in 
2015, and in the years afterwards, it is clear that the number of lodged asylum applications 
could cause higher pressure for the reception facilities and institutions in other continents 
of the world than Europe.
Relying on these findings it can be concluded that the high number of asylum applica-
tions does not necessarily explain the crisis, because on the one hand, in other less developed 
parts of the world the number of asylum applications submitted to the responsible authorities 
was not so high, on the other hand, the situation did not come to a turning point, where 
there is no possibility for further existence, whereas the whole system would be doomed for 
destruction in the original meaning of the word crisis. This is totally true in light of the facts 
that the population of the whole continent was 741 million in 2015, while the population of 
the European Union was 508.5 million persons in the same year.8
The total per capita GDP was 25,590 USD9 and in the MSs of the European Union 
the per capita GDP was 25,700 Euro in 2013. The same data are available for Africa, for 
the continent with the highest number of asylum applicants in comparison to its level of 
economic development. The total population of Africa was 2 billion while the per capita 
GDP was 1,914 USD in 2015, it means that compared to the three times higher population 
figures, the GDP was just one thirteenth of the total GDP produced in Europe.
According to its population and economic power the registration of the yearly 
1–1.3 million asylum applicants would not necessarily mean a crisis for the European Union.
Regarding the number of asylum applications submitted in the European Union the 
data are not reliable because on the one hand, an applicant can lodge several applications 
in different MSs of the European Union and the figures published by Eurostat are the cu-
mulative numbers of the applications – the data of 1.3 million asylum applications indeed 
show the symptoms of over coverage, on the other hand the majority of asylum applicants 
probably try to leave the territory of the European Union after the situation normalised in 
their countries of origin.
Summarizing the above listed facts, the asylum situation in the European Union could 
hardly be called a crisis because in some other parts of the world the phenomenon of asylum 
related migration causes bigger pressure for the receiving countries. Due to the fact that 
the term of migration crisis is not necessarily the right word for the phenomenon caused 
by the irregular migration in 2015–16, it has to be examined what kind of crisis situation 
we are observing? Is it possible that merely the control and service systems of the Union 
7 UNHCR Global Trends 2017.
8 United Nations, Population Division 2017.
9 United Nations, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database 2017.
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were affected by the crisis? In order to decide, focus will be laid on the functioning of the 
asylum related control and service system of the European Union.
Birth of the Common European Asylum System
The establishment of the asylum policy of the European Union began10 with the Treaty on 
the European Union (hereinafter Treaty),11 before this, only one statement had been accepted 
on the asylum policy, which was the interpretation of the definition laid down in the 1951 
Geneva Refugee Convention. It is also important to outline the decision of the Council 
of 20 June 1995 in connection with our theme, on the minimal guarantees of the asylum 
procedures; albeit none of them was mandatory, and whether they have been transposed in 
the national legislation depended on the decision of the MSs. The Treaty incorporated two 
tasks in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:12
1. In the short term: harmonisation of the national asylum law with using the comp-
lete and exquisite definition of the Geneva Convention, respecting the non-refou-
lement13 principle, and
2. in the long term: the establishment of a Common European Asylum System 
 (hereinafter CEAS), and interdiction of the secondary movements of asylum 
 seekers.
The MSs already decided on the establishment of the CEAS with signing the Treaty of 
 Amsterdam and with the agreement of the Programme of Tampere (1999) at the same 
time. The first step of forming the CEAS was the harmonisation of the asylum procedure, 
although it is inevitable that the main goals of the process were the establishment of a com-
mon  European asylum procedure and the initiation of common asylum status Europe-wide. 
During the evolutionary process of the CEAS it became evident, that the harmonisation of 
the law itself is not enough to the implementation of this goal, and that is why the Com-
mission of the European Union instead of realizing the legal background of the CEAS, 
concentrated on the deepening of the operational cooperation, which manifested in the 
creation of the EASO.14
The stakeholders of the European Union recognized that the cooperation in the field of 
asylum policy has numerous advantages. The improvement of the CEAS has mostly internal 
reasons, which can be found in the fact that the MSs try to avoid the secondary movement 
of asylum seekers within the European Union. Certainly the implementation of the CEAS 
has external reasons as well, for instance the formulation of a common action plan in order 
to better pursue the foreign policy interests of the Union. Not explicitly, it is also the goal 
of the think-tanks of the CEAS that there should be regular possibilities for the asylum 
seekers to submit their applications.
10 Kende Tamás (2015): Introduction to the Policies of the European Union. Budapest, Wolters Kluver. 530.
11 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
12 According to Art. 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
13 The non-refoulement of persecuted persons.
14 EASO Regulation 2010.
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The Legal Acts of the CEAS
The legal acts of the CEAS incorporate the following five areas:
• The Dublin III Regulation
• The Temporary Protection Directive
• The Reception Directive
• The Qualification Directive
• The Asylum Procedures Directive
The Dublin III Regulation
The Dublin III Regulation15 is based on the Dublin agreement,16 which establishes linkage 
elements17 according to a strict sequence in order to link the asylum applications to a MS 
(i.e. it defines the MS responsible for the asylum procedure). Due to this the asylum applicant 
cannot choose his/her country of asylum freely within the EU. The linkage elements defined 
in the regulation are the following: 1. family contacts; 2. issued residence permit or visa; 
3. if none of these linkage elements can define the MS responsible for the asylum procedure, 
the countries of first entry (the state) will take over the responsibility; 4. if these linkage 
elements do not give a guideline to define the MS responsible for the asylum procedure the 
procedure has to be conducted in that MS where it was lodged.
The MS which is responsible for the asylum procedure has to be sought as soon as 
possible, and the MS has to answer this take-over request within two months. If the asylum 
applicant absconds during the asylum procedure, and seeks for asylum in another MS, either 
after his/her application being refused or withdrawn, the MS where the procedure is being 
conducted has to take him/her over. The request should be answered within one month, in 
case of a Eurodac-hit, within two months. After approval, the asylum applicant should be 
taken back within six months. The fingerprint registered in the Eurodac-system18 makes 
the identification easier for the MS responsible for the asylum procedure.
The Temporary Protection Directive
The Temporary Protection Directive19 assigns the minimum standards of temporary protec-
tion in case of mass influx of asylum seekers and enables the well based balance between 
the MSs. Mass influx is the situation when from a single third-country or from a single area 
15 Official Journal of the European Union (A).
16 Intergovernmental agreement between the MSs of the European Union on asylum issues. The agreement was 
signed in 1990 but came into force in 1997 and was the ancestor of the Dublin Regulation.
17 Kende (2015): op. cit. 531. 
18 The Eurodac system enables the identification of the border-sequence where the entry to the respective state 
occurred and also enables the identification of the fingerprints of the illegal border crossers and makes possible 
the comparison of the stored data with the data requested by the national authorities where the person entered 
the MS.
19 Official Journal of the European Union (B).
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in several third-countries huge number of asylum applicants arrive in the MS. The Council 
of the European Union should decide whether this condition is relevant. The length of the 
protection ensured by the Council is one year which can be prolonged twice with six months.
The temporary protection does not replace the individual asylum procedure or the 
granting of the refugee status according to the Geneva Convention. It enables the overloaded 
authorities a maximum two years of moratorium to conduct the procedure. The directive 
ensures the persons taken under subsidiary protection, rights similar to the recognized 
refugees, they are allowed to access the labour market and the right of family reunification 
is also possible for them.
The Reception Directive
The Reception Directive20 regulates the common rules of accommodations of the asylum 
seekers, after its amendment, it also regulates the conditions of detention of the asylum 
seekers. If the asylum seekers are not in possession of financial resources or this is what they 
claim – which is characteristic of most of the asylum procedures, the state should supply 
them on a minimal level, which means that it should supply them with accommodation, food 
and in case of minor asylum applicants the access to education should be ensured, as well.
The Qualification Directive
The Qualification Directive21 contributes to the common understanding of the refugee 
definition of the Geneva Convention and reacts to the achievement of the 21st century that 
the asylum seeker is not “the typical Eastern-European intellectual, who »votes with his/her 
feet« (leaves the country) because of the repression of central state power and flees to the 
West but those persons became asylum seekers because they fled from civil war, from the 
war-torn zone of the failed states or from the extremists”.22 The category of subsidiary pro-
tection was introduced to these categories. Persons can be taken under this category if there 
is a well-funded danger that they will be persecuted after returning to their home country.
An important component of the directive is, that it describes and formulates some of 
the main categories of the Geneva Convention, like persecution, persecutor, the reasons of 
persecution and it defines the rights connected with the refugee status and the subsidiary 
protection status in the area of family reunification, healthcare, and remunerative activities. 
Another novelty of the directive is, that it lowers the obligation of the MSs because the grant-
ing of international protection can be refused, if a safe area of protection is available within 
the country, in other words, there is an internal alternative for protection. One of the most 
important improvements of the directive is that it introduces the category of persecution. In 
this case the oppression is realized by non-governmental actors, either by an organization 
or by one’s own family. One of the Commission’s proposals of 2016 recommends replacing 
20 Official Journal of the European Union (C).
21 Official Journal of the European Union (D).
22 Kende (2015): op. cit. 531.
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the Qualification Directive with a regulation, setting uniform standards for the recognition 
of people in need of protection and for the rights granted to beneficiaries of international 
protection.23
The Asylum Procedures Directive
The Asylum Procedures Directive24 specifies the minimal guarantees of the procedure in 
which a decision is taken on the refugee status; it regulates the procedure of taking the 
asylum applicant under refugee status or under subsidiary protection. This directive defines 
the administrative procedure, the juridical phase and the special procedures. The Asylum 
Procedures Directive reduced the possibilities of accelerated procedures and ensured more 
guarantees for legal assistance and it enables more considerate procedure for the vulnerable 
groups.
This directive regulates the withdrawal of statuses, the administrative and juridical 
procedures against these types of decisions. Among the minimal guarantees it should be 
outlined that every adult asylum seeker is entitled on his/her right to apply for asylum and 
the examination of his/her application should be done on an objective and independent 
way. The asylum applicant should be interviewed personally, and a written, well-grounded 
decision should be taken in his/her case.
Some types of accelerated procedures can be distinguished from the normal procedure 
where the minimal guarantees of the procedure apply but the deadlines can be shorter. The 
directive also describes the cases when the application is inadmissible, when for example 
the applicant has already applied for asylum in another MS, either there is an MS which 
is the first state of protection or the category of a safe third-country can be applied. The 
application is also inadmissible if the applicant submits new asylum application without 
confining himself/herself to new facts or he/she as a dependant relative gives up the right 
of submitting an application.
The introduction of the category of a safe country of origin excludes the possibility of 
recognition as refugee while the category of a safe third-country does not doubt this but it 
passes the right of recognition to another country.
Basic elements of the CEAS
Apparently the CEAS is a well-developed system which ensures protection and it has both 
legal and political effect to the international asylum protection systems. The MSs strived 
to have some responsibility areas of their own and improved rules which were not covered 
by the 1951 Geneva Convention, for instance asylum procedures.
The establishment of the EASO is the proof that the MSs succeeded to build a form of 
cooperation on a higher level and to set up an institutional framework for the former quite 
infrequent cooperation and exchange of experience. The MSs tried to strengthen the scope 
23 European Parliament.
24 Official Journal of the European Union (E).
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of their cooperation outside the EU and to enhance the possibility of access to asylum in 
third-countries, as well.
The EU’s efforts are sometimes blocked in the field of asylum policy, because it has 
not yet been defined adequately what the methodology of equal burden-sharing between 
the MSs would be. Accordingly, if a MS claims excessive burden, other MSs often criticise 
it that its demand on more resources is unfounded. Solidarity can be enhanced if the MSs 
have more confidence in each other.
According to the adopted regulations and directives, the CEAS is already functional 
and its institutional framework already works. Although the institutions controlling and 
assessing the irregular migration movements like FRONTEX and Europol are operational, 
there is no common European asylum procedure. The current asylum system is a fragmented 
one, which does not necessarily take into account the interests of the MSs and solidarity 
between them works on a minimum level.
It can be concluded that this irregular migration-related situation is the crisis condition 
of the European systems which are responsible for the control of migration and due to the 
deficient control, the institutions dealing with asylum affairs reached a crisis, as well and 
in a wider sense the EU itself.
This paper argues that the current case is merely the crisis of functionalities of the 
system. It is doubtful whether the situation which occurred in 2015 and has generally char-
acterised the European asylum policy since then, can be described with one of the criteria 
which we got to know from the definition of crisis. Does it head towards destruction or is 
it able to renew and improve from the current situation?
The reason of the dysfunction of the CEAS
The dysfunctionality of the CEAS had already begun in the years before 2015, during 
the time of the revolutionary movements called the Arab Spring when some of the MSs 
expressed their concern about the potential increase of irregular migration movements 
from North Africa and from the Middle East. The critical situation occurred in the field of 
asylum, which raised debates in the French and Italian society already in 2011 when at the 
border between the two states temporary border control was set up in order to prevent the 
mass influx of potential asylum seekers to France.25
International migration became a determinant of the political campaigns of the coun-
tries to a stronger extent in other parts of the World, as well. Just take into account the 
German and Austrian early elections in 2017. Due to the protest of public opinion and the 
policy debates,26 some of the countries indeed changed their asylum and immigration pol-
icy, most of these changes hampered immigration and the access to the asylum procedure.
“Moreover, such legislative changes have been accompanied by an increase in the 
budgets devoted to migration controls in several Member States. Those have invested vast 
25 The Guardian, 2011. France and Italy in call to close EU borders in wake of Arab protests. Available: www.
theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/26/eu-borders-arab-protests (Accessed: 17.10.2017) 
26 The Telegraph, 2011. France and Italy to propose European border reform. Available: www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/uknews/immigration/8472417/France-and-Italy-to-propose-European-border-reform.html (Accessed: 
17.10.2017)
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amounts of money into sophisticated technologies in order to strengthen migration controls. 
One example is the electronic tagging of asylum-seekers in the UK, which aims to prevent 
people from absconding during the processing of their asylum claim. Nevertheless, the most 
prominent illustration of this trend is certainly the acquisition of technological devices – in-
cluding some originating from the military sector – in order to intercept migrants at border 
sites.”27 As the quotation suggests this was already the tendency in 2002.
Signs of the Crisis
The burden caused by the unexpectedly high influx of asylum seekers in 2015 should not 
have affected the European Union and to a wider sense the whole continent as unprepared 
as it did. However, this significant volume of influx caused dysfunctionalities in the insti-
tutional framework of the EU and in the relation between the MSs.28
This crisis in the system after the crisis of the Euro-area made the biggest interference 
in the integration processes of the European Union. This turmoil caused by the high number 
of irregular migrants laid focus on the malfunction of the security systems of the European 
Union. Seemingly, despite the many policy documents, there is no available common asylum 
policy or strategy of the Union.
In spite of the common European attempt the MSs tried to consolidate the security 
turmoil relying upon their own resources. There was no common solution but there is no 
common sense between the MSs in point of the goals which have to be achieved. The mass 
influx of irregular migrants on the Western Balkan route in 2015 passed; the EU still does 
not have an effective and system-wide solution for such a crisis. “If a similar influx occurs 
again that would mean with high probability the breakup of the Schengen area and the 
CEAS.”29
Although in connection with border control and migration management the harmonisa-
tion of the legislation was accomplished or at least the scope of the legislation was broadened 
in previous years, the cooperation on home affairs issues has broken up. This statement is 
true for making up the core element of home affairs and security cooperation, for the asylum 
policy and for the visa policy, too. The cooperation in the area of counterterrorism and in 
information exchange on criminal affairs was not affected to such an extent.
The development of the common asylum policy among the common European policies 
is outstanding if we take into account how a tiny part builds the migration management 
issues of the heading No. III, Security and Citizenship in the European Budget.
The total budget of the European Union for payments and expenditure was 286.5 billion 
Euros while the amount for the heading of Security and Citizenship was just above 4  billion 
27 Kaunert, Christian – Léonard, Sarah (2012): The European Union Asylum Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon 
and the Stockholm Programme: Towards Supranational Governance in a Common Area of Protection? Refugee 
Survey Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4. 2.
28 Szacsúri János (2017): The crisis of the Common European Asylum System: Is there a common European 
answer to the asylum and migration crisis? Migration Research Institute. 1. Available: www.migraciokutato.
hu/hu/2017/09/13/a-kozos-europai-menekultugyi-rendszer-valsaga-letezik-e-kozos-unios-valasz-a-menekul-
tugyi-es-migracios-valsagra/ (Accessed: 17.10.2017)
29 Szacsúri (2017): op. cit. 1.
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which was 1.4% of the budget.30 Of this amount, the budget of the Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund made up 403 million Euros. The extent of the amounts signifies the real 
relevance of the issue of asylum affairs which is otherwise very much highlighted on dif-
ferent European forums.
The budget of FRONTEX, the agency of the European Union responsible for the control 
of the EU borders, compared to the total budget of the EU is extremely small, the budget 
planned for operational activities did not exceed 82 million Euros31 (but the actual amount 
was a little bit more than 111 million). In the crisis situation the capable actors would have 
been the law enforcement, border control and asylum authorities of the MSs, extended 
with the agencies and offices of the European Union, with FRONTEX, EASO and Europol.
Plan for the Management of the Crisis: The European Agenda on 
Migration32
The tragedies occurring on the Mediterranean en route to Europe lead the Council of the 
European Union to handle the issue of international migration. In the special meeting of 
the 23rd of April 2015, the heads of the states and governments expressed their initiative to 
strengthen the solidarity of the MSs to each other and the common burden sharing in the 
area of migration.
According to the European Agenda on Migration the mid and long term priorities of 
the European Union can be summed up as follows: migration is both an opportunity and 
a challenge. The priorities consist of helping the MSs to better manage all aspects of mi-
gration, the Agenda is built upon four pillars:33
• “Reducing the incentives for irregular migration, dismantling smuggling and traf-
ficking networks and defining actions for the better application of return policies.
• Saving lives and securing the external borders: this involves better management of 
the external border, in particular through solidarity towards those Member States 
that are located at the external borders.
• Strengthening the CEAS: with the increases in the flows of asylum seekers, the EU’s 
asylum policies need to be based on solidarity towards those needing international 
protection as well as among the EU Member States, whose full application of the 
common rules must be ensured through systematic monitoring.
• Developing a new policy on legal migration: in view of the future demographic 
challenges the EU is facing, the new policy needs to focus on attracting workers 
that the EU economy needs, particularly by facilitating entry and the recognition 
of qualifications.”34
30 Budget of the EU 2015.
31 FRONTEX (C).
32 Agenda on Migration 2015.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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Improvement of the Council’s position35
At the time of drafting this study (November 2017) the meeting of the Council was held36 
where still the well-formed phrases came to the foreground. The EU leaders agreed that the 
measures aiming to restore control of the external borders brought results and expressed 
their support of MSs affected by high migration pressure at the external borders with assis-
tance of the European institutions. They expressed the strong need of cooperation with the 
countries of origin and transit including Turkey. The heads of the states and governments 
showed full commitment to the cooperation with Turkey and to the support of the Western 
Balkans.
The statement37 emphasises that the EU still handles the situation as the crisis of the 
Mediterranean and it reiterates the importance of working with the countries of Northern 
Africa and especially highlights the need of cooperation with Libya. It calls for increased 
efforts to rapidly establish a permanent EU presence in Libya, taking account of the con-
ditions on the ground.
According to the FRAN-report38 of FRONTEX, for the first quarter of 2017 it can 
be established that the crisis situation caused by the high pressure of irregular migration 
affected the Mediterranean route already in 201639 to a larger extent than the Balkan route, 
because on the Mediterranean route there were 374 thousand illegal border crossings reg-
istered by the authorities while on the Balkan route not more than 130 thousand, and this 
situation has remained unchanged.
The European Agenda on Migration also prioritises the management of the migration 
crisis in the area of the Mediterranean. The main pillars of the plan are relocation, the Eu-
ropean resettlement mechanism and the setting-up of European registration points, hotspots 
in Italy and Greece.
In the regulation 1624/2016 EU40 establishing the FRONTEX, stands that, “hotspot 
area means an area in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union 
agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing 
or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in 
the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”. The same legal act regulates the 
setting-up and utilisation of the hotspots by a MS. “Where a Member State faces dispropor-
tionate migratory challenges at particular hotspot areas of its external borders characterised 
by large inward mixed migratory flows, that Member State may request technical and op-
erational reinforcement by migration management support teams. That Member State shall 
submit a request for reinforcement and an assessment of its needs to the Agency and other 
relevant Union agencies, in particular EASO and Europol.”41
35 General Secretariat of the Council 2017.
36 European Council 19–20.10.2017, Brussels.
37 European Council 2017, 2.
38 FRONTEX (D).
39 According to the data of the FRONTEX more than 1 million persons arrived in Europe on the Mediterranean 
route while on the Balkan route 764 thousand; the two routes were affected by the crisis to a similar extent.
40 Official Journal of the European Union (E).
41 Official Journal of the European Union (F).
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In the regulation establishing the EASO, the definition of hotspots cannot be explicitly 
found, yet Article 3 contains that the MS affected by extremely high pressure of irregular 
migrants can request support from the Office to deploy asylum support teams.42
Outlook: Hotspots in the third-countries
The think-tanks around the European Commission43 already planned the establishment of 
the asylum registration centres (hotspot) in the territory of third-countries close to the crisis 
areas. The initiative would distinguish between two relocation mechanisms of asylum appli-
cants: according to the first version the asylum applicants would be distributed among the 
states participating in the Dublin III regulation. According to the other approach the decision 
in the asylum application would be taken already in the hotspot area, in the third-countries 
and at the end of the procedure the applicants taken under international protection would 
be shared between the states implementing the Dublin III regulation. The supporters of 
the initiative argue that the asylum registration centres would be operated either by the EU 
or by the UNHCR but they may be under control of the International Red Cross, as well.
Despite the disadvantages, these centres would also have some advantages, because 
the asylum applicants would not be forced to use the Mediterranean route endangering their 
lives to reach Europe and it would reduce the activity of the human smuggling networks 
in the area, as well. The asylum registration centres in the third-countries could reduce the 
financial load of the asylum procedure, although estimates are not available, simply because 
of the lower expenses of the suppliers. In addition to the cost reducing effects, it has to be 
taken into account that with the centres operating in the third-countries, a second parallel 
asylum system would come into existence parallel to the asylum system in the MSs which 
would presumably increase the expenses of the asylum procedure.
Taking the decision on the asylum applications in the hotspots would lower the ex-
penditure of the return operations because the entry to the EU would be allowed just for 
persons who have the right to stay in the EU or are entitled to get the right of stay. It can 
be established that the operation of hotspots in the territory of third-countries incorporates 
some legal and political bottlenecks which can be the following:
1. “What would be the legal base of setting up these hotspots?
2. Would a bilateral agreement between the EU and the host country for the asylum 
registration centres be enough to establish hotspots?
3. Which country would be suitable, on the basis of humanitarian and political cri-
teria to operate these centres on its territory? Hotspots can be pull-factors; they 
can attract even more asylum applicants to their host countries?
4. What would the legal base of the asylum applicants be to stay in the third-countries 
and what would the responsibility of these countries be towards the applicants? 
42 Official Journal of the European Union (G). “A Member State or Member States subject to particular pressure 
may request the Support Office for deployment of an asylum support team. The requesting Member State or 
Member States shall provide, in particular a description of the situation, indicate the objectives of the request 
for deployment and specify the estimated deployment requirements, in accordance with Article 18(1).”
43 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft 2015, 11.
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Setting up these centres would raise some doubts regarding the sovereignty of the 
countries, as well.
5. Which countries, and how would they share the burden of the operation of these 
hotspots?
6. Which institution of the EU would be functionally responsible for these centres? Is 
it possible that the restructured EASO as an agency of the European Union would 
manage the operation and control of the CEAS?
7. How would the hotspot system be able to tackle the huge number of applications?
8. How would the asylum applicants whose application was rejected react? Presu-
mably some of them would still try to enter the EU and the third-countries would 
be obligated to ensure them some kind of right to stay.
9. This type of reception centres with huge capacity would jeopardize the security 
situation in the host countries too.”44
It seems obvious that the funding of these asylum registration facilities in the third-countries 
would raise some questions and it can be stated that solving the crisis based on the hotspot 
approach is questionable and too idealistic.
Ensuring Solidarity in the MSs
Two types of burden-sharing mechanism can be distinguished in the Union, one is a one-di-
mensional and the other one is a multidimensional approach. The first one tries to share the 
burden equally between the MSs based on the number of the asylum applications and this 
type of burden-sharing could be divided into two sub-methods whether the ground of the 
burden-sharing is mandatory (legal harmonisation or possible quotas) or voluntary. The 
scope of the EU covers mostly the one-dimensional burden sharing.
The multidimensional burden-sharing does not only focus on one aspect. The exam-
ple for a multidimensional burden-sharing can be the establishment of an agency which 
appoints the quotas or deploys asylum support teams into the transit/destination countries, 
or countries of origin. The latter solution is reactive because they can be implemented in 
the case when the situation has already emerged.45
Technically the burden-sharing mechanism has three distinctive types: the first one 
is physical, and it is technically implemented, the sharing of persons, the second one is the 
harmonisation of legal backgrounds (burden-sharing based on legal acts) and the third one 
is purely financial (the share of financial resources). Developing the CEAS, the harmoni-
sation of the legal background played an important role, but recently the arguments for the 
physical burden sharing are quite frequent (see the idea of quotas).
The development of the CEAS based on regulations and directives was time consuming 
and the irregular migration related events of 2015–16 proved that its concept was partly mis-
44 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft 2015, 18.
45 Thielemann, Eiko (2008): The Future of the Common European Asylum System. Swedish Institute for Euro-
pean Policy Studies. 3. Available: www.sieps.se/en/publications/2008/the-future-of-the-common-european-
asylum-system-20081epa/Sieps_2008_1epa.pdf (Accessed: 18.10.2017)
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taken. The professionals dealing with asylum affairs agree that the current system favours 
the abuse of the right of asylum and asylum shopping.46
The core element of the CEAS: The Dublin III Regulation
One of the core parts of the CEAS is the Dublin III Regulation, which does not aim at 
sharing the asylum applications equally, instead it ensures the identification of the country 
responsible for the asylum procedure and makes it faster. The criteria which help the as-
signment of the country responsible for the asylum procedure were already touched upon; 
one of the shortcomings of these linkage elements is that the MS will not be interested in 
the registration of the applicants if the number of asylum applicants and the workload of 
the authorities significantly increase.
The Dublin III Regulation assumes that the states participating in the Dublin system 
(although Switzerland, for instance is not an MS of the EU, but member of the Dublin system 
and accordingly, the crisis of the EU does not only affect the EU directly) introduce similar 
asylum procedures and they completely fulfil their obligations rising from the humanitarian 
rights, too. It would mean, that for the asylum applicant it is irrelevant in which country he/
she submits his/her application, because he/she would have the same or comparable oppor-
tunity to be recognised as a refugee. These conditions were already not sustainable at the 
early phase of the Dublin system, a good example of this is the change in the recognition 
rate of asylum applicants by category of citizenship in the countries of the Dublin-area.
Here are some facts by the European Commission which should be outlined in con-
nection with the malfunction of the Dublin III Regulation:
• “The system is unfair, because it means an extreme burden for the countries affected 
by mass influx of asylum seekers at the Southern part of the Dublin area.
• Parallel to this, 75% of the asylum procedures are conducted in five MSs: Germany 
is responsible for the vast majority of the asylum applications, the other main af-
fected countries are France, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom, according to 
the statistical data of 2015.47
• Due to the missing fingerprint registration in the Eurodac-system, it is impossible 
to identify the country responsible for the asylum procedure.
• One of the shortcomings of the system is that in cases where the responsible country 
can be identified, the rate of the realized Dublin takeover is just 13% of the incoming 
requests,48 due to the absconding asylum applicant or because of logistical obstacles.
• In case of some MSs the suspension of the handover was terminated, according 
to the leading cases of the European Court of Justice or by the European Court of 
Human Rights.”49
The unique response of the EU to the crisis was relocation, but after a quite peaceful period 
in 2016, the Union was not able to deliver an ultimate solution.
46 Szacsúri (2017): op. cit. 6.
47 Eurostat database.
48 Ibid.
49 Szacsúri (2017): op. cit. 6.
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Initiatives for a reform of the Dublin Regulation
The Council50 has proposed a new planned automated system allowing the registration of all 
asylum applications made in the EU, and the monitoring of the number of applications made 
in each Member State on a daily basis. The new system will automatically be established, 
when a country is handling a disproportionate number of asylum applications.
If the number of asylum applications made in one of the Member States is above 150%51 
of the reference share, the fairness mechanism is automatically triggered. This reference 
number is identified on the basis of a key, taking account of the country’s population, and 
the size of its economy. Once the fairness mechanism is triggered, all new applications in 
the Member State concerned are allocated to other Member States.
A Member State will also have the option to temporarily not take part in the allocation. 
In that case, it would have to make a financial solidarity contribution of EUR 250,000 to the 
Member State receiving an applicant for whom it would otherwise have been responsible 
under the fairness mechanism.
Though CEAS is primarily a system based on regulations and directives, there are 
institutions in connection with it, which emphasise the operational collaboration, for ex-
ample EASO or FRONTEX.
Next, the study focuses on showing the effectiveness of the cooperation and on these 
mentioned European institutions extended in the area of home and justice cooperation, by 
the agency, Europol.
European Institutions Managing the Crisis Situation Caused by 
the Irregular Migration
The European Asylum Support Office
In the CEAS, the EASO plays one of the main roles, the idea of its foundation goes back 
to 1999, when the heads of states and governments decided on it in the council meeting in 
Tampere, and thereafter in 2004, within the framework of the Hague programme the deci-
sion was taken on the establishment of EASO, as the main institution in the area of asylum.
In the first quarter of 2010, the European Parliament and the Council decided on its 
establishment, the regulation on the operation of the EASO52 came into power in June 2011, 
and on 1 February 2011 EASO, as the Office of the European Union, became functional 
with the headquarters in Valetta, on Malta.
According to the regulation establishing the EASO, the Office was created, “in order to 
help to improve the implementation of the Common European Asylum System (the CEAS), 
to strengthen practical cooperation among Member States on asylum and to provide and/
50 European Parliament (Proposal) 2017.
51 Ibid.
52 Official Journal of the European Union vol. 53. L 132 Regulation 439/2010 EU on the Establishment of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, Establishing a European Asylum Support Office. Available: http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2010:132:TOC (Accessed: 21.11.2017)
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or coordinate the provision of operational support to Member States subject to particular 
pressure on their asylum and reception systems”.53
As one of its main activities, EASO helps MSs in particular pressure, in this case, 
the first asylum supports were provided to Luxembourg and Sweden in 2012, which were 
followed by Bulgaria and Italy in 2013, and by Cyprus in 2014. Since 2015 the EASO has 
played a central role in the implementation of the Migration Agenda on Europe and the 
hotspot approach in Greece and Italy.
The establishment of the hotspots is, as a matter of fact, a pilot project; this type of asy-
lum registration centres had not been operational in the EU previously, and its development 
and possibilities for change are still open. The EASO supports the implementation of CEAS 
by applying a bottom-up approach in order to ensure the decision on asylum applications 
according to the same principles.
Within the framework of the permanent support, EASO provides common trainings 
with the help of common training material in order to ensure the common quality of the 
asylum procedure. Within the special support programme, it provides support in capacity 
building and in relocations, within the scope of a tailor-made, country specific programme, 
it delivers quality control tools to the MSs in need, as well.
In the emergency support programme, it organises solidarity for Member States subject 
to particular pressures by providing assistance to repair or rebuild asylum and reception 
systems. As part of the permanent asylum support, the EASO follows the tendencies in the 
field of asylum, and collects data on it. Based on the collected data, it publishes the Latest 
Asylum Trends, analyses on its homepage, but the national authorities responsible for the 
management of international migration are provided with the extended and confidential 
version of this publication.
EASO supports the external dimension of the CEAS by collaborating with third coun-
tries, to reach common solutions with the help of building regional protection programmes, 
and coordinating MSs initiatives on resettlement.
This aim of the CEAS was outlined by the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs 
and Citizenship in November 2014 as well, when he mentioned that the Committee should 
work on a strategy which strengthens the capability of the EU to answer for crisis situations, 
and especially to support the capability of EASO in cooperation with third-countries.
In the crisis situation caused by the irregular migration, EASO played and still plays 
an important role in the hotspot approach.54
The hotspots support the MSs hosting the asylum support teams to register and pro-
cess the asylum applications. By creating the hotspots, the EASO ensures the coordination 
between the participating experts in the Asylum Support Teams and technical means de-
ployed by the Agency in the framework of EASO Hotspot Operating Plan. Currently, there 
are functional hotspots in two MSs: there are five of them in both Italy and Greece. The 
reception capacity of the hotspots in Italy is 1,600 persons, while in Greece a total of 7,450.55
53 Official Journal of the European Union (H).
54 The hotspot approach was initiated by the Council on its meeting in 25–26 June 2015 and afterwards it was 
supported in the note by the Commissioner for Migration Home Affairs and Citizenship in June 2015.
55 State of play of the hotspots, 2017.
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Beyond the experts of EASO, the staff of FRONTEX, Europol and Eurojust56 partic-
ipate in the work of the hotspots in close cooperation with local experts. The staffs of the 
collaborating institutions with the local experts conduct the registration of the potential 
asylum applicants, take fingerprints and if needed, they organize the return of the person 
in question.
If the registered persons apply for asylum, the EASO experts support the smooth con-
duct of the procedure and for those not eligible for international protection, the FRONTEX 
organizes their return to the country of origin or to a safe third-country. The Europol and 
Eurojust staffs cooperate in exploring the human smuggling and trafficking networks.
Table 1.
The capacity and number of staff in Italy as of 23 October 2017, the row EU presence contains the 
number of experts from EASO (EASO Staff and MS Experts)
Hotspots operating in Italy
Lampedusa Pozzalo Taranto Trapani Messina
Capacity 500 300 400 400
EU presence 5 experts 7 experts 4 experts 9 experts 2 experts
FRONTEX presence 18 experts 24 experts 13 experts 21 experts
Source: European Commission, State of play of the hotspots, 2017
Table 2.
The capacity and number of staff in Greece as of 23 October 2017, the row EU presence contains the 
number of experts from EASO (EASO Staff and MS Experts)
Hotspots in Greece
Lesvos Chios Samos Leros Kos
Capacity 1500 1100 850 1000 1000
EU presence 143 experts 114 experts 113 experts 50 experts 67 experts
FRONTEX presence 105 experts 63 experts 32 experts 16 experts 17 experts
Source: European Commission, State of play of the hotspots, 2017
The concentration of the hotspots is noticeable in Greece, whose necessity is obviously ow-
ing to the geographical situation of the country, and the high number of irregular migrants 
who disembark there.
The hotspots approach did not manage to successfully solve the crisis situation caused 
by the mass influx of irregular migrants in view of the following:
1. One of the reasons of the creation of hotspots was the sustainable relocation of the 
asylum seekers to the EU MSs (and accordingly, to the states of the Dublin area); 
however, the statistical data indicate that only a small part of the irregular mig-
rants were relocated to another MS: until October 2017, 30 thousand persons were 
56 The European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit. Available: http://eurojust.europa.eu/Pages/home.aspx (Ac-
cessed: 21.11.2017)
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relocated:57 about 21 thousand (asylum seekers) from Greece and slightly above 
10 thousand from Italy. The biggest destination countries of the relocated persons 
so far, are Germany (4,838 persons), France (4,091 persons) and Belgium (1,700 
persons). Certainly the success of the relocation programmes widely depends on 
the cooperation of the receiving countries.
2. The hotspots were also criticised for selecting the asylum applicants based on ci-
tizenship categories – although this is one of their responsibilities – and for taking 
decisions without examining individual cases.
3. It is also outlined by the critics that the role of the EASO is overrepresented in 
the decision-making process (although apparently the Commission’s aim is to 
strengthen the role of EASO on deciding the admissibility and on the in-merit 
procedure), while these decisions can only be reached by the authorities of the 
receiving countries.
4. The operation of the hotspots is not regulated in a single law, but in several diffe-
rent laws; on the one hand, this legal background enables flexibility for them, on 
the other hand, a single law would ensure a more discrete situation.
5. There are huge differences in the financing of the deployed authorities and the ex-
perts seconded by them in the hotspots. This is also true for EASO and FRONTEX, 
but even truer for Europol and Eurojust. Their role and responsibilities should be 
defined more thoroughly and the way of cooperation between them should also be 
regulated better.58
The FRONTEX
The other decisive institution in the field of institutional cooperation is FRONTEX, which 
is also an important part of the hotspot system. FRONTEX was established by the Council 
with regulation 2007/2004 EC of 26 October 2004, as the agency for the management of 
operational cooperation at the external borders of the European Union. This regulation was 
overruled by regulation 1624/2016 EU, which established the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency.
The main duties of FRONTEX include monitoring migratory flows and carrying out 
risk analyses regarding all aspects of the integrated border management; it also carries out 
vulnerability assessments, including the readiness of the MSs to face threats. It also deploys 
liaison officers in the MSs who monitor the management of the external borders.
The Agency supports search and rescue operations preventing humanitarian catastro-
phes. To be able to do this, it can deploy European Border and Coast Guard Teams within 
the framework of migration management teams, including rapid border intervention teams. 
It provides operational and technical support for the MSs controlling the external borders 
of the European Union and assists them fulfilling their return operation. During the joint 
return operations, it controls the implementation of the returns in cooperation with the return 
experts and with the staff responsible for implementing the return.
57 Available: www.easo.europa.eu/easo-relocation (Accessed: 27.10.2017)
58 European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) 2016, 51.
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In the hotspot areas FRONTEX conducts the first screening, debriefing, identification 
and fingerprinting of the asylum applicants in cooperation with the EASO and the national 
authorities. It fights against organised cross-border crime and terrorism at the external 
borders in cooperation with Europol and Eurojust. Furthermore, it is responsible for the 
development of the EUROSUR59 and the interoperability of the system which is a common 
information-sharing environment. The tasks of FRONTEX also include a strong external 
dimension, because the Agency’s task is the improvement of the cooperation between the 
MSs and third-countries.
The relation between FRONTEX and the MSs is twofold, because the MSs are obliged 
to avoid any activity which could endanger the agency’s activity, in connection with the 
responsibilities of FRONTEX, and they also have to inform the agency about any operational 
actions carried out outside the scope of FRONTEX.
The activity of FRONTEX in practice: Schengen countries are obliged to control the 
external borders of the Schengen area. The primary responsibility of border control lies 
with the Schengen countries that have an external border (including land and sea borders 
and international airports). FRONTEX plays a role in border control when experts and 
technical equipment are needed at the external border affected by high migration pressure. 
FRONTEX also supports the capacity of the MSs of controlling the external borders by 
trainings and sharing the best practices.
FRONTEX joint operations are planned on the basis of FRAN (Annual Risk Analysis 
Network), which analyses the likely future risk of irregular migration and cross-border 
crime. The actions of FRONTEX are planned in negotiation with the MSs, during this 
process, FRONTEX assesses the expert staff and equipment needed. According to the risk 
assessment, FRONTEX prepares the action plan in which it decides on the type of experts 
(interviewers, cultural mediators and/or interpreters) needed. The FRONTEX experts work 
under the command of the hosting country’s authorities. The guest officers perform all 
tasks, and exercise all powers for border checks or border surveillance in accordance with 
Schengen Borders Code.
Rapid intervention: in case of mass influx of irregular migrants, FRONTEX may 
deploy European Border Guard Teams (EBGT). The decision to deploy EBGTs for a rapid 
intervention is made by the Executive Director of FRONTEX, the final decision is preceded 
by a number of procedural steps. Members of the teams perform tasks under instructions 
from and in the presence of border guards of the MS requesting assistance. The role of 
FRONTEX in the hotspots approach of the management of mass influx of irregular migrants 
was substantial, because FRONTEX performed the following tasks:
• It carried out the fingerprinting and interviewing of the asylum applicants.
• In the management of the crisis caused by the mass inflow of irregular migrants, 
FRONTEX also deployed intercultural mediators and interpreters.
59 EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System) is the information-exchange framework designed to 
improve the management of Europe’s external borders. It aims to support Member States by increasing their 
situational awareness and reaction capability in combating cross-border crime, tackling irregular migration. 
The backbone of EUROSUR is a network of National Coordination Centres (NCCs). The EUROSUR was 
established by 1052/2013 EU regulation. Available: http://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/eurosur/ (Accessed: 
22.11.2017)
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• The crisis of the institutions of the European Union managing irregular migration 
strengthened FRONTEX, its budget increased to a great extent, while in 2015 it 
could spend 111 million Euro on operational activities, this amount doubled to 
209 million Euro in 2016.
• According to the current plans, the number of its staff will be increased to 1,000 
persons, which is quite a reasonable plan, taking the current tendencies into account, 
because one-third of its 488 persons staff was employed during 2016.60 Evidently, 
FRONTEX is to be reformed and built into an agency fully responsible for the 
control of the external borders of the EU (see the speech of Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker, 
the President of the European Commission on 9 September 2015 in the European 
Parliament).61 Obviously, the feasibility of this idea is disputable.
• This plan would result in the establishment of a new law enforcement institution 
collaborating or extending those of the MSs but it has to be taken into account that 
the approach highlighting only the law enforcement aspect of irregular migration 
would not be a sustainable solution of the problem.
The Europol
The other institutional actor of the hotspot approach is the Europol, which plays an active 
role in the fight against human trafficking and international human smuggling networks. 
The agreement on the establishment of the Europol was signed on 26 July 1995, after long 
multilateral negotiations between the MSs. After ratification by the MSs, the agreement 
came into power on 1 October 1998, and Europol became functional on 1 July 1999 with 
the headquarters in The Hague.
In the meeting of the Council of the Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs in 2006, 
a decision was made by the Council to replace the agreement and actually the decision 
establishing the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) was 
adopted in 2009 and accordingly Europol became the budgetary agency of the EU from 1 
January 2010.
The task of Europol is to support the MSs in the fight against organized crime, terror-
ism and in the prevention and fight against dangerous criminal activities affecting two or 
more MSs. Europol collects different types of operational data on criminal activities and 
supports the criminal investigation of the MSs by providing assistance to the national units.62
Europol’s tasks are the requests of the responsible authorities of the MSs for the 
implementation of investigation, exchange of crime related operational information and 
providing assistance for the MSs in accordance with high volume international events, and 
the development of strategic assessment and situational reports.
Each MS establishes a national unit which is an institution liaising between the Europol 
and the national authorities and the MSs deploy liaison officers to the Europol, who build the 
national liaison offices at the Europol and work under the national law of the sending MS.
60 FRONTEX (E), 8. 
61 European Commission 2015.
62 Nagy Judit (2014): The Europol. In Hollán Miklós: The EU as the Area of Ensuring Freedom, Security and 
the Role of Law, Hungary in the European Union 2004–2014. Budapest, NKE. 139.
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Since 2013 the Europol has developed the SOCTA (Serious Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment), which provides an overall picture about the criminal threats affecting the EU.
The staff of the Europol can participate in common investigation teams, the members 
of which are entitled to support the investigation and share information with the other 
members of the team under the law of the hosting country.63
In accordance with its activity the Europol also cooperates with many other internation-
al organizations and third-countries. The memorandums of cooperation can be distinguished 
on the basis of the type of information exchange; on the one hand, there are strategic agree-
ments, which enable the exchange of all types of data except personal data, and on the other 
hand, there are operational agreements which enable the exchange of personal data, as well.
Beyond many agreements with third-countries, the Europol also cooperates with ten in-
stitutions of the EU, among others the CEPOL, the OLAF, the Eurojust and the FRONTEX.
The European Migrant Smuggling Centre
“The goal of the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) is to support EU Member 
States in targeting and dismantling the complex and sophisticated criminal networks in-
volved in migrant smuggling.”64
The Centre was formed in February 2016, in response to the unprecedented increase in 
the number of irregular migrants arriving in the EU since 2014. The Europol’s researches 
indicate that 90% of this unexpectedly high number of irregular migrants arrived in the 
EU with the help of human-smuggling networks and indeed that is why the fight against 
human-smuggling is one of the key priority of the EU.
The EMSC provides help to MSs, to improve the way they exchange information and 
it facilitates increased collaboration among MSs themselves, and between international 
organisations. In the Joint Operation Teams (JOT), seven states cooperate within the scope 
of EMSC, and share important information on human-smuggling networks departing from 
Turkey, Lybia and North Africa.
As an information centre, the EMSC provides help to the regional action teams in 
Catania and Pireus, in identifying human-smuggling networks and in asylum related 
support, with sharing secret information originating from intelligence and participating in 
criminal investigations. In the fight against human-smuggling, Europol closely cooperates 
with EASO, FRONTEX and Europol within the framework of this cooperation, it deploys 
Europol Mobile Investigation Teams and Europol Mobile Assessment Teams to the MSs.
The role of Europol in the hotspot approach
The Europol provides support to the MSs in the criminal investigations and it may deploy 
JOTs to the hotspots, which implement the following activities:
63 Nagy (2014): op. cit. 139.
64 Europol 2015.
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• They share information with the collaborating authorities to identify criminal activi-
ties and prevent human-smuggling, and to prevent secondary movement of migrants.
• It enables direct access to the database of Europol for the cooperating institutions.
• It strengthens the possibility of joint operations with the collaborating institutions.
• In the framework of the hotspot approach the EASO, the FRONTEX, and the 
Europol work complementing each other, the EASO helps carry out the asylum 
procedure, FRONTEX identifies the asylum applicants and Europol supports the 
intelligence of human-smuggling networks and persons in contact with terrorist 
organizations.
Conclusions
It can be established that the crisis caused by the irregular migration in 2015 and in the 
following years, cannot be called crisis regarding the volume of the events, because Eu-
rope and the European Union with its economic and demographic power (with more than 
510 million inhabitants) should be able to manage a yearly inflow of 1–1.4 million irregular 
migrants or potential asylum seekers.
The collapse of the system (the CEAS and other systems may be listed here) did not 
take place: it was avoidable due to temporary solutions, and to the sovereign actions intro-
duced by the MSs. The CEAS itself was in crisis, which, as it was stated by many experts, 
was not able to manage its tasks fully even under quite peaceful circumstances, not to 
mention the time of the inflow of this extent of irregular migrants.
Speaking of crisis, it was found that the CEAS itself was in crisis and one of its core 
elements, the Dublin III Regulation because it was adopted to identify the MSs responsible 
for the asylum procedure and to facilitate the proceeding of the asylum applications. The 
regulation did not reckon with the possibility, that there might be MSs, lying mainly at the 
external border of the EU, which simply utilize the policy of go-through, and the carrying 
out of the procedures will place a burden on the MSs in the centre of the EU.
The situation is well characterised by a source close to the Committee, who said that 
“the asylum acquis as a construction was like an airplane which was constructed for flying 
in good weather conditions and it should have been strengthened for bad weather, as well”.65 
Presumably, this construction of airplane was unable to fly even in good weather. One of the 
reasons for the crisis was the lack of solidarity from the side of the MSs to each other, and 
the fact that the MSs use emergency solutions taking only their own interests into account 
(for instance pushing forward the irregular migrants into other MSs).
There are two possible ways for the EU to develop the CEAS. The first being, to en-
hance the CEAS, which is a construction of regulations and directives, and it can strengthen 
the role of the authorities and institutions active in the area of asylum procedure ensuring 
them more rights. The second is to develop a new and common asylum procedure valid for 
the whole EU. The latter one does not seem too feasible.
65 Szacsúri (2015): op. cit. 6.
108 Dynamics and Social Impact of Migration
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
For the functioning of this strengthened system with more rights, it is inevitable to 
ensure punctual and reliable data and to harmonise the data collection mechanism of the 
European Union from the definitions through common methods and procedures.
The hotspot approach introduced at the time of the crisis can be seen as a best prac-
tice, besides many disadvantages, because within this frame, the different institutions 
managing international migration cooperate and complement each other. Nevertheless, it 
is also important to develop a single legal background which regulates the operation of the 
hotspots. The current situation, the lack of a single regulation on the hotspots enables more 
flexible operation but a single regulation would obviously have many advantages, as well. 
Currently, the hotspot approach is a pilot project, and it is to be decided whether the high 
standards during the asylum procedure are really needed, since it would enable the access to 
the procedure only for a limited number of applicants and operate a demonstrative system. 
The extension of the hotspot approach to third-countries is also possible in order to guide 
the asylum applicants to the procedure already outside the EU.
In my point of view, the turning point of the crisis is manifested in the hotspot approach 
(beyond the MSs own solutions), which enabled the survival of the CEAS. However, to 
tackle the crisis and improve the asylum procedure sustainably, it is important to recast the 
CEAS, primarily the Dublin III Regulation, furthermore it is also inevitable to establish 
a common asylum procedure to ensure equal chances for every asylum applicant to be taken 
under international protection.
The common system based on the hotspot approach should develop the method of 
avoiding secondary movements of asylum applicants and a fair burden-sharing method 
should be developed which shares applicants according to the population figures and eco-
nomic power of the MSs.
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Escaped from War and on the Border of Asylum Law and 
Children’s Right: Response and Responsibilities of States
Anita Rozália Nagy-Nádasdi
Introduction
As mass influx of migrants arrives to the external border of the EU, the survival migration1 
drives thousands into border-crossing and perilous journey; the linkage between climate 
change, armed conflict and migration is with identifying this case. Thousands of children 
and youth arrive from persistent conflict zones to Europe yearly and the problem of de-
termining which state is responsible for their interrupted childhood is the main question. 
There are several responses in different international legal frameworks but in this paper we 
examine them in order to find responses to how their rights are protected.
The international public law addresses holistically the situation of children who are 
affected by war. In this paper we are focusing the international treaties, as they are pri-
marily binding contracts between states. We only touch upon the legal instruments of the 
United Nations regarding children and war. But we need to state here that the UN Security 
Council has a right under the UN Charter to oblige the States in its resolutions. These legal 
instruments are the basis of the UN peacekeeping missions and these resolutions alongside 
with the documents of the General Assembly have a great effect on the international law.
The international humanitarian law is the very first legal framework that tried to give 
a response to the need of children affected by armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions and 
its Additional Protocols contains several provisions regarding children2 but the complete 
and complex protection they need could not be covered only by one framework.
The widely signed and ratified or accessed Convention on the Right of the Child signed 
in New York, 1989 (CRC)3 is the first one that referred back to the international humani-
tarian law exactly on the issue of children and armed conflict. The Optional Protocol to 
1 Betts, Alexander (2013): Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement. Itacha, 
Cornell University Press.
2 Article 51 of Geneva Convention (I) on Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949 and its com-
mentary; Article 140 of Geneva Convention (II) on Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked of Armed Forces at Sea, 
1949 and its commentary; Article 85 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; and 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.
3 Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 1989. United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1577. 3.
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the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict 
(OPAC)4 closely links to the Convention and Sates intended to give a protective response 
by raising the age limit of child soldiering. In this paper we will look into the interpreta-
tion of the CRC done by its treaty body, the Committee on the Right of the Child (CRCee) 
through its comments.
Children often get into life threatening situation by armed conflict, and those who 
are forced into fleeing, alone or along with family members, are usually entitled to get in-
ternational protection on the basis of the Convention on the Statues of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention) signed in Geneva in 1951.5 Besides the interpretations of the Refugee Con-
vention done by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as treaty body, we 
will examine the European application of the Refugee Convention. The European Union 
has a great effect on asylum, as it belongs to the shared competency of the states and the 
 Common European Asylum System (CEAS) built on the responses of the Refugee Con-
vention. Although from the aspects of the CRC it is a controversial situation since child 
soldiers are considered to be not only victims but also offenders because of the crimes they 
committed or were forced to commit, and for this reason they might be excluded from the 
subject of the beneficiaries of international protection. However, the protection of children’s 
rights determines that the duty of the States to ensure the exercise of children’s rights and 
the right to integration of such victims of violence – is responsible for the reparation of the 
children concerned because of their prior human rights violations.
In the final chapter we will show how the only judicial body, the International  Criminal 
Court (ICC) gives responses to the endangerment of children by armed conflict that also 
provides reparation for the victims under international humanitarian law. The national 
responses should follow these binding international treaties. In practice this is happening 
slowly. This phenomenon has several reasons, such as protection of sovereignty and the re-
sponsibility for their own citizens. But the fragmented transportations of these international 
obligations have a societal effect in addition to the legal consequences, especially when the 
children concerned arrive in European countries as children or young adults.
International Law
Often those children who were involved in armed conflicts are the very same ones who left 
their country later because of the consequences of the involvement. The question if they 
became asylum-seekers later is an assumption, but the link between these two groups might 
exist. According to the data of international organisations, the place of origin of the children 
4 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of the Rights of the Child 
into force Children in Armed Conflicts, adopted on 25 May 2000, G.A. Res. A/RES/54/263 (12 Feb. 2002). It 
was promulgated by Act CLX of 2009.
5 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees Geneva, 28 July 1951. United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 189. 
137.; and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees New York, 31 January 1967. United Nations, Treaty Series, 
Vol. 606. 267.
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affected by armed conflict in 2016 converge with the place of origin of the migrant children 
who reached Europe in 2017.6
We assume that they are migrating nationally and internationally and they might have 
been forced to migrate. They may fall under the scope of the Refugee Convention. There are 
several thousands of people who do not fulfil the conditions set in Article 1 of the Refugee 
Convention.7 These are the people who did not receive proper protection from their states 
and community.
Understanding the legal situation of these children, more precisely youth, we need 
to examine those binding international treaties that oblige the signatories to protect them. 
The international treaties create rights and obligations of those States that have consented 
to be bound by them (or by one of them), through ratification or accession. They are the 
source of international law inter pares, i.e. treaty law. A certain number of provisions may 
require action after ratification: measures have to be taken at national level to ensure their 
implementation as treaty obligations.
We assume that these provisions aim to protect children and create a fabric of law that 
might not cover as much as they should. By this method we try and hope to raise the veil of 
ignorance. These children are those who lost their childhood and their States; those who 
were responsible to provide them a secure period, failed them. The international community 
should provide protection to them in such cases for the sake of all of us.
International Humanitarian Law
Among others, the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention IV)8 and the Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (Additional Protocol I)9 determine 
the child’s protection in armed conflict. This was the very first legal instrument that dealt 
with the issue of children in armed conflict.
6 According to the Annual Report of the Special Representative of Security-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict, the concerned states for at least 4,000 verified violations by government forces and more than 11,500 
verified violations by the range of non-State armed groups are Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, 
Columbia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mali, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Yemen in 2016. A/72/361–S/2017/821. Available: https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/millions-
of-children-caught-in-conflict-victims-and-targets-of-despicable-harm/ (Accessed: 10.04.2018). According to 
the report of the UNCHR, International Migration Organisation and United Nation Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
from a total of 16,500 children 11,400 accompanied and unaccompanied children arrived to Europe from 
Kuwait, the State of Palestine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Pakistan, Iran, Nigeria, Eritrea, Bangladesh, The Gambia, Mali, Somalia, Senegal, Cote D’Ivoire, 
Guinea Conakry, Morocco, Algeria between January and June 2017. Available: https://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/60348.pdf. (Accessed: 10.04.2018) 
7 According to the UNHCR, there are 803,100 people in 2016 who fall outside the protection of the Refugee 
Convention. Available: www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2016/ (Accessed: 10.04.2018)
8 Available: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/380 (Accessed: 10.04.2018). 196 State Parties came into 
force on 21.10.1950. 
9 Available: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470 (Accessed: 10.04.2018). 174 State Parties 
came into force on 07.12.1978.
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Provisions regarding children in the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols
In this chapter we will examine the children related provisions of the Geneva Convention 
IV and Additional Protocol I. These legal instruments were the first after World War II that 
paid special attention to children affected by armed conflict. These treaties tried to handle 
their situation with a holistic approach and have a regulation regarding age, access to justice, 
physical protection, detention, participation in hostilities, identification, education, cultural 
environment, education, clothing.
It is commonly agreed that major parts of both Protocols are not completely new law 
but to a varying extent give expression to customary law.10 Unlike Protocol I, Protocol II11 
on international armed conflict was drafted against the background of a customary law 
which contained few relevant provisions. Indeed, some States argued that there was no 
customary law regarding the conduct of internal armed conflicts. This sentiment which 
followed the ensure that version of the Martens Clause, which appears in the preamble to 
Protocol II, contains no reference to principles of international law. This, together with the 
hostile attitude of many States towards the whole Protocol II, has led commentators to argue 
that none of the provisions of the Protocols can be regarded as reflecting customary law.
The Geneva Convention IV does not offer any common definition of the child. Chil-
dren under the age of 7 are mentioned not as exclusive bearers of certain rights but only 
in relation to the rights of their mothers. Neither Additional Protocol I nor Additional 
Protocol II12 contains a fixed age limit for a person considered to be a child.13 The Geneva 
 Conventions and its Additional Protocols contain provisions regarding the question of chil-
dren’s participation in hostilities. Their active involvement in armed conflict not solely as 
victims but also as participants has possibly the most drastic effects on their childhood and 
development. At the Diplomatic Conference of 1977, the drafters of the Additional Protocol 
I were not able to identify a generally accepted rule and the proposal of prohibition of the 
recruitment of persons below 18 years of age was rejected. The result was a compromise, 
and it is possible to understand the point of view adopted by the Diplomatic Conference 
without fully agreeing with it.
Protection of children explicitly laid down in Article 77.
“1. Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any 
form of indecent assault. The Parties to the conflict shall provide them with the care and 
aid they require, whether because of their age or for any other reason.
10 Gasser, Hans-Peter (1991): Negotiating the 1977 Additional Protocols: Was it a waste of time? In Delissen, 
Astrid J. M. – Tanja, Gerard J. eds.: Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead: Essays in 
Honour of Frits Kashoven. Dordrecht–Boston–London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 85.
11 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977 (Additional Protocol II).
12 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. Available: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/
INTRO/475?OpenDocument (Accessed: 10.04.2018)
13 Heintye, Hans Joachim – Lülf, Charlotte (2015): Special Rules on Children. In Claphem, Andrew – Gatea, 
Paola – Sassoli, Marco eds.: The 1949 Geneva Convention. A commentary. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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2. The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children 
who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, 
in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting 
among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained 
the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those 
who are oldest.
3. If, in exceptional cases, despite the provisions of paragraph 2, children who have 
not attained the age of fifteen years take a direct part in hostilities and fall into the power 
of an adverse Party, they shall continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by 
this Article, whether or not they are prisoners of war.
4. If arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict, children 
shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of adults, except where families are 
accommodated as family units as provided in Article 75, paragraph 5.
5. The death penalty for an offence related to the armed conflict shall not be execut-
ed on persons who had not attained the age of eighteen years at the time the offence was 
committed.”14
As stated before, the direct participation raises several questions. Article 77 does not 
prohibit the form of indirect participation such as support activities; however, children 
may be involved in transporting of weapons and munition, as well as in the collection in 
information by reconnaissance missions and these actions are not covered by the  Additional 
Protocols. Such participation includes hostile acts harmful to the enemy without using 
a weapon, which raises the question of whether it might constitute direct participation in 
hostilities. Whatever response is given to this question, the guiding principle in each sce-
nario is that the provision of international humanitarian law on child recruitment must be 
read in conjunction with the international human rights law.15
Furthermore, the physical protection of children within the Geneva Conventions is 
not explicitly addressed. Reference to age is given among others in Article 27(3) Geneva 
Convention IV,16 but they are general references to age rather than protection of children or 
the benefits they enjoy according to their particular needs and vulnerabilities. Identification 
disc in Article 24(3) Geneva Convention IV17 was debated due to lack of standardisation 
14 Article 77, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Protection of children. Available: https://
ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=8F7D6B2DEE119F-
BAC12563CD0051E0A2 (Accessed: 10.04.2018)
15 Heintye–Lülf (2015): op. cit. 1302.
16 “Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family 
rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be 
humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against 
insults and public curiosity. Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in par-
ticular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault. Without prejudice to the provisions 
relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration 
by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on 
race, religion or political opinion. However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and 
security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.” Article 27(3) of the Geneva 
Convention IV.
17 “They shall, furthermore, endeavour to arrange for all children under twelve to be identified by the wearing 
of identity discs, or by some other means.” Article 24(3) of the Geneva Convention IV.
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at that time but it was the sole example of a means of identification. Due to the suggestion 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the age limit was lower than 15; 
it was thought children over the age of 12 were able to clarify their identity themselves.
The broad cultural environment in which a child grows up is emphasised by the Geneva 
Conventions, including moral, religious and traditional values. Article 24 of the Geneva 
Convention IV enriches broad protection for the maintenance of children. Being incorpo-
rated in Part II, Article 24 applies to children regardless of their nationality. It does not give 
a detailed instruction on how to implement the obligation; it is left to the discretion of the 
state to choose the appropriate means. Not only in time of occupation18 but during deten-
tion,19 it enshrines concrete provisions for internees with regard to religious, intellectual, 
physical activities, concentrating on the needs of children. The attendance of school outside 
of the place of internment must also be ensured and special playground shall be placed at 
the disposal of children and young people so that they can engage in physical exercises, 
sports, and outdoor games, ab obligation was later renewed in Article 78(2) Additional 
Protocol I and Article 4(3) a) Additional Protocol II.20 Disciplinary punishment must take 
age into account, as well as sex and conditions of health, and may never be inhuman, brutal, 
18 “The Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the proper 
working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children. The Occupying Power shall take all 
necessary steps to facilitate the identification of children and the registration of their parentage. It may not, 
in any case, change their personal status, nor enlist them in formations or organizations subordinate to it. 
Should the local institutions be inadequate for the purpose, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements 
for the maintenance and education, if possible by persons of their own nationality, language and religion, of 
children who are orphaned or separated from their parents as a result of the war and who cannot be adequately 
cared for by a near relative or friend. A special section of the Bureau set up in accordance with Article 136 
shall be responsible for taking all necessary steps to identify children whose identity is in doubt. Particulars 
of their parents or other near relatives should always be recorded if available. The Occupying Power shall not 
hinder the application of any preferential measures in regard to food, medical care and protection against the 
effects of war, which may have been adopted prior to the occupation in favour of children under fifteen years, 
expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven years.” Article 50 of the Geneva Convention IV.
19 “The Detaining Power shall encourage intellectual, educational and recreational pursuits, sports and games 
amongst internees, whilst leaving them free to take part in them or not. It shall take all practicable measures 
to ensure the exercise thereof, in particular by providing suitable premises. All possible facilities shall be 
granted to internees to continue their studies or to take up new subjects. The education of children and young 
people shall be ensured; they shall be allowed to attend schools either within the place of internment or out-
side. Internees shall be given opportunities for physical exercise, sports and outdoor games. For this purpose, 
sufficient open spaces shall be set aside in all places of internment. Special playgrounds shall be reserved for 
children and young people.” Article 94 of the Geneva Convention IV.
20 Heintye–Lülf (2015): op. cit. 1299–1300.
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dangerous in accordance with the Geneva Convention III21 and the Geneva Convention IV.22 
Children are entitled to assistance and care, medicine, food and clothing.23
These international instruments have their limits. They were created in 1949 and 
treated children as protected persons. The drafting procedure of the Additional Protocol 
and the drafting period of the Convention on the Rights of the Child were made in the 70s. 
The goal of the Additional Protocol regarding children was prestigious but retrospectively 
it was too challenging. There were several expectations they failed to meet: the level of 
measures expected, the age limit and the type of involvement in armed fights. However, 
we need to identify those provisions that were the starting point of the measures of current 
international human rights systems.
Critics of international humanitarian law
The measures taken on international level
Although the aims of the Additional Protocols were to codify the already existing custom-
ary law, as we saw, this mission was not fully completed. The other reason was that the 
humanitarian law itself touches upon several different interests. The chevalier attitude of 
soldiers, the long lasting humanitarian attitude is one practical aspect. The other frequent 
attitude of contracting states − represented by soldiers − was not to give up too much from 
those tools that potentially could be useful for winning. Not mentioning the fact that the old 
cliché might have worked again: one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter. 
The Additional Protocol I applied under international armed conflict, the Additional Pro-
tocol II is applicable during internal hostilities, and these self-regulatory will of States was 
already a great step forward to reduce casualties in armed conflict. All these circumstances 
were taken into account when contacting parties reached the compromised version of the 
Additional Protocols.
21 “The disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following:(1) A fine which shall not 
exceed 50 per cent of the advances of pay and working pay which the prisoner of war would otherwise receive 
under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a period of not more than thirty days.(2) Discontinuance 
of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present Convention. (3) Fatigue duties 
not exceeding two hours daily. (4) Confinement. The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied to 
officers. In no case shall disciplinary punishments be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health of prisoners 
of war.” Article 89 of the Geneva Convention III.
22 “The disciplinary punishments applicable to internees shall be the following: (1) A fine which shall not ex-
ceed 50 per cent of the wages which the internee would otherwise receive under the provisions of Article 95 
[Link] during a period of not more than thirty days. (2) Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above 
the treatment provided for by the present Convention. (3) Fatigue duties, not exceeding two hours daily, in 
connection with the maintenance of the place of internment. (4) Confinement. In no case shall disciplinary 
penalties be inhuman, brutal or dangerous for the health of internees. Account shall be taken of the internee’s 
age, sex and state of health. The duration of any single punishment shall in no case exceed a maximum of 
thirty consecutive days, even if the internee is answerable for several breaches of discipline when his case is 
dealt with, whether such breaches are connected or not.” Article 119 of the Geneva Convention IV.
23 Article 23, Article 24, Article 38 para 5, Article 85 para 5, Article 70(1), Article 50, Article 91, Article 127 of 
the Geneva Convention IV and Article 79 of Additional Protocol I.
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The Additional Protocols do not put unconditional obligations on parties to a conflict 
with respect to prohibiting child-participation in hostility. Article 77(2) of Protocol I con-
cerning parties to an international conflict says take all feasible measures.24 It does not say 
all necessary measures which would be a sign of a stronger commitment.
The Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Develop-
ment of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflict (CDHH), the text 
of Article 77(2) is the result of a compromise reached among the Conference delegations. 
It was a flat ban on the recruitment of children while omitting any absolute prohibition on 
voluntary participation by children, as this was felt to be unrealistic, particularly in occupied 
territories, and in wars of national liberation.25
This is a weak provision from the point of view of child-protection: it fails to protect 
children, who are older than fifteen years; only feasible measures must be taken in order 
to prevent children from taking a direct part in hostilities, and there is a no ban on the so-
called indirect child-participation.
The age limit
The Geneva Convention IV does not set a lower age limit that would define who can be 
regarded as a child during hostilities. In relation with women there is a reference to children 
under 7 years old. The Additional Protocol I or Additional Protocol II does not contain 
a fixed age limit for a person considered to be a child.26
The Additional Protocol I set the age limit at 15 years as a ban to use children in direct 
armed conflict. But the determination of childhood is problematic and the age as the access 
for protection raises several questions, such as an older but still under 18 years old person 
is not entitled to protection. On the basis of the International Red Cross’ commentaries, it 
can also be interpreted that persons according to CRC definition (see below) can be con-
sidered children.27
Direct or voluntary participation
The humanitarian law standards systematically use the expression of direct and active 
participation of children, but they do not define the term direct.28 Generally, child soldiers 
during engagement mainly do not fight i.e. causing personal damages to the enemy. Stud-
ies and reports of the Truth Commissions show that children were used in other ways 
during fights, but they are regarded as child soldiers, killing machines by the outside 
24 Delissen, Astrid J. M. (1991): Legal protection of child-combatants after the protocols: reaffirmation, devel-
opment or a step backwards? In Delissen–Tanja eds.: op. cit. 145.
25 Delissen (1991): op. cit. 154.
26 Heintye–Lülf (2015): op. cit. 1295.
27 Csapó Zsuzsanna (2011): Fegyverekkel szemben, fegyverekkel kézben. Budapest, Publikon Kiadó. 50.
28 Csapó (2011): op. cit. 223.
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world. The  literature is divided29 by the question that both forms of offenses i.e. voluntary 
recruitment and enlistment shall be committed; finally the OPAC contains both of them, 
although it is complicated to decide what other sort of coercive circumstances led to vol-
untary recruitment.30
The head of the US delegation, Ambassador G. H. Aldrich stated that “Article 77 of 
the Protocol (had) a flat ban on the recruitment of armed forces, even when the children 
volunteer. [against the ICRC Commentary] …the word recruitment in Article 77(2) covers 
both compulsory and voluntary enrolment, which means that the Parties must also refrain 
from enrolling children under fifteen years of age who volunteer to join the armed forces.”31
The humanitarian law is one legal structure in what those who committed international 
crimes during armed conflict can be punished. It is the law of war that set a ban to protect 
children even if it is controversial, still it was advanced in its time. One way of the protection 
of children is to end the impunity of the perpetrators.
In summary, it is hard to evaluate the efficiency of international humanitarian law 
regarding the protection of children involved in armed conflict. Some said that standing 
along the Geneva Convention IV cannot provide a sufficient framework, and one supporting 
evidence of the rising of the age limit became part of the framework of human rights. In that 
regard it is true that the weak implementation of international humanitarian law is shown 
by the works of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.32
International Human Rights
The CRC and OPAC
CRC was the first international legal instrument that defined a child as any person below 
the age of 18. CRC has already been signed by every state of the world, except the USA.33 
Determining the age of children involved in armed conflict caused disagreements among 
29 Happold, Matthew (2000): Child Soldiers in International Law: The Legal Regulation of Children’s Partici-
pation in Hostilities. Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 27. 214.
30 Coomarasawany, Radhika (2010): The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict – Towards Universal Ratification. The International Journal 
of Children’s Rights, No. 4. 540.
31 Delissen (1991): op. cit. 156.
32 Heintye–Lülf (2015): op. cit. 1311.
33 Available: treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&clang=_en 
 (Accessed: 10.04.2018)
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contracting parties already during drafting the CRC, but the signatories had to create the 
age limit of 15 in Article 3834 by consensus.
The failure of setting the age limit higher as it was used in the Geneva Conventions 
and its Additional Protocols led to the drafting of another international treaty, the OPAC.35 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child, which monitors the implementation of CRC, 
paid attention on the second day of the first meeting to the issue of children involved in 
armed conflicts, and incorporated it into its procedural rules as an issue that requires regular 
consideration.36 The role of NGOs was decisive at the establishment of OPAC, especially 
the umbrella organisation Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (1998), which also had 
a significant influence on the slowly improving drafting process of OPAC.37
In 1995, based on the mandate of the UN Secretary-General (UN SG), Graca Machel 
wrote a report about the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.38 As a result of the report, the 
UN SG created the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General for  Children 
and Armed Conflict39 (SRSG CAAC). The SRSG CAAC writes annual reports on the im-
pact of armed conflicts on children and gives recommendations to OPAC States Parties.40
The OPAC reflects a compromise between legal cultures because it permits voluntary 
recruitment below the age of 18, however a binding declaration is required. This would 
have been a double-edged sword, but practice of ratification showed that most of the par-
ties intended to raise the age limit of recruitment. As the UN Security Council stressed in 
 Resolution 2068(2012), governments have the primary role in providing protection and relief 
to all children, and all UN action must be designed − only – to support and supplement the 
already existing protection and rehabilitation roles of national governments.41
In sum, the use of children under the age of 15 in armed fights and conflicts is a war 
crime according to the rules of humanitarian law, and the compulsory or voluntary recruit-
ment and participation in armed conflict of persons under the age of 18 is the violation of 
human rights.42 As the prohibition of military recruitment and the use of children under 
34 “1. States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law ap-
plicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child.
 2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen 
years do not take a direct part in hostilities.
 3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their 
armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not 
attained the age of eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.
 4. In accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population 
in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who 
are affected by an armed conflict.” Article 38 of the CRC.
35 Breen, Claire (2003): The Role of NGOs in the Formulation of and Compliance with the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Human Rights 
Quarterly, No. 2. 460.
36 Breen (2003): op. cit. 461.
37 Coomarasawany (2010): op. cit. 537.
38 Available: www.childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/mandate/the-machel-reports/ (Accessed: 10.04.2018)
39 Available: www.childrenandarmedconflict.un.org (Accessed: 10.04.2018)
40 OPAC has been ratified by 166 states. Available: childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/mandate/country-status-2/ 
(Accessed: 10.04.2018)
41 Heintye–Lülf (2015): op. cit. 1306.
42 The age limit of voluntary recruitment during armed fights is 16 years but in several countries it was raised 
over 18 years in their reservation.
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the age of 15 became a part of humanitarian law, the ratification of OPAC is forming the 
prohibition of recruitment and participation in armed conflicts of children under the age 
of 18 into customary law.43 Customary law applies in non-international armed conflicts as 
we saw at the examination of international humanitarian law. State practice establishes the 
rule that children affected by armed conflicts are entitled to special respect and protection. 
This rule constitutes a norm of the Committee of International Law (CIL).44 Although CIL 
is a pillar that influence international human rights law, CRC was the first treaty to contain 
IHL law and it was a breakthrough.45 It has to be reckoned that the original object of CRC 
has become fulfilled with OPAC, since as a human rights instrument it covers the gaps that 
humanitarian law could not.46
The soft law: Paris Principles and Paris Commitments
During 10 years of drafting procedure the OPAC, the so called Cape Town Principles 
(1997) were accepted in Africa at a conference organized by UNICEF.47 The Cape Town 
 Principles has become part of the international customary law, known as Paris Principles 
and Paris Commitments after its actualization in 2017. Although the instruments contain 
only normative standards through which they define the subject group in broader sense 
than the humanitarian law and they are used widely by international organisations, yet they 
have no binding effect. The main result of the Paris Principles and Paris Commitments is 
the definition of the children affected by armed conflict.
Children involved in armed forces are handled not only as combatants, but can also 
complete passive support tasks, for instance guards, porters, spies, cooks, girls or boys 
forced into the role of bush wife who are continuously the victims of sexual and physical 
abuse.48 The issue of active and direct participation was finally synthesized in this con-
cept. The Paris Principles and Paris Commitments used by CRCee during its constructive 
dialogue with signatories of OPAC served as a guidance for the interpretation of OPAC.
The work of the Committee on the Right of the Child
The CRCee is a UN treaty body which is entrusted with the periodic review of the imple-
mentation of the CRC, the OPAC and the other two Optional Protocols of the CRC. Their 
43 Everett, Jennifer C. (2009): The battle continues: Fights for a more child-sensitive approach to asylum for 
child soldiers. Journal of International Law, No. 21.; Coomaraswany (2011): op. cit. 539.
44 Heintye–Lülf (2015): op. cit. 1305.
45 Ibid. 1311.
46 Breen (2003): op. cit. 463.; Csapó (2011): op. cit. 20. The Committee of the International Red Cross had the 
same conclusion by interpreting Article 24 and 89 of the Geneva Convention IV in 1948.
47 The Paris commitments to protect children from unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces or armed groups. 
Available: www.unicef.org/protection/files/Paris_Principles_EN.pdf (Accessed: 10.04.2018); and the Paris 
principles and guidelines on children associated with armed forces or armed groups. Available: www.unicef.
org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf. (Accessed: 10.04.2018) Both were adopted at the interna-
tional conference Free children from war in Paris, in February 2007.
48 Paris Principles 2007 1.0.-1.1.
122 Dynamics and Social Impact of Migration
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
opinion on certain provisions of the treaties is not binding. But their recommendations and 
comments operate as a soft law of the international law and as such, it is part of the texture 
of the legal framework. It addresses all signatories and newly joining States shall take into 
consideration these instruments when transforming and implementing the CRC and its 
optional protocols.
General Comment No. 6 (2005) Treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside 
their country of origin
One of the results of the work of the CRCee is to touch upon the issue of children affected 
by armed conflict form a migratory angle. The objective of the General Comment is to draw 
attention to the particularly vulnerable situation of unaccompanied and separated children; 
to outline the multifaceted challenges faced by States and other actors in ensuring that such 
children are able to access and enjoy their rights; and, to provide guidance on the protection, 
care and proper treatment of unaccompanied and separated children based on the entire 
legal framework provided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child.49
The General Comment No. 6 of the Committee of the Right of the Child requires that 
the signatories of CRC shall provide residence permit to the former child soldiers which 
may not only be entailed by refugee status − or by subsidiary protection in case of an EU 
Member State − but any other humanitarian legal title, too. The obligation of the state to 
integrate the victims shall also cover those who were perpetrators and cannot be expelled 
from the territory of a state next to those who received international protection.
Regarding the former child soldiers in Section 56–57, the integration can be put aside if 
the children above the age of 15 constitute serious security harm.50 In that regard the CRCee 
does not overstep the provisions of international humanitarian law in 2006, 4 years before 
the OPAC was signed but expressly tried to reconcile the age limit differences explained 
above by referring back to international human rights law. Furthermore, as an addition to 
the issue of age, the CRCee expresses its view that each State Party shall develop the age 
49 General Comment No. 6, Section 1.
50 “Child soldiers should be considered primarily as victims of armed conflict. Former child soldiers who often 
find themselves unaccompanied or separated at the cessation of the conflict or following defection, shall be 
given all the necessary support services to enable reintegration into normal life, including necessary psycho- 
social counselling. Such children shall be identified and demobilized on a priority basis during any identifica-
tion and separation operation. Child soldiers, in particular, those who are unaccompanied or separated, should 
not normally be interned, but rather, benefit from special protection and assistance measures, in particular, 
as regards their demobilization and rehabilitation. Particular efforts must be made to provide support and 
facilitate the reintegration of girls who have been associated with the military, either as combatants or in any 
other capacity.” Section 56 of General Comments No. 6. “If under certain circumstances, exceptional intern-
ment of a child soldier over the age of 15 years is unavoidable and in compliance with international human 
rights and humanitarian law, for example, where s/he poses a serious security threat, the conditions of such 
internment should be in conformity with international standards, including article 37 of the Convention and 
those pertaining to juvenile justice, and should not preclude any tracing efforts and priority participation in 
rehabilitation programs.” Section 57 of General Comments No. 6.
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and gender based psychological services to the children involved in armed conflict accord-
ing to Section 60.51
One of the most forward-thinking provision of the General Comments No. 5 is that in 
Section 88 it states that local integration is a durable solution: “Local integration is the pri-
mary option if return to the country of origin is impossible on either legal or factual grounds. 
Local integration must be based on a secure legal status (including residence status) and be 
governed by the Convention rights which are fully applicable to all children who remain in 
the country, irrespective of whether this is due to their recognition as a refugee, other legal 
obstacles to return, or, whether the best interests-based balancing test has decided against 
return.”52 That provision determines the long term aims of all signatories; and clearly shows 
how all State Parties are responsible for providing accurate response for those children who 
were affected by armed conflict.
Joint General Comment No. 3 (2017) of the Committee on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and No. 22 
(2017) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the general principles 
regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration
After the General Comment No. 6, as another end of the arch, we examine the latest in-
strument of the CRCee. The Joint General Comments are the result of a united work of 
the CRCee and another UN treaty body, the Committee on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. These instruments were partly 
a response to the refugee protection crisis Europe faced since 2015, still we cannot forget 
about its universal nature.
The aim of the Joint General Comment No. 3 is “to provide authoritative guidance on 
legislative, policy and other appropriate measures that should be taken to ensure full com-
pliance with the obligations under the Conventions to fully protect the rights of children in 
the context of international migration”.53 The cross-cutting character of the Joint General 
Comment No. 3 sheds light on the interlinkages between the two international treaties 
and gives guidance to states in case they face legislative gaps.54 Its wording makes clear 
51 “States shall develop, where needed, in cooperation with international agencies and NGOs, a comprehensive 
age appropriate and gender sensitive system of psychological support and assistance for unaccompanied and 
separated children affected by armed conflict.” Section 60 of General Comments No. 6.
52 General Comment No. 6. 22. Available: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/GC6.pdf (Accessed: 
10.04.2018)
53 Section 7 of the Joint General Comment No. 3.
54 “The Committees reaffirm the application of articles 41 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 81 
of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, and reiterate that the provisions in domestic and international legislation that are the most conducive 
to the realization of the rights of all children in the context of international migration shall apply in cases where 
standards differ. Furthermore, a dynamic interpretation of the Conventions based on a child-centred approach 
is necessary to ensure their effective implementation and the respect, protection and fulfilment of the rights of 
all children in the context of the increasing number of challenges that migration poses for children.” Section 
20 of the Joint General Comment No. 3.
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the position of the two treaty body on the level of state responsibilities regarding children. 
“The Committees encourage States parties to ensure that the authorities responsible for 
children’s rights have a leading role, with clear decision-making power, on policies, prac-
tices and decisions that affect the rights of children in the context of international migration. 
Comprehensive child protection systems at the national and local levels should mainstream 
into their programmes the situation of all children in the context of international migration, 
including in countries of origin, transit, destination and return. In addition to the mandates 
of child protection bodies, authorities responsible for migration and other related policies 
that affect children’s rights should also systematically assess and address the impacts on and 
needs of children in the context of international migration at every stage of policymaking 
and implementation. States parties should develop policies aimed at fulfilling the rights 
of all children in the context of international migration, in particular regarding migration 
management objectives or other administrative or political considerations.”55
Joint General Comment No. 4 (2017) of the Committee on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and No. 
23 (2017) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on state obligations 
regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration 
in countries of origin, transit, destination and return56
The Joint General Comment No. 4 is a more specific element of the soft law, because it ad-
dresses only the status of migrant children from the angle of human rights. It is built around 
the crucial issues of fundamental rights of migrant children such as age-assessment, the right 
to liberty, due process guarantees and access to justice, right to name, nationality, and family 
life. The issue of protection from all forms of violence and abuse has a special relevance, 
because it entails child labour. The International Labor Organization’s Convention No. 182 
was signed in 1999, a year before OPAC and it stated that the worst form of child labour 
is child soldiering.57 It is a widely accepted treaty, 181 countries have already ratified it.
International Refugee Law
Refugee Convention
The right of asylum is historically rooted in an ancient juridical concept according to which 
persons persecuted by their own country may be protected by another sovereign authority 
55 Section 14–15 of the Joint General Comment No. 3.
56 Joint General Comment No. 4 (2017) of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Work-
ers and Members of Their Families and No. 23 (2017) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on state 
obligations regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration in countries of 
origin, transit, destination and return, 2017, CMW/C/GC/4-CRC/C/GC/2.
57 The worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999, (No. 182). Available: www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/ILOcon-
ventionsonchildlabour/lang–en/index.htm (Accessed: 10.04.2018)
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for example a state or a church. Later, the right of sanctuaries was first codified by king 
Ethelbert of Kent considering the right of sanctuary as being inviolable and under royal 
protection which transformed into the right to asylum as we know it nowadays. Today, the 
idea of global protection is a part of customary international law as rendering victims of 
persecution to their persecutor is a violation of the non-refoulement principle.
The refugee status determination procedure (RSD) in Europe is governed by the 
 Refugee Convention and the asylum acquis of the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) and the national legislation. Both the Refugee Convention and the directives and 
regulations of CEAS contain several regulations regarding children. The CRC principle 
of best interest of the child should be taken into account in every level of the procedure 
together with the protection of those rights that intended to facilitate their reception and/or 
integration into the host society.
This article is about the responses of the responsibilities of state, but because of the 
direct applicability of the EU law in most European states and the primacy of the EU law 
over national legislation in certain cases are our reasons to examine the CEAS regulation 
in this article, because it is an effective response to apply similarly between states; noting 
as a first step, that the Refugee Convention is the basis of the CEAS. The CEAS is a legal 
system created in order to facilitate the harmonizing effort of the Member States of the Eu-
ropean Community and later the European Union. The asylum is part of an era of freedom, 
security and justice, and as such it belongs to those with shared competencies in line with 
Article 4(2) k) of the Treaty on the European Union.58 There are already two phases of recast 
of those regulations and directives which are regarded as CEAS. The first phase was the 
creation of CEAS between 1999–2010 when the national implementation of these acquis 
happened. The first recast of the instrument was an eminent need and based on the feed-
backs of the Member States, evaluations of the nation implementation and jurisprudence.
The currently applicable CEAS, namely the Dublin III Regulation,59 the Eurodac 
 Regulation,60 EASO Regulation,61 the Reception Condition Directive,62 the Asylum 
58 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union – Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Protocols – Annex-
es – Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of 
Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007, Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390.
59 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person.
60 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the es-
tablishment of Eurodac for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) 
No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by the law enforcement 
authorities of the Member States and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in 
the area of freedom, security and justice.
61 Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 establishing 
a European Asylum Support Office.
62 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards 
for the reception of applicants for international protection.
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 Procedure Directive63 and the Qualification Directive64 are under revision since 2016. The 
response of the EU to the refugee protection crises set out in the European Migration Agen-
da65 and as it is envisaged, the CEAS II phase reform has been needed. During this reform 
one of the major conmen is the better protection of migrant children.
Most of the case the asylum authority, especially in Europeans are the one that meet 
those victims who residing outside of the country of origin. The enlistment and voluntary 
recruitment committed against the asylum-seeker children are those sort of war crimes 
that entail the duty of reporting ex officio to the investigatory authorities. But those who 
committed war crimes themselves – even under duress – are excluded from the procedure.66 
The victims of child soldiering may be persecuted67 in line with Section 88 of the General 
Commentary No. 6 of the Committee of the Right of the Child68 and the suggestion in SR 
SG CAAC report,69 providing a compliance with Article 38 of CRC and special guarantees 
described in Guidelines of the UN Economic and Social Committee (2005),70 however, it 
may not interfere with their status as victims.71
Exclusion clauses
The right to asylum has already been codified by multilateral treaties. Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights72 states that “everyone has the right to seek and to 
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”. The Refugee Convention defines the 
63 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures 
for granting and withdrawing international protection.
64 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, 
for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the 
protection granted.
65 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A European Agenda on Migration. Brussels, 13.05.2015 
COM(2015) 240 final.
66 Szép Árpád (2013): A menedékjog mint a büntetőjogi felelősségre vonás akadálya. Büntetőjogi Szemle, No. 
1–2. 48–58.; Rossi, Elisabeth (2013): Special Track for Former Child Soldiers: Enacting a “Child Soldier Visa” 
as Alternative to Asylum Protection. Berkeley Journal of International Law, No. 2.
67 Csapó (2011): op. cit. 228.
68 Available: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/GC6.pdf (Accessed: 10.04.2018)
69 Available: childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/15-18739_Children-in-Conflict_FI-
NAL-WEB.pdf (Accessed: 10.04.2018)
70 UN Guideline on justice for child victims and witnesses of crime. ECOSOC Resolution 2005/20 of 22 July 
2005. Doc.E/2005/INF/2/Add.1 of 10 August 2005.
71 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing mini-
mum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2001/220/JHA OJ L 315, 14.11.2012. 57–73.
72 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).
127Escaped from War and on the Border of Asylum Law…
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
elements for eligibility for asylum more precisely, though.73 The ECtHR has also declared 
in cases concerning extradition, expulsion or deportation of individuals that Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits in absolute terms expulsion if the 
person concerned would face a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the country of destination.
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention provides possibility to States to exclude certain 
asylum-seekers and refugees from refugee status. By establishing the system of exclusion 
clauses States had sought to achieve two legitimate goals, namely to protect refugee status 
from abuse by prohibiting its grant in undeserving cases and to ensure that those who 
had committed grave crimes in World War II, and other serious non-political crimes or 
who were guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations be 
punished. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the application Article 1F imposes limitation 
on a humanitarian provision, it should be interpreted restrictively and be applied only in 
particular and legally well-based circumstances.
The exclusion clauses74 from RSD contain the reasons of threat to national security. 
The practical national application of this clause and the European case law assist us to define 
if the reason of rejection is in line with the goals of right to international protection. The 
question of children or youth should be excluded is still not responded due to the special 
rules of RSD, which will be detailed below.
The legal migration tried to deal with the issue of exclusion of children affected by 
armed conflict in the USA. They suggested a special track of visa for former child soldiers,75 
but it was controversial. The possible responses of the EU need to be examined thoroughly. 
The literature is divided whether these children are perpetrators or victims, or both. The 
international legislation addresses both options and using the principle in the best interest 
of the child as guiding on in times of collusion.
Soft Law: UNHCR Guideline No.12 Claims for refugee status related to 
situations of armed conflict and violence under Article 1A (2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
regional refugee definitions
Such as by the comments of CRCee, the UNHCR is the interpreter of the Refugee Conven-
tion. There is no tribunal or judicial body of their own created by the signatories in case 
of dispute over the regulation of the Refugee Convention. The situation is the same with 
the CRC. Nevertheless, the European Court of Human Rights which is the responsible 
73 “A refugee is a person who is outside their own country’s territory or place of habitual residence in case of 
stateless persons owing to well-founded fear of persecution on one or more of the protected grounds: race, 
nationality, religion, political opinion and belonging in any particular social group and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality or habitual residence 
and as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” Article 1 of the 
Refugee Convention.
74 Article 1F of the Refugee Convention and Article 12 of the Qualification Directive.
75 Rossi (2013): op. cit. 392–461.
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dispute-solving body over the European Convention of Human Rights frequently cites the 
Refugee Convention and the Guidelines of the UNHCR.
Guideline No. 12 was created as a response to the refugee protection crisis in Europe 
in 2015. It is stated that children are entitled to international protection according to the 
UNHCR Guideline No. 1276 and the applicant only has to presume the well-founded fear 
that may amount to the level of persecution.
This is not the Guideline that deals with the case of refugee children, it is only the 
newest response to the armed conflict. The long lasting armed conflicts are one of the major 
factors which act as push factors. The intent to deal with that push factor was a response 
to advise the states how to fulfil their obligations as signatories in line with the objective 
of the Refugee Conventions. It interprets armed conflict and its long lasting results,77 and 
specifies how to take into account the situation of children during the assessment, especially 
their recruitment.78As the RDP reaches its end, the phase when a refugee authority shall 
establish the facts, the UNHCR Guideline No. 12 does states that it poses significant chal-
lenges regarding children and armed conflict, still obtaining reliable and accurate country 
of origin information is an obligatory task.
76 Guidelines on International Protection No. 12, 6 December 2016. Available: www.unhcr.org/publications/
legal/58359afe7/unhcr-guidelines-international-protection-12-claims-refugee-status-related.html (Accessed: 
27.07.2017)
77 “18. In situations of armed conflict and violence, whole communities may be affected by, and be at risk from, 
aerial bombardments, the use of cluster munitions, barrel bombs or chemical weapons, artillery or sniper fire, 
improvised explosive devices, landmines, car bombs or suicide bombers, or siege tactics, for example. The 
systematic denial of food and medical supplies, the cutting of water supplies and electricity, the destruction 
of property or the militarization or closure of hospitals and schools may also constitute serious human rights 
or IHL violations that affect whole communities. Exposure to such actions can amount to persecution within 
the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, either independently or cumulatively.
 19. Both the direct and indirect consequences of situations of armed conflict and violence may also constitute 
persecution, including long-term consequences of these situations, such as demolition of vital infrastructure, 
insecurity and abject poverty. More specifically, situations of armed conflict and violence may seriously affect 
the rule of law as well as state and societal structures and support systems. Situations of armed conflict and 
violence may lead to a full or partial collapse of government institutions and services, political institutions 
and the police and justice system. Vital services such as water, electricity and sanitation may be disrupted. 
Increased crime levels; looting and corruption; food insecurity, malnourishment or famine; constraints on 
access to education and health care; serious economic decline, destruction of livelihoods and poverty may 
also ensue. These consequences of situations of armed conflict and violence may be sufficiently serious, either 
independently or cumulatively, to constitute persecution and create a well-founded fear of being persecuted. 
This is also relevant where the risk of persecution emanates from non-state actors (see paragraphs 28 to 30 of 
these Guidelines).” Sections 18–19 of UNHCR Guideline No. 12.
78 “Situations of armed conflict and violence frequently involve exposure to serious human rights violations or 
other serious harm amounting to persecution. Such persecution could include, but is not limited to, situations 
of genocide and ethnic cleansing; torture and other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; rape and other 
forms of sexual violence; forced recruitment, including of children; arbitrary arrest and detention; hostage 
taking and enforced or arbitrary disappearances; and a wide range of other forms of serious harm resulting from 
circumstances mentioned, for example, in paragraphs 18 and 19 of these Guidelines.” Section 3 of UNHCR 
Guideline No. 12.
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Access to Justice
The right to justice of the victims is supported by the opinion of UN Human Rights 
 Committee under which if a foreign citizen gains the right to enter the territory of the State 
Party, from that time they are entitled to enjoy the rights undertaken as an obligation by 
the State Party.79 Regarding our subject matter, the children affected by armed conflict are 
victims of war crimes. War crimes do not lapse; therefore, the current age of the victim is 
irrelevant, and the only relevant fact is that at the time of the commitment they were chil-
dren, under the age of 18.
The International Criminal Court is the competent dispute resolution authority that 
applies international humanitarian law. The court has no jurisdiction over persons who have 
not reached the age of 19 at the time of the commission of the offence, says Article 26 of 
the Rome Statute.80 The prosecution of child soldiers falls under the jurisdiction of the state 
parties or another international tribunal with jurisdiction over children but not the ICC itself. 
This is the criminal prosecutorial aspect of the participation of children in armed conflict. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone Statue offers through a solution for the complicated 
relationship between the avoidance of impunity on the one hand and respect for mental and 
intellectual maturity on the other. The Statue provides the Court with competence to try 
children or juvenile soldiers between 15–18 years of age. These cases referred to truth and 
reconciliation mechanism according to Article 15(5) of the Statue of the special court.81
The jurisdiction of the ICC is a complementary one in those countries of what the 
Rome Statute was signed and ratified. The status of the transformation of the Rome  Statute 
raises questions in some country, and Hungary is one of them. Although the status of 
 implementation of the Rome Statute is not examined in this article,82 for the sake of better 
understanding the implementation, we look into the national legislation in relation with 
offenses described in OPAC.
According to Article 3 (2) ac) of the Hungarian Criminal Code Act C of 2012 (CC) the 
CC shall be applied in such cases when a foreign citizen committed crimes abroad, if the 
prosecution of such crimes is prescribed by an international treaty promulgated by statute. 
Hungary is a dualist country from the point of view of international law and the OPAC was 
promulgated by Act CLX of 2009 of what Article 4 prescribes the age limit of enlistment 
and voluntary procurement to be 18.
The universal jurisdiction as a legal institution created by the legal necessity83 and its 
application has two conditions: double incrimination and the fact that the General Prosecutor 
orders the commencement of a criminal procedure. If an international treaty prescribes the 
prosecution of the offense, it means an exception from double incrimination. According to 
79 Csapó (2011): op. cit. 64.
80 Article 26 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: “Exclusion of jurisdiction over persons 
under eighteen. The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of 
the alleged commission of a crime.” Available: http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (Accessed: 
10.04.2018)
81 Heintye–Lülf (2015): op. cit. 1297.
82 Ádány Tamás (2010): A Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróság joghatósága és a magyar jog. Pázmány Law Working 
Papers, No. 2.
83 Varga, Réka (2014): Challenges of Domestic Prosecution of War Crimes with Special Attention to Criminal 
Justice Guarantees. Budapest, Pázmány Press. 61.
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some authors the fact that only the General Prosecutor shall order the commencement of the 
criminal proceeding fulfil the criteria of equity and provides enough guarantee for taking 
into account the points of the persecutor regardless if there is double incrimination or not.84
Accepting that the Hungarian authorities may apply85 the principle of universal juris-
diction, they are legally obliged to submit the case to the General Prosecutor when a  foreign 
citizen claims or suggests in front of the state authorities that he/she was involved in armed 
conflict before his/her age of 18, therefore they are under the subject scope of OPAC. 
Although under the Article 146(3) of CC86 recruitment is a criminal offense only if it was 
committed on the territory of Hungary but it is an unnecessary restriction and it is not in 
line with the general goals of the OPAC.
If this theoretical event would not happen in practice, the ICC may claim the right to 
involve the victim in the prosecution or start the prosecution. On the other hand if the victim 
is a perpetrator himself, like it happened in the Ongwen case,87 the state authority i.e. asylum 
authority may start the investigation, otherwise the ICC may declare its jurisdiction over the 
perpetrator.88 Another issue is the case of those victims who committed a war crime; whether 
they participate in the criminal procedure as offended or as perpetrators?89 According to 
the humanitarian law, after the ending of the fights, they need to be prosecuted for their 
actions against the law of war but during the decision-making and the implementation of the 
sentence it has to be taken into consideration that they are victims and survivors of human 
rights infringement, and they have the right to restart their life and the right to integration.90 
84 Polt Péter ed. (2013): A Büntető Törvénykönyv Kommentárja. Budapest, Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv 
Kiadó. 54.
85 Even though our understanding is that authorities shall examine the applicability of universal jurisdiction in 
case of suspicion in parallel with the applicability of more frequently used principles, it is clear this is not the 
practice. Discovering the possible reasons of this practice is not the main topic of this article, but for the sake 
of the argument, we presume that in certain situations they may apply it.
86 “(1) Any attempt to recruit personnel in the territory of Hungary for military service – other than for any 
allied forces –, paramilitary service in a foreign armed body, or any mediation of volunteers for such service 
shall be construed a felony punishable by imprisonment between one to five years. (2) Any Hungarian citizen 
who voluntarily joins or offers to join any foreign armed body – other than the allied forces – that is involved 
in an armed conflict (national or international), or who participates in training in such an armed body shall 
be punishable in accordance with Subsection (1). (3) Any person who recruits or mediates persons under the 
age of eighteen years in the territory of Hungary for military service, paramilitary service in a foreign armed 
body, or any mediation of volunteers for such service shall be punishable by imprisonment between two to 
eight years.” Section 146 of the CC, illegal recruitment.
87 Dominic Ongwen is allegedly responsible for seven counts of crimes allegedly committed on or about 20 May 
2004 at the Lukodi IDP Camp in the Gulu District, Uganda, being three counts of crimes against humanity: 
murder, enslavement, inhumane acts of inflicting serious bodily injury and suffering; and four counts of war 
crimes: murder, cruel treatment of civilians, intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population, 
and pillaging. Available: www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/ongwen (Accessed: 10.04.2018)
88 This is a purely theoretical question, and it stops at this point because of the promulgation of the Rome Statute 
in Hungary. See more in Ádány (2010): op. cit.
89 Rosen, David M. (2010): The Dilemma of Child Soldiers. How Should International Law Treat Children 
 Engaged in Armed Conflicts? Insights on Law & Society American Bar Association, Vol. 10, No. 3. 8.; Everett 
(2009): op. cit. 289.
90 CRC Article 37.
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In line with that the application of alternative approach and legal instruments during the 
criminal procedure91 is a strong suggestion on several forums.92
War crimes are one of the classic examples of international crimes for which an in-
ternational control mechanism is said to exist: the four Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I 
provide for the duty either to extradite or to prosecute suspected or convicted war criminal. 
On closer scrutiny, however, the system hardly seems to work. Problems exist on two levels, 
both with respect to extradition (aut dedere) and with respect to prosecution (aut judicare). 
Here too, Protocol I has failed to remedy the problems. In theory, the deficiencies of the 
extradition system should be compensated by other parts of the international duty either to 
extradite or to prosecute, namely the prosecution of alleged war criminals. The provision 
on universal jurisdiction contained in all four Geneva Conventions and incorporated by 
Article 85 (1) Protocol I should, theoretically oblige the State to prosecute those offenders 
whose extradition has been denied.93 The state parties are also obliged to provide for crimi-
nalization of child recruitment under domestic law. However, in the literature some authors 
argue that this is problematic in many cases.94
Nevertheless, the contracting party to that treaty should bring its international leg-
islation in line with its international obligations under that treaty. It is an open question 
whether a State must ensure that its legislation keeps pace with development in customary 
international law. The internationally wrongful act of the type under consideration here is 
a breach of the applicable treaty. Often it will be that the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties terms a material breach. Failure to do this is a breach of the treaty, regardless 
of whether or not any of that State’s nationals are charged with a crime of that sort before 
any competent tribunal. Often the act in question is already a crime under internal law, and 
the liability of the State to prosecute or extradite an accused person depends on the internal 
law of that State and its international obligations.95 Professor Geatano Arangio-Ruiz talked 
about relationship between the international responsibility of a State for criminal actions 
committed by individuals and attributed to the State and the international responsibility 
of that State arising out of that action. When an individual’s responsibility is involved, one 
should simply ascertain whether the prosecution of individual perpetrators by States injured 
for an international crime can also be properly considered a lawful form of sanction against 
the wrongdoing State. This might have been the case of exercise of jurisdiction that would 
otherwise be inadmissible with report to an official who was the material perpetrator of 
conduct that constituted or contributed toward constituting an international crime of State.96
91 “I call upon Member States to treat children associated with armed groups, including those engaged in violent 
extremism, as victims entitled to full protection of their human rights and to urgently put in place alternatives 
to detention and prosecution of children.” SRSG report 2016. Available: https://childrenandarmedconflict.
un.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/15-18739_Children-in-Conflict_FINAL-WEB.pdf (Accessed: 23.07.2017)
92 Drumbt, Mark A. (2011): Child Pirates: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and Accountability. Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law, No. 46. 256.
93 Van Den Wyngeart, Christine (1991): The suppression of war crimes under additional Protocol I. In 
Delissen– Tanja eds.: op. cit. 202–203. 
94 Heintye–Lülf (2015): op. cit. 1304.
95 Rosenne, Shabatai (1997): War Crimes and State Responsibility. In Dinstein, Zoram – Tabory, Mala eds.: 
War Crimes in International Law. The Hague, Kluwer Law International. 67.
96 Rosenne (1997): op. cit. 65.
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The most significant judgements regarding the use of child soldiers are at the trials 
of the International Criminal Court, because the judgements stating the responsibility of 
individuals strengthen the message that involving children into armed conflict does not 
remain unpunished. Thomas Lubanga Dylo from the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment in case no. ICC-01/04-01/06,97 because of the 
recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts under the age of 15 years. Unfortunately, 
similar judgements to the Lubanga case could only happen when both political and strategic 
aspects luckily met.98
The gaps in implementation of international treaties lead to the fact that State Parties 
rarely initiate procedures because of war crimes, despite the developing international 
regulation. Beside the monist and dualist systems, doubts can also hinder the referring of 
each state to the treaty as a legal basis. In addition to these reasons (which according to 
Francis are mainly the reason of reluctance in the African states) Cassese identifies as the 
fourth reason that national authorities try to interpret jurisdiction in the narrowest way to 
avoid applying international standards.99 Generally the flaws of proper transformation and 
implementation of the international treaties lead or accumulate to the situation inclined 
above: the states are reluctant to start a procedure because of war crimes.
Conclusions
The children who are involved in armed conflicts have rights under international hu-
manitarian law, under international human rights law and even under the refugee law for 
special treatment and care to them. But at times of breach of obligation by State Parties of 
these treaties, the only response they would get is the decision of the ICC due to the lack of 
a CRC court of their own and Refuge Convention. In addition to personal reparation, the 
States are obliged to prove protection and it is an obligation that governs the actions of all 
State Parties. One of their possible responses regarding responsibility is to implement the 
examined treaties entirely and shape their legal system. The other possible response is to 
act according to its provisions and foster international cooperation in a reparative and in 
a preventive manner.
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Human Rights, Asylum Law and Terrorism1
Aranka Lőrincz
Introduction
International law declares the right of asylum which consists of the right of a state to grant 
asylum and the right of an individual to seek asylum. To date no international instrument 
or custom settles down the right of an individual to be granted asylum.2 The principle 
of non-refoulement is understood in international law as the duty of a state not to return 
a person to a place of persecution.3 When it comes to terrorism, the question is raised if it 
is permitted to strike a balance between the national security of a state and the obligation 
to provide protection against refoulement.4
In the aftermath of 9/11, governments all around the world have turned their attention 
to combat the threat of global terrorism. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) on 
the threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts was the response 
of the international community to terrorism which made explicit reference to the need to 
safeguard the system of international refugee protection from abuse by terrorists.5 The UN 
Security Council called upon states to deny asylum for those who finance, plan, support, 
or commit terrorist acts and to prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit ter-
rorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States 
or their citizens; States shall prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by 
effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, 
and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity 
papers and travel documents.6 The UN Security Council thus asked the Member States to 
exclude terrorists from refugee status. However, as no uniform international definition of 
1 Any views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
Office.
2 On the three faces of the right of asylum see Boed, Roman (1994): The State of the Right of Asylum in Inter-
national Law. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, Vol. 5, No. 1. 1–33.
3 There is a difference in international treaties whether the duty of non-refoulement applies to recognized ref-
ugees or to all persons. Article 33 of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention protects only those who were granted 
asylum while Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights apply to all persons regardless their status.
4 Bruin, Rene – Wouters, Kees (2003): Terrorism and the Non-derogability of Non-refoulement. International 
Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 15, No. 1. 5–29.
5 Zard, Monette (2002): Exclusion, terrorism and the Refugee Convention. Forced Migration Review, No. 13. 
32.
6 UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), para. 2 (c)-(d), (g).
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terrorism exists, it remains the prerogative of the states to decide who is excludable from 
international protection as a terrorist.7
Paragraph 7 (d) of the 1950 UNHCR Statute, Article 1F of the 1951 Convention 
 Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter Refugee Convention) and Article 1 (5) of the 
1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa oblige states and UNHCR to deny the benefits of refugee status to certain 
persons who do not deserve international protection as they committed certain grave acts 
and to ensure that such guilty persons do not abuse the institution of asylum in order to avoid 
being held responsible for the crimes they committed. Nevertheless, with special attention 
to the consequences, the so called Exclusion Clauses enshrined in the Refugee Convention 
must be assessed with great caution with regard to the individual circumstances of the case.8
The European Council also asked the Member States of the European Union in several 
conclusions to protect security and invited the European Commission to examine the rela-
tionship between safeguarding internal security and complying with international protection 
obligations and instruments.9 The Working Document of the European  Commission entitled 
The relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with international 
protection obligations and instruments indicated that the European Commission wants to 
nullify the non-derogability of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).10 According to the Commission extradition must be considered legal when it is 
possible to obtain legal guarantees from the State that it is going to try the person, addressing 
the concerns connected to the potential violations of the ECHR. Such guarantees by third 
States could for instance relate to the non-application of capital punishment in that particu-
lar case, though the law of that State allows for such punishment.11 However, the Working 
 Document did not mention guarantees against the risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.12 The obligation of non-refoulement under Article 3 
of the ECHR is absolute, there are no exceptions or limitations to this right.13 Considering 
Article 3 of the ECHR there is no room for adopting a balancing act between the protec-
tion needs of the individual and the security interests of the State. This was underlined by 
the European Court of Human Rights in the Ahmed v. Austria14 and the Chahal v. United 
Kingdom15 cases where the Court considered that the applicants could not be expelled under 
Article 3 of ECHR even though Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention was applicable 
7 Since 1963 a number of global and regional treaties have been drafted and adopted in which specific crimes 
have been defined that are viewed as terrorist acts. Among these terrorist acts are hijacking, kidnapping and 
bombing. The thin line between fighting for freedom or self-determination and terrorism can be regarded as 
a reason why no agreement was reached so far on a definition of terrorism. Bruin–Wouters (2003): op. cit. 
14–15.
8 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003. 2.
9 European Council on Justice and Home Affairs Conclusion SN 3926/6/01 and Report from the Commission, 
17 October 2001 (COM [2001] 611).
10 COM (2001) 743 final, para. 2.3.1. 16. In Bruin–Wouters (2003): op. cit. 10.
11 COM (2001) 743 final, para. 2.3.2.
12 Bruin–Wouters (2003): op. cit. 9.
13 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
14 Ahmed v. Austria (17 December 1996), European Court of Human Rights, Appl. no. 25964/94.
15 Chahal v. United Kingdom (15 November 1996), European Court of Human Rights, Appl. no. 22414/93.
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and the applicants could not claim protection under the obligation of refoulement laid down 
in Article 33 (1) of the Refugee Convention.
However, it should be noted that Article 21 of the Qualification Directive16 allows 
refoulement in certain cases which means that the European Commission did not uphold 
the absolute character of Article 3 of the ECHR. In EU legislation, Articles 12 (2) and (3) 
of the Qualification Directive are relevant which are formulated in the spirit of Article 1F 
of the Refugee Convention.
It still remains a question whether the mere membership of a terrorist organization 
might have the consequence of exclusion from the refugee status. It should be noted that 
there is no common understanding among the states that which organization should be 
considered a terrorist organization. As an example, while the United States and Canada 
have both listed the Tamil opposition group in Sri Lanka, the LTTE, as a terrorist group, 
the list of the European Union did not mention it.17
The Exclusion Clauses of the Refugee Convention
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention says that the Convention shall not apply to any person 
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering the followings: a) he has 
committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as defined in 
the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; b) he 
has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his ad-
mission to that country as a refugee; c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations.
According to the travaux préparatoires, the purpose of Article 1F was twofold: firstly, 
to deny the benefits of refugee status to those persons who would otherwise qualify as ref-
ugees but who do not deserve it because there are serious reasons for considering that they 
committed heinous acts or serious common crimes; secondly, to ensure that such persons 
do not misuse the institution of asylum in order to avoid being held legally accountable for 
their acts.18 On the question whether inclusion or exclusion has to be established first, the 
UNHCR has a clear point of view: the inclusion has to be considered before exclusion. It 
is important to assess if the person has a well-founded fear of persecution and take a pro-
portionality test or to establish if the person may rely on the prohibition of refoulement.19
There are a number of questions that must be answered when applying Article 1F: are 
there serious reasons to consider that the asylum seeker may have committed an excludable 
act; does the act with which the asylum seeker a crime or act as mentioned in Article 1F, 
16 Directive 2004/83 of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted; Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries 
of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, 
and for the content of the protection granted.
17 Even the draft of the UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism does not declare that mem-
bership of a terrorist organization might constitute an offence. In Bruin–Wouters (2003): op. cit. 7–8.
18 UNHCR Statement on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, July 2009, para 2.1.
19 UNHCR Handbook para. 176–177.
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can the asylum seeker be held responsible for the act, are there any grounds for rejecting 
individual responsibility?20 The phrase there are serious grounds means that no final penal 
judgement is needed to exclude the asylum seeker when applying Article 1F. It is sufficient 
that the established facts and circumstances of the case provide serious reasons for consid-
ering that the individual committed the act, or in any other way can be held responsible for 
the act.21 Article 1F (a) of the Refugee Convention relates to international instruments in 
general that define the crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. From 
international sources it can be concluded that crimes against peace can be committed in the 
context of the planning or waging of a war or armed conflict. As wars or armed conflicts 
can be waged by states or state-like entities, crimes against peace can be committed by 
individuals who possess very high ranks.22 Serious violations of international humanitarian 
law constitute war crimes.23 War crimes may be committed in times of international or in 
non-international armed conflicts not only against civilians but military persons, as well. 
According to the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) 
crimes against humanity are fundamentally inhuman acts like murder, extermination, 
enslavement, and deportation of a population, severe deprivation of physical liberty, and 
are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population and with the knowledge of the attack.24 The widespread and systematic attacks 
against civilian population are the characteristics that make crimes against humanity dis-
tinguishable from common crimes. An inhuman act against an individual may constitute 
a crime against humanity if it is a part of a coherent system or a series of systematic and 
20 Boeles, Pieter – den Heijer, Maarten et al. (2009): International Refugee Protection. In European Migration 
Law. Antwerp–Oxford–Portland, Intersentia. 276. Article 6 of the 1945 Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal concerning the prosecution of Nazi war criminals defines a crime against peace the “planning, prepa-
ration, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing”. 
The United Nations General Assembly resolution 3312 (XXIX), 1974 considers aggression the “use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in 
any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”. The International Law Commission’s Draft 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind in Article 16 on the crime of aggression says 
that: “an individual, who, as a leader or organizer, actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State, shall be responsible for a crime of aggression”.
21 Ibid. 277.
22 Ibid. 278–279.
23 Article 8 of the Statute of International Criminal Court (ICC) defines war crimes inter alia as “serious violations 
of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and 
customs applicable in an armed conflict not of an international character”. This is reflected in the jurisdiction 
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and UNTAET Regulation No. 2000 for East Timor. Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal on war crimes was interpreted in the Delalic case in 2001 by the Appeals Chamber stating that “laws 
and customs of war” included all laws and customs beside those listed in the Article. “Serious violation” is to 
be interpreted according to the military manual and legislation of the States. Available: https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156 (Accessed: 29.10.2017) 
24 ICC Statute Article 7 (1).
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repeated acts.25 The most common crime against humanity is genocide.26 Crimes against 
humanity may be committed in peace time, as well as in war times.
According to Article 1F (b) any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons 
for considering that he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of 
refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee is excluded from being granted 
international protection. What constitutes to be a serious crime27 has different meanings in 
the national legal systems of the States but according to the UNHCR’s Handbook, a serious 
crime must be a capital crime or a very grave punishable act.28
The UNHCR considers that a serious crime should be considered non-political when 
other motives – such as personal reasons, causing fear and terror or gain – are the predom-
inant feature of the specific crime committed.29 The predominance test has to be taken into 
consideration when assessing the non-political nature of a crime. Violent acts as hostage 
taking of civilians and torture or acts of terrorism always fail the predominance test as 
they are disproportionate to any political objective. The non-political serious crime must be 
committed by the individual prior to his admission as a refugee in the country. This means 
that the crimes should be committed prior to entering and staying as an asylum seeker in the 
country. The ratio behind this limitation is that a person who commits a serious non-political 
crime within the country of refuge is subject to the ordinary criminal laws of that country 
and may be expelled from that country in accordance with Article 32 (2) and 33 (2) of the 
Refugee Convention.30
The meaning of admission differs when interpreting the Refugee Convention and the 
EU Qualification Directive. The drafters of the Refugee Conventions were guided by the 
general aim that the term admission must be understood as referring to the person’s physi-
cal presence and not his recognition as a refugee. Contrary to this, in the EU Qualification 
Directive admission means the time of granting refugee status. In this sense, the individual 
can be excluded from international protection for having committed a serious non-political 
crime also when that crime has been committed while in the country of refuge but prior of 
being recognized as a refugee.
According to Article 1F (c) acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations may also constitute a reason for exclusion. The purposes and principles of the United 
25 Boeles–den Heijer et al. (2009): op. cit. 280.
26 Article 2 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines the 
crime of genocide as: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group; c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.
27 According to UNHCR Background Note on the Application of Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003, para. 39 in determining 
the seriousness of the crime the following factors are relevant:
 • the nature of the act;
 • the actual harm inflicted;
 • the form of procedure used to prosecute the crime; 
 • the nature of the penalty for such a crime;
 • whether most jurisdictions would consider the act in question as a serious crime.
28 UNHCR Handbook, para. 155.
29 Ibid. para. 152.
30 Boeles–den Heijer et al. (2009): op. cit. 281.
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Nations are laid down in Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter in a broad way. 
Neither the drafters nor UNHCR give much guidance on what constitutes those purposes 
and principles that may be triggered when exclusion from international protection might be 
examined.31 As pointed out by Sarah Singer, several UN resolutions might be considered as 
forerunners of this provision, the Constitution of the International Refugee Constitution also 
included in its mandate those who had assisted enemy forces in the persecution of civilian 
populations or operations against the United Nations, and those who had participated in any 
organization hostile to the government of a member of the United Nations, or participated 
in any terrorist organization.32 However, terrorism did not explicitly appear in the wording 
of the Refugee Convention, later the EU Qualification Directive felt the necessity to make 
more clear the blurry provision of Article 1F (c): Acts contrary to the purposes and princi-
ples of the United Nations are set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of 
the United Nations and are, amongst others, embodied in the United Nations Resolutions 
relating to measures combating terrorism, which declare that “acts, methods and practices 
of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations” and that 
“knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations.”33
Given the unclear wording of Article 1F (c), it is not surprising that compared to Article 
1F (a) and 1F (b), this article is applied very seldom. Article 1F (c) is applied only in extreme 
circumstances when the act affects the basis of the international community. Crimes capable 
of affecting international peace, security and peaceful relations between States, as well as 
serious and sustained violations of human rights would fall under this category. Analysing 
the United Nations Charter which sets out the acts and principles of the UN, it can be stated 
that only persons who have been in positions of power in a state or state-like entity would 
appear capable of committing such acts.34
With regard to the consequences of the exclusion, the Refugee Convention does not 
pose any obligation. The state may choose to allow the excluded individual to stay on its 
territory on other grounds but obligations under international law may ask the state to crim-
inally prosecute or extradite the individual concerned. However, an excluded person may 
still be protected against return to a country where he or she is at risk of torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment.35
Applicability of Article 1F to Terrorism
There is, as yet, no internationally accepted legal definition of terrorism. Negotiations con-
tinue on a draft of UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. Currently 
31 Ibid. 282.
32 Singer, Sarah (2015): Terrorism and Exclusion from Refugee Status in the UK. Queen Mary Studies in Inter-
national Law. 85.
33 EU Qualification Directive, Preamble (22).
34 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, para. 5–6.
35 International instruments that prohibit ill-treatment are: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
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there are some twenty global or regional treaties pertaining to international terrorism 
which are enumerated in the Annex to the UNHCR Background Note on the Application 
of Exclusion Clauses. Where an individual has committed terrorist acts as defined within 
the international instruments mentioned in Annex D of the UNCHR Background Note and 
a risk of persecution is at issue, the person may be excludable from refugee status.36 In these 
circumstances, the basis for exclusion under Article 1F will depend on the act in question 
and all surrounding circumstances. In each case, individual responsibility must be estab-
lished. This remains the case even when the membership of the organisation in question is 
itself unlawful in the country of origin or refuge. The fact that an individual may be on a list 
of terrorist suspects or associated with a proscribed terrorist organisation should trigger 
consideration of the exclusion clauses. Depending on the organisation, exclusion may be 
presumed but it does not mean that exclusion is inevitable.37 In such cases, it is necessary 
to examine the individual’s role and position in the organisation, his or her own activities, 
as well as related issues as outlined above.38
Although providing funds to terrorist groups is generally a criminal offence, such 
activities may not necessarily reach the gravity required to fall under Article 1F (b). The 
particulars of the specific crime need to be looked at if the amounts concerned are small 
and given on a sporadic basis, the offence may not meet the required level of seriousness. 
On the other hand, a regular contributor of large sums to a terrorist organisation may well 
be guilty of a serious non-political crime.39
Although Article 1F (b) is of most relevance in connection with terrorism, in certain 
circumstances a terrorist act may fall within Article 1F (a), for example as a crime against 
humanity. In exceptional circumstances, the leaders of terrorist organisations carrying out 
particularly heinous acts of international terrorism which involve serious threats to inter-
national peace and security may be considered to fall within the scope of Article 1F (c).40
In the international community’s efforts to combat acts of terrorism, it is important 
that unwarranted associations between terrorists and refugees/asylum-seekers are avoided.
In reaching a decision on exclusion, it is therefore necessary to weigh up the gravity 
of the offence for which the individual appears to be responsible against the possible conse-
quences of the person being excluded. If the applicant is likely to face severe persecution, the 
crime in question must be very serious in order to exclude the applicant. A proportionality 
analysis would normally not be required in the case of crimes against peace, crimes against 
humanity, and acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as the 
acts covered are so heinous that they will tend always to outweigh the degree of persecu-
tion feared. However, war crimes and serious non-political crimes cover a wider range of 
behaviour and exclusion may be considered disproportionate if subsequent return is likely 
to lead to the individual’s torture in his or her country of origin.41
36 In Annex D of the UNCHR Background Note there are 13 international and 18 regional instruments pertaining 
to terrorism.
37 UNHCR Background Note, para. 80.
38 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, para. 26.
39 Ibid. para. 82.
40 Ibid. para. 83.
41 Ibid. para. 78.
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Exclusion, Application of Non-refoulement and National Security 
Interests
There are a number of ways by which States can prohibit the entry of individuals who 
constitute a danger to the national security. Besides issuing an alert in the joint Schengen 
Information System, those states that are parties to the Schengen Agreement, can also 
simply stop the foreign individual from entering the country or refrain from giving access 
to asylum procedures, for example by strictly applying the concept of safe third countries.42
Under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, states can exclude a person seeking asy-
lum from being acknowledged a refugee. Article 33 (1) of the Refugee Convention stipulates 
that no contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
The prohibition of refoulement under Article 33 (1) of the Refugee Convention is not 
absolute as Article 33 (2) allows for exceptions: “The benefit of Article 33 (1) may not, 
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as 
a danger to the security of the country in which he or she is, or who, having been convicted 
by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community 
of that country.” The application of Article 33 (2) requires an individualized determination 
by the country in which the refugee is that he or she comes within one of the two categories 
provided for under Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention.43
Looking at Article 1F and Article 33 (2) it is clear that the former applies to asylum 
seekers, while the latter applies to persons who are recognized as refugees. The objective 
of the Article 33 (2) is the protection of the country of refuge, whereas the objective of 
Article 1F is to define who should be excluded from the refugee status. Thus, excludable 
persons cannot claim protection against refoulement under Article 33 (2) of the Refugee 
Convention. It should be noted that the threshold for applying Article 33 (2) is high. The 
standard of proof is higher than when applying Article 1F. Therefore, the exception needs 
to be applied restrictively.44
Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention provides for exception in two cases: where 
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in 
which he or she is, or having been convicted for a particularly serious crime, the refugee 
constitutes a danger to the community.
When does a refugee constitute a danger to the national security of a country? The 
wording of Article 33 (2) refers to the danger to the country of refuge. Therefore danger 
to other states or to the international community falls outside the scope of this paragraph. 
Bruin and Woters call the attention to the reasoning of the Canadian Supreme Court in the 
42 Bruin–Wouters (2003): op. cit. 16.
43 UNHCR Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 26 January 2007, para. 10.
44 Bruin–Wouters (2003): op. cit. 16–17.
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Suresh case.45 The Supreme Court is of the opinion that the security of one state depends 
on the security of other states. “It may once have made sense to suggest that terrorism in 
one country did not necessarily implicate other countries. But after the year 2001 that ap-
proach is no longer valid.”46 Bruin and Woters argue that the mere possibility of danger is 
not enough. The danger needs to be proven and cannot be based on assumptions, possible 
adverse repercussions are insufficient.47 However, Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention 
does not specify the facts and circumstances that can be considered a danger to the national 
security and leaves a margin of appreciation for the states, still, the Refugee Convention 
demands a level of risk to be proven.48
The other exception from the obligation of non-refoulement is the case when the ref-
ugee has been convicted in the country of refuge. According to the text of Article 33 (2) 
a provable danger to the community of the country of refuge is a condition, too. The mere 
fact that the refugee has been convicted is not enough to apply this provision. On the one 
hand, the final judgement should cover particularly serious crimes, on the other hand the 
assessment of the danger to the community should be for the future. The term community 
is intended to refer to the safety and well-being of the population in general, in contrast to 
the national security exception that refers to the larger interests of the state.49
The Obligation of Non-refoulement and Other International 
Instruments
Non-refoulement obligations complementing the obligations under the Refugee Convention 
have also been established under international human rights law. This means that States are 
obliged not to transfer any individual to another country if this would result in exposing him 
or her to serious human rights violations, notably arbitrary deprivation of life, or torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. An explicit non-refoulement 
provision is contained in Article 3 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which prohibits the removal of a person to 
a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture. Obligations under the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights also encompass the obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove 
45 Suresh v. Canada (11 Jan 2002), Supreme Court of Canada, 2002 SCC 1, File no. 27790. The background of 
the case: Suresh was a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil descent. In 1990 he entered Canada and asked for asylum 
which he was granted. In 1991 he asked for immigrant status but his application was not finalized and in 1995 
Canada decided to deport him to Sri Lanka based on security grounds. Suresh was a member of the LTTE 
and is still involved in fundraising for the LTTE. The Canadian authorities acknowledged that he has not 
committed any acts of violence neither in Canada or Sri Lanka but considered that the mere membership in 
a terrorist organization was a sufficient ground for deportation. The authorities also confirmed that he might 
face the risk of being tortured if returned to Sri Lanka but considered the national security of Canada higher. 
The legal issue was if it is permitted to consider a balancing act between the national security of a state and 
the human rights of a person.
46 Cited by Bruin–Wouters (2003): op. cit. 17.
47 Ibid. 18.
48 Ibid.
49 Boeles–den Heijer et al. (2009): op. cit. 288.
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a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there 
is a real risk of irreparable harm, either in the country to which removal is to be effected 
or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed.50 The prohibition of 
refoulement to a risk of serious human rights violations, particularly torture and other forms 
of ill-treatment is also established under regional human rights treaties, the main source of it 
being Article 3 of the ECHR. The prohibition of refoulement to a country where the person 
risks torture is non-derogable and applies in all circumstances, including in the context of 
measures to combat terrorism and during times of armed conflict.
The prohibition of torture and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life is also 
part of customary international law. It includes the prohibition of refoulement to a risk 
of torture and a cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In this meaning, 
States must establish, prior to implementing any removal measure, that the person whom 
it intends to remove from their territory or jurisdiction would not be exposed to a danger 
of serious human rights violations. If such a risk exists, the State is not allowed to remove 
the individual concerned.51
The Relevant EU Case Law
As regards the European Union, there are two significant resources that should be taken 
into account: the Refugee Convention and the Qualification Directive as already discussed. 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B&D was one of the first asylum-related judgments of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) when the Court was asked to interpret the 
exclusion clauses.52 In his judgment the CJEU ruled that Article 12 (2) (b) and (c) of the 
Qualification Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a person has been 
a member of an organisation which is on the list forming the Annex to Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and that that 
person has actively supported the organization does not automatically constitute a serious 
reason for considering that that person has committed a serious non-political crime or acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. According to the Court, 
the finding that there are serious reasons for considering that a person has committed such 
a crime or has been guilty of such acts is conditional on an assessment on a case-by-case 
basis of the specific facts, with a view to determining whether the acts committed by the 
organisation concerned meet the conditions laid down in those provisions and whether 
individual responsibility for carrying out those acts can be attributed to the person con-
cerned. The Court said that exclusion from the refugee status pursuant to Article 12 (2) (b) 
or (c) of the Qualification Directive is not conditional on the person concerned representing 
a present danger to the host Member State and the exclusion of a person from the refugee 
status is not conditional on an assessment of proportionality in relation to the particular 
50 UNHCR Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations, para. 17–20.
51 Ibid. para. 21–22.
52 Joined cases C-57-09 and C-101/09. Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B and D, Judgement of the Court, 
9  November 2010.
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case. According to the Court, Article 3 of the Directive53 must be interpreted as meaning 
that Member States may grant a right of asylum under their national law to a person who 
is excluded from the refugee status pursuant to Article 12 (2) of the Directive, provided 
that that other kind of protection does not entail a risk of confusion with the refugee status 
within the meaning of the Directive.
In the Commissaire general aux refugies et aux apatrides v. Mostafa Lounani case54 
the CJEU went further in explaining the exclusion clauses. Whereas previously the scope 
of the exclusion clause for those engaging in terrorist acts was limited to engaging in, 
conspiring to or planning an actual act of terrorism with an international dimension, the 
Court has widened the scope to include those who provide logistical support even where 
no act of terrorism takes place.55 In its judgment the Court held that according to Article 
1F (c) of the Refugee Convention acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations and in Article 12 (2) (c) of the Qualification Directive cannot be limited to the acts 
set out in the Security Council Resolutions. The Court referred to Council Framework 
Decision 2002/475 which lists various forms of conduct which may fall within the scope 
of the general concept of terrorism and classifies them within four categories of offences: 
terrorist offences, offences relating to a terrorist group, offences linked to terrorist activities, 
and, last, inciting, aiding or abetting, or attempting to commit some of those offences.56 
The Court held that Article 12 (2) (c) of the Qualification Directive and Article 1F (c) of the 
Refugee Convention could not be limited to Article 1 (1) of the Framework Decision. The 
scope of the exclusion clauses cannot be confined to acts of terrorism but must also extend 
to the “recruitment, organization, transportation or equipment of individuals who travel to 
a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of, inter alia, the 
perpetration, planning or preparation of terrorist acts.”57 The Court further noted that the 
test for an individual assessment as laid down in the B&D case still applies. The decision 
whether the conduct falls within the scope of Article 12 of the Qualification Directive is that 
of the national authorities and courts. The Court ruled that Article 12 (2) (c) and Article 12 
(3) of the Qualification Directive must be interpreted as meaning that acts constituting 
participation in the activities of a terrorist group, may justify exclusion of refugee status, 
even though it is not established that the person concerned committed, attempted to commit 
or threatened to commit a terrorist act as defined in the resolutions of the United Nations 
Security Council.
53 Article 3 of the 2004/38 Directive reads as follows: “Member States may introduce or retain more favourable 
standards for determining who qualifies as a refugee or as a person eligible for subsidiary protection, and 
for determining the content of international protection, in so far as those standards are compatible with this 
Directive.”
54 C-573/17, Judgment of the CJEU, 31 January 2017.
55 Available: www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/cjeu-c-57315-commissaire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-aux-
r%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9s-et-aux-apatrides-v-mostafa-lounani (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
56 Judgment of the CJEU, para. 51.
57 Available: www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/cjeu-c-57315-commissaire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-aux-
r%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9s-et-aux-apatrides-v-mostafa-lounani (Accessed : 15.12.2017)
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Conclusion
This article tried to show the legal background to the situation when an individual 
asks for asylum and apparently he or she is/was a terrorist or gives/gave assistance to ter-
rorists or simply is/was a member of a group connected to terrorism. At the same time the 
article made efforts to present the law that affects the obligation of non-refoulement when 
an acknowledged refugee is convicted for terrorist acts as there are international treaties 
that allow for exceptions while others consider non-refoulement as an absolute human right 
with no exceptions. Considering the complexity of the issue and the many undefined terms 
that should be a reference point when assessing a case, a lot of questions remain that should 
be answered for the national authorities and courts to be able to give justified decisions.
The intention of the international community is clearly that those persons who do not 
deserve it – especially terrorists – are excluded from being provided a safe haven. The main 
problem in this regard is that to date no internationally accepted definition of terrorism ex-
ists. The thin line between fighting for freedom or self-determination and terrorism might 
drive to the conclusion that terrorism is rather a political term than a legal term. In the light 
of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe there is an urgent need for clearing the unclear.
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Migratory Impacts on Law Enforcement
Zoltán Hautzinger
Introduction
By the first decades of the 21st century, views on human migration as a social phenomenon 
have almost completely lost their positive characteristics, especially due to occasionally 
large-scale, cross-continent migration patterns. Relating to the concept of migration, 
thoughts in society concerning the concept of migration now primarily focus on negative 
phenomena, envision harmful consequences on the affected (host or transit) states caused 
by human displacement, which consequences can only be solved by employing reactive 
legal instruments.
The basis of reactive regulation is to sanction and prevent uncontrolled migration. From 
this perspective, migration processes are considered issues to be solved by legal and polit-
ical measures, which can basically represent solutions to issues of public order and public 
security.1 Given that providing a normative framework for human migration is mostly of 
non-policing nature, when regulating migration, the effects that may represent solutions to 
dangers and risks arising from migration are felt strongly. These are the policing effects of 
migration and can be felt in certain areas such as alien policing within alien administration 
or other policing needs during asylum authority procedures, the implementable policing 
measures in citizenship administration and, ultimately, certain possibilities to manage 
migration as criminal proceedings.
Nevertheless, the effects of policing migration do not only take shape in forms of 
regulation concerning foreigners, they also appear when it comes to regulating human 
movement. More specifically, they appear when defining the legal possibilities of crossing 
the state border, or when implementing applicable norms in cases of unlawful exit and en-
try. These are the limits and prohibitions concerning the state border and border policing 
and, ultimately, the criminal prosecution initiated due to the violation of such limits and 
prohibitions.
1 Gyeney Laura (2014): Legális bevándorlás az Európai Unióba, különös tekintettel a családi élet tiszteletben 
tartásának jogára. Budapest, Pázmány Press. 39.
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The Policing Effects of Rules and Regulations Concerning Foreigners 
(Alien Law)
Migration and policing
The basis of the conceptual definition of policing foreigners is the general definition of 
policing. In accordance to the so-called Szamel concept, policing is a state activity aimed 
at preventing public order disturbances, preventing directly disruptive behaviour, and re-
storing the disturbed public order.2
Policing can be considered professional administration exercising the power vested 
in the authority, in the scope of which the authority, for the purpose of protecting pub-
lic security and public order, grants rights to and imposes obligations on hierarchically 
non-subordinated clients by enforcing them, due to the lack of voluntary compliance, us-
ing administrative measures or authority coercion, which includes the monopoly of using 
legitimate physical violence.3 Policing is a part of civilian administration, the activities of 
the authorities and its directness as visible in their measures are clearly present.4 For the 
purpose of public interest, the policing authorities, therefore, have the obligation to protect 
the legally defined public services by upholding the law and, additionally, have the obligation 
to perform their duties to apply the law, more precisely to provide legal protection. Thus 
policing as a function is closely tied to the state, it is the instrument to exercise power, and 
to enforce such power it can apply legitimate coercion.5
The above fundamental black letter law mechanism of policing defines the necessity of 
policing activities related to the entry and stay of foreigners. Within the scope of alien law, 
the legal provisions related to foreigners is called policing of foreigners, while regulating 
migration, at present by prescribing the legal consequences of crossing the state border as 
an inevitable sign of international migration, is called border policing. The common nature 
of the two types of policing, in addition to their relation to the concept of policing, is that, 
when applied, they can be carried out at the same location (at the state border or the border 
area), and we can also find personal overlaps if the addressees of border policing measures 
are members of the group of persons of foreign nationality (foreigners). An additional 
common element is that both branches of policing aim, among others, at employing the 
principles and norms of regulating migration.
In spite of their common goals, alien policing and border policing do not represent the 
same areas. Especially, it cannot be stated that they are embedded into each other’s sys-
tems. While alien policing manifests itself, basically from a personal and material scope, in 
applying authority inspections and measures taken with reference to foreigners’ entry and 
stay – ultimately, using coercive measures to restrict personal freedom – border policing ac-
tivities mean carrying out guarding services in connection with the maintaining order at the 
border (border surveillance), checking (cross-border-traffic) and law enforcement activities 
(maintaining border order). Thus alien policing is related primarily to a well-defined group 
2 Szamel Lajos (1992): Jogállamiság és rendészet. Rendészeti Szemle, Vol. 30, No. 3. 8.
3 Finszter Géza (2012): A rendőrség joga. Budapest, Országos Rendőr-főkapitányság. 18.
4 Patyi András (2013): A rendészeti igazgatás és a rendészeti jog alapjai. In Lapsánszky János szerk.: Közi-
gazgatási jog. Fejezetek szakigazgatásaink köréből. I. kötet. Budapest, Complex Kiadó. 138.
5 Balla Zoltán (2016): Monográfia a rendészetről. Budapest, Rejtjel Kiadó. 10.
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of persons, the foreigners, and, to a certain extent, to other persons (landlords, transporters, 
employers); border policing, on the other hand, is related to specific locations, that is the 
state border, the border area and the border crossing points open to international traffic.
Alien policing
On this basis, the definition of policing, the administration of entry and stay of foreigners 
can only be of the policing type if it is justified by the unlawful conduct of the person of 
foreign nationality. From this perspective, alien policing must sharply be separated from 
legislation necessary to justice because voluntary compliance is not enough in itself. Check-
ing the conditions of entry, issuing certain travel, stay or residence permits refers to the 
non-policing aspects of administrative alien law, therefore, it would be justified to call such 
procedures alien law administration or foreigners administration. In addition to procedures 
granting certain permits, the provisions on administrative issues related to citizenship rights 
and asylum rights may also constitute a part of alien law administration.
Conducting alien policing procedures, taking alien policing measures, or using coercive 
measures can be relevant if the alien law does not apply without any fault due to the subject 
(foreigner) of the particular legal relations. Alien policing as an area of law enforcement 
carried out by the authorities can only occur in relation to the foreigner’s border crossing 
(basically entry) and/or stay, by committing unlawful activities or creating unlawful sit-
uations. Alien policing as an activity of the authorities has an impact on illegal migration 
routes, by its efficiency indicators it can directly influence the propensity to commit unlawful 
activities related to entry and stay occurring in the area of the given country.6
We can talk about exclusively alien policing measures or procedures if the unlawful 
activity basically happens in order to facilitate illegal entry or unlawful stay. Alien policing 
has a supporting role if the foreigner’s stay in Hungary is to be terminated and excluded, 
because the person due to a valid court decision in criminal matter has become persona non 
grata. In such case punitive, and not administrative, sanctions must be imposed against the 
foreigner with the purpose that the person not having a Hungarian citizenship, accountable 
for the crimes committed could officially be restrained from the territory of Hungary.
In alien policing there is competence to apply measures or coercive measures against 
foreigners either at the state border as a part of checks, or in the territory of the state that 
is checks in the area of free movement. The purpose of such checks is to terminate the un-
lawful situation (ordering return, holding, expulsion and deportation) occurring as a result 
of the entry or stay of the foreign person by violating the rules of entry and stay, or the 
temporary restriction on personal freedom (applying alien policing custody) in order to 
ensure the conditions of such termination at a later date.
At the state border alien policing is carried out together with checks by refusing entry 
and ordering return in cases of non-citizens, mainly third-country national aliens not having 
the conditions to enter. The interest of alien policing in this special case, in a particular 
way, prevails over the interest of criminal procedure, since no investigation can be initiated 
6 See Balázs László (2017): Az idegenrendészeti hatóság tevékenysége rendkívüli migrációs helyzetben. Belügyi 
Szemle, Vol. 65, No. 2. 5.
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as regards counterfeiting of authentic instruments, provided that no other crime has been 
committed, if the foreigner uses a false, counterfeit document or uses a genuine travel doc-
ument issued on another person’s name to enter the territory of the country.7
The law and order functions of alien policing (preventive and restorative) arise in 
cases when the prevention of the unlawful situation cannot be carried out by border checks. 
Checks in the area of free movement no longer serves the purpose of making decisions 
about foreigners’ entry, but rather to establish the legality of their stay. In case of suspicion 
of unlawful stay, as policing measures restricting personal freedom, the following can be 
applied: alien policing arrest, holding for unknown identification and citizenship, and custo-
dy for the preparation of expulsion or deportation, or alien policing custody. Restricting the 
personal freedom for a predetermined period by alien policing, however, is not of punitive 
nature, its policing significance lays that the expulsion of the foreigner unlawfully staying, 
not applying for asylum or not deserving any asylum could be successful. These measures, 
due to the restriction of personal freedom, are under strict legal control, each authority 
decision is subject to judicial review and appeal.
Law enforcement activities closely related to alien policing, such as classic law en-
forcement that can hardly be distinguished from alien policing by its features, have been 
found to exist these days in asylum affairs, too. It is present specifically in asylum custody 
and its replacement measures, which, on the one hand must be separated from alien policing 
custody, due to their purpose and function,8 on the other hand, they, in their nature, can 
be interpreted as measures of the similar kind as they involve applying policing rules con-
cerning foreigners. The strengthening of the policing feature of asylum affairs can be seen 
from those measures that may insist on having the assessment of the asylum applications 
to a designated location (hot spot, transit zone, etc.), thus they require the asylum seeker 
to stay at those locations. The above-mentioned metamorphosis of asylum affairs into law 
enforcement is a sort of response from the authorities to individual attempts whose goal is 
to avoid law enforcement carried out by the alien policing authorities due to unlawful entry 
or stay regarding the asylum application submitted in the absence of a genuine reason for 
leaving. As a result of this phenomenon, a part of the asylum seekers have limited rights 
related to asylum (access and right to stay), because the state competent to assess asylum 
applications keeps striving for identifying ways how asylum procedures should focus on 
matters brought forth by applicants requiring international protection.
Measures as the result of rescission, or in some countries withdrawal of citizenship may 
have alien policing consequences. In case of the latter, one should not primarily consider 
the restoration of the pre-existing situation by withdrawing the fraudulently obtained citi-
zenship, but rather measures that enable the authorities to withdraw ex lege the citizenship, 
without the person’s explicit request or consent, of persons that have committed serious 
criminal acts (especially terrorism-related ones). The withdrawal of citizenship is not pro-
hibited by international law, the prohibition of the arbitrary withdrawal of citizenship must 
apply in all cases, which prohibition includes the avoidance of statelessness, the prohibition 
of discrimination, the principles of necessity, reasonableness and proportionality, the prin-
7 Section 170, subsection (6) of Act XIX of 1998 on Criminal Proceedings.
8 Klenner Zoltán (2013): A menekültügyi őrizet és bevezetésének szükségessége. Pécs, Pécsi Határőr Tu-
dományos Közlemények XIV. 297.
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ciple of legality, having legitimate objective and respecting the procedural guarantees.9 
The measures mentioned hereby are not taken against the foreigner but rather the creation of 
a foreign status, such reaching the possibility to conduct further alien policing procedures.
Border policing
Contrary to alien policing, border policing, as mentioned above, is not related to a well- 
defined group of persons, but rather to specific locations, that is the state border and its 
surroundings, the border area. The basis of the border policing activities is the border order. 
This order established and maintained along the state border is a desired and mutually 
beneficial condition in which national interests regarding both neighbouring countries can 
mutually be enforced.10 As a result, policing activities related to state border cannot be 
linked to border protection. The latter basically refers to defence activities that are related 
to the areas of military art.11 Border protection in Hungary stems from the constitutional 
obligation that the fundamental task of the Hungarian Defence Forces, as the national de-
fence force of Hungary, is to protect the independence, territorial integrity and state borders 
by military protection.12 Thus border protection refers to the military protection of the state 
borders, while border policing refers to the protection of the sate border order, which is the 
constitutional obligation of the Police.13
In accordance with the Act on Police, this organization provides surveillance at the 
state border, it prevents, reconnoitres, disrupts the unlawful crossing of the state border, 
checks the passenger and vehicle traffic crossing the state border, maintains order at the 
border crossing points, operates the road-crossing points and manages the tasks to maintain 
and improve them. This organization guides the activities of the Hungarian authorities 
tasked with inspecting border events, it supervises the works surveying and marking the 
state border, upgrading the border markers, it takes the necessary measures to handle the 
conflicts directly threatening the order of the state border or the conflicts arising from 
mass migration, furthermore it eliminates violent acts directed against the order of the 
state border.14
Neither the act on the police interprets the order of the state border, nor does the 
Hungarian criminal law interpret certain crimes related to the order of the state border. 
Regarding the latter idea, Sándor Madai prefers if the legislative power defines the protec-
tion of the order of crossing the state border and the order of border traffic stipulated in the 
9 Lőrincz Aranka (2015): Az állampolgársági jog válasza a terrorizmusra. In Hautzinger Zoltán szerk.: 
Migráció és rendészet. Budapest, Magyar Rendészettudományi Társaság, Migrációs Tagozat. 119.
10 Varga János – Verhóczki János (2013): Határrendészet. Budapest, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, 
Rendészettudományi Kar. 31.
11 Suba János (2017): Határvédelem a második világháború időszakában, 1938–1944. In Pósán László – 
Veszprémy László – Boda József – Isaszegi János: Őrzők, vigyázzatok a határra! Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó. 
537.
12 See Section 45, subsection (1) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
13 “The core duties of the police shall be the prevention and investigation of criminal offences, and the protection 
of public security, public order, and the order of state borders.” See Section 46 of The Fundamental Law of 
Hungary.
14 Section 1, subsection (2) points 9–13) of Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police.
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relevant legislation.15 Activities by the authorities related to the before-mentioned serves as 
the basis of border policing, which concept, as viewed by József Beregnyei, can be approxi-
mated to border surveillance,16 while in accordance with the definition by Gergely Virányi, 
it goes beyond border surveillance and may include certain state activities which can be 
integrated into the mission of several authorities, and which can direct towards establishing 
and maintaining the border order, the prevention of border order disturbances, as well as 
towards interrupting the behaviour directly disrupting the border order and the restoration 
of the disrupted border order – or its defence, if need be.17 Gábor Kovács describes border 
policing as a legal category, a system of activities and an organization, which can on the 
whole be related to border surveillance and other activities (criminal investigation and alien 
policing).18
Relating to the referred concepts, it must be mentioned that border policing, as a part 
of law enforcement, can indeed be related to border control and border order, but it cannot 
include other independent branches of policing, it can only be linked to them. Law enforce-
ment activities in criminal matters related to the state border or separating alien policing 
from border policing, however, do not mean that border policing cannot be an instrument 
when authorities handle migration issues. Moreover, border policing in consideration of the 
two faces of migration goes beyond alien policing when it comes to checking migration 
issues, since its personal scope includes everyone, regardless of their citizenship, who crosses 
(inwards or outwards) the state border at the designated border crossing. Nevertheless, only 
those safety rules and models can be related to border policing which can be applied at the 
state border.
Although authority measures launched due to managing migration far from the state 
borders and the border areas are fit by many19 into the integrated border management or 
border control systems, these measures, due to their characteristics of checking foreigners, 
are not border policing but rather alien policing ones by their nature. Another matter is 
that behind using the terminology border policing there may be organizational reasons, 
by designating authorities to carry out alien policing checks in the area of free movement, 
which authorities otherwise carry out their main tasks at the state border as border policing 
(border control, border safety) authorities.
15 Madai Sándor (2016): A „tömeges bevándorlás okozta válsághelyzet” kezelésének büntető anyagi jogi esz-
közei hazánkban. In Hautzinger Zoltán szerk.: A migráció bűnügyi hatásai. Budapest, Magyar Rendészet-
tudományi Társaság, Migrációs Tagozat. 248.
16 Beregnyei József (2012): Rendészet, rendvédelem értelmezése, viszonya és kapcsolata a Határőrséghez. Pécs, 
Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények I. 30.
17 Virányi Gergely (2012): Gondolatok a rendészettudományhoz. Pécs, Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények 
I. 63.
18 Kovács Gábor (2012): A rendészet, határrendészet értelmezése a határőrségi csapaterő feladat- és tevékeny-
ségrendszerében. Pécs, Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények I. 92.
19 For more details, see Varga János (2008): A schengeni eszme uniós biztonsági rendszerré válásának kitel-
jesedése és távlatai. In Postavenie Schengenkého acquis v systéme politik Európskych spoločenstiev. Zborník 
z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie. Bratislava, Akadémia Policajného zboru v Bratislave. 80.
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The Effects of Migration on Crime and Criminal Law
The social consequences of crimes committed in relation to migration or by foreigners, 
 respectively, are apparently related – they can, however, be basically classified in two differ-
ent sets. Criminal acts related to human migration, on the one hand, can be related to either 
emigration and immigration, additionally such acts can be included into this scope whose 
perpetrators are not necessarily foreigners (another phrasing: the foreigners). Criminal 
acts perpetrated by foreigners are mostly non-migrational ones (unlawful border crossing, 
unlawful stay, people smuggling, unlawful employment, etc.), but unlawful conducts that 
anyone can commit, and among which the gravest crimes (homicide, assault and battery) 
or offences that have a more limited effect on the general sense of security (defrauding 
public finances, traffic offences) may occur. Another significant difference is that most of 
the crimes committed by foreigners do not become known. Some of the possible reasons 
may be the lack of language proficiency, the lack of knowledge of the culture and legal or-
der of the place of stay, and last but not least the existing solidarity even in cases of crimes 
committed against each other.20
Handling the unlawful acts related to migration can be carried out by legal instru-
ments in the framework of provisions of various branches of law. For the general public and 
sometimes the profession too, criminal laws seem to be convenient; however, applying them 
would mean the criminalization of the phenomenon of migration and, on the other hand, it 
would unduly affect and burden the punitive application of the law and justice. The ultima 
ratio principle of criminal law does not support that unlawful behaviours or unlawful acts 
relating to irregular migration be punishable by means of criminal law. The Constitutional 
Court, for instance has expressed that the social function of the criminal law is to serve as 
the sanctioning keystone of the entirety of the legal system, that is the purpose and role of 
punishment is to maintain the integrity of the legal and moral norms when no other sanctions 
by other branches of the law can help.21 Therefore, in the wide range of legal means and 
instruments available to combat and prevent unlawful entry or stay, ultimately criminal law 
may also offer solutions to punish criminal conduct directly related to irregular migration.
The issue of crimmigration
International literature aptly uses the term of crimmigration to describe the criminalisa-
tion of human migration.22 In this definition the asymmetric blending of criminal law and 
migration rules is visible, as it includes the sanctioning of unlawful immigration by the 
instruments of criminal law, relating criminal behaviour to the coercive measures employed 
20 Haller József (2016): Migránsok agresszivitása az adatok tükrében. In Hautzinger Zoltán szerk.: A migráció 
bűnügyi hatásai. Budapest, MRTT. 89.
21 Decision 30/1992. (V.26.) of the Constitutional Court.
22 Stumpf, Juliet (2006): The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power. American Uni-
versity Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2. 368.
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in migration (e.g. expulsion) and introducing criminal law instruments (e.g. bail, secure 
detention) in alien policing procedures, respectively.23
The term crimmigration has by now become a well-defined concept for international 
criminal science academia, which concept shows how different countries attempt to control 
human migration, to make an effect on regulating certain human rights.24 The term crimmi-
gration has only sporadically occurred in the relevant Hungarian literature. Summarizing 
the findings of international studies in this field, Miklós Lévay, for instance, associates 
the criminalisation of migration and the criminological examination of its consequences 
to the concept of crimmigration.25 Examining criminality related to foreigners, however, 
is not considered a particularly negligible area.26 Besides, due to criminalising irregular 
immigration and stay, the works assessing the criminal law means and instruments recently 
introduced to respond to the acceleration of illegal migration have generated a wider scale 
of interest within jurisprudence.
When sanctioning unlawful immigration, it is especially interesting to examine the 
situation regarding the criterion set on judging an act subject to applying criminal law 
instruments. The European Union, for instance, tries to strengthen the criminal law frame-
work of its fight against unlawful entry and transit, as well as unlawful stay. Thus, in the 
criminal law systems of certain member states special legislation can be found concerning 
people smuggling, human trafficking, illegal employment of foreigners unlawfully residing 
in the member state.27
Nevertheless, it can be a subject of examination what acts, in addition to the behaviours 
related to classical unlawful migration or stay, related directly to irregular migration can 
reach the level of being sanctioned by criminal law. In Estonia, for instance, the unlawful 
stay of a foreigner is considered a policing crime. It can be committed by a foreigner who 
stays in the country without a legal basis at least on two occasions within one year.28 In 
Finland crossing the state border unlawfully constitutes a criminal act and unlawful stay in 
the country is considered a criminal offence.29 In Italy, the consolidated act on immigration 
defines the punishable acts related to irregular migration. Among such acts are the follow-
ing: violating the decision on expulsion or not respecting the obligation to participate in the 
voluntary return programme in case of third-country nationals or avoiding the obligations 
arising from the programme.30 Violating the decision on expulsion as well as unlawful  entry 
23 Legomsky, Stephen H. (2007): The new path of immigration law: asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice 
norms. Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 64. 476.
24 Woude, Maartje van der – Barker, Vanessa – Leun, Joanne van der (2017): Crimmigration in Europe. 
 European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 14, No. 1. 4.
25 Several articles on crimmigration were published in 2017 in the European Journal of Criminology, Issue 1.
26 See e.g. Hautzinger (2016): op. cit. or Póczik Szilveszter (2017): A jelenkori nemzetközi migráció egyes 
speciális kriminológiai vonatkozásai. In Sabjanics István szerk.: Modern kori népvándorlás. A migráció 
komplex megközelítése. Budapest, Dialóg Campus Kiadó. 57–70.
27 Not including those punishable acts, which immigrants commit during their stay but not for the purpose of 
illegal entry or stay. In this respect, see Alonso-Borrego, César – Garoupa, Nuno – Vázquez, Pablo (2011): 
Does Immigration Cause Crime. Evidence from Spain. Madrid, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
28 Estonian Penal Code (passed 06.06.2001 RT I 2001, 61, 364, entry into force 01.09.2002) Sections 233–234 
and 260. Available: www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes (Accessed: 10.06.2015)
29 The Criminal Code of Finland (39/1889, amendments up to 927/2012 included) chapter 17, Section 7, subsection 
(2). Available: www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes (Accessed: 10.06.2015)
30 Ad-Hoc Query on criminal law. Requested by HU EMN NCP on 23 June 2014. 21.
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or stay are also punishable in Luxembourg. Considering the former, not only the illegal 
entry or the timed-out stay is considered punishable together with misrepresentation before 
the competent authorities, while considering the latter, expulsion or repeated entry despite 
the existing prohibition of entry and stay is punishable. The Romanian and Bulgarian penal 
code had declared illegal border crossing a crime long before the migration wave hit the 
area in 2015, and presently they sanction the act with deprivation of liberty irrespective of 
the fact whether or not the applicant has applied for asylum.31
Disregarding the above examples, criminalising irregular migration, or basically any 
form of human migration contrary to the law, has become a current issue for the general 
public, as well as the people in alien policing, criminology and criminal law. In her analysis 
concerning the impact of the police and the justice system on the opinion of the general 
public, Joanna Parkin concludes that authority measures taken against persons of irregular 
status can easily demonstrate the effectiveness of policing. Additionally, a useful enemy 
figure can be found that may play on public fears and lessen the feeling of security.32 This 
is also a reason why no-one today disputes that the effects of criminal law concerning 
migration show a growing trend generating an additional issue whether migration may 
become overcriminalised?33
Examples of crimmigration in the Hungarian Criminal Code
Since, as set out in the substantive set of rules in the Hungarian legal regulation, there is 
no crime similar to unlawful stay (infringement of prohibition of entry and stay) that can 
only be committed by a foreigner, this area may include acts that can typically be carried 
out in relation to foreigners (third-country nationals).34 These include, among others, people 
smuggling, facilitating unlawful stay, abusing family status and unlawful employment of 
third-country citizens.
Of the above crimes mentioned, people smuggling is considered the most typical 
migration crime, whose goal is to facilitate the entry of certain persons to the territory of 
a country different from their country of citizenship without meeting the requirements of 
lawful entry and stay. This crime was already punishable in the Criminal Code of 1961. At 
that time, however, the situation did not primarily focus on preventing illegal immigration 
into the territory of the country, but rather on preventing unauthorised emigration from 
the country. Concerning the above, at that time the Criminal Code listed crimes such as 
unauthorised border crossing, refusal to return, or failure to report unauthorised border 
crossing or people smuggling. Currently people smuggling activity has become an area 
preferred by organised crime, in which the perpetrators assist persons not having permits 
31 Although asylum application is considered ground for exemption from punishment in Romania and Bulgaria, cer-
tain rights organisations consider detention as authorised by criminal law in reference to unlawful border crossing. 
See Rigo, Enrica (2006): Citizens and Foreigners in the Enlarged Europe. In Sadurski, Wojciech – Czarnota, 
Adam – Krygier, Martin eds.: Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? Springer. 111–112.
32 Parkin, Joanna (2013): The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security, No. 61. 5.
33 Chacon, Jennifer M. (2012): Overcriminalizing Immigration. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 
Vol. 102, No. 3. 616.
34 Not including particular offences against or related to foreign officials.
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to enter and stay in Hungary (and the area of the European Union) to unlawfully cross the 
state border. Therefore, people smuggling refers to a criminal situation whose goal is to 
prevent illegal immigration into Hungary rather than prevent emigration from the country. 
Although anyone can be the perpetrator and party (mainly instigator) involved, people 
smuggling activities are usually committed by Hungarian and non-Hungarian citizens by 
providing assistance in illegal border crossing for third-country citizens.35
The new Criminal Code introduced the crime of facilitating of unauthorised residence36 
and the abuse of family ties.37 The former, quite complex, regulation is essentially the updat-
ed version of the crime of unlawful stay as set in the previous Criminal Code. Its perpetrator 
can be a person lawfully residing in the territory of the country who provides assistance for 
financial gain to foreign nationals (generally third-country nationals) to reside unlawfully 
in the territory of Hungary. For similar purposes the new Criminal Code punishes the abuse 
of family ties too, which can be committed by persons over the age of eighteen who enter 
into a family relationship for financial gain for the sole purpose of obtaining a document 
verifying the right of residence or consent to a statement of paternity of full effect. While 
providing assistance to reside unlawfully punishes the assistance concerning unauthorised 
residence of persons not having the right of free movement, the abuse of family ties is 
a deception of a condition by which the third-country national intends to legalise his/her 
unauthorised residence intellectually.
Even the previous Criminal Code, although by one of its last amendments, regulated 
the unlawful employment of third-country nationals as a punishable crime.38 The focus of 
this crime was the third-country national not having a licence to carry out economic ac-
tivity, who is nevertheless employed, regardless of his/her legal or illegal stay in Hungary. 
The primary reason for the factual situation derives from the Directive 2009/52/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards 
on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, 
which requires member states to set penalties in serious cases, as specifically identified in 
the directive, in their national laws.39 Thus creating the above crime, it penalises unlawful 
employment related to migration having regard to the European Union legislation and its 
implementation in Hungary.
To some extent, the special case of human trafficking40 may also be considered a tra-
ditional act of migration background, since its factual elements contain the conduct of 
trafficking. In human trafficking, however, border crossing and spatial movement do not 
constitute the most important elements, since human trafficking can be considered a crime 
against personal liberty, thus domestic or cross-border migration is only related to it as 
35 In accordance with Section 353 subsection 1 of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code: “Any person who provides 
aid to another person for crossing state borders in violation of the relevant statutory provisions is guilty of 
a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years.”
36 Section 354 of the Criminal Code.
37 Section 355 of the Criminal Code.
38 Section 356 of the Criminal Code.
39 Polt Péter ed. (2013): A Büntető Törvénykönyv Kommentárja. Budapest, Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv 
Kiadó. 177. The referenced commentary was written by Balázs Gellér.
40 Section 192 of the Criminal Code.
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a secondary, basically not strictly necessary element.41 The crime itself is not necessarily 
in migration but in the serious infringement of human rights. Nevertheless, in international 
cases against human trafficking it is clearly visible that certain international documents put 
special emphasis on assisting victims with migration background.42
Provisions concerning criminal law and procedural law caused by increased 
migration
In 2015 Hungary was affected by migration activities previously unheard of. The refugees 
mainly arrived to Europe and Hungary from areas, such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and 
some Sub-Saharan countries, where the previous polities had collapsed (e.g. Libya, Syria) 
or where state building had failed (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq) causing the local populace to 
face open and prolonged civil wars or serious and long-lasting instability.43 Nevertheless, 
almost all third-country nationals unlawfully entering Hungary, apart from the last quarter, 
arrived with the purpose of travelling further to countries in Western Europe, after they 
submitted their request for asylum but before their asylum procedure was scheduled. This 
situation made its effect on legal provisions whose primary goal was not to provide legal 
support (criminal law or procedural law) as regards actions taken by the authorities against 
foreigners, but rather to serve the protection of the so-called temporary border barrier aimed 
at ensuring that the authority procedures concerning persons unlawfully crossing the border 
could be conducted at locations where the physical conditions were adequate.44
As the result of the phenomenon of mass migration, the offences of prohibited crossing 
of border fence, vandalisation of border fences and disruption of construction works related 
to the border fence were integrated into the Criminal Code. In the reasoned opinion, it can 
be read that due to the criminality related to illegal migration, even the strictest means of 
exercising public authority, i.e. criminal sanctions must be applied to combat serious forms 
of unlawful conduct.45 The protected legal interest, however, is not only the protection of 
the territorial integrity of the country, but also the protection of the installation serving 
the effective combating against illegal immigration and the protection of the order of the 
state border. For this purpose, applying the criminal law to such cases is not justified if the 
persons enter the country by avoiding the temporary border barrier, since the unauthorised 
border crossing refers to any person who enters the territory of Hungary, in an unauthorised 
way, through the technical border barrier established on the state border serving to protect 
41 Windt Szandra (2015): Az emberkereskedelem jelensége és a fellépés nehézségei. In Hautzinger Zoltán 
szerk.: Migráció és rendészet. Budapest, MRTT Migrációs Tagozat. 249.
42 See Act CII of 2006 on the Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women 
and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Act 
XVIII of 2013 on the Convention of the Council of Europe against Trafficking in Human Beings or Directive 
2004/81/EC.
43 Szuhai Ilona – Tálas Péter (2017): A 2015-ös európai migrációs és menekültválság okairól és hátteréről. In 
Tálas Péter szerk.: Magyarország és a 2015-ös európai migrációs válság. Budapest, Dialóg Campus Kiadó. 27.
44 Government Decrees of 211 and 213 of 2015 on the temporary border barrier.
45 Section 27 of Act CXL of 2015 on The Amendment of certain Acts related to the management of mass migra-
tion.
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the order of the state border.46 The same legislative consideration is behind the codification 
of the vandalisation of border fence, as it punishes the perpetrator who destroys or vandal-
ises the technical border barrier planted on the state border to protect the order of the state 
border insofar as the act did not result in a more serious criminal offence.47 The disruption 
of the construction works related to the border fence is similar in character, which offence 
is committed by any person who disrupts the construction works related to the building and 
maintenance of the technical border barrier established on the state border to protect the order 
of the state border.48 The reasoning for such offence is that if a person’s conduct jeopardises 
the operation, as intended, of the installation serving to protect the order of the state border 
by disrupting the works, the person’s act would entail criminal consequences. Constructing 
such installation and maintaining its operation is a priority instrument to effectively protect 
the state border, its uninterrupted operation is of public interest which would entail criminal 
consequences.49 An important legislative intent is, however, to state that exercising expulsion, 
as a punishment, regarding the offences involved cannot be bypassed. In consideration of this, 
it can be stated that the genuine intent is not to use imprisonment but rather to expulse and 
deport foreign defendants, basically third-country nationals, from the territory of Hungary. 
By doing so, subsequent law enforcement requirements are not expected.
Considering the migration crisis, the legislative power formulated a special procedure, 
considering the unique nature of the crimes committed in relation to the border barrier 
(fence) with special regards to the prohibited crossing of the border fence, the essence of such 
procedure, adapted to the spirit of the substantive penal provisions, being the establishment 
of the possibility that the stay of foreigners who are found guilty and sentenced could be 
terminated as soon as possible. By such move, a different legal regime has been created 
based on ensuring the specific procedures regarding unlawful border crossing caused by 
mass immigration of foreigners during crisis situations.
These specific procedures in relation to the border barrier affect two forms of crimi-
nal proceedings that traditionally belong to different procedures in criminal proceedings. 
Arraigning the perpetrator to court, a stricter procedural deadline was set by enabling the 
prosecutor to arraign the defendant, within fifteen days from his/her examination as a sus-
pect if the case is simple, the evidences are available and the defendant has admitted the 
crime. If these conditions exist, arraigning the perpetrator to court can be carried out within 
eight days from the moment the perpetrator was caught in the act.50 In this new form, the 
rules of waiver of the right to trial apply in a particular way. According to it, the procedure 
must be conducted within fifteen days from the defendant’s examination as a suspect and, 
in an unconventional way, it can be initiated by the defence (defence is mandatory in the 
procedure). In such cases the examination as a suspect is led by the prosecution, minutes 
of the examination are taken, and on the basis of same facts and findings, the prosecution 
indicts, proposes the case to be judged in an open court, and proposes the application of 
the punishment or measures, their type, extent and content being set in the agreement, ad-
ditionally, the prosecution indicates the lower and upper limits of the before-mentioned. If 
46 Section 352/A subsection (1) of the Criminal Code.
47 Section 352/B subsection (1) of the Criminal Code.
48 Section 352/C subsection (1) of the Criminal Code.
49 Section 27 of Act CXL of 2015 on The Amendment of certain Acts related to the management of mass migration.
50 Section 542/K of the Act on Criminal Proceedings.
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the court agrees with the facts and findings in the indictment, as well as with the application 
of the punishment or measures, their type, extent and content being set in the agreement, 
and the indicated lower and upper limits, the court will then arrange the trial immediately 
upon the files arrival at the court.51
These specific procedural rules in relation to the border barrier have been prolonged 
in the new act on criminal procedures.52 The new regulation does not substantively modify 
and amend the previous criminal procedures, it further offers regulations that affect the 
jurisdiction and competence of the courts, the implementation of coercive measures, the 
harmonisation of integration of special procedures, as well as facilitation measures re-
garding such procedures. Codifying such specific rules brings the message about ensuring 
the prosecution of perpetrators the easiest way possible, insofar as the act did not result 
in a more serious criminal offence, in cases of offences committed in connection with the 
border barrier by participation as a result of illegal migration. From the aspect of a funda-
mental black letter law mechanism, the above-mentioned, at the same time constitutes the 
weakness of these procedures. Certain simplifications, on the one hand, may neglect the 
concept of international or European Union guarantee arrangements regarding fairness 
in criminal proceedings (including the use of one’s own language, rights of the defence) 
and, on the other hand, may question the genuine function of criminal proceedings, that is 
the protection of society. If the main function of the criminal proceedings is not to protect 
society, but rather to create a situation that aims at expulsion of the foreigner who is an 
unlawful migrant, it may well not be justified to have criminal proceedings authorities 
 involved. It would be enough to apply special policing rules that may guarantee the assumed 
purpose of punishment in other simpler procedures.
Policing Opportunities Instead of Criminal Law Instruments
As instruments of illegal migration, the conducts of the unlawful or impermissible crossing 
of the state border or the concealment of unlawful stay, including human trafficking and 
forgery of official documents in respect of acts of participation in a criminal organisation, 
usually do not represent a risk to society. It, of course, does not preclude that a state should 
not proportionately and reasonably respond by its authorities to the infringements commit-
ted. Therefore, there may be grounds for finding responses to illegal immigration (entry) or 
stay applying other (not criminal law) measures.
One solution may be the formulation of certain facts outside the scope of criminal law, 
but here one can also mention, for reasons of convenience, the assessment of criminal acts 
in other ways. Applying the administrative criminal law may be an adaptive method, but 
alien policing law, as a primary legal instrument, may also be taken into consideration due 
to its efficiency, in particular its primary social interest in remedying the unlawful state 
resulting from unlawful entry or stay, and which alien policing law, in addition to adminis-
trative measures taken to terminate irregular stay, imposes additional public administration 
sanction (fine) in relation to unlawful entries or employing foreign nationals.
51 Sections 542/L-542/T of the Act on Criminal Proceedings.
52 See the general statement of reasons of Act CX of 2017 on criminal proceedings.
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Sanctions outside criminal law
The national administrative criminal law assigns quite obvious norms to migration and 
foreigners. These norms, on the one hand, can be found in the general part of administra-
tive criminal law and, on the other hand, in the facts of offences53 against human dignity, 
personal freedom and public order. In case of the former, the foreigner status dominates. 
Among these the administrative rules must be mentioned that refer to specific registration 
requirements54 concerning foreign subjects, or principles that can mainly be interpreted in 
respect to non-Hungarian citizens. The example of the latter is the right to use one’s own 
language55 and the request to be assisted by an interpreter,56 or the obligation of authorities 
to provide information during custody.57
Regarding administrative offences, we can talk about clearly outlined forms. They 
are, among others, prohibited border crossing or offences relating to travel documents.58 
In two separate sections, two different types of conduct are sanctioned. In the former, the 
punishable offence is the unauthorised or impermissible crossing, or the attempt of crossing 
of the state border of Hungary, while in case of the latter it is the infringement of the legal 
provisions related to travel documents which is in the focus. By acting as above, the legis-
lation expresses that while crossing the state border or staying as a foreigner is undoubtedly 
part of the freedom of movement, it is subject to certain conditions (valid travel document, 
valid visa, in certain places crossing the border in scope of border control procedures), and 
non-compliance with the conditions is subject to sanctions. Another issue is that prohibited 
border crossing can be sanctioned by administrative criminal law and enforced against the 
residents of the country only, since regarding third-country nationals, including nationals 
not having the right to free movement and stay, the above-mentioned alien policing pro-
cedure provides a more efficient procedure, provided that no asylum procedure should be 
concluded. Moreover, in the latter case, until the asylum procedure has been concluded, 
certain procedural restraints must be taken into account considering the restriction of the 
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.59 A minor flaw is that the relevant 
provisions have not been transposed into the national administrative criminal law, although 
Hungary has been a party to the Geneva Convention since 1989.
Administrative offences relating to policing foreigners60 is also a fact that is intended 
to discourage irregular migration. According to this, a person commits an administrative 
53 Chapter XXIV of Act II of 2012 on Offences, the Procedure in Relation to Offences and the Offence Record 
System.
54 In case of foreigners, the content of personal identification data is supplemented by the identification number of 
the residence card or passport in accordance with Section 151, subsection (2) point (f) of the Act on Offences.
55 Section 36 of the Act on Offences.
56 Section 67, subsection (1) of the Act on Offences.
57 Section 73, subsection (11) of the Act on Offences.
58 Section 158 of the Act on Offences.
59 In accordance with the Protocol (Section 31, subsection 1): “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, 
on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life 
or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, 
provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry 
or presence.”
60 Section 208 of the Act on Offences.
163Migratory Impacts on Law Enforcement
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
offence if he/she breaks the regulations regarding the notification on, registration of, or stay 
of foreigners in the territory of Hungary. Although this offence can be committed regarding 
either persons having the right to free movement and stay or third-country nationals, irreg-
ular migration; however, it exclusively affects those third-country nationals who arrive in 
the territory of Hungary having a permit (legally), but as regards the regulations on their 
stay there is negligence either by them or by others (educational institution, landlord). The 
effectiveness of administrative criminal law, contrary to the previous fact, can be measured 
in cases of institutions that do not comply with the administrative obligations on foreigners. 
It is only a theoretical question that such administrative crime is committed by citizens of 
EEA, since in their cases the duration of stay cannot authentically be determined, while 
in case of third-country nationals, determining the administrative crime can only make 
sense of foreigners lawfully staying in the country, and in cases of persons residing without 
a permit, alien policing law may provide a solution to the arising situation.
In addition to the above two facts, there are several other facts in administrative crim-
inal law that can be related to migration, in particular the administrative offence in border 
policing, especially one of its sections that describes the punishment in case of breach of 
prohibitive or restrictive provisions related to the order, surveillance and protection of the 
state border. Of these conducts, in particular, breach of norms related to border checks can be 
highlighted, such as the attempts of avoiding checks, ignoring the order related to the check, 
not complying with the order of the border crossing point, not following the prescribed rules 
of conduct in case of the refusal of entry and ordering return.61
In addition to administrative criminal law, there exist other non-punitive sanctions 
regarding the phenomena related to irregular migration. Public administration, since its 
very beginning, has had sanction instruments whose scope, in order to ensure the faster 
and more effective enforcement, extends to punitive legal sanctions.62 A good example of 
such sanctions in the Hungarian alien policing law is the possibility of penalty imposed 
on carriers or employers in the so-called vested responsibilities. In case of the former, car-
riers providing travel accommodations to third-country nationals by means of air, water 
or scheduled road transport shall be required to check the travel document and visa of the 
planned stay for the period not exceeding 90 days, of their passengers before boarding for 
travelling to the Republic of Hungary or to another country through the territory of the 
Republic of Hungary to ensure that they have travel documents required for entry or for 
transit.63 For any failure to comply with the obligation, as set out in other specific legislation, 
a penalty for the protection of public order shall be imposed upon the carrier in question.64 
Employers shall also be required to ascertain not later than the first day of work (before 
the employment) of a third-country national that the third-country national affected has the 
permit prescribed in this Act for staying and engaging in gainful employment. Additionally, 
61 Cserép Attila – Fábián Adrián – Rózsás Eszter (2013): Kommentár a szabálysértési törvényhez. Budapest, 
Wolters Kluwer. 366–367.
62 Kis Norbert (2015): „Metszéspontok” – rendészettudomány, bűnügyi tudományok, közigazgatás-tudomány 
és transzdiszciplinaritás. Magyar Rendészet, Vol. 15, No. 4. 90.
63 Section 69, subsection (1) of Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country 
 Nationals.
64 Section 69, subsection (4) of Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country 
 Nationals.
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employers are subject to other obligations, as well. Any employer who fails to satisfy the 
obligation shall be subject to a penalty – specified under other specific legislation – for the 
protection of public order imposed by the alien policing authority. Relating to the above, 
the main contractor and all subcontractors together with the subcontractor employer shall 
jointly and severally be liable for paying the penalty for the protection of public order if 
they knew, or had reasonable grounds to know that the subcontractor employer employs 
a third-country national without the permit prescribed for staying.65
The increasing migration situation in 2015 that affected Hungary made its effect on 
legal provisions whose primary goal was not to provide legal support (criminal law or 
procedural law) as regards actions taken by the authorities against foreigners, but rather 
to serve the protection of the so-called temporary border barrier aimed at ensuring that 
the authority procedures concerning persons unlawfully crossing the border could be 
conducted at locations where the physical conditions were adequate.66 The purpose of 
these provisions was, on the one hand, to ensure the protection of the temporary border 
barrier by applying public administration sanctions and, on the other hand, to ensure the 
uninterrupted construction of the border barrier. Accordingly, it was stated that in order to 
protect the temporary border barrier, the person who enters without proper authorization 
the area of the temporary border barrier during the construction or the maintenance works 
of the temporary border barrier, or the person who carries out any activity that disrupts the 
ongoing construction and installation works, and the person who brings in drones or any 
remote-controlled devices the area of the temporary border barrier during the construction 
or the maintenance works of the temporary border barrier, respectively, is subject to pay 
a public administration fine.67 Additionally, the person who, during the construction or the 
maintenance works of the temporary border barrier, prevents the authorised official persons 
or the persons carrying out the work, as well as the official or transport vehicles heading 
to or leaving the area, from entering or leaving the area of the temporary border barrier is 
also subject to pay a public administration fine.68
Both facts serve to protect the establishment and maintenance of the state-owned 
premises constructed and installed to protect the order of the state border in order to ensure 
migration control, but crossing or vandalising the border barrier unlawfully, or disrupting 
the ongoing works way exceed the scope of imposing a public administration fine, and can be 
manifested in punitive legal provisions.69 The purpose of these facts, however, are directly 
connected to foreign persons with migration background, considering the fact that, in case 
of non-Hungarian perpetrators of such crimes, in accordance with the Hungarian Criminal 
Code exercising expulsion, as a punishment, regarding the offences involved cannot be by-
passed.70 In consideration of the cases provided for by the special laws, the question keeps 
65 Section 71, subsections (1)–(7) of Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country 
Nationals.
66 Government Decrees 211 and 213 of 2015 on the temporary border barrier.
67 See Section 2, subsections (1)–(3) of Government Decrees 211 and 213 of 2015 on the temporary border bar-
rier – protection of border barrier.
68 Section 3, subsections (1)–(2) of Government Decrees 211 and 213 of 2015 on the temporary border barri-
er – obstruction.
69 See Sections 352/A, 352/B, and 352/C of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code – crossing or vandalising the 
border barrier unlawfully, or disrupting the ongoing works.
70 Section 60, subsection (2) of the Criminal Code.
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arising in this paper: Do we necessarily need criminal law sanctions and the procedures 
leading to imposing such sanctions to remove the unlawfully entering and staying persons 
from the territory of the country (and of the European Union)?
Applying policing instruments instead of criminal proceedings
Apart from the functional separation between criminal proceedings and policing, and 
considering the effectiveness of the policing measures, in particular, its use to eliminate or 
interrupt directly disturbing conduct, or to immediately enforce penalties, the issue may 
still arise, whether or not policing is suitable for restoring impairment and eliminating 
unlawful situation instead of governing whether criminal law liability has incurred. The 
answer in this regard is affirmative. Policing can be called to assist to augment the safety 
net of criminal law71 in cases when the incurred impairment is minor or when eliminating 
the unlawful situation fulfils greater social needs rather than setting criminal liability. In 
the former case, the substantive criminal law provides ground for extinction, in the latter, 
we need to mention specific obstacles of criminal proceedings, among which there is a fine 
example when the perpetrator is a foreign person and commits his/her act from migration 
considerations.
In the Hungarian criminal procedure, we cannot find an independent subsystem, sum-
marising rules and regulations that differ from the regular procedure, regarding prosecution 
of non-national persons. While concerning differentiation in prosecution related to the 
identity of the defendant, we may primarily think of prosecution against juveniles, military 
prosecution or prosecution against absent defendants or legal persons, respectively, similar 
specialisation against foreigners has not yet emerged. Due to the increasing phenomenon 
of migration, and considering the rising trend of crimes against foreigners, in particularly 
in cases of defendants with alien citizenship or stateless defendants, a number of specific 
features can be identified (authentic instruments proving citizenship, the right to use one’s 
own language due to the unfamiliarity with the language of the procedure, mandatory 
defence, the right to communication with consular authorities), it is timely to consider and 
reflect on compiling such criteria relative to criminal proceedings that differ from the regular 
ones, similarly to those in cases of juveniles, military personnel and the like. This can be 
carried out by expanding part 5 of the Act on Criminal Proceedings containing provisions 
diverging from the general rules with an additional new chapter.
A special obstacle to the system of criminal proceedings against foreigners is re-
flected in the following: “No investigation may be launched due to the forgery of public 
deeds (Section 342 of the Criminal Code), if the forged or falsified travel document or the 
authentic travel document issued to the name of another person is used by a foreign citizen 
to enter the territory of the country, provided that an immigration control procedure may 
be instituted. This provision shall not apply, if an investigation must be started against the 
same foreign citizen for the perpetration of another criminal offence as well.”72 The section 
71 Amberg Erzsébet (2014): Büntetőjogi változások – rendészeti reakciók. Pécs, Pécsi Határőr Tudományos 
Közlemények XV. 125.
72 Section 170, subsection (6) of the Act on Criminal Proceedings.
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quoted here introduces an exception, due to practical considerations, from the principle of 
proceedings ex officio, serving as the theoretical basis of opening proceedings. The intention 
of the legislation is based on aspects of economic viability, according to which, if the crime 
committed was directed exclusively towards the entry to Hungary, in this present case in an 
unlawful way, and it involves alien policing procedures, no investigation may be launched.
The previously mentioned obstacle to investigation can only be applied if other uniform 
conditions are met. Firstly, we talk about special subjects. The perpetrator of the crime 
can only be a foreigner against whom prohibition of entry, ordering return at the border 
crossing or, as a part of alien policing procedures, expulsion can be enforceable. Due to the 
differentiation of foreigners by criminal law, this may refer to third-country citizens against 
whom the principle of non-refoulement has been taken into consideration or who have not 
initiated an asylum procedure in Hungary. The second condition stems from this one: the 
investigation cannot be launched only due to conducting the alien policing procedure. If 
the alien policing procedure cannot be conducted regarding the foreigner, due to his/her 
citizenship or asylum request, the investigation must be ordered in accordance with the 
general rules. Thus, this obstacle cannot usually be applied in case of persons having the 
right to free movement and stay, as well as their family members; nor can it be applied if the 
investigation must be initiated against third-country citizens due to whose intent or request 
for asylum revives the prohibition to return.
The detailed obstacle to investigation is not mentioned, however, in the 2017 Act 
on Criminal Proceedings. One can only guess its reasons, however, in case investigating 
criminal matters emerge from detecting forged or falsified travel documents in the future, 
it is still more effective to take alien policing measures. It is advised to set the legal basis 
of it in the act on criminal proceedings, but another solution may be, quoting Béla Blaskó’s 
wording on the matter, if the substantial criminal law, considering the issue an obstacle to 
investigation, has its response to the issue by a solution based on its own guarantee arrange-
ments of its own traditional black letter law mechanism.73
Conducting criminal proceedings cannot be prevented by submitting the asylum 
request. This obstacle, as an international prohibition, stems from Article 31 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention (Geneva),74 which states that the contracting states shall not impose 
penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly 
from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened, enter or are present in their 
territory without authorization. The condition of the prohibition of penalty as quoted above 
is that the refugees in question shall present themselves without delay to the authorities and 
show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. Indirectly from the above, what follows 
is that the refugees have the obligation to submit their request for asylum where their life 
or freedom is no longer threatened.75 Another issue is that this obstacle was not integrated 
into the Hungarian rules of criminal proceedings, so in cases of persons who later were 
73 Blaskó Béla (2015): Közigazgatás – rendészeti igazgatás – büntetőjog. Magyar Rendészet, Vol. 15, No. 4. 52.
74 In 1989 Hungary acceded by Government Decree 15 of 1989 to the Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the 
Status of Refugees, and to the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 that amended it.
75 Tóth Norbert (2016): „Államarcú” nemzetközi jog, avagy a 2015 őszén módosított magyar Büntető 
Törvénykönyv a menekültek jogállásáról szóló 1951. évi genfi egyezmény 31. cikk (1) bekezdése fényében. 
In Hautzinger: op. cit. 243.
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acknowledged as refugees during the asylum procedure, the criminality of forgery and 
falsification of authentic documents was practically excluded.
International provisions on asylum, however, do not exclude the possibility of apply-
ing provisions of policing nature against the asylum-seeker during conducting the asylum 
procedure. One of its institutions is asylum custody (administrative detention), which can 
basically guarantee the successful conduct of the asylum procedure by guaranteeing the 
asylum-seekers’ personal presence and availability during the entire procedure. However, 
it cannot be excluded that ordering administrative detention different in nature from alien 
policing may have an effect of deterrence for persons having their legitimate claim for 
international protection. It may also compromise the scientific and technical appraisal of 
asylum custody if, during housing, pronounced cultural and civilizational differences exist 
(hygiene, dietary customs, practice of religion, etc.) and, when locked up, the excessive 
period of the assessment of the asylum procedure (essentially, the lack of immediate and 
favourable decision) may also have adverse effects.76 Despite all that, this custody may prove 
to be a necessary coercive measure in cases if the final assessment of the asylum procedure 
in a large number of cases fail due to the asylum-seekers’ leave to unknown destinations.
Instead of assessing crimes committed, as mentioned above, due to the asylum proce-
dures initiated without foundation, the so-called alien policing expulsion can be considered 
a coercive measure with the purpose of policing. It is ordered by the asylum authority, if it 
has established that the asylum-seeker is not entitled to international protection, and has no 
further right to stay in the territory of the country. Similarly to asylum custody, this legal 
institution may seem alien compared to the spirit of asylum, but in principle it cannot be of 
concern if the authority has the obligation to establish whether or not the asylum and the 
prohibition of expulsion is founded.77 Therefore, even in case of an unfavourable ending 
of the asylum procedure, there is no need to conduct the objective criminal proceedings 
concerning the crime committed in order to ensure entry or stay prior to applying for 
asylum or for the purpose of getting an asylum, it is more than enough to simply enforce 
asylum custody.
Summary
The issue of migration can neatly fit in the area of social safety and security but with one 
proviso; the impacts accompanying this phenomenon will be visible in the long term in 
the areas of politics, economy or, in extreme cases, the military.78 As a result, branches of 
policing that are intended to function to handle and manage the impacts accompanying 
migration will be given higher priority. This is even more the case as regards the systems 
intended to protect the borders of nation-states and certain international communities 
76 Regarding the findings of the authorities on carrying out asylum-related detention, see more in Pacsek 
József (2016): A menekültügyi és az idegenrendészeti őrizet, valamint a kitoloncolás végrehajtása az ügyészi 
törvényességi felügyeleti tapasztalatok tükrében. In Hautzinger: op. cit. 287–297.
77 Szép Árpád (2017): A 2015-ös migrációs válságra adott menedékjogi válaszok. Jogszabály-módosítással 
a tömeges beáramlás ellen? In Tálas: op. cit. 61.
78 Vajkai Edina (2014): A migráció kezelésének térnyerése a biztonságpolitikában. Pécs, Pécsi Határőr 
 Tudományos Közlemények XV. 254.
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(in case of Hungary, it is the European Economic Area), and as regards the alien policing 
systems encompassing the persons not having the citizenship either of these nation-states 
or the member states of the international communities.
Though they are apparently synergistic systems, alien policing and border policing 
have their own characteristics, due to which they can be interpreted by different defini-
tions. While in case of border policing being specific to limited areas it is definitive, in 
case of alien policing it depends on persons or clients. Border policing produces its effects 
exclusively at the state border and its area, at the border crossings and the border area in 
order to maintain the desired lawful situation (order). Alien policing has no geographical 
limits when it extends to persons not having citizenship at their place of residence, more 
precisely foreigners, in respect of whom, their entry and stay are to be examined under 
separate legal frameworks. Therefore, alien policing is present either at the state border or 
in the area of free movement. Nevertheless, either border policing and alien policing may 
extend to citizens, that is persons having citizenship at their place of residence. This circle 
is far broader in case of border policing, since it is not only foreigners that happen to be 
present in the area of the state border and at the border checks, while alien policing very 
rarely encounters citizens, on an entirely exceptional basis only, when their legal status, 
e.g. carriers, employers, hosts requires so.
Delimitation of tasks of border policing and alien policing appears in the establish-
ment of the organisational structure of the authorities. Border policing is basically law 
enforcement, a set of tasks that may entail, if need be, establishing checkpoints, roadblocks, 
area closures, increased and more visible police presence. Alien policing, on the contrary, 
contains the activities of the authorities which, due to its customer-orientation, must be 
carried out by enforcing individual rights. This should not necessarily require using classical 
law enforcement measures. So while the authority responsible for the functions of border 
policing is the law enforcement authority, the primary authority for the functions of alien 
policing must be an agency (office).79
As regards the types of sanctions relating to irregular migration, there are several 
existing alternatives from practices across countries worldwide and within the member 
states of the European Union.80 Basically, the core issue can be narrowed down to the fact 
whether measures of criminal law or measures outside the criminal law are applied when 
eliminating and preventing conducts (behaviours) or situations that are, due to uncontrolled 
human movement, contrary to law and order. The relevant application of the law is not 
consistent in the Hungarian legal system. The legal consequences of illegal immigration 
(entry and stay) may derive from norms outside of criminal law, but they are also present 
in the provisions of the criminal law.
As a result of its effectiveness, in particular its primary social interest in remedying 
the unlawful state resulting from unlawful entry or stay, alien policing law should be 
taken into consideration as a primary legal instrument. By imposing expulsion or, if need 
be, deportation, but not including asylum procedure, alien policing procedure terminates 
79 As of January 1, 2017, this agency in Hungary is the Office of Immigration and Nationality.
80 A recently published article details the effective regulations existing in the European Union. See Criminali-
sation of migrants in an irregular situation and of persons engaging with them. European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights. Vienna, Austria, 2014.
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irregular stay regardless the possibility of applying further sanctions deriving from other 
legal sanctions of alien policing.
The Hungarian public administration law and the administrative criminal law contain 
instruments and measures outside the criminal law. The latter refers to facts of offences 
against human dignity, personal freedom and public order,81 while those in the public ad-
ministration law are public administration fines established either as public administration 
sanctions in the scope of the so-called vested responsibilities82 required from carriers and 
employers, or due to the increasing migration situation in 2015 with the purpose of ensuring 
the protection of the temporary border barrier and ensuring the uninterrupted construction 
of the border barrier.83
There is a wide range of legal means and instruments available to combat and prevent 
unlawful entry or stay; ultimately criminal law may also offer solutions to punish crim-
inal conduct directly related to irregular migration. It is important to mention here that 
criminalising irregular migration, or basically any form of human migration contrary to 
the law, has become a current issue for the general public, as well as the people in alien 
policing, criminology and criminal law. This is the issue of the so-called crimmigration 
whose concept and scientific interpretation have recently been addressed in more detail.84 
Integrating the institutions of criminal law into migration law, applying punitive sanctions 
against immigration and the social impacts of immigration, respectively, are now in the 
focus. Connected with this is the examination whether 1. the increase of crimmigration can 
be justifiable or how inevitable itis in connection with the rising trend of migration; 2. how 
it can, if at all, provide effective solution to combat and prevent certain phenomena of un-
lawful migration; and 3. whether the sanctioning system of criminal law can be considered 
proportionate to the irregular trends of migration.
When considering the classical examples of criminal law prohibitions relating to the 
unlawful forms of migration (in particular unauthorised entries and stays), the following 
may be remembered: prohibited crossing of the state border, foreigner’s unlawful residence 
or assisting and supporting prohibited conducts, such as people smuggling, providing as-
sistance for unlawful stay or, perhaps, unlawful employment of foreigners. The classical 
criminal law sanction in such cases is expulsion, which refers to the removal of the foreigner, 
declared persona non grata, and held liable for his/her intentionally committed crime in 
the territory of the country by the court.
The before-mentioned norms may be found in the Hungarian criminal law together 
with the particular facts, that is the technical barrier (temporary border barrier) established 
due to the increased migration pressure on the country, which barrier became the subject 
of debates in legal literature.85 The prosecution by the state, at the same time, can only be 
81 Prohibited border crossing or offences relating to travel documents (Section 158), administrative offences 
relating to policing foreigners (Section 162), administrative offence in border policing (Section 159) in Chapter 
XXIV of Act II of 2012 on offences, the procedure in relation to offences and the offence record system.
82 Section 69, subsection (4) of Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum.
83 Section 2, subsections (1)–(3) of Government Decree 213 of 2015 on the temporary border barrier – protection 
of border barrier.
84 Regarding the works focusing on the topic, see García Hernández, César Cuauhtémoc (2015): Crimmigration 
Law. ABA Book Publishing. 75–148.
85 Sections 352/A, 352/B, and 352/C of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code – crossing or vandalising the border 
barrier unlawfully, or disrupting the ongoing works.
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possible in the form of substantive, adversarial and contradictory criminal proceedings. 
However, it does not prevent applying other legal instruments instead of criminal proceed-
ings for practical reasons, in particular when the seriousness and the nature of the committed 
crime allows for it. A prime example of such move is the separation of military criminal 
proceedings – initiation of disciplinary proceedings. This method can be applied in mili-
tary community in particular and is the application of labour law. Diverting the criminal 
proceedings, that is setting the liability in criminal proceedings of an act committed else-
where is not found in the criminal proceedings in force. The rules of criminal procedures, 
however, allow for terminating a situation arising from unlawful stay in the scope of an 
alien policing procedure instead of establishing culpability. This method, however, is only 
available if there is but one crime committed, and only if the crime, detecting forged or 
falsified travel documents in case of foreigners, third-country nationals, is detected at the 
border crossing point. No alien policing procedure should be concluded if the foreigner, 
due to his/her status of free movement or stay, or his/her being under prohibition to return 
due to humanitarian principles.
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The Policies of the Hungarian Government in the Field 
of Migration within the Framework of the Visegrád 
Cooperation
Mátyás Hegyaljai
Migration
Migration is a social phenomenon that is as old as human history and is caused by several 
motives. It has been still discussed if the flow of migration can be stopped or only moderated 
but we can agree that the style of migration management is always the result of a political 
decision. This attitude determines the country’s approach to the phenomenon. Although 
migration is examined in a broader context compared to historical periods and situations 
producing a whole library of literature, now I want to concentrate on the situation of the last 
couple of years that emerged after the Arab Spring. This problem was brought to Europe by 
the unexpected big number of migrants, even though a strong African migration has been 
predicted. This increase was almost exclusively due to higher rates of irregular migration 
from North Africa during the Arab Springs, which led to the largest number of detected 
illegal border crossing into the European Union of any first quarter in recent years.1
The different ideas have led to the lack of common action to this day. The result of 
the crisis was that the European States have adopted nation state solutions for migration 
pressure during the past years.2 In order to control migration, it is essential to analyse the 
root causes. There are several reasons in the world today for which people decide to leave 
their homes. Some of them escape from different causes of danger whilst others simply 
are seeking a better future. The subject of the study is the emerging migration pressure 
on Hungary and the European Union from 2015 and the powerful governmental policy on 
migration management which is still being observed today. Whatever we call the situation 
of residence resulting in the legal or illegal enter, it is true for each concept that behind the 
legal, regular or documented migration there is a movement that could be controlled by the 
state while illegal, irregular or undocumented migration covers a group of persons who do 
not act according to the regulations on entry and/or stay.3
1 Morehouse, Christel – Blomfield, Michael (2011): Irregular Migration in Europe. Migration Policy Institute, 
Washington, D.C. 5.
2 Tálas Péter (2017): “The past few years have only been the premonitory signs of the migration crisis.” Con-
ference presentation Boundary Stones: Can the Schengen Zone Be Dismantled by Mistrust? 20 May 2017.
3 Hautzinger Zoltán (2016): Szemelvények a migráció szabályozásáról. [Excerptions on the Regulation of 
Migration.] Pécs, AndAnn. 9.
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It is especially interesting to focus on the last years because Hungary receives a lot of 
criticism, so it is worth examining the reasons behind the decision. The V4 countries, espe-
cially Hungary and Poland, have a very strong political position which is almost the opposite 
of the dominant EU approach. The phenomenon of illegal and irregular migration and the 
intensification of conflicts naturally lead to the revulsion and fear of the local population and 
the decrease in their tolerance.4 Seeing the last year’s migration flows, this process raises 
the question again whether the state has the law enforcement forces by which any form of 
immigration can be managed under real control.5 There is no disagreement about the com-
plexity of the current migration processes, only about the positions how to find solutions by 
using different means. Recently more and more experts use regular-irregular classification 
instead of the legal-illegal definition.6 “There is no clear or universally accepted definition 
of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work 
in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration 
regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen 
in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or 
travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. 
There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term illegal migration to cases of 
smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.”7
Immigration is treated as a national matter by the Hungarian Government and is not 
willing to compromise on this issue. European countries, especially European institutions 
were so surprised by the events of 2015 that they were not able to react consistently, there 
were no plans on which to effectively control the crisis, thus ideas based solutions were 
created. It should not be ignored, that other challenges have arisen for the countries of the 
Balkans and the Mediterranean, for the frontline or the destination countries and those 
member states that have an external Schengen border. Since no single decision has been 
taken, therefore countries tried to find solutions in different ways depending on the extent 
to which they were affected by the mass migration. It is vital to separate the real refugees 
from economic migrants. Real asylum seekers should be granted the rights of protection 
but all the others should be returned to their countries of origin as soon as possible. Hun-
gary has also developed its own migration management system which, however, has raised 
serious criticism by several member states. It has already been declared at the beginning 
that nobody has the right to enter illegally into the territory of Hungary and the European 
Union and we are determined to apply the law.
As much as we talk about migration to the European Union, it should not be ignored 
that this migration is not identical, as it has a different impact on different regions or coun-
tries even in our continent. No surprise that the primary destinations are the countries with 
the best social services and economic potential as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
4 Petővári Bence (2010): A paradigmaváltás esélyei a fejlett országok migrációs politikájában. [The Chances 
of the Changes of Paradigm in the Migration Policy of the Developed Countries.] PhD dolgozat, Budapest, 
Corvinus Egyetem, Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok, Doktori Iskola. 62.
5 Pátyodi Szandra (2017): Az Európai Unió válaszai a migrációs kihívásokra. [The Answers of the European 
Union to the Challenges of Migration.] Pécs, Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XIX. 292.
6 Ritecz György – Sallai János (2016): A migráció trendjei, okai és kezelésének lehetőségei 2.0. [Trends, 
Reasons and the Options for Treatment of Migration 2.0.] Budapest, Hans–Seidel. 18–19.
7 Available: www.iom.int/key-migration-terms (Accessed: 20.03.2018)
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Sweden since they can provide much better treatment. Obviously, factors are also taken 
into consideration like languages spoken, larger communities in the country, what kind of 
assistance, integration chances are provided, what education system is available, what job 
opportunities exist and naturally what is the cost of living. Examining our region, it can 
be said that there is a very strong cooperation between the Visegrád countries, especially 
because they represent the same political position of migration even though almost none of 
the four countries are affected in the same way.
While Hungary represents one of the front doors of the Balkan route to the EU, Poland 
is facing a challenge on the Ukrainian border, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are in fact 
no destination countries and the transit routes largely avoid both of them. Nonetheless, they 
are not indifferent but supportive of the Hungarian and Polish migration policy. When we 
are talking about the roles of the state, it must be based on tasks characterising the nature 
of the state but we cannot overlook the current political approach and the obligations arising 
from the EU and international conventions.
State Tasks
As the European Union was unable to give a unified response to the unexpected, exces-
sive migration phenomenon, Hungary had to make its own decisions. On 13 July 2015, 
they started to build the temporary border protection system, then on 15 September 2015 
the Government declared a state of emergency due to mass migration.8 On 15 April 2016 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán proposed a ten-point action plan (1. Borders; 2. Identification; 
3. Corrections; 4. Outside the European Union; 5. Agreements; 6. Return; 7. Conditionality; 
8. Assistance; 9. Safe countries; 10. Volunteering) for protecting the external borders of the 
European Union and free movement within the EU at the meeting of the Centrist Democrat 
International (CDI) held in Lisbon. Several European governments argue on different bilat-
eral and multilateral meetings that economic and demographic problems can be solved by 
immigration but Hungary does not share this view, as it considers that this issue can only 
be treated by national decisions.
Border Protection
In order to tackle illegal immigration we need stricter border protection than usual. This 
is also justified by the fact that more than 391,000 people crossed illegally the Hungarian 
border in 20159 but the majority of these people have gone towards Western and North 
European countries for finding a better life. The Balkan route that time was unlimitedly 
interoperable because of the lack of the efficient border control mainly at the Greek islands. 
In addition to illegal immigration, there was another problem, i.e. most of these people were 
not checked or registered anywhere. During September–October 2015 eight–ten thousand 
8 Government Decree No 269/2015 (IX/15).
9 Statistics collected by the Hungarian National Police. Available: www.police.hu/hu/hirek-es-informaciok/
hatarinfo/elfogott-migransok-szama-lekerdezes (Accessed: 26.03.2018)
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people crossed the southern borders of Hungary per day10 so it is easy to understand that 
this mass could not have been stopped by police or border guards alone. In order to regain 
control over the borders a physical border protection system should have been built up at 
the Schengen external borders. The temporary border protection system was constructed 
first along the Hungarian–Serbian, then along the Hungarian–Croatian border.
This decision was criticised by some states, except for the V4 countries. They have 
understood that this kind of protection is not only in defence of our country but the whole 
European Union. Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic have stated that one country alone 
cannot protect the whole borderline solely with its own police staff, therefore, they decided to 
provide assistance by sending police forces to the external Schengen borders.11 Afterwards, 
more countries decided to send experts for the protection of the borders in the frame of 
FRONTEX12 cooperation. At the same time, the national legal system was harmonised to 
the physical border protection system, so Hungary was able to reduce the number of illegal 
border crossing, which led to the closure of the Balkan route with other measures such as 
the EU–Turkey statement. In effect, it has been proved that border protection should be the 
first step; otherwise all other ideas remain ineffective. Up to now the cost for Hungary is 
a total of 270 billion forints only from the national budget. The first critical voices have 
been softened after a certain period of time and more and more stakeholders understood 
and accepted this solution. Furthermore, we should not forget that the Bulgaria– Macedonia, 
Greece– Macedonia, Greece–Turkey, Spain–Morocco borderlines are also protected by 
fences.
Focusing on the sea routes, it is not disputable that human lives should be saved first 
but the question is where to disembark the migrants saved from the sea. Back to the depar-
ture state or to Europe directly. Border operations must not only respect human rights and 
the refugee law but it must also be in line with the international maritime law. Activities 
in the high seas are ruled by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the SOLAS13 
and SAR14 conventions. As required by the international standards, people in trouble at 
sea must be helped and saved. According to the international law, the rescued people must 
be transported to the first safe European seaport but some specialists start to think of an 
alternative solution because this practice is clearly a pull factor and motivate others to choose 
this dangerous adventure. Italy has already turned back some ships to the seaport of Libya 
in 2009, then the migrants turned to the European Court of Human Rights.15
As far as its function is concerned, in my judgment, the border protection system is 
primarily responsible for defensive tasks by contributing to the proper control and regu-
lation of people entering the country.16 I think that Balla and Kui concluded correctly the 
relationship between cost, construction, and migration that all along with running and 
10 Available: www.police.hu/hu/hirek-es-informaciok/hatarinfo/elfogott-migransok-szama-lekerdezes?creat-
ed%5Bmin%5D=2018-03-01&created%5Bmax%5D=2018-04-01&created%5Bmin_year%5D=2015&cre-
ated%5Bmin_month%5D=09 (Accessed: 26.03.2018)
11 Annual report of the Czech Presidency 2015–2016.
12 European Border and Coast Guard Agency.
13 International Convention for the Safety and of Life at Sea.
14 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue.
15 See the ECtHR – Hirsii Jamaa and others v. Italy (GC), Application No. 27765/09.
16 Csobolyó Eszter (2017): A határőrizeti célú ideiglenes határzár mint kritikus infrastruktúra. [Temporary 
Technical Barriers as a Critical Infrastructure.] Hadtudományi Szemle, Vol. 10, No. 3. 487.
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maintenance costs seems to predict that the temporary border protection is only allegedly 
temporary, in fact, it must be kept and maintained in a long-term system.17
Legal Protection System
In line with the installation of the physical border protection system, the legislation was also 
improved so these measures are being formed as a unified system. On 15 September 2015 the 
Government declared the state emergency due to mass migration for two counties,18 which 
was extended to four more ones19 after three days. On 5 September 2016 until 8 March 2017 
and then by the decision of 30 August 2017 the Government extended20 the crisis situation 
concerning the whole territory of the country until 7 March 2018.
The Parliament introduced21 three new criminal offenses related to the border guard 
into the Criminal Code:
• unlawful crossing of border barrier (Section 352/A.)
• damaging of the border barrier (Section 352/B.)
• obstructing the construction of the border barrier (Section 352/C.)
Criminal proceedings related to these acts in times of state of emergency due to mass 
immigration are being carried out before any other case: in case of admission, within 15 
days, in case of flagrante delicto, within 8 days the perpetrator shall be brought to court.
In addition, the Law on the Protection of Children has changed,22 so foreign unac-
companied children aged 14 to 18 are also placed in the transit zone during the asylum 
 procedure in time of state of emergency due to mass migration. Government responses 
to mass immigration of foreigners in the current Hungarian legal environment cannot be 
given – or only with considerable delays. It is therefore appropriate to introduce the concept 
of state of emergency due to mass immigration, which requires some legislative provisions 
to be amended. A state of emergency can be ordered by a government decree on the initi-
ative of the head of the county police (capital) and the head of the asylum authority on the 
proposal of the minister.23 Although the purpose of the physical and legal border protection 
system is to ensure that migrants with unclear status cannot move freely in the territory of 
a country or in the European Union, and thus reduce the security risk of migration, many 
countries and institutions expressed their dissatisfaction.24 Some of them stated that the 
rules unjustifiably criminalised refugees, migrants and asylum seekers.
17 Balla József – Kui László (2017): A határőrizeti célú biztonsági határzár és határőrizetre gyakorolt hatásai. 
[The Temporary Technical Barrier at the Border and its Impacts on the Border Surveillance.] Hadtudományi 
Szemle, Vol. 10, No. 1. 228.
18 Government Decree No 269/2015 (IX/15.).
19 Government Decree No 270/2015 (IX/18.).
20 Government Decree No 247/2017 (VIII. 31.).
21 Act CXL of 2015 on Amending Certain Acts Related to Mass Migration.
22 Act XXXI of 1997 on the Protection of Children and the Administration of Guardianship.
23 T/5983. Proposal for laws related to the management of the mass migration, 23 August 2015. 23.
24 The visit of the CPT (The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture) in Hungary, 21–27 October 
2015, Council of Europe CPT/Inf (2016) 27.
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Registration
In order to maintain the rule of law, it is necessary that the laws in force be enforced at all 
times and only legally through legal crossing points of a border to enter Hungary.25 Hungary 
will provide access to everyone who wishes to enter the territory of the country with valid 
documents at the designated border crossing points. However, those who do not meet these 
conditions need to be checked much more strictly. The check is made difficult by the fact that 
most migrants do not have any documents. Either they did not have time to get a document 
while leaving their home or they had lost them or had never had a travel card, but in reality, 
it is most likely that they throw their papers away to make identification more difficult. This, 
in addition to showing no good intentions, makes the background of the person completely 
uncontrollable. A person might be a honest citizen in his home country, but he/she may 
also have a criminal file or could have committed war crimes. Most of the migrants want 
to submit a request for refugee status, primarily to some Western EU member state where 
better life is waiting for them.
The categories of a refugee are defined in Article 1 of the UN Convention of 1951, 
which is not disputed. However, according to my own assessment, someone can be a ref-
ugee until he/she has not arrived in a safe country where he/she is no longer the subject of 
persecution or danger. If, however, he/she continues to go unlawfully from this safe country 
onwards, he/she is most likely to become a migrant with the hope to find a better life in 
some selected countries even though he/she formally has a right to protection. Checking and 
registering migrants without documents is important not only for identifying them later but 
also for preventing abuses of the asylum system and also for filtering people who want to 
misuse the good intent of the receiving countries. Eurodac is the European Union database 
where each asylum seeker and people already protected by a Member State must be regis-
tered in order to make the data comparable later. The applicant’s data and fingerprint will be 
uploaded to the central database for identification in a later stage. It was originally designed 
to help implement the Union’s asylum policy. Today, however, the database is more than it 
was at its starting point, as it serves not only this purpose but also offers the possibility of 
crime prevention and detection, moreover law enforcement agencies and Europol have also 
been granted access to screening terrorists and criminals. Earlier, the majority of countries 
rejected the Hungarian approach that terrorists could enter the territory of the Union among 
migrants. Unfortunately, this proved to be a fact since in the course of the migration wave on 
October 2015, one of the perpetrators of the Paris terrorist attack arrived through Greece–
Fyrom–Croatia–Hungary–Austria. He was fingerprinted and registered as asylum seeker 
with a falsified passport in Leros on 3 October 2015, then he asked protection for asylum in 
Fyrom and listed in Croatia, as well. The French authorities matched the fingerprints fixed 
on the scene of the Paris terror attack and identified that person as one of the perpetrators.
25 Act of 2007 LXXXIX, Section 11. Under international agreements and statutory conditions, if the international 
treaty or the directly applicable legal act of the European Union does not make an exception, the state border 
shall be crossed by road, rail, water or air border crossing point or border crossing point open to traffic. Act of 
2007 LXXXIX, Section 11/A. In the course of crossing the state border, legal provisions related to crossing 
the state border and the border crossing point must be respected.
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Hotspots, Transit Zones
EU leaders agreed in September 2015 to create hotspots in Greece and Italy to screen incom-
ing refugees and differentiate between bona fide asylum seekers and economic migrants in 
order to regularly control the migration flow. Fingerprints must be taken and the refugee has 
to wait the end of the whole procedure. Six hotspots in Italy26 and five hotspots in Greece27 
were set up. Although the task is a national competence but the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO), Frontex and Europol provide support to countries because of the large 
number of applicants. They cooperate on the hotspot with the most affected Member States 
for fixing fingerprints, quick identification and registration. Those who are not entitled to 
asylum or other protection should be returned to either the previous or the home country 
with the assistance of Frontex. Europol can send investigative teams to assist the authorities 
of the Member States in tackling and dismantling organized criminal networks for migrant 
smuggling and other serious and organized crime and in identifying whether these networks 
are, where appropriate, viewed as terrorist investigations.
One of the key operational measures proposed in the Agenda was to set up a new hot-
spot approach towards managing the large inflow of migrants. The hotspot approach was 
conceived as an immediate response to a major migratory crisis and had to be implemented 
under very challenging and changing circumstances. “A hotspot was defined as an area at the 
EU’s external border which faces disproportionate migratory pressure. Most migrants enter 
the Union at these hotspots and, according to the Commission, it is here that the EU needs 
to provide operational support to ensure arriving migrants are registered and channelled, 
as appropriate, into the relevant national follow-up procedures.”28
Taking into account the hotspot concept our country has created two transit zones in 
Röszke and Tompa, but this solution did not get a good feedback in most EU countries, 
institutions29 and NGOs,30 as summarized below. The high commissioner of the UNHCR 
considers the transit zone as a detention and criticizes that only a few people can access the 
zone per day. Unfortunately, this rejecting position is not affected by the fact that the aim 
here is not to discourage the asylum seekers from entering the country, but to ensure that 
refugee applications are regulated in accordance with the law. The European Commission 
did not accept this solution, therefore stepped up an infringement against Hungary on this 
national legislation.31 As regards the asylum procedures, the Hungarian law32 does not allow 
the applications to be submitted outside the special transit zones at the borders, and restricts 
access to these zones, thus failing to provide effective access to asylum procedures within 
its territory. The border procedures are not in accordance with the conditions of the EU law 
and the special guarantees for vulnerable individuals are not respected. The reduced time 
26 Taranto, Lampedusa, Pozzallo, Porto Empedocle, Augusta – The decision was taken but the last two ones were 
not opened.
27 Lesvos, Kos, Leros, Sámos, Híos.
28 Special Report EU response to the refugee crisis: the hotspot approach (pursuant to Article 287(4), second 
subparagraph, TFEU) 2017. 14.
29 Case of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary (Application No. 47287/15).
30 Transparency International, Helsinki Committee.
31 On 10 December 1995 incompatibility with the Asylum Procedures Directive (Directive 2013/32/EU) and the 
Directive on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings (Directive 2010/64/EU).
32 Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum.
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for appeals violates the fundamental right to an effective remedy. The  Hungarian asylum 
law also falls short of the EU rules on return of illegally staying third country nationals. The 
Commission is concerned that Hungary is currently returning migrants (including asylum 
seekers) who cross the border irregularly to Serbia without following the procedures and 
conditions of the EU law on return and asylum. Individual return decisions are not being 
issued by Hungary as required.
Finally, the Commission believes that the systematic and indefinite confinement of 
asylum seekers, including minors over 14, in closed facilities in the transit zone without 
respecting the required procedural safeguards, such as the right to appeal, leads to system-
atic detentions, which are in breach of the EU law on reception conditions and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Hungarian law fails to provide the required material 
reception conditions for asylum applicants, thus violating the EU rules in this respect. The 
Commission shared its additional concerns regarding the amendments to the Hungarian 
asylum legislation introduced in March 2017 and organised a series of meetings at expert and 
political level to support the Hungarian authorities in making the necessary adjustments to 
bring the new provisions in line with EU standards and rules. The Hungarian Government 
did not agree with these arguments, however, decided not to modify any of the relevant legal 
provisions so the European Commission was informed by an official letter.33 The process is 
still ongoing and it is not thought that there is any difference between establishing hotspots 
within the country or accepting applications in the transit zones located along the border 
with the final decision there. Today more countries have in mind how to set up hotspots out-
side the EU. In practice, the EU–TR declaration is partially a similar solution,34 where, for 
certain benefits and sums,35 Turkey will not allow migrants to leave but put them in refugee 
camps in the country and try to return them to the countries of origin. In order to prove that 
the hotspot concept is the right approach some data should be compared for 2015 and 2017.
In Greece, in July 2016, migrants were being identified, registered and fingerprinted 
within three days of their arrival on the islands. This is a substantial improvement compared 
to the 8% registration rate in September 2015. In Italy, the registration and fingerprinting rate 
have improved significantly from some 60% in the first half of 2015 to an average of 97% 
for the whole of 2016. All the relevant stakeholders agreed that the hotspot approach had 
played an important role in improving the situation in Italy, not only by providing adequate 
infrastructure, but also by establishing standard procedures to be followed and by having 
a positive influence on practices in general.36
Even better results were achieved in the Hungarian transit zones as 120,487 persons 
were registered in Eurodac in 2015 and 46,505 in 2016.37 Comparing the applications sub-
mitted for asylum in 2015, 177,135, while this figure is in 2016, 29,432 which shows a 83.38% 
33 Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1285_en.htm (Accessed: 15.11.2017)
34 Some characteristic elements (territory of third country, registration of asylum seekers) are identical to transit 
zones.
35 3 + 3 billion Euro to Turkey, upgrading customs union, opening other chapters, acceleration of visa liberali-
sation and EU accession talks.
36 Special Report EU response to the refugee crisis: the hotspot approach (pursuant to Article 287(4), second 
subparagraph, TFEU) 2017. 38–39.
37 EU–LISA Eurodac – 2015, 2016 statistics.
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reduction.38 As currently a request for asylum can only be submitted in transit zones, it 
appears that this system has contributed not only to the reduction of illegal migration but 
also to the regulated submission of applications.
Preparedness/Unpreparedness of the EU
For such a migration pressure that the European countries faced in 2015 neither the Member 
States nor the EU was prepared. This proves that the package of measures issued by the 
European Commission appeared to be rather ideas than comprehensive measures. Since the 
EU was unable to form a united position, therefore each country tried to solve the problems 
themselves. That is why fragmentation has now emerged and that is why some Member 
States perceived that the immigration needs to be strictly controlled and only given a very 
restricted opportunity to enter, others are more tolerant and more welcome all and then try 
to integrate into the society, and some of them are still watching the phenomenon.
European Migration Agenda
A ten point package was announced on 20 April 2015 in Luxembourg by the European 
Commission.39 The European Agenda on Migration40 was published on 13 May 2015, then 
three implementation packages were presented in 2015 (May, September, and December). 
Lots of people lost their lives in the Mediterranean is one of the issues that the Commission 
had to react. “This Agenda sets out four levels of action for an EU migration policy which 
is fair, robust and realistic. When implemented, they will provide the EU with a migration 
policy which respects the right to seek asylum, responds to the humanitarian challenge, 
provides a clear European framework for a common migration policy, and stands the test of 
time.”41 The four chapters are: 1. Reducing the incentives for irregular migration; 2.  Border 
management – saving lives and securing external borders; 3. Europe’s duty to protect: 
a strong common asylum policy; 4. A new policy of legal migration.
On 4 May 2016, the Commission adopted the first package of proposals for the 
 Common European Asylum System42 aimed at better managing the refugee crisis, which 
includes the following proposals:
38 Based on the Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Office 2015–2016.
39 Available: www.europeansources.info/showDoc?ID=1203414 (Accessed: 25.03.2018)
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final 
Brussels, 13.05.2015.
41 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final 
Brussels, 13.05.2015. 7.
42 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for 
Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010, COM (2016) 271 final 2016/0131(COD) Brussels on 
04.05.2016.
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• a reform to the Dublin system
• the establishment of an EU Asylum Agency which is to replace EASO
• a modification of the Eurodac Regulation
• visa liberalisation measures
On 13 July 2016, the Commission adopted the second package of proposals for the reform 
of the Common European Asylum System.43 The package includes:
• a new Regulation to replace the Asylum Procedures Directive
• a new Regulation to replace the Qualification Directive
• targeted modifications of the Reception Conditions Directive
• the Reform of the Reception Directive and Common EU Resettlement Framework
The two packages together include seven elements and aim to establish a common asylum 
procedure to ensure that asylum seekers are treated equally and properly. In addition tasks 
and obligations are laid down for asylum seekers in order, inter alia, to eliminate abuses and 
secondary movements. “At the same time, the solutions offered by the European Agenda on 
Migration in many cases only give surface treatment instead of solving the problem at its 
roots. Moreover, in these solutions, serious concerns may arise not only about the violation 
of the national sovereignty of the Member States but also their compatibility with the Euro-
pean or international law. This includes the mechanism of emergency relocation, which not 
only contributes to the survival of the predominantly serious disadvantaged Dublin system 
but also concerns European and international law.”44
EU–Turkey statement
Due to the unprecedented pressure on the Balkan route, its closure was extremely impor-
tant. Hungary has a physically reinforced border protection, but this did not correspond to 
the ideas of European decision-makers. Moreover, they were not in favour of recognizing 
that a Member State is effectively tackling a situation while the Union itself cannot find an 
effective solution. On the Balkan route a major entry point towards the EU is Turkey, so it 
was inevitable that negotiations started. Thus, on March 18, 2016, a seven-point statement45 
was concluded between the EU and Turkey. It was already visible at the moment when the 
idea emerged that there were some points among the elements, like lifting the visa require-
ments for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, that could not be easily 
accomplished, but the Member States finally accepted it for the much-desired compromise.
43 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards for the qualification of 
third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted 
and amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third country 
nationals who are long-term residents, COM (2016) 466 final 2016/0223 (COD) Brussels on 13.07.2016.
44 Gyeney Laura (2016): Az Európai Unió Migrációs Politikája „Tényleges megoldás egy valós válságra”? Iustum 
Aequum Salutare, Vol. 12, No. 2. 302.
45 EU–Turkey Statement adopted by the European Council on 18 May 2016.
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Relocation–resettlement
Among the ideas that have risen in the EU, the institution of relocation, which was thought 
to be a solution to the management of the crisis by the distribution of persons already entered 
into the EU. Hungary has already stated at the beginning46 not to agree with this approach for 
several reasons. On the one hand, we do not believe in this instrument, and in our view, we 
cannot force people to stay at the chosen place of residence, thirdly, it can have some effect 
on people already inside, but it does not treat newcomers. However, it also means a pull 
factor that encourages those who are still uncertain to hit the long route and try to enter the 
territory of the EU and just have to wait for being treated. But in spite of the distribution 
system, they do not care much about it, since they will not stay in the country where they 
were relocated, but continue to go on where they originally wanted to go.
After the Committee could not effectively be active against the mass migration, it 
was also reluctant to strengthen the border control, so the idea of  relocation was ultimately 
abandoned. To this end, two Council decisions were adopted in 2015; at first 40,000 people 
had to be relocated from the EU frontline countries of Italy and Greece.47 Here, voluntary 
commitments were made by Member States to offer the numbers; Hungary committed 
0 people. Then, according to the second decision, another 120,000 people48 from the same 
countries should have been relocated as mandatory.49 Those citizens were the subjects of 
relocation where the rate of recognition of asylum applications reaches 75% of the EU 
average. Based on the data at that time, those refugees came from Syria, Iraq or Eritrea in 
2014 and Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq in 2015.50 In the second relocation decision Hungary 
was also among the beneficiary countries with 56,000 people, but the political position at 
that time also indicated that our country disagreed with this solution, so we did not want to 
be a beneficiary country in this program. According to that decision, 1294 people should 
have been relocated to our country but Hungary did not agree with that decision and turned 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union.51 Even before the decision of the court, the 
European Commission launched an infringement procedure,52 for the reason that we did not 
relocate anybody and did not offer any place for relocation. The court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union ruled against Hungary in each point for failure of fulfilment of the obligation of 
relocation.53 Since Hungary continued to take nobody, the European Commission brought 
the case to the next stage in the infringement procedure on 7 December 2017, namely the 
case was submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union for enforcement.54
We can conclude that the concept of refugee distribution ended with a total failure, as 
31,469 people were relocated so far.55 The plan was to redistribute asylum seekers across 
46 The Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted the Decision about the temporary and exceptional relocation 
mechanism on 22.09.2015. Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania voted against, Finland abstained.
47 2015/1523 Council Decision.
48 15,600 from Italy, 50,400 from Greece.
49 2015/1601 Council Decision.
50 Based on Frontex Risk Analysis for 2016.
51 C-643/15 and C647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council of the European Union.
52 Infringement procedure was launched against Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland.
53 Judgement of the Court (Grande Chamber) 6 September 2017.
54 Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5023_en.htm (Accessed: 25.03.2018)
55 Until 15 November 2017.
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the EU and simplify the intense pressure on Greece and Italy at the height of the migra-
tion crisis. It also became obvious that life will not stop after the relocated migrants as 
newcomers will become permanent residents. In order to tackle this problem, another idea 
occurred: asylum seekers from the crisis areas should be officially transported to Europe 
via a European resettlement system. This is currently operating on a voluntary basis, to 
which every country can make its own commitments. The commitment of Hungary in the 
resettlement framework is 0.
The Approach of the V4 Countries
The co-operation of the V4 countries has been very widespread since the beginning, but 
since 1998 the cooperation has started to intensify, and in recent years it has shown a very 
spectacular integration character. Combating migration has made the relationship between 
the four countries even tighter. In this area, it has become clear that the pursuit of interests 
can only be achieved as a result of close cooperation, as we see that the Western European 
approach is completely different from our position.
The previously detailed Hungarian standpoint is shared by the representatives of the 
other three countries. They are focused on defense and security policy even if the migration 
crisis deepened such a cooperation.56 However, since the migration pressure is of a differ-
ent nature in the four countries, it is natural that their own characteristics are also shown. 
When the migration crisis was on the top in 2015 and 2016 the Czech V4 Presidency paid 
attention to this problem. During this presidency, the V4 countries declared its support 
for Hungary and Slovenia by deploying police personnel.57 In the second half of 2016, the 
Slovak Presidency of the European Union had the opportunity to define the direction of 
the European Union. In order to somehow step forward the policy of the EU, the document 
proposal Effective Solidarity was presented in the JHA Council meeting on 18 November 
2016. Although constructive ideas could be found in the paper, no breakthroughs and 
consensus were taken, thus the European Council decided to further work on the Conclu-
sions of 5 December 2016 without giving a deadline. The V4 Polish Presidency announced 
a deepening cooperation of police and border services on migration and asylum issues and 
therefore regular political consultations have been introduced not only with the V4 partners 
but in a V4+ format with Baltic, Nordic, Benelux countries and with neighbouring countries 
from Central and South-Eastern Europe.58 “The mandatory allocation of asylum seekers to 
Member States does not provide a proper and long-term solution to the migration crisis; it 
only constitutes a strong pull factor and generates secondary movements. For these reasons, 
the countries of the V4 are not able to support the proposal of an automatic and mandatory 
relocation mechanism.”59
56 Kobierecka, Anna – Reginia-Zacharski, Jacek – Rulski, Michał (2017): V4 in the Face of Migration Crisis. 
Diagnosis and Recommendations. Policy paper. Łódź, University of Łódź, Faculty of International and Political 
Studies, Department of Theory of Foreign and Security Policy. 30.
57 Annual report of the Czech Presidency 2015–2016.
58 Programme of the Polish Presidency of the Visegrád Group 1 July 2016 – 30 June 2017.
59 Joint Declaration of the V4 Ministers of the Interior in Budapest on 5 October 2017.
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Most of the declarations in the field of combating new threats and migration challenges, 
however, require joint actions within the European Union. The representatives of the V4 
states declare full engagement in such activities, especially concerning practical support for 
the Balkans region as an important migration route. What is more, after several discussions 
on migration crisis, a decision was made to establish the joint Migration Crisis Response 
Mechanism (MCRM) enabling coordination among governmental institutions responsible 
for migration.60
It is our common position concerning the reform of the Common European Asylum 
System that an asylum system to be developed should be able to flexibly respond to the 
challenges of the 21st century, and to provide protection to the ones in need of international 
protection, while acts resolutely against abuses of the asylum system. We must avoid cre-
ating a procedure that would only mean an additional pull factor. The solution lies in the 
mitigation and management of the root causes of crisis situations in the countries of origin.61
With regard to the relocation, all V4 countries, without exception, consider that the 
idea is bad and does not work. The essence of the earlier V4 cooperation can be found in 
preparing their position. The reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
should be based on responsibility and voluntary contribution. The reform of the CEAS 
should be coordinated at EU level. The essence of solidarity does not lie in compulsory 
distribution but in comprehensive measures and in trust.62 The most determined position 
is represented by our country, which has opposed the Council’s decision from the outset 
and does not implement it. Moreover, Hungary submitted to the European court its appeal 
against the decision of the European Commission about the mandatory settlement of peo-
ple.63 The quotas or the permanent mechanism of relocation met with opposition from other 
countries including Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.64 From the perspective of 
governance, the policy of the Slovak Government reflected the wider public discourse on 
the issue and was particularly reactive to outside events and forces. The government was 
not especially proactive in seeking to outline its own policy. The position before March 
2016 included several core components: rejection of any mandatory European redistribution 
mechanism, strong border protection, and the prioritization of solutions aimed at addressing 
the root causes of migration.65 Slovakia, on the other hand, does not reject categorically 
the performance, in particular, depending on the court’s decision. Poland is one of the most 
homogenous countries in Europe – its population is overwhelmingly Polish and Roman 
Catholic. The Czech Republic opposed the migration quotas and offered other solutions to 
the migration crisis, such as more effective protection of the external borders of the EU. It 
tends to provide more support to the EU countries which face new challenges by the mi-
60 Joint Statement of Ministers on establishment of the Migration Crisis Response Mechanism in Warsaw on 21 
November 2016.
61 Visegrád Group Ministerial Meeting, Joint Declaration of Ministers, Budapest, 5 October 2017.
62 Kisiel, Kamil (2017): Opportunities for Joint Action by the Visegrád Four in Dealing with the Migration Crisis. 
Changes in Migration Crisis Management in 2016–2017 in Europe and Hungary. Scientific Conference on 
15–16 June 2017, Budapest. 79.
63 C-647/15 on 3 December 2015.
64 Joint Statement of Ministers on establishment of the Migration Crisis Response Mechanism in Warsaw on 21 
November 2016.
65 Dubeci, Martin (2016): Slovakia: Migration Trends and Political Dynamics. 3. Available: www.globsec.org/
publications/slovakia-migration-trends-political-dynamics/ (Accessed: 13.07.2018)
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gration crisis and find ways to improve the security situation and economic conditions on 
the ground in the countries of origin in order to mitigate the push factors for migration. The 
migration pressure is on the Mediterranean Sea and Italy today, therefore, the V4 countries 
declared to provide 35 million euros to protect the maritime borders of Libya.
In case of safe countries, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic also set up a list 
of their own national assessments. For example, Serbia and Hungary are considered safe 
countries of origin, while Slovakia does not put it on its list. As Brussels and Berlin applied 
different approaches to managing migration, it was important at international level that 
co-operation, such as the V4 could effectively express their united position. The EU’s draft 
measures were far behind reality, and Hungary, experiencing migration pressure on a daily 
basis, was able to articulate its position and enforce its common will together with the other 
three Visegrád countries.66
“The European Court of Justice has made an outrageous and irresponsible political 
decision in the quota case that would not be with the interests of all European nations. Pol-
itics has raped European law and European values, he said, stressing that there is a huge 
wimping out in the case of quotas, since less than three weeks before the deadline for this 
decision expired, only 25% achieved the targets. After that, it is an un-European behaviour 
to say that the quota’s failure is based on the four Visegrád countries.”67
It is in the nature of the European Union’s recent system that small countries have 
practically no opportunity to enforce their interests if they differ from the position of the 
majority. There are two ways to compensate this. Either they join a big country and try to 
follow its interest or attempt to make alliances with countries that have a similar position. 
Such an alliance exists between the Benelux States, the Scandinavian States, the Baltic 
States and the Mediterranean States, so it would be a completely logical expectation to es-
teem the alliance of the V4 states, but for some reason, while the aforementioned  alliances 
and common positions are accepted within the EU, the V4 alliance is very often being 
criticized. I believe that the idea of  the Union is based on equality and partnership, so this 
principle must be valued. Everybody has to accept it and the covenant must be tightened 
to show that small countries have to be taken seriously and have the right to be respected.
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Migration as the Object in Higher Education  
in the Field of Law Enforcement
Jozef Balga
Introduction
The rectors of the European Universities in 1988 in Bologna, on the occasion of the 900th 
anniversary of the founding of the oldest university in Europe, signed the Magna Charta 
Universitatum.1 In this document, the Rectors highlighted the irreplaceable role of univer-
sities in spreading knowledge among the younger generation and the fact that the cultural, 
social and economic future of society requires considerable investment, especially in con-
tinuing education. They also emphasized that universities must provide future generations 
of students with education that would teach them, and through them also others, to keep in 
mind the great harmony of the natural environment and life itself. The basic principles on 
which the mission of universities needs to continuously rely on are part of the document.
One of the principles highlighted the autonomy of universities as institutions at the 
heart of companies organized differently, depending on geography and historical heritage. 
Through research and education, they produce, review, valorise and transmit culture. This 
also means that their research and education must be morally and intellectually independ-
ent of any political or economic power. The fundamental principle of university life is the 
freedom of research and education. Respect for this basic requirement must be ensured by 
governments and universities. Universities as guardians of European humanist traditions 
provide universal knowledge and are evidence of the vital need for mutual understanding 
and influence of different cultures.
Magna Charta Universitatum also emphasized that, in fulfilling these principles, it 
is necessary to use effective means corresponding to the present conditions. In order to 
preserve freedom of research and education, the means of exercising freedom must be 
available to all members of the universities. The recruitment of teachers and the regulations 
governing their position must be in line with the principle that research is an integral part 
of education. Each university – having regard to its specifics – must oversee the freedom 
of its students and provide students with conditions in which they can acquire a culture 
and receive training in their own interest. Essential to their continued development of the 
university, they regard the mutual exchange of information, documentation and numerous 
joint projects aimed at improving their study. In conclusion, this document highlights the 
1 Magna Charta Universitatum. Bologna, 18 September 1988.
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need to promote the mobility of teachers and students, to cope with the equivalence of status, 
titles, examinations (without prejudice to national diplomas) and scholarship admissions. 
The Magna Charta Universitatum is one of those documents that, despite the time, have 
proven their timeliness and the vision of higher education for the 21st century.
The Joint Declaration of European Ministers of Education, adopted on the 19th of June 
1999 in Bologna (the Bologna Declaration below), was one of the most important documents 
that influenced the European higher education area.2 Among other things, it was inspired 
by the Sorbonne Declaration of 25 May 1998.3 The Sorbonne Declaration highlighted the 
central role of universities in developing European cultural dimensions. It highlighted the 
support for the creation of a European area of higher education as a key prerequisite for 
promoting the mobility of citizens and their ability to work in the labour market as well as 
in the overall development of the continent.
The Bologna Declaration specifically drew attention to increasing the international 
competitiveness of the European higher education system and increasing the global attrac-
tiveness of the European higher education system. The document also includes the primary 
objectives of creating a European area of higher education and the global support of the 
European higher education system.
The first objective was to adopt a system of easily readable and comparable academ-
ic degrees through the introduction of the Diploma Supplement, in order to promote the 
opportunities for European citizens to work in the labour market and the international 
competitiveness of European higher education systems. The second objective was to adopt 
a system of study based essentially on two main cycles: pregradual and gradual. An access 
to the second cycle should require a successful completion of the first cycle of study lasting 
at least three years. The title awarded after the first cycle should be relevant to the European 
labour market as a suitable level of qualification. The second cycle should lead to the aca-
demic rank of Magister (Doctor). The third objective in line was to set up a European Credit 
Transfer System (ECTS) as an appropriate means of promoting broad student mobility. The 
content of the penultimate objective is to support mobility and to remove obstacles for free 
movement with special attention to students (the ability to access learning and teaching), 
teachers, scientists and administrative staff (recognition and valorisation of the period of 
study undertaken in the European competitive research, teaching without damaging to 
their statutory rights). The last objective was to promote European cooperation in quality 
assurance, with a view to developing comparable criteria and methodologies and promoting 
the necessary European dimension in higher education, particularly with regards to the 
preparation of study plans and cooperation between institutions in the field of study and 
research. The Bologna Declaration initiated the unification of the European higher education 
area and the beginning of a new enhanced European cooperation in this field.
2 The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999.
3 Sorbonne Joint Declaration. Available: www.donau-uni.ac.at/imperia/md/content/io/cop034_sorbonne_dec-
laration.pdf (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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Police Higher Education
Education in state and law development has played an important role, above all, in the im-
plementation of governmental functions of the state. From antiquity to the present, education 
and specifically school systems have overcome quantitative and qualitative changes. They 
were mainly related to the social requirements and level of development of the state. The 
modern state is currently performing an educational function that includes subsystems, such 
as education, science and research. The interaction of those entities is not possible without 
the legislative, institutional, financial, personnel and technical support. A particular posi-
tion in the education system has a high school with its specific environment. Specialized 
universities include, in addition to military universities, police universities with specific 
needs related to the preparation of students for the future performance of the profession of 
police officers. On the other hand, it performs specific tasks aimed at fulfilling the state’s 
protection and security functions. Content fields of study implemented at police universi-
ties adapts to the requirements of the police and security services to carry out tasks in the 
field of public order and state security. An important fact is the specialization of students 
in the subjects drawn up for individual police services and their specific activities. Police 
education is an important part of training specialists and managers for state administration 
specifically for police administration.
The first police universities were, from the beginning of the 70s of the last century, 
constituted in the former socialist countries that conducted education and research on 
communist principles which negatively affected the graduates and their practical activity 
was directed to violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The post-communist 
states began, after the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 90s of 
the 20th century, to build a police system of higher education on democratic principles.
The position of police universities today is special because of their subordination to 
the Ministry of the Interior and the Minister of the Interior or to the Government and its 
President. In addition to the general tasks set by the higher education act4 for all higher 
education institutions, police universities have special roles arising from their status in the 
system of state schools. Their structure is influenced by the consensus of ministers and 
the funds allocated by the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior, among 
other things, approves conditions for admission to study and eligibility criteria for study. 
It approves the number of admitted students, the number and the structure of the staff. In 
addition to allocating funds, it checks the legality and cost-effectiveness of using these 
funds. It also discusses and evaluates the long-term intentions of the police university and 
their updating. It associates and uses information from the students’ registers and provides 
data to the college registers of police colleagues. The statutory representative of police 
universities is the Rector or Dean of the faculty. The Rector is accountable to the Minister 
of the Interior. He is also accountable to the Academic Senate.
Police universities are part of the European area of education and a common European 
research area. The main mission of these schools is to develop a harmonious personality 
and contribute to the development of education and science in areas relevant to internal 
security and public order of the state. Schools cooperate with domestic and foreign univer-
4 Available: www.slov-lex.sk/právne predpisy/sk/ZZ/2002/131/20160101 (Accessed: 15.12. 2017)
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sities and scientific research institutions, government bodies and other legal and natural 
persons involved in higher education. Reported universities also carry out academic rights 
and freedoms such as the right to learn, the right to free expression and publication of their 
views, freedom of teaching various scientific opinions, scientific and research methods 
and freedom of scientific research, research and other creative activities and publication of 
their results. The academic rights and freedoms are implemented in accordance with the 
principles of democracy and the rule of law. Basic activities carried out at police universi-
ties include education (pedagogical activity), scientific, development and creative activity 
(scientific activity).
The study at police universities is carried out on the basis of the approval of the 
 Accreditation Commission in the given study program in the field of study administered by 
the Ministry of Education. This fact is influenced by the curriculum and the subjects defined 
therein, while the study takes place in a daily or an external form. Police universities educate 
professionals especially for police and security services, as well as authorities. In addition 
to police officers, state and private security services, also civilian students are studying at 
the universities. On this basis, the police high schools are part of state universities as well as 
the police administration system. The subject of study at the police high schools at present is 
the migration of people and their impact on the security of citizens and the state. Education 
in the field of migration is also influenced by disciplines such as pedagogy, legal science, 
police science, administrative science, forensic science, criminology and political science.
Important subjects in the education of students in the area of migration of people are the 
departments. These include mainly the legal and police department. The legal departments 
dealing with the issue of migration of people from a legal point of view are the Department 
of Public Disciplines, the Department of Administrative Law or the Department of Criminal 
Law. Police departments focusing on teaching and research into the migration of people 
from the point of view of police science include the Department of Foreign and Boarder 
Police, the Department of Criminal Police, the Department of Investigation, the Department 
of Forensic Science, and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. Employees of 
police departments, research institutions and offices of the Ministry of the Interior are also 
involved in the education of this area who present application problems of implementation 
of laws by state authorities, especially in the control of foreigners in the country.
The departments are involved in the training of future police managers, which is 
necessary for managing the conceptual approach tasks determined by the requirements of 
the European Union and the community requirements to eliminate the illegal international 
migration of persons. Their training focuses on management control and specialized func-
tions in the police and security services of the control of the border and alien regime with 
emphasis on the application of the laws. Students will acquire the knowledge necessary 
for the operation of the police services, in cooperation with the security authorities of the 
 European Union, in the implementation of the Schengen system. The departments are 
preparing highly educated professionals for the control of specific forms of international 
organized crime such as smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, or terrorism, who 
are able to carry out their professional activities in dynamically changing conditions.
University teachers focus their efforts on students within the compulsory, optional 
and elective courses in order to acquire knowledge, skills and habits that should have man-
agers and specialist services of the police. Efforts also seek to increase professionalism, 
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responsibility, reliability, care for subordinates and difficulty to perform the tasks arising 
from legislation.
The process of acquiring the content of the subject within higher education is to be 
carried out at the level of relationships that are the driving force behind logic-thinking oper-
ations in the minds of students, provided that the learning process is realized on the basis of 
solving the problem situations resulting from the multilateral relationship between the taken 
facts. It also means formulating specific issues, addressing these issues in a framework, and 
verifying the accuracy of the solution achieved. The applicability of the problem method 
is conditioned, among other things, by the breadth of personal, individual or collectively 
acquired student experiences which greatly influence the content and style of educational 
work in individual subjects.5
Teachers, as a control system must also respect the properties of the controlled object, 
the students, the great diversity and variability characteristics and operation disturbance 
variables. An important factor here is the adaptability of the learning process to changing 
working conditions. The teacher should find the optimal means of increasing the student’s 
interest in learning, thus ensuring the desirable quality of the learning process.6 In the 
educational process, the teacher is not only a source or reproduction of a new information 
for students, but it is primarily an active driving factor that activates, motivates and modifies 
the intellectual processes of the students.
In terms of teaching in the system of police training, methods used by university ped-
agogy are as follows: lectures, seminars, exercises, practical work, group work, problem 
teaching, mastery learning, integral thematic teaching, legal clinic, group exercises and 
professional experience. University teachers present, through these methods, their scientific 
knowledge and research roles in order to clarify processes and phenomena related to the 
migration of people. This improves the preparation of students for positions of management 
of police officers or specialists for the various police and security services.
Migration as a Subject of Education and Research at Police 
Universities
With the increasing migration of people, a number of negative phenomena and processes 
related to illegal international migration are brought to society, as well. The current causes 
of migration of people are deeply rooted in global issues that are being addressed by states 
or clusters of states (such as the European Union). Migration of people directly and imme-
diately causes military conflicts, violations of human rights and freedoms, poverty, climate 
change or religious hatred. Currently, the causes of migration are: political, socio-economic, 
legislative, geographic, ethnic, religious, demographic, climatic, ecological, related to 
the state border regime, related to food security and others.7 Examining the processes by 
teachers influencing the causes of people’s migration has an impact on the use of individual 
forms of education of the police departments.
5 Stračár, Emil (1967): Systém a metódy riadenia učebného procesu. Bratislava, SPN. 294–295.
6 Štepanovič, Rudolf (1975): Základy pedagogiky vysokých škôl. Bratislava, Univerzita Komenského. 136.
7 Balga, Jozef (2003): Teória služby cudzineckej polície. Bratislava, Akadémia Policajného zboru v Bratislave. 39.
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The current migration of people has a negative impact on the security of the citizens 
of the European Union (EU). International organized crime and terrorism, which becomes 
a phenomenon of the 21st century threatens public order and public security with its inhu-
mane forms, flexible methods and unique means of implementing terrorist attacks targeting 
the EU’s citizens. Protecting citizens fully relates to the readiness of the state authorities of 
the Member States to implement preventive measures at the external and internal borders. 
The use of new technologies to enhance security requires high-quality training of police 
and security staff at selected secondary schools and universities for the use of active forms 
of teaching.
The current status of knowledge of migration has enabled the system of subjects to 
implement migration policy issues of the state, which contain knowledge relevant to the 
operation of police and security services. Law disciplines as the theory of law, constitu-
tional law, police law, aliens law, the Schengen acquis, asylum law, administrative law, 
European law and international law and sources governing the movement of persons within 
the state are an integral part of the educational process. Application of laws is necessary 
to be taught in the police education system because the police authorities, as state bodies 
in their activities, implement the principles of legality and legitimacy. Legal subjects also 
include topics such as the legal status of police authorities, the system of interpretation and 
the application of legal standards by the administrative authorities. Special attention from 
the legal sciences deserves a state-scientific view of the migration of people based on the 
features of the state, especially the personal substrate. Issues related to the implementation 
of the administrative procedure, asylum procedures, residence and offense proceedings are 
also important. Themes in the area of the Schengen acquis, visa policy and immigration 
policy are also interesting. A particular attention is given to the legislative area of freedom, 
security and justice.
In European law, the area of freedom and security regulates the material and formal 
sources of law. Among the material sources we include declarations, programs, agendas, 
reports and resolutions of the EU institutions. Formal sources of law governing the area of 
freedom and security are the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the EU Treaty, regula-
tions, directives, decisions or the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. An important 
part of the area of freedom and security are bodies carrying out and applying sources of law 
guaranteeing security and particularly personal safety of EU citizens. Based on the Article 
72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, responsibility for maintaining public order 
and ensuring internal security lies primarily on the Member States, but at present they are 
able to address international threats and risks effectively and independently.8 It is therefore 
necessary to establish a rational and efficient system of cooperation between the national 
authorities of the Member States and between the EU State authorities and institutions. EU 
citizens must be confident that they will feel safe in the EU, regardless of which Member 
State they are staying in. In this context, it is necessary to ensure a high level of security 
and freedom through cooperation between police, security and intelligence services.
The fundamental four freedoms include the freedom of movement of persons. These 
freedoms are guaranteed by the primary sources of European law and are the basis of the 
8 Available: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Consolidated_version_of_the_Treaty_on_the_Functioning_of_the_
European_Union/Title_V:_Area_of_Freedom,_Security_and_Justice#Article_72 (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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education process carried out by the legal departments. Freedom of movement of persons 
does not only apply to the area of employment, business, service, but its content must be 
understood in its universal form which also includes the movement of persons for the pur-
poses of tourism, visiting family and friends, study and so on. Freedom, in the context of 
the free movement of persons within the EU, remains a fundamental objective, to which 
the support measures relating to the security of persons and the protection of public order 
must make a significant contribution. Freedom of movement of persons in the area of free-
dom and security is divided into the freedom of movement of citizens of the Union and the 
freedom of movement of aliens.
Freedom of movement of persons is regulated in three basic areas, namely in the area 
of international law, European law and constitutional law. From the perspective of the 
international-legal concept it is important to define the content of freedom of movement.
The fundamental international treaties that govern human rights and freedoms and 
their counterparts are also the EU Member States include, in particular, the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Rome Convention), 
Protocol No. 4, Art. 2. The Rome Convention in Protocol No. 4 in Art. 2 reads: “Everyone 
who is legally resident in the territory of a State has in that territory the right to freedom 
of movement and freedom to choose a place of residence. Everyone can freely leave any 
country, even their own. No restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of these rights 
other than those provided by law and are necessary in a democratic society for the sake of 
national security, public security, the maintenance of public order, the prevention of crime, 
the protection of health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”9 
Also, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states in the Article 12 that: 
“Everyone who is legally resident in the territory of a particular country must have the right 
to freedom of movement and freedom to choose his place of residence there. Everyone has 
the right to leave any country, including their own.”10 Those rights may not be subject to 
any restrictions other than those laid down by law and not necessary for the protection of 
national security, public order, public health or morals, to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others and which are consistent with the other rights recognized in this covenant. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his/her own country.
The common feature of these documents is the guaranteed right to freedom of move-
ment until the person lawfully resides in the territory of the State, limiting the freedom of the 
person concerned to law, in the interests of national security, public security, public order, 
prevention of crime, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
In the European-law concept, the area of freedom of movement of persons is governed 
by European law. EU law is the area of freedom of movement provided for in the Article 3 
of the EU Treaty which aims to offer “its citizens an area of freedom and security without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of persons is guaranteed, together with ap-
propriate control measures on external borders, asylum, immigration and the prevention of 
and fight against crime”.11 Following this Article, Title 5 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
9 Available: www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 35. (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
10 Available: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf 176 
(Accessed: 15.12.2017)
11 Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/
DOC_1&format=PDF 17. (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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EU12 focuses on the formation of measures allowing remove controls on persons crossing 
internal borders valid for EU citizens as well as foreigners (people who are not EU citizens).
It should be noted that the current degree of liberalization of the free movement of 
persons in the territory of the EU is linked to Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU 13 which characterizes the internal market as an area without internal borders 
in which is guaranteed the freedom of movement, and Article 2014 which guarantees the 
right of a citizen of the Union to move freely and to reside in the territory of the Member 
States. Article 2115 allows for exceptions and limitations on the implementations of that 
right, under the conditions laid down by the EU Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU, in the light of the measures taken to implement it, in particular as secondary 
sources of European law. The European Parliament and the Council may, in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, adopt rules to facilitate the exercise of those rights.
The legal standards governing the freedom of movement of persons advised the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter of Rights). Article 4516 guar-
antees every citizen of the Union the right to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States. Freedom of movement and residence may be granted in accordance 
with the contractual obligations also to aliens who are legally resident in the territory of 
a Member State. It follows that the granting of this right depends on the implementation of 
the power of state bodies and institutions of the Member States.
The constitutional law concept is characterized by the implementation of that free-
dom from international agreements binding EU Member States. Therefore, in the area of 
liberties, the role of the legal norms, which is the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of 
movement of persons, is important. The Constitution defines only the basic boundaries of 
these freedoms, both in terms of fulfilling freedoms as well as implementing them. At the 
same time, the Constitution allows, in particular in the form of laws, to specify the freedom 
of movement of persons within the territory of the particular states. In the Slovak Republic, 
the Constitution of Article 2317 provides the freedom of movement and residence of per-
sons. The constitutional concept links the sources of the national legal system with laws, 
regulations and decrees regulating the movement of persons.
Freedom in terms of free movement within the EU remains a fundamental objective to 
which they must contribute substantially to the accompanying measures related to the con-
cept of security, law and justice. The Treaty of Lisbon, on the other hand, gives the concept 
of freedom a meaning which goes beyond the free movement of persons between Member 
States. It is also the freedom to live in a law-enforced environment with the knowledge 
that the public authorities separately or jointly devote all their efforts to prosecution and 
punishment of those who deny or abuse that freedom.
12 Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:41f89a28-1fc6-4c92-b1c8-03327d1b1ecc.0007.02/
DOC_1&format=PDF 73–75. (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
13 Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:41f89a28-1fc6-4c92-b1c8-03327d1b1ecc.0007.02/
DOC_1&format=PDF 59. (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
14 Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:41f89a28-1fc6-4c92-b1c8-03327d1b1ecc.0007.02/
DOC_1&format=PDF 56–57. (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
15 Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:41f89a28-1fc6-4c92-b1c8-03327d1b1ecc.0007.02/
DOC_1&format=PDF 57. (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
16 Available: www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf 19. (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
17 Available: www.prezident.sk/upload-files/46422.pdf (Accessed: 15.12.2018)
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An irreplaceable role in the education process of police higher education institutions 
is covered by the Schengen acquis, which includes topics such as entry and exit of for-
eigners (list of border crossings, setting of minimum data on information boards at border 
crossing points at external borders, agreements on local border traffic, the methodology for 
carrying out checks on persons crossing the national border, the establishment of uniform 
entry and exit stamps, measures to combat illegal immigration, the list of third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and 
countries whose nationals are exempt from that requirement at the external borders, issuing 
visas at the external borders, practical procedures for carrying out border checks), stay of 
aliens (introduction of a harmonized form providing proof of invitation, ensure payment 
of subsistence and accommodation, establishing a united format for visas, examining visa 
applications, united format for residence permits for third-country nationals), granting 
sanctions for the illegal stay of foreigners (expulsion, mutual recognition of decisions on 
the expulsion of third-country nationals), responsibility of legal entity and natural persons 
(obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data and reporting of accommodation by 
aliens), international police cooperation (liaison officers, cross-border surveillance and 
persecution of persons, immigration liaison officers network, organization of joint flights for 
the removal of third-country nationals who are subject to individual removal orders from the 
territory of two or more Member States), the Schengen Information System (installation and 
operation, updating SIRENE, the introduction of some new functions for the SIS, including 
the fight against terrorism), the control of the aliens regime (criminal law framework in the 
fight against the facilitation of unauthorized entry, crossing or stay) and the operation of 
the web-based information and coordination network for management services migration 
of Member States.18 The subject in its content also deals with the territorial, temporal and 
personnel validity of the Schengen acquis. It follows from this that the Schengen acquis 
is involved in the application of the freedom of movement of persons within the European 
Union, which is guaranteed not only as a primary source of European law but also by in-
ternational treaties. In terms of the system, it has a pragmatic dimension. The special status 
of the Schengen system in the system of control of persons now has a demonstrative and 
subsidiary character. The impact of the Schengen acquis on the control of people’s migration 
is weak, resulting in a restriction on the free movement of persons in the area of freedom, 
security and justice. It is therefore necessary for the teachers to objectively assess the cur-
rent status and role of the Schengen system in the elimination and control of international 
illegal migration of people.
A special position in the education of students of police high schools has police sub-
jects, which focus mainly on the activities of foreign police and border police. We share the 
system of police subjects on special topics that deal directly with people’s migration and, 
in the alternative, focus on crimes related to the migration of persons such as investigation. 
Police subjects dealing with the migration of persons and their elimination include activities 
of the foreign police service, activities of the border police service, special activities of the 
services of foreign and border police, operative and intelligence activities, foreign and border 
regime, operative and intelligence processes, theory of the Service of Foreign Police and 
the theory of the border police services. Within these subjects a priority must be given to 
18 Balga, Jozef (2009): Systém schengenského acquis. Bratislava, VEDA. 76–77.
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the forms, methods and means of actions that implement these services in controlling the 
migration of persons. The subject deals with the system of activities of police and security 
services in the implementation of visa policy, asylum policy, immigration policy, control 
of the foreign regime and police cooperation. In this section, the students are provided with 
the information they need to solve the problematic situations related to the application of 
the EU visa regime, the EU visa policy and police cooperation in the area of the transfer 
of foreigners from the EU territory. On the other hand, police subjects must respond to the 
fact that the control of movement and residence of aliens in the EU territory has been fully 
transferred to Member States that are unable to restore old forms and methods of control. 
At the same time, the current state of migration regulation is inadequate and all forms of 
migration and residence control of the Member States are not used. Efforts to implement all 
available forms and methods of migrants’ control on the territory of the EU are shifted to 
internal border controls. In principle, the Member States concerned, in line with the sources 
of European law, are putting their security at risk. However, the fact is ignored that some 
responsible Member States, for the protections of the external borders are incompetently 
carrying out border checks and border surveillance. The presented risks of uncontrolled 
migration and the impact of migration on the security of EU citizens and their Member 
States are presented by police department teachers to students with possible solutions to the 
issue from the perspective of police science and the theory of police activities.
An important part of police subjects is in operational terms the cooperation area. It is 
important to handle the different forms, methods and means of better information exchange 
from information systems such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Interpol 
database of stolen and lost travel documents (SLTD), the Anti-Fraud Information System 
(AFIS), automated DNA profile comparison, the fingerprint data system and vehicle reg-
istration data provided under the Prüm cooperation. In terms of tracking the movement of 
criminals and terrorists in particular, the use of Passenger Name Record of air passengers 
(PNR) has a cardinal importance. A particular mention should be made of the use of the 
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which allows the exchange of 
information on previous judgments of EU citizens. The system does not work effectively in 
case of persons convicted in the EU, who are nationals of third countries.
Last but not least, the police subjects focused on detection of new forms and methods 
of committing crime smugglers and traffickers and to fight against them and along the entire 
route, starting with the source and transit countries and ending in the EU. This crime belongs 
to the subsystem of crimes related to the migration of persons and the subjects containing 
the alleged issues focus on theoretical and application level.
In these subjects, the university teachers of the department use, among other teaching 
methods, the exposure teaching method – problem teaching. The teacher must appropriately 
consider the expertise and practical knowledge of students to whom the problem situation is 
addressed in the context of problem teaching. Among the factors influencing this fact, we 
advise the physical age of the students, the level of knowledge of the students, the type of 
school terminated, the student’s psychic circumstances, the time period of the new study, 
the material possibilities of using didactic aids, the environment in which the curriculum 
is taken, professional and practical readiness of the teachers. The teaching of specialized 
subjects has a special significance in the problematic lecture in those thematic units, where 
the teacher does not pass the facts and knowledge, but introduces the students to the spe-
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cific situation, the application of other legal norms in their own professional problems. The 
situation not only creates and analyses but also reveals hypotheses, existing solutions to 
the problem and its final solution. Significantly, problematic teaching can be used more 
thoroughly in those organizational forms of teaching, where we work with smaller groups 
of students. The pedagogical practice of higher education proves that a problematic approach 
is necessary to apply especially to seminars, exercises and practical jobs.19 The application 
of problem-based teaching at the departments is an important factor in improving the edu-
cation of police students in high schools. The application has its own specific features. The 
key pillars of the subjects are based on the determination and selection of information for 
students at three levels in the field of human migration and its control by police departments.
The first level is available for students in all forms of study and all fields of study. At 
this level, we focus on the provisions of the primary and secondary sources of European 
law governing visa policy, asylum policy, control of the foreign regime and police cooper-
ation and their application by the police and security services of the EU Member States. In 
this section, the students are provided with the information they need to solve the problem 
situations related to these areas.
In the second level, the issue is narrowly focused on students who have chosen man-
datory subjects that include migration issues based on police practice requirements. After 
acquiring knowledge, skills, and habits from the first level, students move to the second 
level. In these subjects, information on tactical procedures used by the police and security 
services in the field of control of the alien regime and border regime of the Member States 
is presented in the form of lectures and seminars. Solved problems focus on situations 
related to the implementation of migration control of persons in the EU Member States. 
Further attention is paid to the specific police cooperation, as it is used in practice in the 
control of the border regime and the alien regime. This cooperation is based in particular 
on the exchange of information on illegal migration at common national borders provided 
by a joint contact point deployed at border crossing points.
The third level focuses on verification of theoretical knowledge through practical 
work. These practical jobs are carried out, for example, at a joint contact point deployed to 
tax-specific police departments, where students can verify acquired theoretical knowledge, 
correct solutions to the problems assigned to them in the context of problematic lessons at 
seminars and exercises.
This dichotomous system of the pedagogical approach of education at police univer-
sities involves the interconnection of propaedeutic legal subjects with subjects of police 
focus. Police subjects must be based on the knowledge presented by the police science. 
There is a clearly visible connection of science and research with education and the use of 
knowledge of police practice.
From the point of view of the research on the migration of persons, this subject deals 
with the police science and its subsystem of the theory of foreign police. Among the sub-
jects researching the migration of people, we advise police universities and their police 
departments, research institutions and police units. In terms of personnel the subjects are, 
therefore, personnel departments, PhD students, staff of research institutions and personnel 
19 Haládik, Jozef (2001): Problémové vyučovanie v predmete Teória a prax služby hraničnej polície. Bratislava, 
Akadémia Policajného zboru v Bratislave. 28.
202 Dynamics and Social Impact of Migration
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
of police departments. At present, the areas of research on the migration of persons are legal 
relations governing the status of foreigners, the causes of migration, the legal status of state 
bodies and institutions controlling the migration of persons, the activities of foreign police 
units, forms, methods and means used by foreign police services in the control of migration 
of persons and legal relations between state authorities and aliens. Last but not least, the 
research focuses on the processes and phenomena affecting the commission of criminal 
activity related to the migration of people.
Migration must be regulated both on a national and international level, due to its social 
importance. The regulation on the migration of people includes in a wider sense all legal 
norms that concern human migration and the change of the place of residence. Its function 
is to react efficiently to the current situation of immigration and emigration, and also to be 
capable of influencing migration tendencies.20
Conclusion
European universities have taken the lead and have taken on a major role in creating 
a European area for higher education and in highlighting the basic principles laid down by 
the Magna Charta Universitatum. This is considered to be the most important, given that 
the independence and autonomy of universities ensure the ongoing adaptation of higher 
education and research systems to the changing needs and requirements of society and to 
scientific progress. The extended framework for qualifications, the agreed set of European 
standards and guidelines for quality assurance and recognition of qualifications and periods 
of study are key characteristics of the structure of the European Higher Education Area.
If police universities want to be attractive locally and globally, they must thoroughly 
revise study plans in the curriculum of study programs – not only to ensure the best possible 
academic content but also to respond to changing police and security practise needs. One of 
the main social tasks of higher education is to integrate university graduates into the work-
ing life and thus into society. In addition to professional knowledge, education must also 
include cross-cutting skills and habits. In teaching and learning, including lifelong learning, 
full use should be made of the potential of information and communication technologies.
Police high schools fulfil the specific requirements of society such as the training of 
police managers and specialists and have a special position in the system of higher education 
and belong to the subsystem of state schools. The departments of these schools develop 
modern forms, methods and means of police activities aimed at protecting public order 
and state security. In cooperation with other police universities, they focus on exchanging 
experience in pedagogical and research activities. An important part of the education pro-
cess is the teaching of migration issues that negatively affects the security of EU citizens. 
For this reason, it is necessary to permanently update the content of subjects containing 
themes related to the migration of persons. The education of police students from the issue 
of migration of people is a necessity due to the fact that serious crime is related mainly to 
terrorism with the phenomenon mentioned.
20 Hautzinger, Zoltán (2016): Szemelvények a migráció szabályozásárol. Pécs, AndAnn Kft. 58–59.
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The Current Situation in the Field of Migration 
in the Czech Republic
Zdeněk Chlupáč
Introduction
Migration is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that has social and economic impacts on 
each country. The entry, stay and integration of foreign nationals in the territory of the Czech 
Republic are processed with both potentially positive1 but also negative2 consequences for 
the Czech society. These processes are to a large extent dependent on the active and flexible 
approach of the Czech Republic. (Migration Policy Strategy of the Czech Republic; MoI) 
On the one hand, it is in the national interest to tackle this issue responsibly, to promote 
positive aspects of migration, but on the other hand, it is also desirable to fight against the 
negative ones.
Since the foundation of the sovereign Czech Republic in 1993, the situation in the 
field of migration has undergone substantial development. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
the Czech Republic was mainly a source country from which migrants travelled mostly for 
work to Western European countries. Later, at the turn of the 21st century, the country ex-
perienced a large influx of applicants for international protection and an increasing number 
of transiting foreign nationals. In recent years, the Czech Republic has become a state that 
is the final destination for thousands of foreign nationals migrating for work and business 
reasons who want to settle here on a long-term basis or permanently.
The asylum and migration policy of the Czech Republic is made up of a large amount 
of sub-topics, such as legal and illegal migration, international protection, integration etc. 
It is beyond the scope of this work to focus on each specific problematic aspect and de-
scribe them entirely. My goal is to present the most significant parts of the Czech asylum 
and migration policy and provide a comprehensive view of this issue. I would also like to 
answer the question: in which way does the Czech Republic contribute to solving the current 
migration crisis and what are its priorities in this context.
1 Immigrants can fill the gaps in the labour market; they also contribute to the development of the host culture, 
since there is an influx of new or revitalised services.
2 More people increase the pressure on resources and services such as health care systems, there is also the 
risk of conflicts between immigrants and the majority society. The insufficient integration of the new-coming 
people is also a big problem.
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Migration and Asylum Policy of the Czech Republic
Before 1989, during the era of the rule of the Communist Party, the experience with asylum 
and migration policy in Czechoslovakia was at a very negligible level. At that time, it was 
impossible to speak of a systematic approach to this issue, as there were very strict state 
border controls, especially with the neighbouring Western states, and it was very difficult to 
both enter and exit the country. No significant number of immigrants into Czechoslovakia 
was recorded during this period. On the basis of intergovernmental agreements with the 
friendly states, foreigners – for example from Cuba, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and other 
socialist countries – came to work under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
programme. However, these figures were also strictly regulated by the state. An exception 
was the arrival of several thousands of migrants from Greece in the 1950s who left their 
home country for political reasons. Attempts at illegal emigration from Czechoslovakia 
to Western countries can be considered quite a rare case of migration and it was indeed 
severely punished by the Communist regime. The internal migration of the inhabitants of 
the present Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic was a different phenomenon due to 
the fact that they migrated freely between the territories of both states. In the light of these 
facts, it can be stated that Czechoslovakia in the communist era was primarily a source 
country of migration.
After the fall of Communism in November 1989, asylum and migration policy was 
something completely new for the Czechoslovakian state. There was a lack of experience and 
also a lack of experts. It was necessary to create new legislation, organizational structure, 
migration facilities and much more. In 1993, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the 
Czech Republic started to form its own asylum and migration policy. Due to the fact that 
the migration issue is directly related to the area of internal security and state security, it 
was assigned to the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). The Ministry is in charge of the issues 
of asylum and migration policy at legislative, conceptual, analytical and implementation 
level. The Department of Asylum and Migration Policy (DAMP) is primarily responsible 
for this area. Certain parts of the competencies are also in the agenda of the Police of the 
Czech Republic, respectively the Alien Police Service and other ministries.3
After the Czech Republic joined the European Union (EU) in May 2004, its migration 
policy started to be shaped by the common policies of the EU to a large extent and its imple-
mentation has largely been based on the common legal instruments of the EU. On the one 
hand, there are specific areas of migration policy that are almost exclusively formed by the 
common policies of the EU, such as international protection, protection of the EU’s external 
borders or return policy; on the other hand, in some areas, the EU Member States retain 
a relatively high degree of discretion, like in legal migration and integration of foreigners. 
In the light of these facts, when making decisions on migration issues, the Czech Republic 
must take into account not only the specific requirements and possibilities of the state, but 
also the situation at the level of the EU.
3 Ministries with competence in the field of migration are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industry 
and Trade, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, ministries with associated competence are the Ministry of 
Education, Youth and Sports, Ministry of Regional Development, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Transport.
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Migration policy strategy of the Czech Republic
On the 29th of July 2015, at the peak of the migration crisis, the Czech Government approved 
a fundamental strategic material for the field of migration, called the Migration Policy 
Strategy of the Czech Republic, which formulates the priorities of the country in the area of 
migration and international protection.4 The wording of the individual principles express-
es the wish of the country to address the migration policy actively and responsibly, while 
respecting the obligations arising from international conventions, treaties and recommen-
dations. The priority of national activities in migration is to formulate effective measures 
which will support controlled legal migration, while minimising illegal migration. (MoI)
The document sets out seven principles that are listed by priority with regard to the 
security aspects of migration. However, they also represent the basic thematic groups on 
migration issues: integration of foreign nationals, illegal migration and return policy, inter-
national protection (asylum), the external dimension of migration (including the development 
and humanitarian aspects), free movement of persons within the EU and the Schengen 
Area, and legal migration and the interconnection with the common policies of the EU. In 
accordance with these principles, the Czech Republic will:
1. Fulfil the obligation within its migration policy to secure a peaceful coexistence of 
its citizens and foreign nationals, and – through effective integration – to prevent 
the emergence of negative social phenomena;
2. secure the safety of its citizens and effective law enforcement in the field of illegal 
migration, return policy and organized crime associated with people smuggling 
and human trafficking;
3. meet its commitments in the area of asylum and provide flexible capacity of its 
system;
4. strengthen its activities in order to provide assistance to refugees abroad and to 
promote the related prevention of further migration flows, including the support 
for the development of countries in managing migration crises;
5. promote the maintenance of the benefits of the free movement of persons within 
the EU and the Schengen Area;
6. support legal migration which is beneficial to the state and its citizens so that the 
Czech Republic can respond flexibly to the needs of its labour market and reflect 
the long-term needs of the state;
7. fulfil the international and EU obligations in the field of migration, and acti-
vely participate in the all-European debate and search for common solutions. 
(MoI 2015)
Together with The Migration Strategy, The Communication Strategy was developed as 
a cross-sectional measure for informing the public and other partners. It addresses all 
aspects of migration in the Czech Republic, is closely linked to the individual chapters of 
The Migration Strategy and is presented jointly with it. (MoI 2015)
4 The Migration Policy Strategy of the Czech Republic from 2015 replaced the Czech Government’s Migration 
Policy Principles, accepted by the Government of the Czech Republic in 2003.
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The scope of activities of the Department of Asylum and Migration Policy
The DAMP is a department of the Ministry of the Interior which is responsible for exercising 
competence in the area of foreigners’ entry and residence, international protection, refugees, 
the process of integration of foreigners into the Czech society and Schengen cooperation. 
The department is also responsible for the state administration of the Refugee Facilities 
Administration of the Ministry of the Interior. With more than 1100 employees, the DAMP 
is the most numerous department of the Ministry of the Interior. It has more than 28 offices 
in all 14 regions of the Czech Republic. From the wide range of issues that are in gesture of 
the DAMP, I chose several of the most important ones to analyse in more detail.5
Legal migration
Legal migration is a process of state-controlled immigration that occurs through author-
ised channels. From the point of view of the Czech Republic, it is necessary to approach 
migration as one of the possible instruments of economic development of the country. One 
of the main goals of the Czech Government in migration policy is to support controlled 
legal migration into the country, i.e. to bring qualified foreign workers, who are able to 
contribute to the development of the economy, and to integrate them into the Czech society 
permanently, together with their families.
The Czech Republic can regulate migration flows through its visa policy and residence 
permits. In the context of legal migration, there are three options how to classify foreign-
ers – first, it can be done based on the nationality of the foreigners (EU citizens and their 
family members or citizens of the third countries), second, based on the purpose of their 
stay (entry and residence permit is authorized for a specific purpose, such as business, work, 
family reunion, study, science and research, etc.) and third, based on the length of their stay 
(short-term stays, temporary stays and permanent stays).
As a part of the migration policy, the Czech Republic creates specific projects to sup-
port certain groups of foreigners. These projects are realized through interdepartmental 
cooperation of central state administration bodies and are an effective tool for supporting 
the migration of selected target groups of third-country nationals whose entry and residence 
is in the interest of the state. The objective of these projects is to speed up the migration 
process by prioritizing the foreigners’ applications for residence permits and possibly also 
for work permits. Foreigners wishing to participate in the projects must meet the eligibility 
criteria. As an example of these projects, the following ones can be mentioned: projects tar-
geting workers from Ukraine – The Project Ukraine6 and The Regime Ukraine,7 Fast Track 
5 Outside the mentioned issues, DAMP also deals with other areas such as European and international cooper-
ation, Schengen cooperation, foreign assistance program, assistance to compatriots, return policy etc.
6 Project for the employment of highly qualified workers.
7 The dominant migration tool for the year 2017, which applies to medium and low-skilled workers. 
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project8 – accelerated procedure for in-house workers;9 Welcome Package for  Investors,10 
Accelerated procedure for granting residence permits for foreign students from third 
countries (in competence of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports) and many others.
International protection
The issue of granting international protection is covered by a number of international treaties 
and laws of the Czech Republic. The basic national law is Act No. 325/1999 Coll. on Asylum. 
The administrative procedure for the granting of international protection is carried out by 
the Ministry of the Interior as a body of the first instance. It is possible to appeal against 
the decision of the ministry at the competent regional court. A cassation complaint may 
be filed against the decision of the Regional Court on an appeal against the decision of the 
ministry on the issue of international protection to the Supreme Administrative Court in 
Brno. The Ministry of the Interior is conducting the procedure for granting international 
protection in the relevant asylum centres, through the expert staff of the DAMP. (MoI)
International protection is granted in the form of asylum or subsidiary protection. 
The foreigners who have been granted asylum acquire a permanent residence in the Czech 
Republic and have similar rights and obligations as Czech citizens, with several exceptions, 
such as the impediment to work in security services and the right to vote. Subsidiary protec-
tion can be granted if the foreigner does not meet the conditions for being granted asylum, 
but he/she would face a risk of suffering serious harm if they return to the country of origin.
Integration
Integration policy builds on a legal migration policy and as such should respond to current 
migration trends. It is a two-way process involving both the foreigners and the majority 
society. Its goal is to maintain social cohesion and harmonic conflict-free coexistence of 
all inhabitants of the country. In this respect, the Czech Republic has a well-balanced in-
tegration policy which is non-problematic in the long term. Its foundations are formed by 
consistent monitoring and projects at national and regional levels, including a network of 
regional integration centres for foreign nationals. (Migration Policy Strategy, MoI)
The basic strategic document of the integration policy of the Czech Republic is The 
Policy of Integration of Foreign Nationals, which was approved by the Government in 2000 
and has since then been continually updated. The target group consists of third-country 
nationals legally residing in the territory of the Czech Republic who are neither applicants 
for international protection nor persons enjoying international protection. In exceptional 
cases, the target group may also include EU citizens.
8 In cooperation with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
9 Acceleration and improvement of the migration process of statutory bodies, managers and key specialists from 
third countries assigned to branches located in the Czech Republic.
10 The project is focused on statutory representatives, managers and key specialists of newly incoming companies.
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There is also a special integration program for persons granted international protec-
tion, The State Integration Program, which aims to facilitate the process of integration of 
persons who have been granted international protection. The Czech Government approved 
this programme in November 2015.
Illegal migration
Illegal migration means unauthorized entry into the country, unauthorized residence in 
the territory or a stay inconsistent with the purpose that the residence permit was issued 
for. It is a security threat not only because it may often be linked to a cross-border crime, 
organized crime and even international terrorism, but also because it can pose economic 
and social risks. Illegal migration may also affect the internal stability of the society, the 
public’s relation to legally settled foreigners and the economic balance of the state.
Within the already mentioned Migration Policy Strategy, the Czech Republic has 
proposed the following procedures to effectively combat illegal migration at national level: 
effective pre-entry control, effective return policy, cooperation with third countries, fight 
against human trafficking and consistent detection and punishment of organizers of illegal 
migration.
The Current Situation in the Field of Migration in the Czech Republic
At the beginning of 1990, only about 35,000 foreigners – about 0.34% of the popula-
tion – lived in the territory of the present Czech Republic. In 1993, the number of foreigners 
living in the Czech Republic was more than twice as high (approximately 78,000, i.e. 0.75% 
of the population).11 The second half of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century can 
be characterized as a period of rapid growth in the field of migration in the Czech Republic. 
This situation was further highlighted after the country joined the EU in 2004. According 
to up-to-date data, more than 516,000 foreigners live legally in the Czech Republic in these 
days, which represents about 4.8% of the total population.12 (CSU, 2017)
Residence of foreigners in the territory of the Czech Republic
According to Act No 186/2013 Coll. on the Czech Citizenship, a foreigner shall mean 
a person, who is not a citizen of the Czech Republic. (Act No. 186/2013 Coll.) The stay 
of foreigners is primarily governed by Act No 326/1999 Coll. on the Residence of Aliens 
on the Territory of the Czech Republic and, for specific groups of foreigners, also by Act 
No 325/1999 Coll. on Asylum.
11 It should be noted that most of them were from Slovakia.
12 In total, the Czech Republic has 10.57 million inhabitants.
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Three basic categories of foreigners staying in the Czech Republic can be identified. 
First, nationals of the EU member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and 
their family members, second, third-country nationals (citizens of countries outside the 
EU) and third, other foreigners (regardless of their citizenship – for example applicants for 
international protection).
The residence of foreigners in the territory of the Czech Republic is divided by the 
Act on the Residence of Foreigners into categories of temporary stay in the territory and 
permanent residence in the territory. As of 30 September 2017, a total of 516,983 foreigners 
with legal residence were registered in the Czech Republic. The long-term development of 
the number of foreigners residing in the country is shown in the following graph, with the 
ratio of permanent and long-term stays marked.
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Figure 1.
Foreigners in the Czech Republic by type of residence permits 1989–2017
Source: ŘSCP MoI
Among the foreigners residing in the Czech Republic, third-country nationals prevail. 
Ukrainians are the largest immigrant community with a legal residence in the territory of 
the Czech Republic, accounting for 113,397 people i.e. 22.2% of the total number of foreign-
ers residing in the Czech Republic. The second largest group are Slovaks (109,914 people), 
followed by Vietnamese (59,279 people), Russians (36,343 people) and Germans (21,148 
people). More detailed information on the national composition of foreigners in the Czech 
Republic is presented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2.
The national composition of foreigners in the Czech Republic
Source: MoI
Administratively, the Czech Republic is divided into 14 self-governing regions. In the long 
run, Prague is the region with the highest concentration of foreigners, followed by the 
Central Bohemian Region, the South Moravian Region and the Ústí nad Labem Region. 
Contrary to this, the smallest share of foreigners was registered in the Vysočina Region 
and in the Zlín Region.
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Figure 3.
Territorial distribution of foreigners by region
Source: MoI
As of 31 December 2016, 382,889 foreigners were registered by the regional offices of the 
Czech Labour Office. Of this number, 284,148 (74.2%) were citizens of the EU/EEA and 
Switzerland (including their family members), who have free access to the labour market, 
and 76,046 were third-country nationals (25.8%). The national composition of foreigners 
officially working in the Czech Republic is shown in the following graph.
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National composition of officially working foreigners  
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Source: MoI 2016
Trends in international protection
The first asylum seekers came to Czechoslovakia immediately after the collapse of the 
communist regime in November 1989. They were mainly citizens of post-communist coun-
tries, especially Romania, Bulgaria and the former Soviet Union, but also from some of 
the non-European countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. During the 1990s, the situation 
in the area of international protection in the Czech Republic was relatively stable with the 
number of applications between 1,000–2,000 per year. At the turn of the 21st century, there 
was a dramatic increase in the number of applications for international protection. The 
highest number of asylum seekers, 18,094 was recorded in 2001,13 but after 2003 the num-
bers declined steadily. The situation changed at the beginning of 2014 in connection with 
the Ukrainian crisis. That year, there was a change in the trend of the decreasing number 
of applications registered in the Czech Republic, when the year-on-year increase was more 
than 30%. A year later, the number of applications for international protection increased 
again, but in 2016, this trend stopped (see Figure 5).
13 The derogation in 2001 was caused by the short-term relaxation of the provisions of the Employment Act 
(asylum seekers could work in the Czech Republic immediately after submitting their application; this was 
abused by a huge number of foreigners, mainly citizens of Ukraine and FYROM). An amendment to that law 
came into force in January 2002, and subsequently the number of applications decreased again.
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Figure 5.
Asylum seekers in the Czech Republic (*up to 31.8.2017)
Source: MoI
The national composition of foreigners applying for international protection in the Czech 
 Republic remains relatively stable in the long term, but several abnormalities can be 
identified. The most frequent applicants for international protection of all nationalities are 
traditionally citizens of Ukraine.14 Between 2013 and 2014, in particular, there was a steep 
increase in the number of their applications. The reason for this change was the outbreak of 
the crisis in Ukraine. Given that the Czech Republic is a target country for many Ukrainians, 
this increase was nothing unexpected. It is also interesting to compare the number of asylum 
seekers from Iraq between 2014 and 2016. In 2014, Iraqi citizens applied for international 
protection in the Czech Republic 22 times and a year later 38 times, but in 2016, it was 
suddenly 158 times. This sudden change was caused by the fact that the Czech Government 
approved a humanitarian admission through which 89 Iraqi Christians from Lebanon and 
Iraqi Kurdistan were admitted to the country.
Table 1.
Asylum seekers by nationality
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017*
UKR (178) UKR (146) UKR (515) UKR (694) UKR (507) UKR (324)
SYR (67) SYR (70) SYR (108) SYR (135) IRQ (158) AZE (92)
BLR (54) RUS (53) VIE (64) CUB (128) CUB (85) GEO (73)
VIE (51) VIE (49) RUS (43) VIE (81) SYR (78) ARM (72)
RUS (42) ARM (43) CUB (42) ARM (44) CHN (68) SYR (60)
* up to 31.8.2017
Source: MoI
14 For many Ukrainian citizens, the Czech Republic is the target country and they try to stay there under all 
circumstances. That is why these people often resort to application for international protection in a situation 
where they have no other possibility of remaining legally in the territory.
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In the last 5 years, the asylum was granted to around 7.8% of all applicants and another 
19.4% of applicants got subsidiary protection (see the following figures).
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017*
753 707
1156
1525 1478
974
113 49 95 82
148
23
270
149
256 194
302
89
Numbers of applica ons Asylum Granted Subsidiary protec on granted
Figure 6.
The success rate of applicants for international protection in the last 5 years 
(*up to 31.8.2017)
Source: MoI
Table 2.
The number of granted asylums/subsidiary protections by nationality
Asylum granted/subsidiary protection granted
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017*
BLR SYR UKR UKR IRQ SYR
10 25 4 98 25 119 7 174 101 49 2 21
SYR BLR SYR SYR SYR UKR
0 22 8 68 1 72 29 101 5 88 6 16
UZB CUB CUB CUB UKR IRQ
8 13 3 30 2 28 0 53 5 46 1 12
CUB MYA BLR BLR CUB UZB
1 16 29  6 16 4 12 0 44 0 13
KAZ IRQ IRQ IRQ AFG YEM
3 13 2 13 1 9 4 12 5 16 0 6
* up to 31.8.2017
Source: MoI
From January to mid-September 2017, the EU member states have received almost 500,000 
applications for international protection. As of that date, the Czech Republic registered only 
1,040 applications, which represented 0.21% of the total. It follows that the Czech Republic 
has never been one of the target countries for a large number of asylum seekers, unlike 
other European countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom or the Scandinavian states. 
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The situation in the field of international protection can be considered stable in the Czech 
Republic without any significant fluctuations.
Illegal migration in the Czech Republic
Illegal migration can be divided into the following two categories – illegal crossing of the 
external Schengen border15 and illegal residence on the territory. Since 2008, when the 
Czech Republic has become part of the Schengen area, the trend of the rising number of 
illegal migrants detected in the Czech Republic can be monitored. Between 2013 and 2014, 
the increase was 17%, but a significant change occurred in 2015, when the year-to-year 
increase was 78%. The following table documents the development of illegal migration in 
the Czech Republic in the last five years.
Table 3.
Illegal migration in the Czech Republic 2013–2017
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017*
illegal residence  (also 
 includes transit illegal 
 migration) and top countries 
of origin
3 974 4 641 8 323 5 039 2 532
UKR UKR SYR UKR UKR
RUS KWT UKR RUS VNM
VNM LBY KWT KWT RUS
illegal crossing of the  external 
Schengen border and top 
countries of origin
179 181 240 222 113
RUS RUS RUS refugees** refugees**
ALB UKR UKR UKR ALB
UKR AFG ALB ALB, AZE RUS
* up to 31.7.2017
** Holders of a so-called refugee passport, i.e. a travel passport marked with the text Convention of 28 July 1951.
Source: MoI, Police of the Czech Republic
During 2015, an enormous number of people, mostly from Middle East and Southern Asia 
or Africa, tried to reach the EU, especially Western and Northern European countries 
and this state continued in 2016 and 2017 (although it is true that the number of incoming 
people was lower). On 17 June 2015, in response to the migration situation in the EU, the 
Czech  Government approved the introduction of special measures such as police controls 
on  selected road and train routes, in particular near the state borders, with the aim of 
 minimizing the illegal movement of persons in the territory. Subsequently, in August 2015, 
the Ministry of the Interior decided to extend the capacity of detention facilities due to the 
growing number of detained irregular migrants.
15 Due to the fact, that the Czech Republic is surrounded by EU states, the only external Schengen borders are 
airports.
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In connection with the mentioned migration wave, the rate of illegal migration in the 
Czech Republic culminated between July and September 2015 (in August 2015, the police 
detained more than 1,300 people, especially from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq). In 2015, 
the rate of illegal migration reached the country’s annual historical maximum, but a year 
later, it declined significantly, by 39%. The lower number of detained irregular migrants in 
2016 was caused inter alia by the opening of border crossings between Hungary, Austria 
and Germany. The final downturn occurred with the closure of the so-called Balkan route.
From the beginning of the enhanced measures announced on 17 June 2015, 3,905 
people were detected by the end of September 2017 (see Figure 7). Most irregular migrants 
were detained in the South-Moravian region (50%), in Prague (15.2 %) and in the Ústí nad 
Labem region (8.6%).
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Figure 7.
Transit illegal migration
Source: MoI, Police of the Czech Republic
Although the number of transiting irregular migrants has dropped significantly since 2015, 
the national composition remains very similar. The graph on the left shows the number of 
detected irregular migrants from 17 June 2015 until the end of September 2017, the graph 
on the right shows the same time period but in 2017.
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SYR
IRQ
AFG
RUS
PAK
MAR
Others
Syria (16.2%) Iraq (16.2%)
Afghanistan (15.2%) Russia  (13.1%)
Pakistan (3.0%) Maroko (3.0%)
Others (33.3%)
SYR
AFG
IRQ
PAK
BGD IRN
XAB
Others
Syria (50.7%) Afghanistan (16.2%)
Iraq (10.3%) Pakistan (6.5%)
Bangladesh (3.2%) Iran (2.0%)
Palestine (1.3%) Others (9.9%)
Figure 8.
Comparation of national composition of transit illegal migration
Source: MoI, Police of the Czech Republic
Foreigners who enter and stay illegally in the Czech Republic, with a decision on their ex-
pulsion and detention being issued, or persons to be transferred to other EU Member States, 
are placed in facilities for detention of foreigners. The highest number of illegal immigrants 
staying in the facilities for detention of foreigners was recorded at the turn of September 
2015, with a maximum of 1,202 people on the 2nd of September 2015.
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Irregular migrants in Facilities for Detention of Foreigners
Figure 9.
Number of irregular immigrants staying in Facilities for Detention of Foreigners
Source: MoI, Police of the Czech Republic, SUZ
As of 16 October 2017, a total of 61 people stayed in the Facilities for Detention of Foreigners 
(ZZC). Among the main nationalities in the Czech detention facilities are currently citizens 
of Ukraine (26), Moldova (10), Vietnam (6), Iraq (5) and Nigeria (3). It should be noted that 
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in most cases, these are people detained because of a violation of the residence regime, so 
they are not primarily transiting migrants.
Currently, the situation in the field of migration in the Czech Republic is stable. Al-
though the Czech Republic has become a destination country for some groups of foreigners 
in recent years, it remains primary a transit country from a European perspective and is 
used by foreigners as a transit area for illegal migration, although currently not in a great 
extent. The continuous migratory influx remains outside the borders of the Czech Republic, 
where only individuals or small groups of irregular migrants are detected in connection 
with the migration crisis.
The Migration Crisis from the Point of View of the Czech Republic
More than a million migrants and refugees have come to Europe since the beginning of 
2015 to the present days, and others are still coming. Irregular migrants often take a long 
and dangerous journey to reach the borders of Europe, travelling across the Mediterranean 
Sea.16 Most of them come from regions south and east of Europe, including Western and 
Southern Asia or Africa, and aim to reach one of the Western European states, especially 
Germany, the United Kingdom or the Scandinavian states. For this situation at the interna-
tional level, the term European migration crisis is used.
The migration crisis in the Czech Republic was not primarily amplified by a huge 
number of refugees crossing the national borders or applying for international protection. 
These numbers were and are disproportionately low, compared to the numbers in other 
Western EU member states. Despite this fact, the Czech Republic does not ignore the prob-
lems associated with the migration crisis and actively participates in their solution. On the 
following lines, I will present how the Czech Republic contributes to solving the problems 
related to the migration crisis and outline its priorities in this area.
The Czech Republic as a part of the migration crisis
Since the beginning of the migration crisis, the Czech Republic has been intensively in-
volved in implementing effective measures to mitigate the impact of the crisis and is ready 
to continue in these endeavours. The country carries out a number of projects within which 
it provides personnel, material and financial assistance. At this point, I would like to mention 
a few particular cases.
The Czech Republic considers the concept of hotspots to be an important aspect of the 
solution to the migration crisis and actively has supported EASO activities both in Italy and 
Greece. In connection with the functioning of the hotspots, relocations and implementation 
of the EU–Turkey declaration, a total of 70 missions of Czech experts from the Ministry 
of the Interior were carried out since 2015 to support the EASO activities (35 in Italy and 
16 Western Mediterranean through Spain, Central Mediterranean through Italy or Eastern Mediterranean through 
Greece, Bulgaria or Cyprus.
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35 in Greece). The Czech Republic has always been one of the most active countries in terms 
of sending experts to the EASO services operating in hotspots in Italy and Greece. (MoI)
Czech policemen regularly take part in foreign missions to help guard the external 
Schengen border and prevent the flow of illegal migration. Since 2015, the Czech Republic 
has deployed more than 350 police officers who have joined the Frontex operations and 700 
more police officers who have worked abroad under bilateral agreements. These policemen 
have mainly worked in countries on the so-called Western Balkan Route such as Greece, 
Hungary, FYROM, Serbia and Slovenia, generally helping with border surveillance, per-
forming security inspections and searching vehicles.
In connection with the migration crisis, the Ministry of the Interior has established 
a targeted Refugee Assistance Programme, under which financial aid is provided to the 
host countries most affected with the refugee crisis such as especially Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, 
Serbia, Bulgaria and FYROM. Over 2015–2017, more than 15 million euros was allocated 
under this program. As part of the Refugee Assistance Program, additional ad hoc finan-
cial grants and donations are provided. The Ministry of the Interior also coordinates the 
MEDEVAC programme, a government-run medical humanitarian project that is focused 
on providing medical care to vulnerable groups of inhabitants in the regions stricken by 
humanitarian crises or natural disasters or in areas with complicated or no access to spe-
cialised healthcare services.17
As can be seen from the previous lines, the Czech Republic has taken an active stance 
towards the current migration crisis and is trying, as far as possible, to minimize its impact. 
The country is consistently and directly helping in the places of conflicts and neighbouring 
states. Czech experts support the EASO activities in Greece and Italy, policemen assist in 
crisis areas and the Czech Republic also provides material and financial assistance to the 
states in need.
Priorities of the Czech Republic in the context of the migration crisis
The current migration crisis needs an effective solution, which is only possible if the EU 
focuses primarily on consistent protection of the external Schengen borders, assisting the 
source and host countries of migration, and on returning those who are not entitled to 
international protection in the EU, i.e. the prevention of abusing of the European asylum 
system. In the light of these realities, the Czech Republic defines the following priorities 
for minimizing the impact of the migration crisis.
It is essential to preserve a functioning national asylum system in all member states of 
the EU. It is also necessary to exert pressure on consistent compliance with the rules and 
insist on preserving the concepts of the first safe countries for asylum applications (including 
safe countries outside the EU) to prevent the so called asylum shopping.
The effective aid in the countries of origin and surrounding states affected by the 
migration crisis is also very important. In addressing the migration crisis, the EU has to 
17 The inception of the MEDEVAC Programme (MEDical EVACuation) dates back to the beginning of the 
1990s, to the times of war conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From that time, Czech doctors were deployed 
for example to Kosovo, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Jordan.
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focus intensively on helping the most affected states, i.e. at the point of conflict, in the 
source countries of migration and in transit countries, where the aid is most effective and 
most needed. Ensuring human dignity in housing, food, health, education and employment 
requires presence directly in the most affected areas. Assistance is needed not only for ref-
ugees but also for local communities, to develop infrastructure. Simultaneously, it is also 
necessary to provide assistance to the European countries most affected by the migration 
crisis. In this way, the Czech Republic supports the concept of hotspots, the Mediterranean 
Sea Operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia and the development and operational capacity 
of a Libyan Coast Guard unit.
Another priority of the Czech Republic is to introduce measures that would reduce the 
flows of illegal migration to the EU and prevent the abuse of asylum procedures for illegal 
migration. With this in mind, the EU member states must work intensively on the protection 
of external Schengen borders (with the support of Frontex, which should fully control mi-
gration flows to the EU), cooperation with third countries and streamlining of return policy.
Return policy and its instruments have considerable reserves in all European countries 
and their current form undoubtedly contributes in a major way to maintaining the attrac-
tiveness of illegal migration from key source countries to the EU. This situation, where it 
is not possible to ensure the effective repatriation of undesirable foreigners18 or to ensure 
that countries of origin assume their own citizens, is no longer acceptable to the Czech 
Republic. In order to achieve measurable progress, the EU must link the return policy with 
other areas, such as putting pressure on non-cooperating third countries through visa pol-
icy. Early identification of persons entering the EU illegally with non-asylum motivation 
and their quick and effective repatriation must remain a key priority if the EU intends to 
establish a system which aims to deter potential illegal economic migrants and prevent the 
abuse of the Common European Asylum System.
Last but not least, there is a need for a comprehensive review of the EU asylum policy, 
as the migration crisis in 2015 has unambiguously demonstrated its shortcomings. The sit-
uation is now relatively stabilized due to lower numbers of arrivals, mainly via the eastern 
Mediterranean route, but the migration system of the EU remains extremely vulnerable 
and abusive. In this respect, the Czech Republic supports changes that would lead to the 
improvement of the asylum procedure in the places of first entry in the EU territory, as well 
as finding methods how to directly return persons without asylum rights from these places.
Conclusions
The migration and asylum policy of the Czech Republic is a coherent concept that can be 
effectively adapted to possible changes. The Czech Republic devotes increased attention to 
migration issues and is fully aware of the difficulties that unmanaged migration policy can 
bring. On the one hand, the country seeks to avoid the negative effects of illegal migration 
and, on the other hand, to support the positive effects of legal migration. For this purpose, 
a governmental document called the Migration Policy Strategy has been developed, in which 
the priorities of the countries in this area are clearly formulated.
18 I.e. persons without residence permit or without the right to international protection.
222 Dynamics and Social Impact of Migration
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
At present, the migration situation in the Czech Republic is relatively constant and the 
available information does not indicate that any significant changes should be made in the 
near future. Although the Czech Republic is not a primary target country for illegal migrants 
and asylum seekers within the EU, it is to a large extent the target country for the legal mi-
gration of certain groups of foreigners, and the number of foreigners in the Czech Republic 
is growing steadily. The Czech Republic reflects the global migration situation and tries to 
evolve it. The Czech Republic acts with solidarity and contributes to the minimization of 
the negative phenomena associated with migration issues.
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Some Practical Aspects of the Training on Migration
Miroslava Vozáryová
Introduction
The Faculty of Law was established in June 1919 together with Comenius University itself. 
Throughout its almost 90-year-long history, the study at the Faculty changed significantly 
a number of times. At present, the Faculty provides its students with three degrees of uni-
versity education organised within the credit system.
The mission of the Faculty is to provide a high quality legal education so that its gradu-
ates would later become successful legal practitioners both in Slovakia and in the European 
Union and be successful in other areas of social life, as well. The aim of the Faculty is to 
continuously improve the quality of material as well as formal aspects of all three degrees 
of university education through the permanent growth of the qualification structure of its 
pedagogical staff along with the introduction of modern methods of pedagogical process.
The Master’s degree programme – Master of Laws is a programme offered also as 
a complete two-year programme in English (including Asylum Law), as one of the few 
Faculties of Law in Central and Eastern Europe. Unlike other Faculties of Law in the region, 
our programme is neither only a certified postgraduate programme or life-long education, 
nor a master degree programme in the non-legal field of study e.g. legal specifics. The grad-
uate of the programme will acquire a full Master Degree in Law that allows him to enrol 
to any of the professional chambers in Slovakia or to practice any of the legal professions.
The philosophy of the Master’s degree programme – Master of Laws is to offer students 
a broad platform on which to design their own course of study within the parameters set 
by the Faculty of Law. The Master’s degree programme pursues innovations of legal edu-
cation in accordance with foreign, mainly Western European models. It was implemented 
as a result of the project Foreign Language Master Degree Programme Law of European 
Integration and Globalization, which was co-financed by the European Union through the 
European Social Fund within the operational programme Education. The graduate will be 
able to analytically and synthetically consider all legal fields with a theoretical, philosoph-
ical and ethical basis, especially with broad knowledge of the European Union Law and 
International Law. The graduate will be fully applicable in practice, especially in multina-
tional law offices and multinational business corporations, international governmental and 
non-governmental organizations, as well as central governmental authorities.
In addition to the introduction of a considerable number of new courses that have been 
already taught for more than three years and modernization of current teaching methods, 
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the programme lays emphasis on gaining practical skills through clinical education and 
moot courts.
The Master’s degree programme would like to provide the active and talented students 
the opportunity to apply their gained theoretical knowledge and skills in the authentic and 
equally demanding environment of international law competitions in which the best law 
students from around the world meet as counsels for adversary parties in moot court pro-
ceedings. Students thus have a unique opportunity to compare themselves with colleagues 
from around the globe and present their legal arguments in front of an international panel 
of distinguished legal practitioners acting as presiding judges. Every student of the Master’s 
degree programme has to participate in one of the moot court courses valued 5 + 5 ECTS 
credits, either as a regular student or among the most successful ones as the competitor 
representing the Faculty of Law, Comenius University in Bratislava.
A new experience could be the Czech–Slovak moot court 2018 on asylum and refugee 
law, held by the Charles University in Prague. The topic is focused on the young man who 
is afraid from the mandatory service in army and students have to consider his application 
for international protection.
Teaching Methods of Asylum Law
Asylum law has been registered as a voluntary program some years ago and is a part of 
the agenda within the Department of International Law and International Relations. Even 
the legal basis is not only in international public law documents, but also in the EU legal 
framework; we still have to bear in mind that the CEAS (Common European Asylum 
 System) is based on the principles of the UN Convention on the status of refugees (1951) 
and its Protocol (1967).
The aim of the course is that the students will acquire knowledge about the central 
concepts relating to the study of refugees and asylum, the state of the world’s refugees and 
displaced persons, the role of governmental and intergovernmental institutions in national 
and international refugee work, the relation between international, EU and national asylum 
law from a historical and a contemporary perspective.
The course comprises studies on the state of the world’s refugees, basic concepts, the 
role of governmental and intergovernmental institutions in refugee work, documents and 
treaties relating to aspects of refugees and asylum and the relation between international, 
EU and national asylum law.
Learning outcomes
• Describe and independently analyse the general refugee situation of the world;
• understand basic concepts relating to the study of refugees and asylum;
• understand the role of governmental and intergovernmental institutions in interna-
tional and national refugee work;
• describe and understand the content, function and historical background of basic 
international asylum documents, conventions and treaties;
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• understand and critically reflect, in dialogue with others, on the reach and limits of 
international asylum law and the tension between international, EU and national 
asylum law.
Teaching is principally in the form of lectures, seminars and group work. A major part of 
the work consists of independent studies where the students are expected to be prepared 
for each session during the course. The group is collectively responsible to enable for all 
members to participate and contribute to the group work.
To arrange courses more connected with the practical experiences we invite experts 
from both state administration and international organisations acting in this field. The main 
actor in state administration is the Migration Office within the Ministry of the Interior of 
the Slovak Republic (hereinafter Ministry of the Interior or MoI).
The Migration Office
MoI implements its agenda in the field of migration and asylum mainly through two 
bodies – the Migration Office, and the Bureau of the Border and Aliens Police. The 
Migration Office is the first instance body, which decides on the granting of asylum and 
subsidiary protection of foreigners in accordance with the provisions of the Act on Asylum 
No. 480/2002 Coll., which also reflects the Geneva Convention relating to the status of 
refugees from 1951, the New York Protocol relating to the status of refugees from 1967, as 
well as relevant EU directives or regulations governing the area of international protection 
of foreigners. The Migration Office provides basic care for asylum seekers, cooperates 
with the NGOs regarding the integration of refugees and persons with granted subsidiary 
protection into society.
It provides also assistance regarding accommodation, employment, language prepa-
ration, education, health and social security. The Migration Office is the guarantor of the 
projects financed by the AMIF and to the recipients of assistance (NGOs), provides the meth-
odological guidance and consultation in this area and cooperates with the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with the IOM International  Organization 
for Migration and participates in the formulation of migration policy for the state. Further-
more, the Migration Office regularly publishes statistical information on asylum in Slovakia.
The International Organization for Migration
Established in 1951, IOM is the leading inter-governmental organization in the field 
of migration and works closely with governmental, intergovernmental and non-gov-
ernmental partners. With 166 member states, a further 8 states holding an observer 
status and offices in over 100 countries, IOM is dedicated to promoting humane and 
orderly migration for the benefit of all. It does so by providing services and advice to 
governments and migrants.
IOM works to help ensure the orderly and humane management of migration, to 
promote international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the search for practical 
226 Dynamics and Social Impact of Migration
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
solutions to migration problems and to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in need, 
including refugees and internally displaced people.
The IOM Constitution recognizes the link between migration and economic, social 
and cultural development, as well as the right of freedom of movement. IOM works in the 
four broad areas of migration management:
• Migration and development
• Facilitating migration
• Regulating migration
• Forced migration
IOM activities that cut across these areas include the promotion of international migration 
law, policy debate and guidance, protection of the migrants’ rights, migration health and the 
gender dimension of migration. IOM has been active in Slovakia since 1996. Among its main 
activity areas are: assisted voluntary returns, migrant integration, prevention of human traf-
ficking and assistance to trafficked persons, resettlement of refugees and coordination of the 
European Migration Network. Within these areas IOM implements the following activities:
• Assisted Voluntary Returns and reintegration in the country of origin
• Migrant integration
• Counter-Trafficking in Human Beings
• Resettlement of refugees
• European Migration Network – Coordinator of the National Contact Point for Eu-
ropean Migration Network in Slovakia (since 2009)
• Research and capacity building in the field of labour migration and migration and 
health
• Projects aimed at stabilization of vulnerable communities in Eastern Slovakia (in 
cooperation with partner intergovernmental organizations)
• Humanitarian and social programmes (in cooperation with selected partner inter-
governmental organizations)
All experiences gained in daily work of the Migration Office and IOM are valuable informa-
tion, which make the theory of asylum/migrant/refugee law much closer and understandable 
for students.
Contemporary Legal Questions
The right to asylum, the law of refugees and the rights of migrants are very often obscure, 
incomprehensible to both experts and laics. It seems that the contemporary regulation of 
the right to asylum offers only a partial answer to multiply challenges, which did not exist 
at all or which existed but the international law regulation thereof was not adequate in the 
past 20th century. The national States had strictly based their asylum and refugee policy 
on an individual basis, i.e. on an individual approach by State authorities with regard to 
foreigners seeking protection in the last decades of the 20th century. This applies also with 
respect to the present situation of the EU Member States and we can see that the contem-
porary legal regulation related to the refugee and asylum problems only partially meets 
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multiply requirements that have originated in the international relations since the beginning 
of the 21st century. The current situation does not deprive the academics and experts from 
opening room for considerations de lege ferenda with respect to re-assessing the traditional 
meaning of the right to asylum. The right to asylum remains to be an actual, complicated, 
complex, multidimensional and multidisciplinary matter of concern that have originated 
in the current developments in the international relations since the end of the 20th century.
The issue of the right to asylum does not refer only to the international and national 
law context, in which the details of the different legal regulations are thoroughly analysed 
from the point of view of diverse sources of law, rules and principles, codification, subjects, 
pacific settlement of disputes, judicial decisions, responsibility, sanctions and coercion. It 
appears that the international law is only one of many ways how to implement the multiply 
foreign policy goals by the sovereign States nowadays. In any case, the international law 
might at least contribute to solutions of urgent problems and challenges. The different ex-
tra-legal factors influence the current problems related to the right to asylum, included the 
general or strategic power politics, military interests, diverse security elements, economic 
interests, social or cultural elements and so on. Namely, the economic factor is of high 
importance not only for the persons who look for protection (e.g. economic migrants) but 
also for the governments, which try to solve the problems related to urgent national deficit 
in labour force and to secure a transfer of a cheap labour force from abroad.
The asylum issue is a historical category which is constantly under development and 
has a broad historic background. The asylum law has the same historical development as any 
other branch of law and historical analyses show that the asylum problems related challenges 
do not form a static situation. Regardless of the differences, the law always expresses the 
will of the ruling power which represents the law, international treaty, international customs 
or any other basic source of law. The asylum law is developing in direct proportion with the 
development of the material sources of the asylum law. From a historic point of view, the 
new phenomenon is that the objective right to grant asylum is nowadays related not only 
to the activities of the sovereign state but also to some of the activities of the international 
organisations. Special position in this regard has the EU within its adopted rules on admis-
sion of refugees, migrants or asylum seekers to the EU Member States.
The term asylum is traditionally used in a number of common meanings. This de-
pends on the fact if it is used in the context of the right to asylum as a subjective right 
of an individual or as a right to asylum as an objective right of state or other subject of 
the international law to grant asylum. Actual determination of the common meaning of 
the right to asylum is done on the basis of available legal interpretation arguments com-
prised in the general explanatory rule, in the subsidiary rules and language rules of the 
international treaties and other international documents interpretation. It is questionable 
if and to what extent the provided interpretation is done in a bona fide manner and if 
the general and broader context and the point and use of legal provision of the asylum 
law de lege lata are taken into account. New phenomena in the area of material sources 
of international law require still broader usage of the additional rules of interpretation 
because the usage of general rules of interpretation leaves sometimes the term unclear 
or contradictory. This concerns mainly the usage of additional means of interpretation 
such as preparatory materials, circumstances under which the legal texts were adopted, 
comparison, analogy, argument and coherencies.
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The law-making power on the international and internal level following the rapid 
development of the material sources of law faces sometimes the issue of being a so called 
powerless lawmaker. The existing legislation only partially satisfies the new challenges. 
Naturally, in such circumstances the traditional content and scope of the usually used terms 
might be purposefully altered on different levels. In order to have a more coherent legisla-
tion it is attempted to solve the problem of insufficient and absent legislation by means of 
extensive or strict interpretation of the current valid asylum law terms.
This is done in the form interpretation of the older legislation in a transitional period 
when the old rules are not widely used anymore and the new rules were not yet codified in 
the form of treaties or they did not arise as an international custom by long-term usage by 
the states. On the basis of inappropriate usage of the a fortiori argument the content and 
scope of the used terms is sometimes inadequately generalized with the aim to support 
or weaken the normative quality of the disputed problem. In these situations, the level of 
bona fide interpretation is very important. It has to take into account the basic strategic 
function of the international law as a tool to strengthen peace, security and the support 
to broad international cooperation following the principles of the UN Charter. States are 
trying by means of additional tools of interpretation of the existing asylum law to promptly 
answer to current and with adequate lead to upcoming future requirements of the praxis. 
This is how they contribute to the effort of progressive development of international and 
European law in the area of asylum. In this regard the states act individually or in groups 
or together, e.g. in the context of relevant international bodies and organisations of which 
they are members.
Legal analysis on the de lege lata level confirms that many questions of asylum law are 
regulated by fundamental or supplementary sources of international, European or domestic 
law. At the same time however, new challenges arise which are related to rapid development 
in the area of material sources of international, European and domestic law which are not 
adequately regulated by norms of international law.
Another aspect which has to be considered in relation to the creation of a new collective 
right to asylum is if at the same time a collective obligation of states to grant the applicants 
collective asylum arises. We are of the opinion that a certain hint of transition from the 
application of individual right to asylum of a person to application of right to asylum as 
a collective right could have been observed in relation to reviewing the legal aspects of 
refugee and migration crisis in Europe. Collectively understood collective obligation of 
European Union states to admit a given number of refugees on the basis of official quotas 
allocated to the Member State from the EU higher authority start to arise. The change in 
attitude towards refugees on the EU level results from the realisation of the urgent needs in 
the globalised world. Today strictly persisting on the principle of supreme equality of single 
states and prohibition of non-interference does not have such a firm place in international 
relations as it was in the past century. In the 20th century the strict respect for the right to 
a state’s sovereignty and prohibition of interference in internal matters of state created the 
basis for building the international legal system in the world which was ideologically or 
otherwise divided by power. Strict respect to these norms creates today an obstacle for the 
world to face the global challenges of the 21st century in the long term. The survival of hu-
man civilization is at stake. Global problems of the world not being solved in the 20th century 
are today fully showing in the area of environment, utilisation of the world’s resources, 
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decrease in the health quality of the world’s population, lack of food and in general in the 
threat to world peace and security and in other areas. In addition, new global problems 
start to appear and these have to be solved by using new approaches. Questions related to 
asylum law and mass transfer of population on international level belong to this category.
In this regard it has to be however stressed, as mentioned already above, that during 
the recent migration crisis the legal categories of migrant and refugee where often confused. 
These legal terms are related to legal consequences. Refugees represent a humanitarian issue 
with which mankind has experiences, it can be rather precisely defined and an international 
norm, as well as international institution to help refugees exist. Despite this, mankind is 
not able to improve their destiny to a civilised level. “The main issue is not that the current 
regime of human rights is not able to secure a dignified life to these refugees… Important 
is that the current human rights regime is not able to prevent situations from which the 
refugees arise…” Their legal status is however defined by the international law in the 
 Geneva Convention on Legal Status of Refugees from 1951 by means of set conditions. By 
fulfilling them, the person becomes a de facto refugee and by legalizing the status in the 
state where the person applied for international protection, he/she becomes a refugee de 
iure. Highlighting the topic of this article, this is always determined on a case by case basis.
Contrary to refugees, the bona fide migrants are moving for economic reasons and are 
looking for better living conditions in the European area. Since the Geneva  Convention on 
the Legal Status of Refugees from 1951 is missing any conditions in this regard, they can-
not be considered persons in need of international protection. In the EU or in the countries 
applying the Schengen acquis, the legislation governing the entry of third country  nationals 
through external border and legal conditions of residence of particular state where the 
 migrants reside are applied in this case.
The move of the asylum issue from the area of first generation human rights into the 
third-generation human rights field would be a serious step on the path to look for more 
optimal legal regulation related to the theory, creation, observation and application of asylum 
law in the 21st century. In this regard the status of asylum seekers would be from a content 
point of view comparable with other collective rights in international law while the terms 
of their consideration might be different from the regulation quality perspective.
Relatively extensive but also significant is the case law practice of the European Court 
of Human Rights even though the asylum law is not directly regulated by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. As it was already mentioned, some parts of the asylum law 
are related to the observance of Articles 1, 3, 5, 8 and other Articles of the Convention.
Recently, the so called Dublin cases are influencing the situation of asylum applicants 
in the EU member states. We provide an example that illustrates how ECHR judgements 
inconspicuously intervene in the situation of such a person.
The applicant is an Afghan national who entered the EU via Greece before arriving 
in Belgium, where he applied for asylum. In accordance with the Dublin II Regulation, 
the Belgian Aliens Office asked the Greek authorities to take responsibility for the asylum 
application. The applicant complained in particular about the conditions of his detention 
and his living conditions in Greece, and alleged that he had no effective remedy in the 
Greek law in respect of these complaints. He further complained that Belgium had exposed 
him to the risks arising from the deficiencies in the asylum procedure in Greece and to the 
poor detention and living conditions to which asylum seekers were subjected there. He 
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further maintained that there was no effective remedy under Belgian law in respect of those 
 complaints. Regarding in particular the applicant’s transfer from Belgium to Greece, the 
Court held, considering that reports produced by international organisations and bodies all 
gave similar accounts of the practical difficulties raised by the application of the Dublin 
system in Greece, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had warned 
the Belgian Government about the situation there, that the Belgian authorities must have 
been aware of the deficiencies in the asylum procedure in Greece when the expulsion order 
against him had been issued. Belgium had initially ordered the expulsion solely on the basis 
of a tacit agreement by the Greek authorities, and had proceeded to enforce the measure 
without the Greek authorities having given any individual guarantee whatsoever, when 
they could easily have refused the transfer. The Belgian authorities should not simply have 
assumed that the applicant would be treated in conformity with the Convention standards; 
they should have verified how the Greek authorities applied their asylum legislation in prac-
tice; but they had not done so. There had therefore been a violation by Belgium of Article 3 
(prohibition degrading treatment) of the Convention. As far as Belgium is considered, the 
Court further found a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) taken together 
with Article 3 of the Convention because of the lack of an effective remedy against the 
applicant’s expulsion order. In respect of Greece, the Court found a violation of Article 13 
taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention because of the deficiencies in the 
Greek authorities’ examination of the applicant’s asylum application and the risk he faced 
of being removed directly or indirectly back to his country of origin without any serious 
examination of the merits of his application and without having had access to an effective 
remedy. As far as Greece is concerned, the Court further held that there had been a violation 
of Article 3 (prohibition of degrading treatment) of the Convention both because of the ap-
plicant’s detention conditions and because of his living conditions in Greece. Lastly, under 
Article 46 (binding force and execution of judgments) of the Convention, the Court held that 
it was incumbent on Greece, without delay, to proceed with an examination of the merits 
of the applicant’s asylum request that met the requirements of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and, pending the outcome of that examination, to refrain from deporting the 
applicant. In a Grand Chamber judgment of 21 December 2011, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) adopted a similar position to that of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), referring explicitly to the judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (see, 
in particular, paragraphs 88 to 91 of the CJEU judgment)1.
In this case, the ECtHR also held that the applicant lacked the practical means to pay 
a lawyer in Greece, where he had been returned; he had not received information concerning 
access to organisations offering legal advice and guidance. Compounded by the shortage 
of legal aid lawyers, this had rendered the Greek legal aid system as a whole ineffective in 
practice. The ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of Article 13 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) taken in conjunction with Article 3.
Under the EU law, Article 46 of the Asylum Procedures Directive provides the right 
to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal. This follows the wording of Article 47 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The directive requires EU Member States to allow 
applicants to remain in their territory until the time limit to lodge an appeal has expired as 
1 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011.
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well as pending the outcome of an appeal. According to Article 46 (6) there is no automatic 
right to stay for certain types of unfounded and inadmissible applications, in which case the 
appeal body must be given the power to rule whether the applicant may remain in the ter-
ritory during the time required to review the appeal. A similar exception exists for transfer 
decisions taken under the Dublin Regulation (Regulation [EU] No. 604/2013, Article 27 
[2]). Under the ECHR, the Court has held that when an individual appeals against a refusal 
of his or her asylum claim, the appeal must have an automatic suspensive effect when the 
implementation of a return measure against him or her might have potentially irreversible 
effects contrary to Article 3.
For example, in the Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France case,2 the ECtHR 
considered that the applicant’s allegations as to the risk of ill-treatment in Eritrea had been 
sufficiently credible to make his complaint under Article 3 of the ECHR an arguable one. 
The applicant could therefore rely on Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3. The 
latter provision required that foreign nationals have access to a remedy with suspensive 
effect, against a decision to remove him or her to a country where there was real reason to 
believe that he or she ran the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3. In 
the case of asylum seekers who claimed to run such a risk and who had already been granted 
leave to enter French territory, French law provided for a procedure that met some of these 
requirements. The procedure did not apply, however, to persons claiming such a risk who 
turned up at the border upon arrival at an airport. In order to lodge an asylum application, 
foreign nationals had to be on French territory. If they turned up at the border, they could 
not make such an application unless they were first given leave to enter the country. If 
they did not have the necessary papers to that effect, they had to apply for leave to enter on 
grounds of asylum. They were then held in a waiting area while the authorities examined 
whether their intended asylum application was manifestly ill-founded. If the authorities 
deemed the application to be manifestly ill-founded, they refused the person concerned 
leave to enter the country. He or she was then automatically liable to be removed without 
having had the opportunity to apply for asylum. While the individual in question could 
apply to the administrative courts to have the ministerial decision refusing leave to enter set 
aside, such an application had no suspensive effect and was not subject to any time limits. 
Admittedly, he or she could apply to the urgent applications judge, as the applicant had 
done without success. This remedy, however, did not have an automatic suspensive effect 
either, meaning the person could be removed before the judge had given a decision. Given 
the importance of Article 3 of the ECHR and the irreversible nature of the harm caused by 
torture or ill-treatment, it is a requirement under Article 13 that, where a state party has 
decided to remove a foreign national to a country where there was real reason to believe 
that he or she ran a risk of torture or ill-treatment, the person concerned must have access 
to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect. Such an effect in practice was not sufficient. 
As the applicant had not had access to such a remedy while in the waiting area, Article 13 
of the ECHR, read in conjunction with Article 3, had been breached.
Access to legal assistance is a cornerstone of access to justice. Without access to 
justice, the rights of individuals cannot be effectively protected. Legal support is particu-
larly important in asylum and return proceedings where language barriers may make it 
2 ECtHR, Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, No. 25389/05, 26 April 2007.
232 Dynamics and Social Impact of Migration
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
difficult for the persons concerned to understand the often complex or rapidly implemented 
 procedures. Under the ECHR, the right of access to a court is derived from the right to 
a fair trial – a right which holds a prominent position in any democracy. The right of access 
to a court, which is one aspect of Article 6 of the ECHR, has been held as inapplicable to 
asylum and immigration proceedings because the proceedings do not concern the determi-
nation of a civil right or obligation, or a criminal charge. It does not follow, however, that 
the principles of access to court the Court has developed under Article 6 of the ECHR are 
irrelevant to Article 13. In terms of procedural guarantees, the requirements of Article 13 
are less stringent than those of Article 6, but the very essence of a remedy for the purposes 
of Article 13 is that it should involve an accessible procedure.
In the aforementioned case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR found that 
Greece had also violated Article 13 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 3 because of 
the deficiencies of its authorities in examining the applicant’s asylum request, and the risk 
he faced of being directly or indirectly returned to his country of origin without any serious 
examination of the merits of his asylum application and without having access to an effective 
remedy. Additionally, in the Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy case,3 an Italian ship at sea 
had intercepted potential asylum seekers. The Italian authorities had led them to believe 
that they were being taken to Italy and had not informed them of the procedures to take in 
order to avoid being returned to Libya. The applicants had thus been unable to lodge their 
complaints under Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 with a competent 
authority, and to obtain a thorough and rigorous assessment of their requests before the 
removal measure was enforced. The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Ar-
ticle 13 of the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 3 and of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.
In a quite recent Grand Chamber case, the ECtHR considered whether a claim under 
Article 13 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 8 also required the domestic remedy to 
have an automatic suspensive effect.
In the De Souza Ribeiro v. France case,4 the applicant, a Brazilian national, had 
resided in French Guiana (a French overseas territory) with his family since the age of 
seven. Following his administrative detention for failing to show a valid residence permit, 
the authorities ordered his removal. He was deported the next day, approximately 50 min-
utes after having lodged his appeal against the removal order. The Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR considered that the haste with which the removal order was executed had the effect 
of rendering the available remedies ineffective in practice and therefore inaccessible. The 
applicant had not had access in practice to effective remedies in respect of his complaint 
under Article 8 of the Convention when he was about to be deported. The Court found 
a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8.
Under the EU law, Article 31 (8) of the Asylum Procedures Directive lists 10 situations 
in which accelerated procedures might be applied, such as when an application is considered 
unfounded because the applicant is from a safe country of origin or when applicants refuse 
to give their fingerprints. While the basic principles and guarantees set forth in the direc-
tive remain applicable, an appeal may not have an automatic suspensive effect such that the 
right to stay during the appeal procedure must specifically be requested and/or granted on 
3 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], No. 27765/09, 23 February 2012, paras. 197–207.
4 ECtHR, De Souza Ribeiro v. France, No. 22689/07, 13 December 2012.
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a case by case basis (see also Section 4.1.3). In practice, accelerated procedures may also 
have shorter deadlines in which to appeal a negative decision. Under the ECHR, the Court 
has held that there was a need for independent and rigorous scrutiny of every asylum claim. 
Where this was not the case, the Court has found breaches of Article 13 of the ECHR taken 
in conjunction with Article 3.
For example, in the I. M. v. France case,5 the applicant, who claimed to be at risk of 
ill-treatment if deported to Sudan, attempted to apply for asylum in France. The authorities 
had taken the view that his asylum application had been based on deliberate fraud or con-
stituted abuse of the asylum procedure because it had been submitted after the issuance of 
his removal order. The first and only examination of his asylum application was therefore 
automatically processed under an accelerated procedure, which lacked sufficient safeguards. 
For instance, the time limit for lodging the application had been reduced from 21 to five 
days. This very short application period imposed particular constraints as the applicant had 
been expected to submit a comprehensive application in French, with supporting documents, 
meeting the same application requirements as those submitted under the normal procedure 
by persons not in detention. While the applicant could have applied to the administrative 
court to challenge his deportation order, he only had 48 hours to do so as opposed to the 
two months under the ordinary procedure. The applicant’s asylum application was thus 
rejected without the domestic system, as a whole, offering him a remedy that was effec-
tive in practice. Therefore, he had not been able to assert his complaint under Article 3 of 
the ECHR. The Court found that there had been a violation of Article 13 combined with 
 Article 3 of the ECHR.
Since we are limited by the scope of this article, we are not able to analyse other cases 
in more depth. In principle however, we can say that the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights does not exceed the traditional understanding of human rights as individual 
rights.
Conclusion
Despite the different situations, the new concept of asylum law is emerging. We can observe 
this phenomenon on the regional level of the European Union law in relation to current 
migration and refugee crisis as well as in relation to the decision of the EU to admit large 
number of refugees who are in need of urgent assistance. The number of partial obstacles 
for arrival and residence of persons in need of assistance in the European Union would be 
eliminated if the application of all relevant rights of refugees would happen in the same 
manner. The process for the preparation of a new legislation on asylum reflecting the needs 
of the 21st century, not by mistake the 20th century, will be ongoing.
The new development in the area of asylum law creation has its deep justification in 
material sources of the law. The political circles in Brussels and the majority of the EU Mem-
bers States are opening themselves for and are inviting the refugees fleeing from conflict 
zones abroad to the old continent. This can be justified by the strategical economic needs of 
the European Union in future. On the other hand, it is questionable if EU citizens are ready 
5 ECtHR, I. M. v. France, No. 9152/09, 2 February 2012, paras. 136–160.
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enough to accept this scenario which is inevitably linked with the need for  coexistence of 
different cultures and traditions in a space were so far, the domestic culture and traditions 
dominated. The rise of aggressive racial attitudes towards migrants, even towards the rep-
resentatives of minorities who for a long time lived in the former colonial metropoles or 
came to these countries many years ago for work based on an invitation, as well as the rise 
of extreme rightist political parties and movements in the European countries show that the 
question of coexistence will be very important in the near future.
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Slovakia, a Country Not Directly Touched by the Migration 
Crisis: What Has Changed since the Summer of 2015
Blanka Timurhan
Introduction
Since the summer of 2015 there is an ongoing discussion in the EU about the migration 
crisis1 or refugee crisis;2 the OECD is using the term humanitarian crisis.3
Some recent voices label the 2015 crisis as the EU political crisis – considering the 
impact which the relatively low number of people moving towards the EU in the worldwide 
context (see figure 14), albeit the highest in numbers of asylum seekers in the EU, had on 
policy but also on national political setting as well as the public mood.
Regardless the terms, which are used to describe the mass arrival of the migrants to the 
EU in the summer of 2015, it could be concluded that this migration wave triggered a lot of 
changes and resulted in the division of the public opinion, including Slovakia – a country, 
which did not face a direct migration influx.
1 E.g. in COM (2015) 240 final, Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, 
the European economic and social committee and the Committee of the regions – European agenda on migra-
tion. Available: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agen-
da-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf 
(Accessed: 15.12.2017)
2 UNHCR: Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European 
Countries. Available: www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/56bb5a876/press-coverage-refugee-migrant-cri-
sis-eu-content-analysis-five-european.html?query=refugees%20crises (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
3 OECD (2015): Is this humanitarian migration crisis different? Migration Policy Debates OECD, N° 7. Available: 
www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
4 Source: UNHCR (2015): Figures at a glance. Available: www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html (Accessed: 
15.12.2017)
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Figure 1.
Where the world’s displaced people are being hosted
Source: UNHCR
The fact that migration became a hot topic in Slovakia virtually overnight must be seen in 
the context of at least two circumstances:
1. The power of media and its speed of spreading information and bringing pictures 
of the massive and uncontrolled waves of people heading to Europe.
2. The slowly starting campaign ahead the parliamentary election which took place 
in March 2016.
Why Was the Year 2015 so Important? What Was Different?
The surge in the number of refugees and migrants arriving to Europe in 2015 brought the 
weaknesses of the Common European asylum system but also migration in general to the 
forefront and caused a collapse. Paradoxically, it seems to be more and more obvious that 
some negative outcomes could have been limited if the early warning signals had been 
assessed with more caution.
In the OECD Migration Outlook 2015 it is mentioned that there has been an ongoing 
increase of permanent entries to the OECD countries already since 2014; this includes e.g. 
workers, students, family members; but also migrants from humanitarian reasons.5
FRONTEX already in its Annual Risk analysis report 20146 warned EU that the deteri-
orating situation of Syrian migrants in Turkey may very likely result in a humanitarian crisis.
5 OECD (2015): International Migration Outlook 2015. OECD Publishing, Paris. Available: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2015-en; http://ifuturo.org/documentacion/InternationalMigrationOutlook.pdf 
(Accessed: 15.12.2017)
6 FRONTEX (2014): Annual Risk Analysis 2014. FRONTEX, Warsaw. Available: frontex.europa.eu/assets/
Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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“Among those migrants, Syrians are the most vulnerable and the likelihood of human-
itarian crisis at the EU border will remain significant until the situation in Syria improves. 
The ability to provide consistent and timely measures and actions will be crucial for coping 
with security and humanitarian risks.”7
A number of other stakeholders reported similar projections. IOM was highly con-
cerned by the increased arrivals by sea and deaths in the Mediterranean; in 2015 it was 
estimated that among more than 971 thousand arrivals there were more than 3.6 thousand 
deaths.8 UNHCR drew attention to the fact that the number of people seeking refugee 
status continued to climb in the first half of 2014, driven by the wars in Syria and Iraq, as 
well as conflict and instability in Afghanistan, Eritrea and elsewhere. “65.3 million people 
were displaced as of the end of 2015, compared to 59.5 million just 12 months earlier. This 
is the first time that the threshold of 60 million has been crossed.”9
Yet, it seems to be the pictures of a drowned three-year-old Syrian boy, Alan Kurdi 
or tens of thousands of refugees moving through Hungary and Austria to Germany, which 
finally nailed down the EU to action. Despite the available evidence, the EU was hit with 
the migrating influx rather unprepared and actually surprised. Though the reaction could 
be considered swift, the implementation of the actions, e.g. establishment of hotspots was 
lengthy.
The EU response since the tragic events in the Mediterranean in April 2015 has en-
compassed a chain of meetings, production of several Communications and legal proposals; 
among them the most important was Commission communication on a European agenda for 
migration,10 followed by the implantation packages encompassing relocation, establishment 
of hotspots, reinforcement of search and rescue operations (SAR) etc.; and later, in 2016 
followed by legislative proposals – so called asylum packages.
Situation in the Slovak Republic
The Asylum system in a nutshell
The Slovak Republic provides international protection in accordance with its international 
obligations, the European Union law and national legislation. Slovakia acceded without 
reservations to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees on 24 February 1992 
and its Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees on 26 November 1991. The first Act on 
Refugees11 in the modern history of the independent Slovak Republic entered into force 
7 Ibid. 64.
8 IOM (2015): Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One Million in 2015: IOM. IOM Press 
release, Switzerland. Available: www.iom.int/news/irregular-migrant-refugee-arrivals-europe-top-one-mil-
lion-2015-iom (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
9 UNHCR (2016): UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015. UNHCR, Switzerland. Available: 
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-global-trends-forced-displacement-2015 (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
10 EC (2015): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
economic and social committee and the Committee of the regions: A European agenda on migration.
 Available: https://ec.europa.eu/antitrafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/communication_on_the_europe-
an_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
11 Act No. 283/1995 Coll. of 14 November 1995 (Refugee Act).
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on 1 January 1996. Regarding terminology, the Refugee Act was using the term refugee 
instead of asylum.
As a part of the negotiations for accession of the Slovak Republic to the European 
Union, the Slovak Republic had to adopt a new, more comprehensive Act on Asylum12 to 
fulfil the expectations of the European Union. It entered into force on 1 January 2003. With 
a view to harmonise the terminology used in the asylum legislation of the European Union, 
the term refugee was replaced by the term asylum.
The Asylum Act is valid although since its entry into force it has been amended sev-
eral times, mostly due to the transposition of the European Union acquis. According to the 
Asylum Act, the Slovak Republic grants different protection statuses, namely the refugee 
status, subsidiary protection and also, the so-called temporary shelter. Furthermore, the 
Slovak legislation provides for the possibility to grant asylum on humanitarian grounds. Re-
quirements for granting asylum on humanitarian grounds are not defined by law. However, 
according to an internal regulation, it may be granted to rejected applicants for international 
protection, especially to elderly, traumatized or seriously ill, whose return to the country 
of origin might lead to a considerable physical or psychological suffering, or even death. 
Asylum on humanitarian grounds is granted for an indefinite period of time.
Statistics
When the migration crisis was reaching its maximum in the EU, the number of asylum 
seekers in Slovakia was historically at the lowest level. Since 1993, when the Migration 
Office was established, different phases can be identified in the development of the number 
of asylum seekers in the Slovak Republic. Between 1993 and 1998, the number of asylum 
seekers was minor. Between 1999 and 2000, the numbers started to grow visibly. In 2004 
the Slovak Republic experienced its own migration crisis with 11,395 asylum applications 
recorded. Surprisingly this sharp increase remained rather unnoticed and did not stir up 
media or political attention. Since 2005 up to the present day, the number of asylum seekers 
in Slovakia is continually decreasing. (See figure 2.)
12 Act No. 480/2002 Coll. of 20 June 2002 (Asylum Act).
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Figure 2.
Asylum applications in Slovakia since the establishment of the Migration Office
Source: Migration Office of the Ministry of the Interior, statistical data available on www.minv.
sk/?statistiky-20 (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
Several reasons could be affiliated to the decrease; among them the application of so called 
Dublin Regulation in Slovakia after the accession to the EU was followed by an increased 
avoidance to lodge asylum claims – seen by the refugees as a disadvantage particularly when 
Slovakia was not their destination country. However, on the other hand, the apprehended 
illegal migrants were continuing to apply for asylum in the country, although the original 
intention of these people was not to stay in the territory of the Slovak Republic. The main 
reason for such actions was to avoid return or extradition, and to gain time, which enabled 
them to get prepared and realise the illicit crossing of the Slovak border in the direction of 
the destination country. Furthermore, the improved effectiveness of the state border protec-
tion after joining the Schengen Area became a highly overcoming obstacle to enter the EU. 
Another given reason is the absence of large foreign communities in the Slovak Republic, 
also due to its non-colonial history and a less-developed economic environment, compared 
to the economically more advanced countries of the European Union. “I don’t like to hear 
people saying that refugees leave Slovakia because they are not granted asylum. Simply, 
many aren’t interested in staying in this country. Slovakia doesn’t have a living standard 
that would be attractive for economic migrants.” (Director of the Migration Office)
The number of asylum applications that have not been assessed on their merit was 
relatively high, around 40% in 2015; 148 ceased asylum procedures out of 330 applications; 
mostly due to run off. However, those numbers are slowly decreasing in the last two years. 
(See figure 3.)
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Figure 3.
Ceased asylum procedures in Slovakia (2011–2017)
Source: Migration Office of the Ministry of the Interior. Available: www.minv.sk/?statistiky-20 
(Accessed: 15.12.2017)
As regards irregular migration from the border perspective, the number of illegal migrants 
grew enormously in 2001, when it represented 15,548 people, which was 9,487 more than in 
2000. A high number of illegal migrants was also recorded in 2002–2003. This enormous 
increase of foreigners was also reflected in the increased number of asylum seekers as de-
scribed above. Though the number of illegal border crossing has again slightly increased 
in 2015, in comparison to the situation in other Member States, including the neighbouring 
Hungary, one could not speak about a crisis in Slovakia.
We can speak about a lot of different figures, still migration is not about numbers. It 
is about people. Just as, for instance, a toolkit for teaching young people about migration 
and asylum in the European Union, developed in 2009 by UNHCR and IOM with funding 
provided by the European Commission, says – Not just the numbers.13
What Has Changed in the Slovak Republic?
Political background in 2015
The August 2015 tragedy in Austrian Parndorf, only about 35 km far from the Slovak bor-
der, where 71 migrants were found suffocated in a lorry with a Slovak registration plate,14 
generated a public discussion and also political actions.
Upon the following civil organisation action called Plea for Humanity, the Government 
has adopted two parliamentary decrees:
13 IOM, UNHCR (2009): Not Just Numbers. IOM/UNHCR, Belgium. Available: www.unhcr.org/574815ca4 
(Accessed: 15.12.2017)
14 Topky.sk (2015): Masová vražda utečencov pri hraniciach: V dodávke smrti vraj zahynulo 10 detí! Available: 
www.topky.sk/cl/11/1494957/Masova-vrazda-utecencov-pri-hraniciach–V-dodavke-smrti-vraj-zahynu-
lo-10-deti- (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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• On further steps to tackle the migration crisis15 encompassing several solutions for 
migration crisis, including focus on prevention of international conflicts, emphasis 
on elimination of migration roots, creation of the so called secure zones in the count-
ries of origin or transit, border protection, returns, etc.;
• on supporting non-governmental organizations actions in humanitarian and integ-
ration related activities for refugees16 which called for e.g. the creation of a compre-
hensive integration package for new arrivals and budgetary appropriations to fund 
them and release funds for activities of NGOs aimed to support refugees.
However, with the rising public actions, both pro-migrants and anti-migrants, the Slovak 
Prime Minister voted against the mandatory quotas,17 in September 2015 fully supported 
by the unanimously adopted parliamentary resolution. Moreover the growing fear of ter-
rorism after the tragedies in November 2015 in Paris, and later in January 2016 in Istanbul, 
with the approaching March parliamentary elections marked by slogans such as Protecting 
Slovakia18 once again massively influenced the public opinion.
In response to possible threats, already at the end of November 2015, the Slovak Par-
liament amended the constitution and adopted a package of anti-terrorist laws assigning the 
police, the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary with more powers.19
Finally, by the end of the year 2015, the Slovak Republic appealed against the deci-
sion of the European Commission about the mandatory quotas to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union. Yet, at the same time 149 Assyrian Christians from Iraq have been 
resettled to Slovakia in December; being a voluntary contribution of Slovakia to resolving 
the migration crisis.20
15 The Government of the Slovak Republic: Uznesenie vlády Slovenskej republiky č. č. 498 z 2. septembra 2015 
k Návrhu ďalšieho postupu Slovenskej republiky na riešenie migračnej krízy. Available: www.rokovania.sk/
File.aspx/ViewDocumentHtml/Uznesenie-15098?prefixFile=u_(Accessed: 15.12.2017)
16 The Government of the Slovak Republic: Uznesenie vlády Slovenskej republiky č. 568 z 21. októbra 2015 k 
Informácii o podpore aktivít mimovládnych organizácií pri humanitárnej a integračnej podpore utečencom 
predložených iniciátormi petície – Výzva k ľudskosti. Available: www.rokovania.sk/File.aspx/ViewDocu-
mentHtml/Uznesenie-15172?prefixFile=u_ (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
17 EUR-Lex: Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal 
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1513338498852&uri=CELEX:32015D1601 (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
18 Portal on Elections in the Slovak Republic: Smer mení kampaň, ide chrániť Slovensko. Available:
 www.vysledkyvolieb.sk/politicke-clanky/403-smer-meni-kampan-ide-chranit-slovensko (Accessed: 
15.12.2017)
19 National Council of the Slovak Republic (2015): Calendar day. Available: www.nrsr.sk/web/Controls/Calen-
darDay.aspx?date=27.+11.+2015&app=nrcpt&lang (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
20 The Slovak Spectator (2015): Christian refugees from Iraq arrive in Slovakia. Available:
 https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20066657/group-of-assyrian-christians-from-iraq-arrives-in-slovakia.html (Ac-
cessed: 15.12.2017)
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2016 – A new Slovak government and the first Slovak presidency of the Council 
of the European Union
After the election in March 2016, due to the slowly decreasing number of migrants to the EU 
and also due to the closure of the Western Balkan route from Turkey, the topic of migration 
became less hot. Still, the new Slovak Government issued a Manifesto, which in part related 
to the migration states that it is of “key importance to support measures that will contrib-
ute to the better management of the external borders of the EU and functioning Schengen 
Area as a positive achievement of the European integration.”21 Furthermore “constructive 
solutions for the unprecedented migration crisis should be in line with the specificities and 
capacities of individual member countries.”22 In the context of security, the Government of 
the SR declared that special attention will be paid especially to the issues of “illegal and 
uncontrollable migration.”23
Similarly, a focus on border protection and integrity of the Schengen Area remained 
a part of the Slovak priorities during the historically first Presidency of the Slovak Republic 
in the Council of the EU in the second half of 2016. “The Programme of the Slovak Pres-
idency of the Council of the European Union is based on four priorities: an economically 
strong Europe, a modern single market, a sustainable migration and asylum policies and 
a globally engaged Europe. Sustainable migration and asylum policy, based on the external 
EU border protection, integrity of the Schengen Area, cooperation with third countries and 
solidarity. [...] and the effective cooperation in returns and readmissions.”24
In line with the honest broker strategy, Slovakia, already before the SK PRES, in May 
2016 submitted the first relocation pledge to relocate 10 persons from Greece, following 
a voluntary schema.25
The first group of women with children arrived to Slovakia in August 2015 and was 
granted asylum on humanitarian grounds. This arrival remained without big public notice, 
though some comments appeared in the social media. It has to be underlined that the Slovak 
Republic opted to focus on vulnerable groups, mainly single women with children.
Following the same honest broker strategy Slovakia introduced at the Bratislava infor-
mal summit of Heads of 27 EU Member States in September 2016 the so called Bratislava 
Declaration and Roadmap, which set out the objectives for the coming months. One of the 
outcomes was a concept of effective (flexible) solidarity presented at the end of the Slovak 
presidency. The concept is based on the principle that in case of an increased number of 
21 The Government of the Slovak Republic (2016): Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic 2016–
2020. Available: www.vlada.gov.sk/data/files/6489.pdf (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
22 Ibid. 5.
23 Ibid. 8.
24 SK EU (2016): Programme of the Slovak presidency of the Council of the European Union 1 July – 31 De-
cember 2016. 9. Available: www.eu2016.sk/data/documents/presidency-programme-eng-final5.pdf (Accessed: 
15.12.2017)
25 EUR-lex: Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32015D1523 (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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asylum applications of the arriving migrants, all EU Member States should share the burden 
of the migration crisis according to the possibilities and capacities of individual member 
states. This can be done e.g. through deploying of experts to support the asylum procedure 
or protection of borders; provision of material and technical assistance; or provision of 
available accommodation capacities (see beneath project ETC).
Public opinion
A research conducted by the University of Sheffield’s Visual Social Media Lab, where 
researchers have been monitoring social media mentions of the terms refugee and migrant 
after the pictures of Alan Kurdi were spread in the media, came with an interesting result. 
Four times as many tweets referring to the issue of the refugee crisis were found in the 
social media since the tragic September 2015.26
Comparably to other EU countries reactions,27 also in Slovakia, both pro-migrants and 
anti-immigration marches took place shortly after the escalation of the migration crisis.
To name one: “Saturday, 20 June 2015 – one day after the World Refugee Day – 
Bratislava experienced a black – or rather brown – Saturday. Five thousand right-wing 
extremists, radical nationalists and neo-Nazis marched through the city’s streets in an 
authorised demonstration entitled “Stop the Islamisation of Europe! Together against the 
dictate of Brussels, for a Europe for Europeans!”28 Though those neo-Nazis’ actions were 
later criticized by the majority of political parties, including the President, the atmosphere 
marked by fear and xenophobia was even more deep-rooted.
According to a representative public opinion poll conducted by Polis Slovakia in June 
2015, among the 1,469 respondents older than 18 years to the question “Are you for that 
Slovakia admits refugees from the Middle East and North Africa based on the quotas pro-
posed by the European Union?” 70.1% of the Slovak respondents answered No. (see table 1) 
To the question “Do you think these refugees are a threat to the security of Slovakia and its 
residents?” 63.4% of the respondents answered Yes. (Table 2.)
26 Withnal, Adam (2016): Alan Kurdi anniversary: 8 charts that show how the refugee crisis has changed. The 
Independent. Available: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/alan-kurdi-death-anniversary-refugee-
crisis-8-charts-how-world-has-changed-a7220741.html (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
27 Graham, Luke (2015): How Europeans have reacted to migrant crisis. CNBC. Available: www.cnbc.
com/2015/09/08/how-europeans-have-reacted-to-migrant-crisis.html (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
28 Mesežnikov, Grigorij (2015): Refugees are not welcome: A brown Saturday in Bratislava. Available: www.
ivo.sk/buxus/docs/publicistika/subor/Mesez_Boell_7_7_15.pdf (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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Table 2.
Public opinion poll 2015a
Are you for that Slovakia admits refugees from the Middle East and North Africa 
based on quotas proposed by the European Union?
 All the responders
Yes 4.2
Rather yes than no 19.3
Total of the positive replies 23.5
Rather no than yes 36.3
No 33.8
Total of the negative replies 70.1
I do not know 6.4
Source: SITA/ČTK (2015): Prieskum: Slováci odmietajú prijať utečencov, vidia v nich hrozbu. Pravda. 
Source: https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/358731-slovensko-by-nemalo-prijat-utecencov-mysli-si-70-
percent-respondentov/. (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
Table 2.
Public opinion poll 2015b
Do you think these refugees are a threat to the security of Slovakia and its residents?
 All the responders
Yes 20.6
Rather yes than no 42.8
Total of the positive replies 63.4
Rather no than yes 20.9
No 3.5
Total of the negative replies 24.4
I do not know 12.2
Source: SITA–ČTK 2015
In this context it is interesting to look at the previous public opinion polls. In May 2001 the 
survey carried out in Slovakia by the Focus agency, in which 1,020 representative sample 
respondents took part, 67% of respondents thought that Slovakia should help refugees.29 
Likewise, in 1998 polls show, that 78% of Slovaks were supporting help for refugees.30
Several actions were made in order to prevent hate speech and to provide objective 
and accurate information on migration and asylum since 2015. For instance, the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs and Family on its website created in January 2016, which serves 
as a comprehensive and up-to-date information source on the integration of foreigners in 
the SR, provides information about Slovak Integration Policy.
Moreover, in the Integration of Foreigners in Slovakia section, foreign nationals but 
also the public can find basic information on entry to and residence in the territory of the 
Slovak Republic, on possibilities related to employment, housing and education including 
29 The Slovak Spectator (2001a): Refugee camp defies local opposition. Available: https://spectator.sme. 
sk/c/20009238/refugee-camp-defies-local-opposition.html (Accessed: 15.12.2017) 
30 The Slovak Spectator (2001b): Refugee camps under strain. Available: https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20007651/ 
refugee-camps-under-strain.html (Accessed: 15.12.2017) 
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the way on how to proceed in order to recognize their foreign diplomas.31 More detailed 
information is also available on the website of the Ministry of the Interior.
Additionally, in the framework of the concept for combating extremism for the years 
2015–2019 a focus was put on the supporting activities aimed at effective and targeted 
prevention of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance through 
educational programs at schools.
Different forms of solidarity
In the field of asylum
The Slovak approach towards refugees used to be very open. For instance, in the 90s the 
Slovak Government announced its plans to support 500 refugees; furthermore, the Minister 
of the Interior at that time said that if the need arose, “the number of refugees [in Slovakia] 
could exceed 1,000”.32 This was at the time of war in ex-Yugoslavia. The Migration Office 
had consequently experienced hosting around 2,000 Bosnian refugees from October 1992 
to August 1997. Even earlier, Slovakia resettled 1,230 citizens of Ukraine of Slovak origin 
affected by the Chernobyl nuclear accident.
Since 2009 Slovakia has been providing humanitarian transfers of refugees and other 
persons of concern to UNHCR through the territory of the Slovak Republic to the country of 
their final resettlement via Emergency Transit Centre (ETC) in Humenné, which is situated 
near the Eastern border.
The capacity of ETC is 250 beds. This project is carried out in cooperation with the 
UNHCR and IOM and is based on The Agreement between the Government of the Slovak 
Republic, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the In-
ternational Organization for Migration concerning Humanitarian Transfer of Refugees in 
Need of International Protection through the Slovak Republic.
The Migration Office provides the transiting refugees with accommodation and free 
time facilities e.g. playroom for children, a prayer room, a computer room, as well as food 
and elementary hygienic items. UNHCR is responsible for e.g. the list of persons proposed 
for humanitarian transfer and for provision of weekly situation reports on the situation of the 
Refugees and Persons of Concern located in the asylum centre. IOM is in charge of transport 
from the refugee camp to the Slovak Republic, medical examinations for the purpose of 
resettlement, cultural orientation and/or language courses for the purpose of resettlement, 
and also for the transportation from the Slovak Republic to the country of resettlement.
31 Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic (2017): Information for foreigners. 
Available: www.employment.gov.sk/en/information-foreigners/ (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
32 The Slovak Spectator (1999): Slovakia awaits Kosovo refugees, wins NATO gratitude. Available: https://spec-
tator.sme.sk/c/20011789/slovakia-awaits-kosovo-refugees-wins-nato-gratitude.html (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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Table 3.
Nationalities under ETC project
Nationalities
Somalia 591
Afghanistan 233
Palestine 98
Eritrea 37
Ethiopia 36
Sudan 33
Iraq 1
Libya 1
Source: MoI
Since the beginning of the project in 2009, 1,047 refugees from different refugee camps, 
such as in Eritrea, Iran, Yemen and Lebanon, and of different nationalities (see table 3.) 
were accommodated in Humenne for up to 6 months, out of them 500 children, 17 were 
already born in Slovakia.
The continuation of the project is under ongoing negotiation process.
The scope of the destination countries is expected to be enlarged beyond the U.S.A. 
considering current migration policy in the States.
In the context of the escalating migration crisis in the EU, the Slovak Republic signed 
with Austria the Memorandum of understanding33 in June 2015. The Memorandum aimed 
to temporarily house refugees from Austria in the Gabčíkovo camp located not far from 
the Slovak–Austrian borders. This project had primary intended to support Austria which 
was under migration pressure.
As of today, SR has provided temporary accommodation for approximately 1,220 asy-
lum seekers whose applications were assessed in Austria.34 On several occasions and levels, 
Austria repeatedly appreciated the support provided by Slovakia regarding accommodation 
for asylum seekers, even though the beginning of the project was not easy. In early August, 
the townspeople staged a referendum that gathered a nearly 97% vote against allowing 
refugees to stay at the camp. Hesitations were also on the other side: some Syrians refugees 
temporary accommodated in Gabcikovo expressed their concerns.
“I want to be in Vienna”, says Abdelkarim Alorfi, 26, sitting on the crumbling steps of 
the main building of the refugee’s housing camp. Alorfi was separated from his brother’s 
family when he left Austria. “I don’t want to be here. The police are watching.”35
33 Full title: Memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic and 
the Federal Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Austria on the temporary provision of accommodation 
facilities to applicants for international protection whose applications are being processed by the Republic of 
Austria.
34 Topky.sk (2015). Refugees welcome to Slovakia: FOTO Prví utečenci zo Sýrie už sú v Gabčíkove. Available: 
www.topky.sk/cl/10/1498601/Refugees-welcome-to-Slovakia–FOTO-Prvi-utecenci-zo-Syrie-uz-su-v-Gab-
cikove (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
35 Sullivan, Meghan Collins (2015): Following Syrian Refugees into an Unwelcoming Slovakia. National 
Geographic. Available: https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/09/150923-syrian-refugees-arrive-slova-
kia-protest/ (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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Regardless of the challenges at the starting point, this project was running without 
bigger difficulties and surprisingly did not result into secondary movements. Today it is 
considered an effective alternative in the migration crisis.
To support the Member States on the frontline, the employees of the Migration Office, 
despite limited human resources, started to actively participate in multiple activities under 
the auspices of EASO; this included also the deployment to hotspots in Greece and Italy. 
On the one hand, Slovakia had the opportunity to express its solidarity; on the other hand, 
it was gaining new and valuable experience.
In the field of irregular migration
In 2015 a new strategical document on managing irregular migration in Slovakia, replacing 
a previous document from 2007, the National Border Control Management Plan of the SR 
for 2015–201836 was adopted. It consists of 95 measurable tasks, among them also training 
and reinforced cooperation, both on national and international level.
Several operative exercises were held in 2015, 2016 as a part of crisis management 
training in Slovakia, for example Zelená vlna 2014, Nový Horizont 2015, Akcia JUH 2015, 
Nový Horizont 2017.
Moreover, a new Foreign Police Unit was established in December 2015 aimed to 
deploy policemen to join operations either under FRONTEX operations or on bilateral 
agreements, for instance to support Hungary on borders with Serbia or in Slovenia.37 To 
name one example, over the course of 2016 activities within the JIT SOKRATES joint 
investigation team took place. The team was established between Slovakia and Hungary 
focused on crime within the organized irregular migration via the Western Balkans.
Likewise two conferences of the Visegrad Group at the level of the heads of national 
departments responsible for combating irregular migration, smuggling, and human traffick-
ing were organized in 2016. The result of joint negotiations was the creation of a working 
group composed of representatives of the departments of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary in 
order to cooperate in the detection and investigation of organized irregular migration from 
the Western Balkan countries to the territory of the involved countries.
36 The Ministry of the Interior (2015a): Vláda schválila Národný plán riadenia kontroly hraníc SR na roky 2015 
až 2018. Available: www.minv.sk/?tlacove-spravy-2&sprava=vlada-schvalila-narodny-plan-riadenia-kontro-
ly-hranic-sr-na-roky-2015-az-2018 (Accessed: 15.12.2017); The Government of the Slovak Republic (2015): 
National Border Control Management Plan of the SR for 2015–2018. Available: www.rokovania.sk/Rokovanie.
aspx/BodRokovaniaDetail?idMaterial=24257 (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
37 The Ministry of the Interior (2015b): Slovenských policajtov pomáhajúcich chrániť vonkajšiu schengenskú 
hranicu v Maďarsku po mesiaci vystriedali kolegovia. Available: www.minv.sk/?tlacove-spravy-2&sp-
rava=slovenskych-policajtov-pomahajucich-chranit-vonkajsiu-schengensku-hranicu-v-madarsku-po-me-
siaci-vystriedali-kolegovia (Accessed: 15.12.2017); Topky.sk (2015): Hranice v Slovinsku by malo pomôcť 
strážiť 20 slovenských policajtov. Available: www.topky.sk/cl/10/1506509/Hranice-v-Slovinsku-by-malo-po-
moct-strazit-20-slovenskych-policajtov; The Ministry of the Interior (2016): Pražský proces: Slovensko pošle 
do Srbska 15 policajtov na ochranu hranice. Available: www.minv.sk/?tlacove-spravy&sprava=prazsky-pro-
ces-slovensko-posle-do-srbska-15-policajtov-na-ochranu-hranice (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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In the field of development
The Slovak Republic was quite active in mainstreaming of migration in development pol-
icies, following up on the legislation changes including e.g. the new Act on Development 
Cooperation. Throughout 2016, humanitarian activities of the Slovak Republic were aimed 
at assistance to countries and organisations affected by the migration crisis.
Syria and the neighbouring countries from the Near and Middle East were included 
among the territorial priorities of the Slovak development cooperation that created a for-
mal precondition for an individual approach to their needs. Following the Resolution, the 
 Slovak Government granted 30 scholarships to Syrian students.38 Students who had arrived 
to Slovakia in September 2016 started a Slovak language course in the 2016/2017 academic 
year and will proceed to study at a public university in a selected branch of studies, after 
the 10-month language course and vocational preparation. They were granted temporary 
residence for that purpose.
In the field of administration
Due to the cross-sectional nature of the topic of migration, the Ministry of Foreign and 
European Affairs established a Task Force for Migration and created a position of the 
ambassador-et-large for migration. Within the Ministry of the Interior, the Štáb (a special 
committee for crisis situations) was re-established in 2015.
The Committee on Migration and Integration, chaired by the Director of the Migration 
Office, created a working group tasked to draft a new State Integration program for people 
with granted international protection also as a tool to prevent radicalisation. Likewise, the 
Government Council for Human Rights, National Minorities and Gender Equality set up 
a new working group on rights for refugees and migrants.
Status Quo in 2017
Current statistics
Currently, the situation in the EU is rather stabilized – according to the latest EASO data, 
around 60,000 asylum seekers applied for asylum in the EU + countries in October 2017.39 
It means almost three times, twice time less respectively than in the same period of 2015 
or 2016.
The situation in Slovakia is equally stable – the number of asylum seekers is historically 
the lowest since the EU accession. On the other hand, the rate of the positive decisions (asy-
lum and subsidiary protection) is the highest – 27% – and thus comparable to the average in 
38 Refugee-Lebanon Organisation (2016): Scholarships for Syrian students from the Slovak Republic. Available: 
www.refugees-lebanon.org/en/news/116/scholarships-for-syrian-students-from-the-slovak-republic (Accessed: 
15.12.2017)
39 EASO (2017): Latest asylum trends, October 2017. Available: www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Lat-
est-Asylum-Trends-October-2017.pdf (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
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EU countries. It should be also noted that more than 40% of the asylum procedure end by 
a cessation, mainly because asylum seekers absconded. The total number of illegal border 
crossing has also decreased compared to 2015 and 2016.40
Figure 4.
Illegal Crossing of state border of the Slovak Republic (2015–2016 and 2016–06/2017)
Source: Drawn by the author
The Slovak Republic did not become a destination country in 2017 either; however com-
paring to the previous year in June 2017, there were about 9,968 more foreigners living in 
Slovakia than the year before, which means an increase of 11%.41 Nowadays about 1.8% of 
the Slovak population are foreigners; and this number is slowly, yet continuously increasing.
Facts & Figures on Migration in Slovakia42
97,934: The number of foreigners with residence permits in Slovakia in June 2017.
6: Out of all the EU countries, Slovakia has the sixth lowest proportion of foreigners.
41%: The proportion of the Austrian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Ukrainian citizens in 
the total population of migrants in the SR.
42,387: The number of foreign workers in the SR in 2017.
1,251: The number of foreigners that in the first half of 2017 illegally crossed the borders 
or illegally resided in the territory of the Slovak Republic.
148: The number of applications for asylum in the SR by November 2017.
40 Presidium of the Police Force – Bureau of Border and Alien Police (2016–2017): Statistical Overview of Legal 
and Illegal Migration in the Slovak Republic.
41 Ibid.
42 IOM: Migration in Slovakia. Available: www.iom.sk/en/about-migration/migration-in-slovakia (Accessed: 
15.12.2017) (Note: data on asylum updated according to the Migration Office figures.)
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Current challenges and opportunities
What are the challenges in this relatively stable period, from the point of view of Slovakia?
Even though there are much less migrants arriving to the EU, one cannot say that the 
crisis is over. Yet, maybe Europe is now better prepared to an eventual future mass influx 
thanks to different tools which have been established so far. From the Slovak Republic point 
of view several tools are important:
Border management
Border management was one of the main focuses of the Slovak presidency in the Council 
of the EU. The effective border protection is also an integral part of today’s European 
Commission’s documents, e.g. one of the pillars of the European Agenda on Migration is 
Border management – saving lives and securing external borders. Today it is not a question 
anymore whether migration flows can be managed without sustainable border protection. 
The same goes for the role of effective returns of persons who are not entitled to stay in the 
territory. Sure, this goes hand in hand with providing legal entry options.
Effective returns
For the practical functioning of the Common European Asylum System (hereinafter CEAS), 
whether a failed asylum applicant is effectively returned to the country of origin is of es-
sential interest, since an inability to return may constitute a major pull factor. Furthermore, 
a failure in this area could deepen mistrust to the effectiveness of the Common European 
Asylum System among European citizens. Yet returns are the biggest challenge of today. 
The Slovak Republic, similarly to other countries, prefers voluntary returns contrary to 
forced ones. However, even if it looks easy to take a person back to where he or she came 
from, this view is short-sighted. In this context a thorough cooperation with the countries 
of origin is crucial.
Cooperation with the countries of origin and transit
The deepening political crisis within the EU has at times overshadowed the immense 
responsibility carried by transit countries along the migration routes to Europe. It is recog-
nizable that Syria’s neighboring countries have been confronted with migrants’ influx to 
a much greater extent and over a longer period of time, with less resources and limited 
assistance than the EU.
It became evident that international assistance to countries hosting migrants and 
refugees in the region had to be a key part of the solutions. Furthermore, this cooperation 
is also vital in order to prevent human tragedies and disappointments upon arrival to the 
destination countries.
251Slovakia, a Country Not Directly Touched by the Migration Crisis…
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
The Migration Office has always been advocating for addressing the problems as close 
to the countries of origins as possible. There are several reasons why:
• Particularly in a case of economical, non-forced migration, human beings can be 
prevented from tragedies while trying to reach the Europe shores;
• smuggling became one of the most lucrative businesses. Many migrants still believe 
in promises of smugglers. Thus, Slovakia considers the information campaigns in 
the countries of origin to be extremely important;
• although the Slovak Republic is not the main destination country, the Migration 
 Office, in cooperation with UNHCR, has worked out a handbook that aims to pro-
vide real information on life in Slovakia. It is essential to provide factual life in-
formation by each Member State.
Improving conditions in countries, so that people do not have to flee should be our common 
goal. The Slovak Republic via official development assistance programs tries to contribute 
in this framework.
Of course, the situation is different when people are forced to leave their homes – they 
run away from war conflicts; it is a forced migration. These days, the EU is discussing the 
establishment of the so called safe zones in African countries. Yet, this is not a new concept 
as one could believe. The Geneva Convention 1949 on protection of the civilian population 
at the time of war introduced this concept. It was later also used for refugees. Though, not 
always without mistakes.
The refugees from Syria remain primarily in neighboring countries – Turkey, Lebanon, 
Jordan. As already mentioned above, the Migration Office is currently working together with 
the V4 countries on a joint project in Jordan which aimed at capacity building, including 
the establishment of the so called mobile medical clinics, if there is an interest and need.
One could call those activities an externalisation of a European problem or pushing 
it out from Europe. It has even stronger connotations in the circumstance of a recent report 
on modern slavery in Libya, which, of course, must be condemned. Yet, only time will tell, 
if this approach is a right one.
Legal pathways
There is no doubt, that to absolutely prevent the arrival of third-country nationals to the 
EU is neither possible nor desirable. In this context, the availability of legal pathways is 
essential; for example, the so called blue cards in case of legal migration or resettlement in 
case of persons eligible for international protection.
The Slovak Republic has its experience with voluntary resettlement. As mentioned 
above 149 Assyrian Christians were resettled to Slovakia at the end of the year 2016. It 
was not without challenges. The correct explanation of the process is therefore crucial; in 
particular, that the resettlement is a voluntary act on both parts: 1. on the side of the person 
to be resettled who knows where he or she is going and wants to go – what is the premise 
of a successful integration process (unlike in cases of relocation); 2. on the side of the host 
country which is recognizing the coming person. It takes a lot of time and effort. Canada, 
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which is today considered a perfect example, did not build a resettlement mechanism over-
night. It took more than 20 years.
In the meantime, the Slovak Republic is testing its solidarity with humanitarian transit 
in Humenné (ETC, see above). At this point it is worth mentioning that the ETC has been 
named as a complementary solution for refugees in the GCR (Global Compact for Refugees) 
consolations process held in Geneva in November 2017.
Slovakia, together with Romania, are the only countries in the EU to implement such 
a project. A new tripartite agreement is currently prepared for signature.
Integration
Last but not least, the importance of an effective integration should be underlined. The suc-
cessful integration, as a two-way process is the key tool to prevent radicalization – a growing 
threat for the EU citizens.
The Way Forward
A document entitled Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic with a perspective to 2020 
was adopted by the governmental resolution No. 574 at the end of August 2011. It happened 
at the time when the protests against the regime escalated in Syria and in Libya. Obvious-
ly, nobody could assume that those events would affect the situation in the EU to such an 
extent, a few years later. This document begins by saying: “Due to the fact that migration 
will objectively affect our future, we must work on the migration.”43
In other words, “migration has always been a part of our everyday life. Even without 
our commitment, its importance is steadily growing. If we approach to migration systemat-
ically, it could be of benefit. Should we underestimate its importance or ignore it, migration 
could cause complications in the political, economic and social life of the country.”44
If this document was published in 2011, it would probably not be a bestseller in 
 Slovakia. Not because it is unreadable; rather because migration was not in the forefront 
in the given period. However, this document already shows what is being discussed in the 
EU nowadays:
• Migration is a phenomenon, it has been and it will stay with us;
• we need to know how to manage migration in order to handle it.
The tools to achieve this goal in the Slovak Migration Policy are very similar to those in 
the European Agenda for Migration:
1. Tackle the root causes of illegal migration
2. Border protection
3. Providing protection to those who are eligible
43 The Ministry of the Interior (2011): Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic with a perspective to 2020.
 Available: www.minv.sk/?zamer-migracnej-politiky-slovenskej-republiky (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
44 Ibid.
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4. Enabling legal channels towards the EU
The year 2015 has revealed that the main challenge for the EU was the uncontrolled and 
unmanaged migration. The Slovak Republic therefore considers that managed migration 
is paramount for dealing with similar crises. Let us believe that, we, in the EU, can set up 
rules which will accommodate everyone. Although finding a compromise between 27 MS 
is already the first challenge. We must not forget that in Europe without internal borders it 
is virtually impossible for the Member States to implement migration policy in isolation.
We also need to call facts by their real names, and at the same time try to find a kind 
of balance. Joint actions carefully prepared and wise decisions based on facts and not emo-
tions, could help avoid the chaotic flood and human tragedies which in 2015 turned into 
a political backlash. Finally, migration is not solely a European challenge but a global one. 
The answers lie in fruitful cooperation.
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Asylum and Migration Situation in Poland –  
The Current State, Trends and Future Prospects
Anna Pochylska
Introduction
In 2015 Europe faced a new and as it later turned out long-lasting and very demanding chal-
lenge – the refugee crisis. That year over 1 million foreigners arrived by the  Mediterranean 
Sea to the Southern EU Member States1 and close to 1.4 million foreigners applied for 
international protection in the European Union.2 Poland however, has not been directly 
influenced by the crisis of 2015, as far as its asylum and migration situation is concerned. 
But at the same time, in the last few years significant changes have been observed in Poland 
in both of these areas.
The analysis presented in this paper is based on the data from the period of 2014 till 
the beginning of October 2017. This timeframe was chosen by the author, because 2014 is 
not only the year of entering into force of the Act on foreigners (1 May 2014), but it was 
also the moment from which Poland has observed so far the largest influx of foreigners to 
its territory.3
The study is mostly based on data provided by the Office for Foreigners in Poland.4 
The Office is a central authority in Poland established in 2001 in order to ensure comprehen-
sive and professional proceedings concerning granting international protection to foreign 
nationals residing within the territory of the Republic of Poland, as well as the regularisation 
of their stay (the Office is, among others, responsible for second instance proceedings in 
regard to legalisation of stay of all foreigners arriving to Poland).5 Moreover, the other im-
portant sources of statistical data (especially on the subject of the situation in the European 
Union) are the Eurostat database and materials prepared by the European Asylum Support 
1 Refugee Operational Portal. Available: http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean (Accessed: 
29.11.2017)
2 EASO (2016): The Key findings of EASO’s Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the EU.Available: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2696299c-5d3e-11e7-954d-01aa75ed71a1 
(Accessed: 29.11.2017)
3 In comparison to 2013, the number of applications for residence permits lodged by the foreigners (both for 
temporary and permanent stay in Poland) in 2014 was 54% higher. All statistical data provided by the Office 
for Foreigners in Poland which were used in this study can be found on the official website of the Office. 
Available: https://udsc.gov.pl/en/ or https://migracje.gov.pl/en/ (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
4 Data for 2017 show the state on the 1st of October 2017 (unless stated otherwise).
5 Office for Foreigners, Mission. Available: https://udsc.gov.pl/en/urzad/misja-urzedu/ (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
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Office (EASO). Due to the thematic scope of the study it was prepared mainly based on 
official documents and legislation, as well as studies and informative materials prepared by 
the Polish authorities and statistical data provided by the Office for Foreigners.
Asylum Situation in Poland
Legal basis and international protection in Poland
Protection of foreigners in Poland might be granted based on the following legal regulations:
• The Constitution of the Republic of Poland (2 April 1997);6
• Act on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Po-
land (13 June 2003) – with further amendments;
• Act on foreigners (12 December 2013) – with further amendments.
In Poland, a foreigner might be granted one of the following forms of protection: refugee 
status and subsidiary protection (international protection as defined by the EU law), asylum,7 
temporary protection and humanitarian/tolerated stay.8 This analysis, due to its thematic 
scope and reference to the situation in the European Union as a whole, will focus only on 
international protection.
The authority responsible for the granting international protection to foreigners in the 
territory of Poland is the Head of the Office for Foreigners. The Head of the Office might 
also refuse to grant refugee status or subsidiary protection or (in particular cases) deprive the 
foreigner one of these forms of protection.9 The refugee status might be granted to foreigners 
if due to the justified fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political views 
or membership in particular social group, one cannot or does not want to use the protection 
of one’s country of origin.10 Consequently, subsidiary protection is granted to foreigners if 
one does not meet the criteria to be granted refugee status, but one’s return to the country 
of origin might endanger him or her to the real risk of serious harm by:
6 According to Article 56 “1. Foreigners shall have a right of asylum in the Republic of Poland in accordance with 
principles specified by statute. 2. Foreigners who, in the Republic of Poland, seek protection from persecution, 
may be granted the status of a refugee in accordance with international agreements to which the Republic of 
Poland is a party”. Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 2 April 1997. Available: www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/
konst/angielski/kon1.htm (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
7 Asylum should be distinguished from the refugee status. According to the Polish legislation, “asylum might 
be granted to the foreigner on his or her request, if it is necessary to ensure his protection and if it is required 
by the vital interest of the Republic of Poland”. Act on granting protection to foreigners within the territory 
of the Republic of Poland, 13 June 2013, Article 90. Available: http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.
xsp/WDU20031281176/U/D20031176Lj.pdf (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
8 Act on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland, 13 June 2013, Arti-
cle 90.; Act on foreigners, 12 December 2013. Available: http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/
WDU20130001650/U/D20131650Lj.pdf (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
9 Act on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland, 13 June 2013, Article 90. 
Available: http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20031281176/U/D20031176Lj.pdf (Accessed: 
29.11.2017)
10 In accordance with the definition of the refugee in Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 
July 1951. Available: www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
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• Being sentenced to death penalty or performing the execution;
• torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;
• serious and individualised danger for life or health because of the widespread use of 
violence against civilians in case of international or internal armed conflict;
• and due to this danger cannot or does not want to use the protection of one’s country 
of origin.11
Applications for international protection in Poland in the period 2014–2017
In the period from 2014 to 1 October 2017 37,025 foreigners applied for international 
protection in Poland. After a substantial increase in the number of lodged applications in 
2015 (from 8,195 in 2014 to 12,325 in 2015), in 2016 a similar number of third country na-
tionals applied for one of the forms of international protection as the year before (12,322).12 
However, currently in Poland, there has been observed a decrease in the number of lodged 
applications. As of 1 October 2017 this figure was 60% lower than the one concerning 
applications in the analogical period in 2016.13
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Figure 1.
The number of foreigners applying for internal protection in Poland in the period 2014–2017 
(as of 1.10.2017)
Source: Office for Foreigners
It should be underlined that in the analysed period the nationalities of foreigners who most 
frequently applied for international protection in Poland remained rather unchanged. The 
11 Act on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland, 13 June 2013, Art. 13 
and 15.
12 Data provided by the Office for Foreigners.
13 Office for Foreigners, Biuletyn informacyjny, second quarter, 2017. 3. Available: https://udsc.gov.pl/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/UDSC-kwartalnik-wydanie-2-www.pdf (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
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exact structure of foreigners lodging the application for international protection in Poland (as 
far as their nationality is concerned) within over three years is illustrated on the graph below.
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Figure 2.
Applications for international protection by the nationality of the applicants in the period 2014–2017 
(as of 1st of October 2017)
Source: Office for Foreigners
The data shows that most of the applications for international protection in Poland was 
lodged by the citizens of the Russian Federation. At the same time, it needs to be underlined 
that the vast majority of them declares a Chechen origin (89% in 2014, 92% in 2015, 94% 
in 2016 and 94% as of 1 October 2017). They were followed by the citizens of Ukraine, 
Tajikistan, Georgia and Armenia.14 In the first nine months of 2017, this tendency remained 
mostly the same (with the exception of the citizens of Belarus who were third in the ten 
top nationalities of applicants). 92% of all applicants came to Poland from the states of the 
former USSR (Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan, Armenia and 
Georgia).15 The high number of applicants declaring a Chechen origin is explained by the 
fact that Poland is the first Member State of the European Union for those willing to come to 
Europe through Belarus (and, as it will be later presented, the vast majority of them leaves 
Poland and travels further to Western EU States).16
14 Data provided by the Office for Foreigners.
15 As of 12 October 2017. Office for Foreigners, Informacja o działalności Urzędu do Spraw Cudzoziemców w 
okresie 6.10–12.10.2017. Available: https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/meldunek-tygodniowy/ 
(Accessed: 29.11.2017)
16 Many applicants declare that they do not wish to apply for international protection in Belarus because of its 
close relations with the Russian Federation. Rafalik, Norbert (2012): Cudzoziemcy ubiegający się o status 
uchodźcy w Polsce – teoria a rzeczywistość (praktyka) (stan prawny na dzień 31 grudnia 2011 roku). CMR 
Working Papers, Vol. 55, No. 113. 17. Available: www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/
WP_55_113__2.pdf (Accessed: 11.03.2018)
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Lately however, Poland has observed a decrease in the number of applications for 
international protection submitted by the citizens of the Russian Federation (mainly by 
Chechen origin),17 Tajikistan and Ukraine (as of 1 October 2017 in comparison to the ana-
logical period in 2016, a 45% decrease in the number of applications lodged by the Ukrainian 
citizens was noted).18 Moreover, according to the data provided by the Office for Foreigners, 
applications regarding international protection accounted only for 7% of all applications 
(including those in regard to the legalisation of stay) submitted by foreigners in Poland (as 
of 1 October 2017 they constitute 3% of all applications in 2017).19 As it will be presented 
in the following part of the study, in Poland it is the migration situation (in regard to legal 
migration) which seems to be currently more dynamic.
Interestingly, compared to the rest of Europe, in Poland there has been observed the 
largest share of females (50%) and children (46%) among foreigners seeking international 
protection within its territory.20 In comparison, in 2016 the share of male first time applicants 
in all of the EU Member States was over 65 per cent.21 This phenomenon derives from the 
fact, that among many of the applicants who come to Poland are families willing to join their 
relatives in Poland or (mostly) Western European states. It is well visible in case of citizens 
of the Russian Federation declaring Chechen origin who, as it was stated before, constitute 
almost all foreigners applying for international protection in Poland.22
To conclude this part of the study, there are three important characteristics of the asy-
lum situation in Poland as far as the applications for international protection are concerned. 
Firstly, within over the last three years 87% applications were lodged by the citizens of 
the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Tajikistan (with the majority of them arriving from 
the Russian Federation). Moreover, the rate of females and children seeking protection in 
Poland is the highest among all European Union states. Finally, lately in Poland (after the 
substantial increase in 2015) the number of lodged applications has dropped. Knowing this 
characteristics of the asylum seekers, one can proceed to further analysis regarding the 
decisions issued in the refugee proceedings.
Granting international protection in Poland
Within the analysed period, the Head of the Office for Foreigners issued 36,751 decisions 
related to international protection from which the vast majority was discontinuation of the 
proceeding (26,001). The decisions granting one form of protection accounted only for 5.5% 
of all decisions issued between 2014 and 2017 (respectively 8.8% in 2014, 5.2% in 2015, 
2.6% in 2016 and 8.4% as of 1 October 2017).23
17 Although they still constitute the majority of applicants (70% as of 30 September 2017).
18 Data provided by the Office for Foreigners.
19 Office for Foreigners, Informacja o działalności Urzędu do Spraw Cudzoziemców w okresie 6.10–12.10.2017. 
Available: https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/meldunek-tygodniowy/ (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
20 Maps and statistics of migrants and Polish migration services. Available: https://migracje.gov.pl/en/ (Accessed: 
29.11.2017)
21 Eurostat, Asylum Statistics. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_sta-
tistics/pl (as of 13 March 2017) (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
22 See more in Rafalik (2012): op. cit. 15–21.
23 Data provided by the Office for Foreigners.
262 Dynamics and Social Impact of Migration
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
Although the majority of applicants comes from the Russian Federation, in the period 
2014–2017 refugee status was granted firstly to citizens of Syria (372 applicants), Ukraine 
(90), the Russian Federation (64), stateless persons (47), Iraq (40), Afghanistan (38) and 
Belarus (37). At the same time, citizens of the Russian Federation received the highest 
number of decisions on granting them both subsidiary protection (followed by Ukrainians, 
Iraqis, Syrians and Tajiks) and tolerated stay24 (in this context the other most numerous 
nationalities include: Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Belarus and Afghanistan).25
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Figure 3.
Decisions concerning international protection proceedings and tolerated stay (2014–2017)
Source: Office for Foreigners
As it has been already mentioned before, the other significant characteristic feature for the 
asylum situation in Poland is that the majority of international protection proceedings is 
discontinued.
24 A foreigner is granted the permit for tolerated stay within the territory of the Republic of Poland if his/her 
expulsion: 1. may be effected only to a country where, in terms of the Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on the 4th of November 1950, the foreigner’s right to life, to freedom 
and personal safety could be under threat, or he or she could be subjected to tortures or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, or could be forced to work or deprived the right to fair trial, or could be punished 
without any legal grounds – in case when there is a basis to deny the foreigner the permit for humanitarian 
reasons; 2. is unenforceable for reasons beyond the authority to execute the decision on expulsion or beyond 
the foreigner; 3. may be effected only to a country to which the extradition is inadmissible on the basis of the 
court judgment or on the basis of the decision of the Minister of Justice on refusing to extradite the foreigner. 
The permit for tolerated stay is granted by the Chief of the Border Guard unit or Commanding Officer at the 
Border Guard Post. Act on foreigners, Art. 351–355.
25 The data provided by the Office for Foreigners include decisions issued both by the Head of the Office for 
Foreigners (first instance) and the Refugee Board (second instance).
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Figure 4.
Decisions issued by the Head of the Office for Foreigners (2014–2017)
Source: Office for Foreigners
As of 12 October 2017 the Head of the Office for Foreigners in 2017 issued 4,400 decisions 
regarding asylum proceedings. What is interesting is that only 47% of them are decisions in 
which the Head of the Office granted or denied international protection. The rest (meaning 
over half of them) are discontinuances related to the foreigner’s lack of interest in further 
proceeding.26 Moreover, it is worth underlining that in the majority of cases regarding 
Chechens (citizens of the Russian Federation), citizens of Georgia and Tajikistan (three 
of five top nationalities applying for international protection in Poland) the procedure for 
granting international protection is discontinued shortly after lodging the application.27
Migration Situation in Poland
Legal basis and legalisation of stay of foreigners in Poland
The procedure of legalisation of stay of foreigners in Poland is based on the following acts:
• Act on foreigners (12 December 2013) – with further amendments;
• Act on the entry into, residence in and exit from the Republic of Poland of natio-
nals of the European Union Member States and their family members – along with 
executive acts (14 July 2006);
• Code of Administrative Procedure (14 June 1960).
26 Office for Foreigners, Informacja o działalności Urzędu do Spraw Cudzoziemców w okresie 6.10–12.10.2017. 
Available: https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/meldunek-tygodniowy/ (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
27 Until 12 October 2107, 78% of discontinued proceedings concerned applications submitted by the citizens of 
the Russian Federation. Ibidem.
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Residence permits granted in the territory of the Republic of Poland include temporary 
residence permits (for a period exceeding three months and maximum 3 years) and permits 
issued for an indefinite period of time (including both permanent residence permit and 
residence permit for a long term EU resident).28
Legalisation of stay of foreigners in Poland in the period 2014–2017
Since 2014 in Poland there has been observed an increase in the number of applications 
for the temporary residence permits lodged by foreigners. According to the Office for 
Foreigners, it has been a result of three main factors. Firstly, it is due to the changes intro-
duced by the new Act on foreigners of 12 December 2013 which simplified the procedures 
of legalisation of stay. Secondly, it is said that it was the conflict in Eastern Ukraine which 
has resulted in the increased influx of Ukrainian citizens to Poland (an important factor 
in this regard is the worsening economic situation in this country – more detailed analysis 
regarding Ukrainians residing in Poland will be presented in the next paragraph). Lastly, 
in the analysed period the validation date of permits issued in the framework of the regu-
larisation action in 2012 came to an end. 29
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Figure 5.
Applications and decisions of temporary residence permits in the period 2014–2017 
(as of 1 October 2017)
Source: Office for Foreigners
28 Act on foreigners, Art. 351–355. Sections V–VI.
29 Office for Foreigners, Report on citizens of Ukraine, 5 November 2017. Available: https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/
raporty-specjalne/biezaca-sytuacja-dotyczaca-ukrainy/ (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
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Figure 6.
Applications and decisions of permanent residence permits in the period 2014–2017 
(as of 1 October 2017)
Source: Office for Foreigners
As it was mentioned above, the majority of applications for residence permits in Poland was 
lodged by the citizens of Ukraine. In 2015 we have observed significant influx of foreigners 
applying for legalisation of stay – 62% of them were submitted by the citizens of Ukraine. 
Interestingly, the same trend was noticeable in the whole of the European Union where they 
received slightly over 19% of all residence permits issued in the EU.30
This tendency (increased number of Ukrainians arriving to Poland) has continued 
also in 2016 and 2017. In the first half of 2017 65% of all registered applications for tem-
porary residence permits were submitted by Ukrainian citizens. The increase in interest 
in legalisation of stay in Poland has also been observed in regard to citizens of Belarus 
(mainly concerning permanent residence) and India (mostly temporary residence). They 
were followed by citizens of China and Vietnam.31
Ukrainian citizens are also the most numerous among the foreigners with valid docu-
ment legalising their stay in Poland (43% of all holders). The other main nationalities include: 
German, Belarusian, Russian, Vietnamese, Italian, Chinese, French, British and Bulgarian 
(as we can see they consist of both citizens of the EU and third country nationals).32
In 2016 Poland was the second state within the EU Members as far as the residence 
permits issued for the first time to third country nationals are concerned (with the UK being 
the leader, Germany third, France forth and Italy fifth). 58,600 permits in Poland accounted 
30 Eurostat, Residence permits for non-EU citizens. EU Member States issued a record number of 2.6 million 
first residence permits in 2015. Main beneficiaries from Ukraine and the United States, Press Release, 27 
October 2016. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7715617/3-27102016-BP-EN.pdf/
ca706fa0-14fc-4b71-a2e2-46b2b933f8f8 (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
31 Office for Foreigners, Legalizacja pobytu w I połowie 2017 roku, ‘Biuletyn informacyjny’, second quarter, 
2017. 12.
32 Maps and statistics of migrants and Polish migration services. Available: https://migracje.gov.pl/en/ (Accessed: 
29.11.2017)
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for 17.5% of all permits issued in the EU countries.33 At the same time, the main reason for 
issuing permits in Poland was employment (84% in the country and 58% share in all EU). 
Interestingly, this tendency has also been observed in the whole of the EU where a quarter 
of all residence permits in 2016 was also issued due to employment-related reasons.34
Migration from Ukraine
The conflict in Eastern Ukraine was one of the main factors which led to the increase in 
the number of foreigners arriving to Poland. It was due to the worsening situation of the 
Ukrainian economy that many citizens of Ukraine decided to leave their country in order 
to look for employment abroad. Interestingly, this rapid migration is characteristic almost 
only to Poland. The reason for that was the new Polish legislation, which entered into force 
in May 2015 and introduced special rules for the citizens coming from states of the Eastern 
Partnership.35 From that moment foreigners from Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine might work in Poland for the period of maximum 6 months 
(in the next 12 months) if the special declaration of the employer (stating that one is willing 
to offer a job to the foreigner) is registered in the competent employment office.36 There-
fore, they do not need to hold separate permits to work in Poland. In 2015 763 thousand 
declarations regarding employment of Ukrainian citizens was registered in Poland. In 2016 
their number reached 1.26 million.37 Although lately the economic situation in Ukraine has 
improved, with the current economic growth (2% of GDP per year), it will probably not be 
sufficient enough to radically change the conditions of the labour market. It is then foreseen, 
that in the upcoming years Ukrainian citizens will most probably continue moving abroad 
in search for employment.38 As of 5 November 2017 102,696 citizens of Ukraine lodged 
applications for residence permits (including temporary and permanent permits, as well as 
permits for permanent EU resident). In the whole previous year, the respective number was 
6,218 lower.39 It is also worth underlining that Ukrainian citizens who received residence 
33 Eurostat, Residence permits for non-EU citizens. New high in first residence permits issued in the EU Mem-
ber States in 2016. Main beneficiaries from Ukraine, Syria and the United States, Press Release 174/2017, 16 
November 2017. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8456381/3-16112017-BP-EN.pdf/
e690a572-02d2-4530-a416-ab84a7fcbf22 (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
34 Ibidem.
35 Jaroszewicz, Marta (2017): Potencjalne skutki zniesienia reżimu wizowego dla obywateli Ukrainy, ‘Biuletyn 
informacyjny’, second quarter. 6–7.
36 Rozporządzenie Ministra Pracy i Polityki Społecznej w sprawie przypadków, w których powierzenie wykony-
wania pracy cudzoziemcowi na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej jest dopuszczalne bez konieczności 
uzyskania zezwolenia na pracę. 29 April 2015. Available: http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/
WDU20150000588/O/D20150588.pdf (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
37 Imigracja z Ukrainy. 128 tys. obywateli Ukrainy z długoterminowymi pozwoleniami na pobyt w Polsce, 
‘Biuletyn informacyjny’, second quarter, 2017. 4.
38 Jaroszewicz (2017): op. cit. 6–7.
39 Office for Foreigners, Report on citizens of Ukraine.
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permits in Poland in 2016, accounted for 87% of all Ukrainian holders of residence permits 
in the European Union.40
When it comes to the profile of the Ukrainian citizens arriving to Poland, there are few 
significant features which need to be underlined. First of all, the majority of Ukrainians 
who holds resident permits legalising their stay in Poland are men (57%), but women also 
constitute a large percentage (43%). Moreover, as far as their age is concerned, 60% of 
the citizens of Ukraine residing in Poland are between 20–39 years old (26% are of 40–59 
years and 12% are children below 12 years old). It is also worth noticing that when it comes 
to the type of residence permits, the vast majority (77%) of Ukrainians holds temporary 
residence permit.41
While applying for temporary residence permits as a reason for legalisation of they 
stay in Poland, Ukrainian citizens declare mostly employment-related issues (69.6% as of 
12 November 2017). Among other frequently declared justifications are studying (starting 
and continuing – 8.6%) and staying in Poland with foreign (5.6%) and Polish citizen – 3% 
(different reasons constitute around 10%). Interestingly, a very similar trend was observed 
in 2016 when nearly 87% of the citizens of Ukraine applied for legalisation of stay due to 
work-related reason (followed by: studying, different issues, staying with foreign and Polish 
citizen).42
On 11 June 2017 the decision of the European Commission (which approved the res-
olution of the European Parliament of 6 April 2017) entered into force. With this decision 
Ukraine was added to the list of states whose citizens will not require visas for a short-term 
stay in the EU. From that moment, the holders of biometric passports will be able to travel 
to the EU (with the exception of the UK, Ireland, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Licht-
enstein – associated members of the Schengen zone) for short stays of up to 90 days within 
a 180 days period.43 This decision caught the attention of the European Member States (in-
cluding Poland) as it was expected to have an effect in increased influx of Ukrainian citizens 
to the EU. So far, the introduction of the non-visa regime has not had a significant impact 
on migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland.44 During almost five months after the new 
regulation was introduced, according to data provided by the Border Guard, 3,65 million 
Ukrainian citizens arrived to Poland (only 644 thousand were traveling within the non-visa 
regime). This number constitutes only a 9% increase in comparison to border crossings in 
the period from February to May 2017, which is one of the characteristics of the increased 
40 Eurostat, Residence permits for non-EU citizens. New high in first residence permits issued in the EU Mem-
ber States in 2016. Main beneficiaries from Ukraine, Syria and the United States, Press Release 174/2017, 16 
November 2017. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8456381/3-16112017-BP-EN.pdf/
e690a572-02d2-4530-a416-ab84a7fcbf22 (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
41 Generally, among the foreigners who apply for permanent residence permit are those who have already 
extended (even for a few times) their stay in Poland. Imigracja z Ukrainy. 128 tys. obywateli Ukrainy z 
długoterminowymi pozwoleniami na pobyt w Polsce, ‘Biuletyn informacyjny’, second quarter, 2017, s. 4–5.
42 Office for Foreigners, Report on citizens of Ukraine.
43 European Commission, European Commission welcomes the Council adoption of visa liberalisation for the 
citizens of Ukraine, Press Release, Brussels, 11 May 2017. Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
STATEMENT-17-1270_en.htm (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
44 Jaroszewicz (2017): op. cit. 6–7.
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inflow of Ukrainian citizens to Poland (connected also to seasonal works).45 Therefore, this 
widely discussed regulation so far has not have a significant effect on migration trends from 
Ukraine to Poland.46 Altogether it is foreseen, that migration from Ukraine to Poland in 
2017 will account for 110–140 thousand foreigners.
Impact of the Migration Crisis on the Asylum and Migration Situation 
in Poland
Contrary to the other EU Member states, Poland has not observed an increased influx of 
foreigners applying for international protection arriving to Europe from North Africa and 
the Middle East (especially from states which are still the countries of origin where most 
of the asylum seekers come to Europe).47 Although according to the data provided by the 
Eurostat, Poland is placed at the 13th place among all of the 28 EU Member States and 
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein (as far as the applications for international 
protection submitted in 2015 and 2016 are concerned).48 In order to better understand the 
low (direct) impact of the migration crisis on Poland, one should take a closer look at the 
nationalities of asylum seekers.
According to data provided by the Eurostat, in 2015 and 2016 the most asylum seekers 
arriving to EU Member States came from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Nigeria. 
On the other hand, as it was stated before, among the applicants for international protection 
in Poland are mostly citizens of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Georgia and 
Armenia. In comparison, in all EU states, citizens of the Russian Federation were placed 
on the 9th position, Ukraine on the 18,th Georgia on the 29th and Armenia on the 27th among 
all the asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016. Tajikistan was not individually listed among the 
top nationalities of foreigners seeking protection in Europe (therefore it should be placed 
in the remaining non-EU States).49 As of 12 October 2017 asylum seekers who have so far 
arrived to Poland in 2017 from the Middle East, Africa and South Asia accounted each for 
only 1% of all applicants.50
45 Office for Foreigners, Ruch bezwizowy z Ukrainą – brak wyraźnego wzrostu dynamiki migracyjnej. Available: 
https://udsc.gov.pl/ruch-bezwizowy-z-ukraina-brak-wzrostu-dynamiki-migracyjnej/ (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
46 More information on this subject can be found: Centre for Eastern Studies: The abolition of the visa require-
ment for Ukrainian citizens: possible migration consequences for the European Union. Summary, 16.10.2017. 
Available: https://udsc.gov.pl/konsekwencje-migracyjne-zniesienia-obowiazku-wizowego-dla-ob-ukrainy/ 
(Accessed: 29.11.2017)
47 In 2016 the asylum seekers arrived to EU+ countries (EU Members, Norway and Switzerland) mostly from 
Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria and as of September 2017 – Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea and 
Nigeria. European Asylum Support Office, Latest asylum trends – 2016 an overview. Available: www.easo.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/Latest%20Asylum%20Trends%20Overview%202016%20final.pdf; European 
Asylum Support Office, Latest asylum trends – September 2017. Available: www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/Latest%20Asylum%20Trends%20September_Final.pdf Accessed: 29.11.2017)
48 Eurostat, Asylum Statistics.
49 Ibidem.
50 Data from the Office for Foreigners.
269Asylum and Migration Situation in Poland…
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
Based on these data, it is visible that the profile of asylum seekers in Poland (as far as 
their citizenship is concerned) is significantly different than in other EU Member States, 
including those which were the most affected by the migration crisis.
International cooperation in the area of migration crisis management
Even though, as it was mentioned at the beginning of the study, its asylum and migration 
situation was not significantly changed by the migration crisis of 2015, Poland still par-
ticipated in missions (undertaken i.e. by the European Asylum Support Office in Greece 
and Italy51) and international projects at regional level aimed at reducing the effects and 
challenges which arose as the result of the events of 2015.
One of the examples of international cooperation in the area of migration crisis man-
agement is the initiative of the Visegrád Group (V4) Member States – Migration Crisis 
Response Mechanism (MCRM). On 21 November 2016 at the Meeting of the V4 Ministers 
of the Interior in Warsaw the Joint Statement of Ministers on establishing of the Migration 
Crisis Response Mechanism was signed by the Ministers of the Interior of the V4. In the 
light of the increased migration pressure in the European Union, the Ministers called for 
“enhancing cooperation and delivering result-oriented solutions”. The initiative was es-
tablished with the goal to “create new or enhance existing links between the Participating 
States” governmental institutions responsible for migration and a framework of coordinating 
actions, as well as projects undertaken within the MCRM.52 The MCRM was initiated in 
the framework of the Polish Presidency in the Visegrád Group and Poland became a coor-
dinating state in this project. According to the abovementioned Statement, the initiative is 
open for all EU Member States.53
Actions which will be undertaken (or has already been launched) are divided into three 
pillars. First of them is strengthening the intra-EU cooperation aimed at supporting those 
Member States which were the most influenced by the migration crisis (by preparation 
of experts from the V4 Member States for participating in activities implemented by the 
EU Agencies, such as the abovementioned EASO Support missions to Italy and Greece).54 
Moreover, according to the Joint Statement from November 2016 the information exchange 
(which constitutes the second pillar of the MCRM) “should support participating States in 
identifying their needs and outline priorities for coordinated actions, as well as efficient 
information sharing, identification and training of experts suitable for common EU activities 
51 In 2016 40 experts from the Office for Foreigners (mainly those who specialise in international protection 
procedures and social assistance to foreigners) participated in 62 EASO support missions to Greece and Italy. 
More information regarding this matter can be found: Office for Foreigners, ‘Biuletyn informacyjny’, I quarter 
2017. 4–5. Available: https://udsc.gov.pl/do-pobrania/biuletyn-informacyjny-urzedu/ (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
52 Joint Statement of Ministers on establishing of the Migration Crisis Response Mechanism. Warsaw, 21 No-
vember 2016. Available: www.msz.gov.pl/resource/12d5f115-0fe9-42b6-b73d-8deeea23983d:JCR (Accessed: 
29.11.2017)
53 Ibidem.
54 Office for Foreigners, Spotkanie szefów urzędów migracyjnych V4 i Szwajcarii. Available: https://udsc.gov.
pl/spotkanie-szefow-urzedow-migracyjnych-grupy-v4-i-szwajcarii/ (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
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(EASO, Frontex) in the EU Members and third countries affected by the crisis”.55 Lastly, 
the third pillar of cooperation (external dimension) is directed toward third countries in 
the area of migration management, border protection, international protection and dealing 
with primary sources of migration.56 Although this initiative is still a relatively new project 
and it will take some time before we can evaluate its results and effectiveness, it proves that 
the events of 2015, even after two years, still pose important challenges to the EU Member 
States.
Conclusion
Based on the analysis presented in this study, it is noticeable that currently, the migration 
situation in Poland seems to be changing more dynamically than the asylum dimension. 
Contrary to the other EU states, especially those which were the most influenced by the 
migration crisis of 2015, the vast majority of asylum seekers arrive to Poland from the 
neighbouring states, through the Eastern border. The majority of them are citizens of the 
Russian Federation who declare a Chechen nationality. However, it is important to underline 
that the number of application for international protection has lately decreased.
At the same time, from 2014 we have observed significant changes in the area of legal 
migration in Poland. The raising number of application for legalisation of stay (mainly for 
temporary residence permits) is the result of two internal factors – mainly legislative modifi-
cations in Poland and the changes in the situation in the neighbourhood, such as the conflict 
in Ukraine. The main reason for the increased legal migration of foreigners to Poland is 
employment. It is visible also in the whole of the European Union, where in 2016 Poland 
was the main destination as far as the work-related permits were concerned. The data from 
the first nine months of 2017 shows that this year also, that tendency will remain the same.
A very important group of foreigners arriving to Poland are the citizens of Ukraine. 
They are still a second nationality as far as the applicants for international protection are 
concerned, but have significantly outnumbered the foreigners arriving to Poland from other 
states in regard to legalisation of stay. Data provided by the Office for Foreigners proves 
that most of the Ukrainian citizens arrive to Poland due to work-related issues. One of the 
reasons of that phenomenon is the relatively easy access to labour market facilitated by the 
special legislation regarding the Eastern Partnership states (mainly the system of declara-
tions on employment). Moreover, also a vast majority (over 70%) of temporary residence 
permits were issued to the Ukrainian citizens due to reasons connected to employment. 
It is foreseen that, if the economic situation in Ukraine will not radically improve, the 
increase work-related migration from this country (also and very likely mostly to Poland) 
will remain unchanged.
55 Joint Statement of Ministers on establishing of the Migration Crisis Response Mechanism. Warsaw, 21 No-
vember 2016. Available: www.msz.gov.pl/resource/12d5f115-0fe9-42b6-b73d-8deeea23983d:JCR (Accessed: 
29.11.2017)
56 Office for Foreigners, Spotkanie szefów urzędów migracyjnych V4 i Szwajcarii. Available: https://udsc.gov.
pl/spotkanie-szefow-urzedow-migracyjnych-grupy-v4-i-szwajcarii/ (Accessed: 29.11.2017)
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What is Migration Policy?  
Some Theoretical and Practical Considerations1
Magdalena Lesińska
The Term and Scope of Migration Policy
The intensification of mass migration processes (in the sense of outflows, but most of all 
the inflows of foreigners) in the post-war period Europe resulted in an extremely serious 
change for the state, understood in the classical sense as a triad of territory, population and 
the system of power. For last decades there has been a global increase in volume, diversity, 
and geographical scope of human flows. Some important questions appeared related to the 
impact of migration on the state and its subsystems: social, legal, economic and political. 
In a broader aspect, also on state sovereignty and security, institutions, the integrity of 
society, national identity, access to social and economic resources, participation in national 
culture. The dynamics of migration processes and their impact on the nation state became 
the source of the concept of migration state “where regulation of international migration is 
as important as providing for the security of the state and the economic well-being of the 
citizenry”.2 Moreover, the unpredictability and mass character of mass migration questioned 
the real possibilities of state control over human mobility.
Migration processes are not limited to the simple flow of people from one country to 
another. Many different entities make it up and act on the course of migration processes. 
Migration forms a complex and very dynamic system, in which not only immigrants are 
involved, but also their immediate surroundings, family and local community in both 
countries – of origin and of settlement. Also countries, both sending and receiving are ac-
tive subjects of migration processes, although the degree of their involvement is subject to 
change. The level of state activity in controlling migratory movements has increased with 
their intensity, the needs of national economies and labour markets, and with the increasing 
threats that they may bring for the social and political order. Migration is the most pressing 
challenge all over the world today whilst emigration from a country is widely regarded 
as a fundamental human right (at least in democratic countries), the right to immigrate to 
a country is not.
1 The text was prepared under the project “IMINTEG – In search for models of relations between immigration 
and integration policies” (No. 2014/14/E/HS5/00397) funded by the National Science Centre.
2 Hollifield, James F. (2004): The Emerging Migration State. International Migration Review, Vol. 38, No. 3. 
885.
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What is important to underline: migrants are not one consistent or coherent group.3 To 
the contrary, innumerable typologies describing particular migrating groups can be iden-
tified in the literature. In order to inject some order into analysing the logic and content of 
migration policy addressed to foreigners, two main groups of migrants that require action 
from the state can be identified:
• Potential (expected) migrants, including two different types: desired (those whom the 
state wants to come) and undesired (those whom the state does not want to come);
• real migrants (who have already come), including two different types: wanted (those 
whom the state wants to stay) and unwanted (those whom the state does not want 
to stay).4
These two groups require different approaches from states. The first group requires mech-
anisms of encouragement (such as special entry and recruitment schemes) or discourage-
ment (strict visa policies, restrictive rules of admission to the labour market). A similar set 
of policies applies to the second group: according to the state’s categorisation of who is 
wanted and who is unwanted, the first type is encouraged to stay, and the second one – to 
leave the country.
Migration flows and policies are reciprocally related: migration flows create the need 
for policy makers to manage them, and policies, in return, shape ongoing and future mi-
gration flows. In the literature, it is difficult to look for a uniform (universally accepted) 
definition of migration policy. Traditionally, migration policy is identified with immigration 
policy (regarding the inflow of foreigners in the territory of a given country, related directly 
to the admission and residence rules). A broader understanding of this term implies inclusion 
in its scope of integration policy (related to the rules of adaptation of foreigners to the host 
society and the dominant culture). The broadest approach to the term migration policy also 
includes the state’s actions concerning citizens of a given country residing permanently 
or temporarily abroad (emigration policy and diaspora policy), as well as actions aimed 
at stimulating the return of citizens or their descendants to their country of origin (return 
policy and repatriation policy).
Without any doubts, migration policy is a multi-phase process, taking place at specific 
levels and using many legal and political mechanisms. It is not limited only to the territory 
of the host country, but is closely related to activities at the source of the migration process-
es – in the sending countries. Grete Brochmann (1999) distinguishes five types of activities 
that make up migration policy: 1. Actions in the sending countries, which are to lead to the 
reduction of the waves of potential incomers before they start their journey (for example by 
information campaigns about the entry criteria for the state and formalities to be met before 
departure). Increasingly, however, it happens that they are intended to encourage a specif-
ic group to come, an example of such activities are recruitment actions among the most 
wanted professional groups and encouraging them to live and work in a specific country. 
2.  Measures to control the size of immigrant groups (by visa requirements, residence permit 
3 Avci, Gamze (1999): Immigrant Categories: The Many Sides of One Coin? European Journal of Migration 
and Law, Vol. 1, No. 2. 199–213.
4 Lesińska, Magdalena (2012): Migration policy matters: A comparative analysis of policy recommendations. 
In Okólski, Marek ed.: Europe: The Continent of Immigrants: Trends, Structures and Policy Implications. 
Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press. 240.
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system, quota systems, information campaigns). 3. Control at the border of the country. 
4. Control of access to the labour market through a system of work permits. 5. Actions for 
the return of migrants to their homeland (through organizational and financial support for 
returnees, the so-called return assistance, but also deportation of those who do not meet 
the specific formal requirements of stay).
While a broad understanding of migration policy is adopted, the state’s actions will be 
directed to a wide range of recipients, among them three main groups can be distinguished: 
1. foreigners: potential and real ones (already described above); 2. citizens: potential emi-
grants (planning to travel to another country and real emigrants (already residents of other 
countries); 3. emigrants or their descendants planning to return or move to a given state 
(including repatriates). The above distinction of successive groups is aimed at realizing how 
broad and diverse the subjective scope of activities of the state defined as migration policy is.
The word migration gets elided to accommodate the new time-limited forms of mo-
bility rather than migration. Migration implies that the migrants will stay for some time, 
perhaps for good. Mobility implies that people will not stay but will remain on the move; 
they will move on or return back home. Especially in temporary Europe, it is an important 
distinction, taking into account that people’s mobility is facilitated by free movement and 
faster and cheaper travel. Migration, nowadays, more so than in the past, is very diverse, and 
recognition of this diversity is the first step towards both better understanding of migration 
processes and formulation of more realistic evidence-based policies.
Migration Policy as Policy of Control
The main mechanisms of control of migration movements by the state authorities are con-
nected with state borders. They perform legal and political functions as well as socio-eco-
nomic functions. Under international law, any state has the obligation to allow foreigners 
into its territory, but it has the right to prohibit entry and establish entry conditions. In prac-
tice, there is no country that would let freely all foreigners into its territory, but in practice, 
there is also no one that would not let anyone in. The state defines and classifies population 
movements, determines their legality or illegality, gives status to the migrating people, 
tries to control and manage people’s movements in accordance with its own interests and 
needs. The process of formulating migration policy is based on the main assumption that 
migration flows could be (obviously, to some extent) regulated through political measures.5
Thomas Faist (1995) distinguishes four consecutive and interdependent levels through 
which the nation state controls the access of foreigners to its territory as well as to the polit-
5 Brochmann, Grete (1999): Controlling Immigration in Europe. In Brochmann, Grete – Hammar, Tomas 
eds.: Mechanism of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies. Oxford, 
Berg Publisher; Boswell, Christina (2007): Theorizing Migration Policy: Is there a Third Way? Interna-
tional  Migration Review, Vol. 41, No. 1. 75–100; Cornelius, Wayne – Tsuda, Takeyuki – Martin, Philip – 
 Hollifield, James F. eds. (2004): Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford, California, 
Stanford University Press; Hollifield, James F. (2000): The politics of international migration: how can we 
“bring the state back in”? In Brettell, Caroline B. – Hollifield, James F. eds.: Migration Theory. Talking 
across Disciplines. New York and London, Routledge.
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ical, social and economic spheres. In the first stage, the state decides about the (qualitative 
and often quantitative) criteria of entering its territory, sometimes giving preferences to 
specific groups of migrants (due to country of origin, family relationships, professional 
skills and others), while trying to block the influx of other groups by, for example, entering 
visas or other special entry conditions. The second level concerns the legal status that the 
state grants to migrants. This level has a key impact for the further process of settlement 
and integration. The third area distinguished by Faist concerns the remaining dimensions 
of social life, such as the labour market, education, housing policy and culture, which de-
termine the success of socio-economic integration of migrants. The fourth level concerns 
political inclusion, reflects the state’s response to the permanent migrants’ settlement on its 
territory, concerns the issue of their political empowerment by providing electoral rights and 
liberal naturalization scheme. Fielding (1993) proposes the following typology of migration 
control policies, with some European examples: unrestricted entry (free movement between 
countries in the Schengen area), promotional entry (guestworker migration to Germany, 
1961–73); permissive entry (managers and professionals of multinational companies); selec-
tive entry (family reunion); and prohibited entry (so-called irregular immigrants).
In theory, it is up to the state authorities to decide on the permission or entry ban, 
residence permits and expulsion orders of the foreigners. In practice, however, the state 
does not have complete freedom of decision here, it is limited by a number of factors, be-
cause any state is a fully independent decision-making body, it is part of a larger political 
and international system. On the one hand, the state in its decisions is limited by various 
types of political and legal obligations related to human rights, bilateral and international 
agreements signed, membership in international organizations such as the European Union, 
which enforces adaptation to certain standards. On the other hand, the place and nature 
of the state’s activities in the structure of migration processes is greatly influenced by na-
tional, economic and security interests, historical patterns of human flows, and the attitude 
of society towards foreigners. The attitude of the given receiving community as an active 
subject of the migration processes will be the result of all the above-mentioned factors.
State actions in the framework of migration policy as the mechanisms controlling the 
influx of migrants can be divided into external and internal ones. All of them are diverse 
at the level of individual states and regional arrangements, they are very often resolved by 
bilateral or multilateral agreements, the best example of the latter is the European Union or 
the Nordic countries. Most European countries apply both types of controls simultaneously, 
although in the era of regional integration and the disappearance of internal borders within 
the Schengen Area, the focus is on a shared responsibility for the protection of its external 
borders. The liberal or restrictive face of the state’s activities in this area depends mainly 
on the needs of the national economy and the labor market. History shows that the influx of 
migrants is subject to strict restrictions in times of economic crises and high unemployment, 
as was the case in the 1970s, and increases during the liberalization and dynamic develop-
ment of national economies and growing demand for foreign labour force.
The international relations also have a significant impact on the state migration policy. 
The migration policy of any country is not created in opposition or without consultation 
and cooperation with others. Migration processes have been one of the most important 
factors shaping inter-state relations in contemporary world. Its effectiveness is conditioned 
to the highest degree from supranational compromises and close cooperation between 
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states. The state shaping its own migration policy must be aware and take into account the 
migration processes taking place in the whole region and migration policies of neighboring 
countries. The dynamic development of a common European policy in the field of border 
control, harmonization of migration policies and the development of a common asylum 
policy have a major impact on the policies of all member countries.
The control of one’s own borders is one of the basic powers of a sovereign state related 
to its external and internal security. The migration control policy is dictated by specific 
objectives, commonly characterized as priorities for the security of the state. The narrative 
about the protection of the sovereignty of the state and its national interests plays an im-
portant role in formulating the goals and principles of migration policy. National interests 
of the state related to migration processes can be briefly characterized as: 1. national se-
curity (maintaining coherence and stability); 2. national economy (maintaining economic 
development, newcomers absorption into the social and economic system, mainly through 
the labor market and social security system); 3. demographic (maintaining an optimal age 
distribution, i.e. the so-called age pyramid of society); 4. social and cultural cohesion (pro-
tection of national identity and social integration). In this context, there is a need to control 
the number of migrants in the interest of preserving economic stability, social unity, cultural 
cohesion and political stability.6
The combination of the above mentioned elements makes up the normative basis 
for the legitimacy of the migration control policy. Its final shape is influenced by many 
factors: internal (such as national history and tradition, administrative solutions, political 
and civic culture, national identity) and external (among others solutions applied by other 
states, international and bilateral obligations, crisis and conflicts in the region). One should 
also not forget about the influence of varied institutional entities. Trade unions exert direct 
and indirect influence by, for example, pressure reducing the inflow of foreign workers or 
structural closure of access to the labour market; political parties, mainly right-wing parties, 
postulate restrictive migration policy; NGOs are directly involved in activities to improve 
the situation of migrants, as well as through actions for an open society, development of 
tolerance and the fight against discrimination and racism.
Ideal Model of Migration Policy
Migration is an unavoidable and indispensable phenomenon. The formulation of proper 
and effective migration policy requires, first and foremost, the conceptualisation of a given 
state’s interests related to migration processes. This means submitting a set of key questions 
and finding a commonly accepted response to at least some of them:
• Does the state need or not need migration (and why or why not)?
• What kind of migration is desired?
• How can the desired inflows be recruited and how can undesired ones be const-
rained?
• How should the migrants who are already in the country be dealt with?
6 Brochmann (1999): op. cit. 6.
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It is important to note in this context that migration policy is directly interdependent with 
other detailed policies. Migration policy as a public policy was distinguished much later 
than economic, demographic, foreign or social policy. The latter were treated and are as 
strategic, which means in practice that decisions directly concerning international migration 
depend on the guidelines and priorities adopted in such areas as the labor market, economy, 
demography, international relations, social and cultural cohesion.
In order to improve our understanding of the creative role of the state and its policies, 
a thorough analysis of the past and present status of migration processes in Europe is need-
ed – one which includes their logic, course and consequences. Every destination country 
has its own unique characteristics. What distinguishes one from the other is the country’s 
history and tradition of immigration, the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of its 
inflows, and also the way the state reacts to the entry and settlement of newcomers. There 
are several commonalities within the logic underlying migration policies in every country, 
regardless of the level of maturity they may already have reached. All destination countries 
are necessarily confronted with the same migration-related challenges: they can be broken 
down into categories of pre- and post-immigration challenges.
The pre-immigration challenges are related to potential immigrants. They most 
significantly affect the state’s interests related to labour market needs, economic develop-
ment, demographic situations, etc. Policy makers attempt to respond to these challenges 
by implementing effective mechanisms of admission and recruitment of selected groups, 
including high-skilled or seasonal workers. The pre-immigration challenges also comprise 
undesired migration inflows (first and foremost irregular ones) and the state’s response via 
stricter border controls.
Post-immigration challenges arise from the direct and indirect effects of immigrants’ 
inclusion into and functioning within the labour market and social fabric of a given 
 destination country. Integration policies are the key to counteracting the discrimination, 
marginalisation and social exclusion of newcomers, as well as weak social cohesion, ethnic 
and cultural tensions, and the irregular employment of immigrants. Following traditional 
approaches, an ideal policy should be:
• Predictive and well-planned (based on a widely accepted long-term strategy that 
defines the state’s interests and aims to achieve them via migration policy);
• well-organized and coherent (supported by a legal framework that serves as a nor-
mative basis and an appropriate bureaucratic structure that ensures successful 
implementation);
• rational (based on a thorough analysis of all available data and information sources 
as well as the experiences of other countries), and, the most challenging criterion:
• efficient (there should be a consistency between the intended objectives and final 
outcomes of a given migration policy).7
It is a difficult task (if it is possible at all) to evaluate migration policy according to these 
ideal characteristics. From a more practical point of view, a basic condition seems to be of 
utmost importance – namely, whether migration policy corresponds well with the actual 
7 Lesińska (2012): op. cit.
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state of affairs, and whether the demand for state intervention in regulating migration flows 
is sufficiently met.
The Relations between Migration and Integration Policy
Integration has to be treated as an issue of significant concern. Inflows of foreigners have 
to be accepted as a permanent process, not as a temporary phenomenon, and one with 
long-term consequences that very often leads to settlement. Integration as a process has 
been studied in the social sciences by using different terms, such as absorption, adaptation, 
race relations cycle, assimilation, acculturation, inclusion, incorporation and, of course, 
integration.
There are many definitions of integration proposed by different authors. Here are just 
two examples. Rinus Penninx and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas (2015) offer a useful short 
definition of integration as the process of becoming an accepted part of society. More com-
prehensive definition is proposed by Friedrich Heckmann: “integration as social integration 
can be defined as a generations lasting process of inclusion and acceptance of migrants in the 
core institutions, relations and statuses of the receiving society. For the migrants, integration 
refers to a process of learning a new culture, an acquisition of rights, access to positions and 
statuses, a building of personal relations to members of the receiving society and a formation 
of feelings of belonging and identification towards the immigration society. Integration is 
an interactive process between migrants and the receiving society. The receiving society 
has to learn new ways of interacting with the newcomers and adapt its institutions to their 
needs. In this process, however, the receiving society has much more power and prestige.” 
Further, the author underlines that process of integration requires time “because integration 
is a learning process and learning takes time. For the persons who have migrated them-
selves, the so-called first generation, integration is a second socialization that takes a lot of 
intellectual and emotional effort. […] The receiving society as well has to learn new ways 
of interacting with “foreign” people and adapt its institutions to their needs. For societies 
who have not experienced migration in their recent history this is more demanding than 
for immigration societies, whose institutions are prepared for the acceptance of migrants”.8
Harald Waldrauch and Christoph Hofinger (1997), studying the integration process 
of migrants in eight selected countries of Western Europe, distinguished three levels of 
integration. The first is legal integration, when migrants receive a specific legal status, 
which consists of civil, economic, social, cultural and sometimes a certain range of politi-
cal rights. The second level is social integration, which refers to their position in the social 
and economic life of the community. The deficit at this level of integration is measured 
by the concentration of migrants in low-paid jobs, their spatial ghettoization, that is, the 
concentration of lower-status districts in the cities and proportionally smaller numbers of 
migrant children at higher levels of the education system. The third level refers to cultural 
integration, which on the one hand means the adaptation of foreigners to the lifestyle and 
8 Heckmann, Friedrich (2005): Integration and Integration Policies. Bamberg, European Forum for Migration 
Studies. 17.
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common values in the dominant society, and on the other, acceptance and even support of 
the host country for the culture and tradition of migrant groups.
Taking into account this typology, the following barriers to migrants’ integration could 
be pointed out:
• Legal barriers or rules of institutions that limited migrants’ participation and mem-
bership in the state and its sub-systems (social system, labour market, national 
culture, etc.) as well as institutional and legal discrimination;
• discriminatory behavior, prejudice and stereotypes fostering unjustified unequal 
treatment of migrants in social and interpersonal encounters;
• lack of support by the state institutions and host society to support the integration 
process (structural discrimination).
The integration policy refers in a general sense to the actions of the state whose legal 
migrants are the subject, and the aim is to include them in the broadly understood social 
dimension of the community. Integration activities should cover all dimensions of migrants’ 
lives in the new country – the labour market, housing, social and social care, education and 
language learning. Integration activities are addressed mainly to permanent residents, but 
also include the reach of recognized refugees, although in their case a formula of temporary 
integration with the prospect of return is often used. Some of the experts and practitioners 
claim that integration activities should be targeted not only at regular migrants, but also at 
irregular ones, who are the most vulnerable to social exclusion and marginalisation (that is, 
irrespectively of their legal status, free access to basic health care services and education 
for minors should be provided).
It is worth noting that integration policy is focused mainly on the areas of health 
 services, housing, welfare schemes, education and the labour market. It is therefore related 
to and dependent on the national welfare system – which varies from country to country. 
Moreover, in federal countries with high levels of decentralisation, as in Germany, Spain 
or Italy, the regional and even municipal authorities have significant independence in the 
implementation of particular policies. Overall, it seems to be a positive solution for integra-
tion policies, in accordance with the assumption that regional and local authorities typically 
possess better knowledge about migrants’ needs, and are thus better prepared to frame 
successful plans for social integration and design a more appropriate structure of services.
Thomas Hammar (1990, 2010) in his theoretical considerations assumes that migration 
policy fundamentally consists of two components: regulation of the inflow of foreigners 
into the territory of a given state (immigration) and actions undertaken towards migrants 
residing already in a given country (integration). Therefore, he considers integration policy 
as a component of migration policy. What is worth to develop are the relations taking place 
between those two policies and the determinants relevant to integration policy for decisions 
made by state authorities as regards the regulation of the inflow of foreigners.
The connection between migration and integration policy is strict and direct, especially 
in the legal dimension. The legal status of a foreigner implies its possibilities, and in the long 
run also the desire to integrate with the community in every dimension (social, cultural, 
political). However, the state policy towards newcomers cannot end only on legal aspects, 
the status of a foreigner and anti-discrimination legislation, but should also include actions 
for their social, economic and cultural participation in society.
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Migration and integration policy is a direct derivative of the legal and political system 
and traditional solutions implemented by the state in this regard. The open political system, 
liberal political culture, religious and ethnic tolerance undoubtedly foster the influx of mi-
grants and the finding of their social niche. Will an immigrant join one of many ethnic and 
religious groups that create a multicultural society, or integrate in society to such an extent 
that such differences will not play a greater role in public life, or will eventually become 
a member of one of the marginalized and excluded groups, depends not only on individual 
preferences and opportunities, but also on political solutions adopted by the state.
Irregular Migration
In many countries, albeit to a different extent, irregular immigration has become a struc-
tural feature of migration regimes, and represents one of the most important challenges 
for national governments. Irregular migrants consist of three main types related to travel, 
residence and work: 1. those crossing international borders without the requisite documents 
and permits or using forged documents (illegal entry); 2. those remaining in a country 
beyond the approved duration of their stay (so called over stayers); 3. those working in 
a country without work permit (or any other necessary form of authorization). Combining 
these types produces a multiplicity of different situations. A case of maximum irregularity 
would combine all three above mentioned types: crossing the border without the necessary 
documents, having no residence status or right to work, and working in the informal sector. 
Given their hidden status, estimates of the scale of irregular migration are highly approxi-
mate. Globally, IOM (2010) has estimated that 10–15% of international migrants are in an 
irregular situation.
What system factors rooted in the state’s regime reinforce irregular migration? A con-
clusion drawn from the variety of analyses is clear on this point, highlighting the most 
important, such as: the existence of a shadow economy and a common acceptance of its 
existence; the lack or excessive restrictiveness of legal entry and recruitment procedures; 
weak administrative structures; ineffective systems of labour market control; and the lack 
of transparent regularisation schemes. Moreover, the state policy drifts towards tightening 
channels of legal migration and pressing down on asylum recognition may well have the 
effect of increasing flows of irregular migrants. When the dominant perception remains 
that the only option to arrive is entering the country illegally, more and more migrants will 
begin to use illegal means of accessing the territory and the labour market.
Special attention should be given here to the role of the informal economy, which 
serves as a magnet for irregular employment. Its relatively large size and particular structure 
 facilitate migrants’ flexibility and invisibility in the labour market. The attractive qualities of 
unregistered employment are reinforced by widespread societal acceptance, relatively high 
non-salaried costs of work and the time-consuming and complex administration procedures 
required to register. The size of the shadow economy also corresponds to the weakness 
of labour market controls. There is a well-known catalogue of state actions taken against 
migration irregularity. They can be divided into external (border controls, cooperation 
with countries of origin) and internal (labour market controls, regularisation). Christina 
Boswell and Andrew Geddes (2011) point out three main policy options which could be 
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used by the states facing irregular migration: 1. toleration: this may be because the costs of 
enforcement are too high or because the irregular migrants occur to be useful labour force 
work (flexible and cheap); 2. regularization: this recognizes post facto the useful presence 
of irregular migrants and confers some kind of legal status (conditional and limited in 
time); 3. expulsion: the action of forcing irregular migrants to leave the country, the most 
draconian and expensive measure.
Europeanisation of Migration Policy
The last several decades have marked a time of building the EU as a legal and political 
entity. The process commonly called Europeanisation refers to the convergence of EU and 
national approaches in numerous areas. Migration is also one of them, and the process of 
re-orienting the direction and shape of migration policy into a European one is currently 
taking place. The chance for a real Europeanisation of migration policy is rooted in all states 
sharing the same basic logic, which is based on a community of interests. As it was already 
underlined, each state has similar interests and concerns related to migration as well as each 
state faces the same set of challenges related to human flows.
Undoubtedly, one of the consequences of the whole process of Europeanisation is the 
creation of a common general legal and political framework, based on an obligatory acquis 
and a collection of recommendations and best practices – which all countries should follow 
(via an open method of co-ordination introduced by the EU). For the new member states, 
accession to the EU was a powerful determining impulse and brought about an acceleration 
in the evolution of national migration policies. Institutions and measures designed by more 
mature migration countries have been transposed, during the process of harmonisation with 
the EU, to the newly acceding states.
Among the recent EU documents pertaining to migration, the key one is the European 
Agenda on Migration. The Agenda emphasizes the broader need to develop well-man-
aged opportunities for legal migration whilst, at the same time, reducing the incentives 
for irregular migration and improving the effective management of borders. The need for 
EU-level action was made clear: “No Member State can effectively address migration alone 
[…] we need a new, more European approach. This requires using all policies and tools at 
our disposal – combining internal and external policies to best effect. All actors: Member 
States, EU institutions, international organizations, civil society, local authorities and third 
countries need to work together to make a common European migration policy a reality.”9
The European Agenda nominates four pillars for a more effective management of 
migration. The first aim is to reduce the incentives for irregular migration (key objectives 
here are addressing the root causes of irregular and forced displacement in third countries, 
cracking down on the smugglers and traffickers of migrants, and encouraging the repatri-
ation of irregular migrants). The second pillar considers border management, the concept 
of smart borders was introduced which enable a tradeoff between increasing the efficiency 
of border crossing for legal inflows and, at the same time, strengthening the campaign 
against irregular migration by better use of IT systems such as Eurodac and the Schengen 
9 EC 2015. 2.
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Information System. The third pillar refers to common asylum policy; it requires further 
development of the Common European Asylum System. The fourth pillar is a new policy 
for legal migration the aim of which is to move towards the ideal of fostering migrants’ 
integration in Europe and maximizing the benefits of migration.
The European Agenda on Migration is clear in its recognition of the need to strength-
en and develop new policies to respond to what are seen as new migratory pressures and 
challenges, such as more-effective asylum and visa procedures, firmer and more targeted 
measures for the integration of migrants, and tackling irregular migration, and at the same 
time strengthening policies on legal migration, including a focus on attracting students and 
other talented and highly skilled persons.
The European Agenda on Migration makes a brief reference to effective integration 
under its priority action area on legal migration. It is planned that for the current program-
ming period (2014–20), at least one fifth of the European Social Fund resources will be 
directed to social inclusion, which includes the integration of migrants, with a particular 
focus on refugees and children.10 More-detailed specifications on EU actions and policies 
towards the integration of third-country migrants are provided in three other Commission 
documents. The foundation statement was included in the Common Agenda for Integration 
(CEC 2005), which laid out common basic principles, which are as follows:
1. Integration is a dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by all im-
migrants and residents of Member States.
2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the overall 
participation of immigrants in the host society.
4. Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions is indis-
pensable for integration.
5. Education is critical for preparing immigrants, and especially their descendants, 
to be successful and active participants in society.
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and 
services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way, is 
a crucial foundation for integration.
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a funda-
mental mechanism for integration.
8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed and safeguarded, unless 
these practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with the national 
law.
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation 
of integration policies, especially at local level, supports their integration.
10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures is an important consideration in 
public policy formation and implementation.
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to 
adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of in-
formation more effective.
10 EC 2015. 16.
284 Dynamics and Social Impact of Migration
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
Review of the progress of integration six years later, taking on board the experience of 
new Member States and the general phenomenon of the increasing diversity of European 
societies, enabled the Commission to identify several ongoing and pressing challenges:11
• Low levels of employment among migrants, especially migrant women;
• rising levels of unemployment and high levels of over-qualification of migrants 
compared to the jobs they do;
• increasing risks of migrants’ social exclusion;
• gaps in educational attainment;
• public concerns with the lack of integration of migrants.
From a global perspective, Europe is already a diverse region, due to its considerable migrant 
and migrant-heritage populations, and is currently facing large-scale flows which could be 
described as mixed migration.12 It not only means inflows of third country citizens (volun-
tary and forced migration) but also internal mobility which scale is greater than ever before. 
The dynamic human movements reinforced by a modern economy and transportation, 
characterised by post-industrial flexibility and insecurity – will be the greatest challenge 
for individual destination countries and the EU as such. It requires interstate and regional 
cooperation to improve currently existed policies related to human mobility in a pragmatic 
way. New dynamic migration reality requires also a new kind of theoretical thinking and 
new innovative high-quality research to explain migration processes, their causes, nature 
and consequences to help policy makers design and implement effective knowledge based 
migration policy.
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The Security Aspects of Immigration in Central Europe
Edina Vajkai
Introduction
Due to the immigration crisis started in 2015, the question of how dangerous immigration 
is, and the security aspects of immigration have been centered, and nowadays, they are also 
in the main focus of political and public life. However, the consequences and aspects are not 
the same in each European country, moreover, the effects may also vary within countries of 
a particular region. It should be added, that the legality of migration may also influence the 
seriousness and the extent of these aftermaths. For example, not every European country has 
equally perceived the consequences of the migration crisis that began in 2015: the number 
of first time asylum applicants in Germany increased from 442,000 in 2015 to 722,000 in 
2016, while in Hungary this number fell from 177,135 in 2015 to 29,430, due to the restric-
tions of the Criminal Code, and the construction of the fence between Serbia and Hungary 
or Croatia and Hungary. At the same time, the number of asylum applications remained 
relatively low in other Central European countries which are not affected by major migra-
tion routes. (Poland had 12,190 asylum applications in 2015, and 12,305 in 2016; Slovakia 
received only 330 instances in 2015, and 145 in 2016; and the Czech Republic got 1,515 
applications in 2015, and 1,475 in 2016). For this reason, other types of challenges (such 
as effects on public safety, risks related to their future integration, etc.) need to be taken 
into account in those countries where there is a high number of asylum seekers (and at the 
same time the number of people illegally entering and staying in the country is potentially 
higher) than where this figure is relatively low.1 In this essay, I will present these different 
types of security aspects in Central European and V4 countries.
Characteristics of Immigration in the V4 Countries
Due to the historical, geographical and social diversity of these countries, the full, compre-
hensive comparison seems difficult, so I have chosen to include the most important aspects 
and events of each state in this essay.
1 Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex. Annual aggregated data (rounded). Last 
update: 04.10.2017. Eurostat.ecc.europa.eu. Available: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/ show.do?da-
taset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en (Accessed: 09.12.2017) 
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Slovakia
Slovakia is not traditionally the final destinations for migrants. Apart from the Treaty of 
 Trianon (at that time Czechoslovakia, and from the 1st of January, 1993 Slovakia), this coun-
try was not affected by the dramatic migration changes during the twentieth century, except 
by the forced emigration of Hungarians after 1920 (as an effect of the Treaty mentioned 
above) and by the forced emigration of Germans after 1945. Until 1950, almost 12 million 
had left or been expelled from East-Central Europe – and almost a quarter of these people 
were from Czechoslovakia.
Slovakia is generally a country of origin for migrants, so Slovakian people leave their 
home country for different reasons. The Slovakian accession to the EU brought several 
amounts of changes to the country’s migration profile. Since 2004, the illegal immigration 
and the number of asylum seekers had decreased, and the legal migration has increased 
a bit more than four times.
In addition to migration based on social reasons, such as family reunification or mar-
riage to a Slovakian citizen, the most significant component of legal migration is currently 
migration for work and study.2
Looking at the statistics, we can see that foreigners possessing a valid residence per-
mit represent a 1,8% of the population, which means that they are 97,937 in the country. 
This amount experienced a real increase in 2004, when Slovakia became a member of the 
European Union, because in 2002, this number was only 22,108. According to the latest 
statistical outcomes, Slovakia has the sixth lowest proportion of foreigners in the European 
Union (1,2%), following Poland (0,4%), Romania (0,5%), Lithuania (0,6%), Bulgaria and 
Croatia (both 1,0%). It is interesting to see that 3 of 4 V4 countries are in the top 7, because 
in Hungary, the proportion of foreigners is only 1,6% (and in addition, the Czech Republic 
is only the 9th with 4,5%). So, we could say that foreigners are not overrepresented in the 
V4 countries, but somehow, they represent a great deal of challenges to these countries.3
With regards to the purposes of immigration to Slovakia, it can be said that labour 
migration is one of the main causes, and in an overwhelming part, foreign workers are from 
the nearby countries (Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ukraine). Given the fact 
that the history of Slovakia and the Czech Republic was intertwined, there are still a large 
number of Czechs living in Slovakia and vica versa.
Considering the effects of the accession to the EU, it is evident that the number of illegal 
border crossings has decreased significantly: from 10,946 illegal entrances in 2002, to 2,170 
in 2016. Another interesting fact: from the overall number of 58,559 applications realized 
since 1993, asylum was granted to only 838 people, and 702 applicants received a subsidiary 
protection. From January to June 2017, only 17 asylum procedures had a positive outcome.4
2 Migration in Slovakia. Iom.sk. Available: www.iom.sk/en/about-migration/migration-in-slovakia (Accessed: 
15.12.2017) 
3 Eurostat – non-national population by group of citizenship, 1 January, 2016. Eurostat. Available: http:// 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Non-national_population_by_group_ of_citizen-
ship,_1_January_2016_(%C2%B9).png (Accessed: 15.12.2017)
4 Migration in Slovakia. Iom.sk. Available: www.iom.sk/en/about-migration/migration-in-slovakia (Accessed: 
15.12.2017)
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Poland
As regards Poland, we must mention firstly the main migration waves, which had a great 
impact on today’s Polish immigration. The first wave took place in the 18th century due to 
the loss of independence and shortly after the unsuccessful national uprisings. This time 
tens of thousands of people emigrated abroad, and many contributed to the freedom of other 
countries (like general Bem in Hungary). The wave which began after 1830 is usually called 
the Great Emigration as many military leaders, politicians and writers left the country in 
order to escape from imprisonment or death.
The second most significant wave took place between 1870–1913, when almost 3.5 mil-
lion people left the Polish territories. In this period, we can talk about economical migration, 
and the majority tried his luck in the US, in Germany or in France.
The third emigration wave happened between WWI and WWII, when 2.5 million 
Polish people left the country hoping for a better future or a well-paid job. So, between 
1970 and 1938, almost 6 million Polish citizens left their country of origin, which is a really 
remarkable number, and it also determined Poland’s future.
The next important wave was during and shortly after WWII. In this period, many 
soldiers were sent abroad (in order to fight), and died there, and during the two years of 
Soviet occupation, over 1.7 million Polish were sent to Siberia and Kazakhstan.
A considerable number of people left Poland after 1956, and their reasons were not as 
obvious as expected: they left because it was easier to get a passport and to leave abroad; 
thay did not leave because life was getting more difficult. In 1967–68 the exodus of Polish 
Jews was also an important moment in history.
Between 1980–1990, 100 thousand people was leaving Poland every year, mainly for 
economic reasons, but some political activists also had to leave after martial law was en-
forced, the overwhelming part of these people were good-educated and young, so it caused 
a serious change in Poland’s demographic characteristics.
Some scientists say that the ongoing migration wave started in 2004, when the country 
joined the European Union. Ever since, Polish people mainly left the country to find a job, and 
have better prospects for the future, because the unemployment rate was between 14–20%.5
The outflow of low- and high-skilled labour from Poland (mainly to the UK and Ireland) 
is considerable, and remains a question to be solved, as the missing workforce can put the 
economic sectors in a delicate position. To avoid this, Poland has also begun to look for 
strategies to attract foreign labour force.
Czech Republic
Given the fact that Slovakia and the Czech Republic used to share on a common history, 
I disregard the description of the historical aspects of the Czech migration.
According to the census realized in 2011, there were 543,000 legally residing,  foreign 
habitants in the Czech Republic, which means 5% of the total population. As I have 
5 Polish Emigration Abroad – a historical review. Culture.polish.us. Available: http://culture.polishsite.us/
articles/ art367fr.htm (Accessed: 13.12.2017
290 Dynamics and Social Impact of Migration
PB KORREKTÚRAPÉLDÁNY
DIALÓG CAMPUS KIADÓ
mentioned below, this is the highest rate among the V4 countries. The largest group of 
foreigners are from Ukraine (which means that although it is a country quite close to the 
Czech Republic, Ukrainians are third country-nationals according to international law). 
We can find also a considerable number of Asian minorities in the Czech Republic, such as 
Vietnamese people. Due to a deal concerning the education of Vietnamese people realized 
under Communism, a lot of Vietnamese people appeared in the Czech Republic in 1956. 
Their number has been steadily increasing until the fall of Communism. Among those, who 
arrived within the first generation, many work mostly as businessmen in small markets. 
Despite this, some of them still does not own a Czech citizenship. Hereafter, a remarkable 
number of Slovakian (84,000), Russian (36,000), German (21,000) and Polish (18,000) people 
are living in the country.6
One of the most important facts concerning Czech immigration is that although the 
Czech Republic is member of the Schengen Area, it does not have a Schengen external 
border, which means that it does not have to face as serious illegal immigration issues as 
other countries having a Schengen external border.
Since the birth of the Czech Republic, the nature of migration has changed signifi-
cantly. In the early 1990s, the Czech Republic was mainly a source country, and a large 
number of incoming of applicants for international protection was typical, and there were 
also a considerable number of transiting foreign nationals. In recent years, this country has 
become a country of destination for foreign nationals, whose purposes are mainly connected 
to business issues and work. They typically want to settle down permanently or for a long 
term. If we compare the initial situation in 1993, when just below 80,000 foreign nationals 
were staying in the territory of the Czech Republic with diverse forms of residence statuses 
to the actual situation, several changes have occurred.7 According to the data provided by 
the Czech Ministry of the Interior, on 31 July 2012, there were 437,928 foreigners legally 
residing in the Czech Republic. This growth of more than 500% is mainly due to the changes 
realized after the creation of the Czech Republic, and its adhesion to the European Union 
and NATO. This also means that issues related to international migration have become 
a really important part of the political and common life.8
The Czech Republic believes that the legal migration needs to be approached with 
adequate openness, because it constitutes a key element towards the development of the 
country and its economy. For this purpose, a document entitled The Czech Government’s 
Migration Policy Principles had been adopted, and within this framework, the following 
thesis forms one of the basis of the Czech immigration policy: “the national migration policy 
does not place obstacles to legal migration and supports immigration, which is beneficial 
for the state and the society in the long run”.9
6 Cesky Statisticky Urad. Available: www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q=Cesky+Statisticky+Urad 
(Accessed: 12.12.2017) 
7 Migration policy of the Czech Republic. Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic. Available: www. mvcr.
cz/mvcren/article/migration.aspx (Accessed: 12.12.2017) 
8 Q&A about immigration in the Czech Republic. Cicpraha.org. Available: www.cicpraha.org/en/pro-verejnost/ 
zakladni-informace-o-imigraci-v-cr/otazky-a-odpovedi-o-cizincich-v-cr.html (Accessed: 12.12.2017)
9 Approach of the Czech Republic to Legal Migration. Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic. Available: 
www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/article/migration.aspx?q=Y2hudW09Mw%3d%3d (Accessed: 12.12.2017) 
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Hungary
Hungary’s special migration characteristics are based on its eventful history. The country’s 
geographical location placed itself in the path of important European historical events, and 
it also plays an important role in Hungary’s migration profile nowadays.
As it is known, the birth of the country in the 10th century was mainly due to popu-
lation movements, and it has also played an important role in Hungary’s history since its 
foundation. During the 13th century, many foreign populations appeared in the Carpathian 
Basin, so the actual authority had to constantly monitor these movements and they did all it 
needed to properly regulate them. The Tartar invasion was a major juncture in the country’s 
history, and its negative demographic consequences could only be remedied by centrally 
managed and instigated settlements.10 From the 16th century, the present-day Central and 
Eastern European countries (along with some Western European countries) were parts 
of the Habsburg Empire. It was basically a single administrative and political entity, and 
population movements between different areas of the Empire was really typical. Later on, 
during the period of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy, migration was also a main point in 
political circles. Till the end of the 19th century, migration in Hungary was mainly char-
acterized by immigration flows, but between 1880 and World War I, emigration became 
much more important. People left Hungary mainly for economic reasons during this period. 
World War I – like in any other country – essentially cut short to immigration and emigra-
tion movements. As a result, the Treaty of Trianon made several and serious changes and 
had serious effects on Hungary’s life. According to the Treaty, two-third of the country’s 
territory became part of neighboring countries, while the number of inhabitants decreased 
by almost half. Hungarians became minorities in their new countries, outside the borders of 
their homeland. That is why new migratory movements (in some cases, they were forced) 
took place between 1919 and 1923. During this period, about 200,000 Hungarians resettled 
in Hungary. Word War II, and the situation afterwards significantly modified the ethnic and 
migration map in Central Europe.
Shortly after the end of World War II, the borders of Hungary were closed, and the state 
prohibited every form of migration, so unauthorized departure from Hungary and failure of 
returning home became a crime. In 1956, as a part or result of the uprising, borders opened 
for a short time, and in just three months, over 200,000 people left the country, and tried to 
settle down in Austria and in the United States. During the following decades, emigration 
was only permitted in exceptional cases. Immigration, on its own, was also limited, mainly 
within the framework of intergovernmental agreements, family reunification and based on 
political decisions. Concerning family reunification, false marriages were often made, in 
order to obtain the corresponding papers. The strictly guarded borders, strict conditions to 
obtain a visa, and also travel restrictions of this period resulted that Hungary was not even 
a sending, nor a transit country. This situation changed right after the transition: since the 
mid-1990s, Hungary has become a second country for inhabitants. Lots of Hungarians tried 
their luck in other countries and Hungary became a destination country for immigrants 
10 Hautzinger Zoltán (2012): A külföldiekre vonatkozó magyar jogi szabályozás fejlődése és története. Budapest, 
Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem. 20.
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mainly from the Eastern neighbours and also a transit country.11 Regarding the actual sit-
uation, it is important to identify that in 2017, one of the most popular reasons for residence 
was labour migration (42%). As a large number of Hungarians are leaving the country in 
order to work in another state, certain economic sectors are in need of foreign workers (like 
health care, manual workers).
According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 350,000 Hungarians have left 
the country since the Regime Change in 1989. After that, Hungary’s EU accession was an 
influencing factor regarding emigration. The period after the economic crisis was also a push 
factor for leaving the country: 29,400 Hungarians moved abroad in 2016. The main destina-
tion countries are Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium.12
Illegal Immigration and Asylum in the V4 Countries
As we have seen above, both immigration and emigration played and are playing an impor-
tant role in the lives of these countries. In order to cover the entire scale of migration, we 
must mention the illegal aspect of immigration and also the situation concerning asylum 
issues. The year 2015 brought a big change to Europe’s life: the rise of the migratory pres-
sure and the migration crisis have fundamentally changed the thinking of some countries 
and the EU.
Among the main migration routes (Eastern Mediterranean, Eastern Borders, Eastern 
Mediterranean, Western Balkans, Western Africa, Western Mediterranean and Central 
Mediterranean) for Central Europe, the West and East Balkan routes are the most significant 
ones which need to be taken into consideration.
The record number of migrants arriving in Greece had a direct knock-on effect on the 
Western Balkan route, as the people who entered the EU in Greece tried to make their way 
across the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia into Hungary and Croatia 
and then towards Western Europe. This led to unprecedented numbers of migrants seeking 
to re-enter the EU through Hungary’s borders with Serbia. After Hungary completed the 
construction of a fence on its border with Serbia in September, the flow of migrants shift-
ed to Croatia. Throughout 2015, the region recorded 764,000 detections of illegal border 
crossings by migrants, a 16-fold rise compared to 2014. The top-ranking nationality was 
Syrian, followed by Iraqis and Afghans.13
As the most recent EMN (European Migration Network) data for Poland is from 2014, 
while for the other V4 countries the latest document is from 2016, I have also called for 
another source for the portability of the data.
If we take a look at the number of asylum applications in the V4 countries, the figures 
show that two of the four countries have felt the migration crisis to a greater extent. In Po-
land, compared to the previous year, the number of applications for asylum has increased 
almost by one and a half times, and it has the second largest number for asylum applications 
11 Juhász, Judit (2003): Hungary: Transit Country Between East and West. Migration Policy Institute. Available: 
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hungary-transit-country-between-east-and-west (Accessed: 12.12.2017)
12 Migration issues in Hungary. IOM. Available: www.iom.hu/migration-issues-hungary (Accessed: 12.12.2017) 
13 FRONTEX – Western Balkan route. Frontex.europa.eu. Available: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/
western-balkan-route/ (Accessed: 09.12.2017) 
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within the V4 countries in 2015 with 12,190, but it is still 0.9% of the total applications 
handed in the EU-28 (and it is almost 37 times more than the data explored in Slovakia). 
The number of applications in 2016 was approximately the same in 2015.
Most of the asylum applications were submitted in Hungary in 2015, which means 
13.34% of the total number of applications of the EU. It is interesting to see that for example 
in 2012, the Hungarian authorities had to deal with only 2,155 asylum applications, and in 
the following years, this number increased gradually, but not even steadily. The number of 
applications doubled from 2013 to 2014, and it became almost four times more from the year 
2014 to 2015, when the migration crisis was at its peak. But next year, in 2016, the number 
of asylum applications dropped to sixth, due to the restrictions made by the Hungarian 
Criminal Law, and the construction of the fence along the southern border of Hungary.
Table 1.
Number of asylum applications and first-time applications
Country 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
EU-28 335,290 431,090 626,960 1,322,825 1,260,910
Hungary 2,155 18,895 42,775 177,135 29,430 
Poland 10,750 15,240 8,020 12,190 12,305
Czech Republic 740 695 1,145 1,515 1,475
Slovakia 730 440 330 330 145
Source: Eurostat
Table 2.
Hungary – asylum applications: Top five third-country nationalities
2015 2016
Nationality Number % Nationality Number %
Syria 64,585 36% Afghanistan 11,050 38%
Afghanistan 46,230 26% Syria 4,980 17%
Kosovo 24,445 14% Pakistan 3,875 13%
Pakistan 15,155 9% Iraq 3,450 12%
Iraq 9,280 5% Iran 1,285 4%
Source: Country factsheet – Hungary
Table 3.
Poland – asylum applications: Top five third-country nationalities
2015 2016
nationality number % nationality number %
Russia 7,870 65% Russia 8,994 73%
Ukraine 2,295 19% Ukraine 1,306 10%
Tajikistan 540 5% Tajikistan 882 7%
Armenia 195 1,5% Armenia 344 2%
Georgia 390 3% Georgia 124 1%
Source: Eurostat Data Explorer and Statistics – Poland
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Table 4.
The Czech Republic – asylum applications: Top five third-country nationalities
2015 2016
nationality number % nationality number %
Ukraine 695 46% Ukraine 505 34%
Syria 135 9% Iraq 155 10%
Cuba 130 9% Cuba 85 6%
Vietnam 80 5% Syria 80 5%
Russia 45 3% China 70 5%
Source: Country factsheet – the Czech Republic
Table 5.
Slovakia – asylum applications: Top five third-country nationalities
2015 2016
nationality number % nationality number %
Iraq 170 52% Ukraine 25 17%
Afghanistan 35 11% Afghanistan 15 10%
Ukraine 25 8% Pakistan 15 10%
Unknown 15 5% Iraq 15 10%
Russia, India, Syria 10 3% Syria 15 10%
Source: Country factsheet – the Slovak Republic
Regarding the applicants’ nationality, the scale shows a diverse picture. While the over-
whelming majority of applicants in Poland, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic 
are from Ukraine, in Hungary, they are mainly from Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan. The 
reason for this is the location of countries along the migration paths mentioned below.
Effects of Immigration in the V4 Countries from Different Aspects
After reviewing the migration characteristics of each V4 country, we need to examine the 
concrete and possible impacts of migration on the lives of these countries. These effects 
are largely dependent of the migration characteristics of the countries. If a country is for 
example a transit country, it has to face different types of challenges compared to a destina-
tion or sending country. The challenges also depend on other issues, like the composition, 
or nationality of the immigrants, or their intention of stay. For example, if an immigrant 
legally arrived to the country for study purposes and stays there longer than authorized, he 
or she becomes a person illegally staying in the country, and this case requires a different 
type of procedure from the part of the acting authority than a person who enters the country 
in an illegal way.
In order to make it easier to review the challenges of each security aspect, I will 
analyze them through the sectorial security concept of Barry Buzan. Although, Buzan’s 
theory is more complex and it has several more elements (such as securitization – a process 
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in which a topic is defined as a security question), for this essay I have chosen to use only 
this approach. In his book, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security 
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, he outlined the following main elements of his concept. 
He denied the primacy of military security, and instead of it, he divided the security into five 
main sectors which plays an important role: the social, environmental, political, economic 
and military. These cannot be treated completely separately, because each element has an 
impact on the other.14
Political aspects
Regarding the political sector, the political aspect, we should consider the reigning political 
system as both a push and pull factor, so it can be the reason of immigration and also for 
emigration. If it is an incentive to immigration, it probably provides better conditions, and 
in some of the cases, we can talk about asylum-seekers and refugees. If we examine only 
the number of asylum applications, even we could say that Hungary used to be an attractive 
country for asylum seekers. But we must add the fact that the overwhelming part of the 
applicants, shortly after the applications was filed, left the country towards other destina-
tions, towards other countries – like Germany or Sweden. For this reason, the statement 
above must be re-evaluated, because Hungary is not a destination, but a transit country.
The aim of the reigning political system in the country should be to create and oper-
ate institutions, different norms and rules in order to effectively regulate immigration and 
migration flows. Managing this is not an easy task since it has to take into account not only 
the legal order of its own country, but it must also have to respect several international 
obligations.
The nature of each country’s immigration policy is also an important issue. If a society, 
or a country is open-minded and welcomes refugees and immigrants, and it accentuates this 
in its communication, it can experience lots of various consequences.
Once the respect of international obligations has already been mentioned, we must 
notice the case of relocation of asylum-seekers, and its political aspects.
In Central Europe, and especially in the V4 countries, the tone of political discourse 
has changed significantly. For example, Poland and Hungary do not want to participate in 
the quota allocation system within the framework of the European Union, and they will 
probably do their best to avoid this.
The European Commission, the EU’s executive body is to sue Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for refusing to take in asylum 
seekers. The Commission accused these three countries of “non-compliance with their le-
gal obligations on relocation”, and it seems it could impose heavy fines. However, the aim 
of this concept was to relieve pressure on Greece and Italy; the Czech Republic accepted 
only 12 of the asylum-seekers it had been designated, while Poland and Hungary did not 
receive any of them.15 Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis told that the Czech Republic will 
14 Buzan, Barry (1983): People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies int he Post-Cold 
War Era. Colchester, United Kingdom, ECPR Press.
15 EU to sue Poland, Hungary and Czechs for refusing refugee quotas. bbc.com. Available: www.bbc. com/news/
world-europe-42270239 (Accessed: 13.12.2017)
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 continue to oppose the relocation plan, and also mentioned that this quota system had fueled 
anti-migration sentiments. Poland’s Deputy Foreign Minister Konrad Szymanski also said 
his government was “ready to defend its position in the court”.
The course mentioned above shows that the political system (in every V4  country) – even 
if it faces the EU’s policy and risks EU procedures – strictly clings to its quota-adhering 
opinion and influences the public opinion in this direction, as well. This anti-immigration 
attitude can influence the functioning and also the future and the stability of the political 
system in the long term. Regarding for exemple Hungary, we must mention the fact that 
the so-called poster-campaign had a significant influence on the outcome of parliamentary 
elections in 2018: Fidesz obtained 49.27% of votes, and has now 133 representatives in the 
Parliament. This fact is probably partially due to this anti-immigration campaign.
In addition, maybe except Hungary, the reports mention a respectable number of 
anti-immigration protests and demonstrations, which also shows that there are serious se-
curity aspects of immigration (and also emigration). Several hundred-people demonstrated 
in Prague in 2015 against the reception of refugees and asylum-seekers. The protests later 
reached their goal, as the Czech Republic came out of the EU-agreement on the reception 
of asylum-seekers.16 In 2017, several hundreds of protesters have disrupted the Polish 
 Independence Day events as ultra-nationalists and fascist groups marched Saturday, waving 
flags and burning flares as they marched down the streets of Warsaw.17
A protest held in June 2015 in Bratislava, Slovakia against immigration that led to 
violence against both bystanders and police officers showed for the first time the surprising 
power of extremists in Slovakia. Protesters were nourished by mass hysteria and fears of 
Muslim immigrants arriving in Slovakia.18 These extremists were trying to group as many 
radicals as possible around one specific topic. Later, in 2016, for a general shock, this far-
right party (People’s Party–Our Slovakia) took 8% of the votes of the elections, which is 
almost three times more than polls had predicted.19 This could also be a danger to security, 
as the emergence of extremists can trigger processes that are not conductive for the country 
or the security of society, and it can put countries into difficult positions. Also, as seen above, 
people intimidated by these extremist points of views can easily put their votes on far-right 
and far-left parties which can push a country towards more radicalization.
From the other side, emigration can also influence political security. As for emigration, 
there are two ways to influence the functioning of a political system. People settled down in 
developed, democratic countries can essentially influence their issuing country’s political 
life in two ways. On the one hand, after experiencing the good functioning of a democratic, 
16 Poland defends massive far-right protest that called for a ‘White Europe’. The Washington Post. Available: 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/12/pray-for-an-islamic-holocaust-tens-of-thousands-
from-europes-far-right-march-in-poland/?utm_term=.8b14d0612f00 (Accessed: 10.12.2017)
17 Protesters disrupt Poland independence day events. CNN. Available: http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/12/ europe/
poland-warsaw-nationalist-march/index.html (Accessed: 09.12.2017) 
18 Brain drain of Slovakia goes on. The Slovak Spectator. Available: https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20065888/ brain-
drain-of-slovakia-goes-on.html (Accessed: 05.12.2017)
19 Slovakia in shock over far-right party’s election success. Reuters. Available: www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-slovakia-election-rightwing/slovakia-in-shock-over-far-right-partys-election-success-idUSKCN0W80UB 
(Accessed: 30.11.2017) 
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stabile state in their host country, they can easily make the decision to settle down there 
permanently. Because of this, they will no longer participate in their country’s elections or 
referendums, which means that the politically active sector of society will probably decrease. 
Nota bene, in a lot of countries, like for example Hungary, citizens living abroad can also 
make their votes even in Hungary in the voting district according to their registered Hun-
garian residence, or at the embassy or consulate of their country of living.
On the other hand, if, after spending a certain time abroad, they decide to come home, 
they can make a significant contribution to the political development of their country even 
through more active participation in local, regional or national politics. In addition, they 
can also encourage their environment to participate in elections, by voting themselves on 
the basis of the example seen abroad.
It is clear, that the fact that a political leader who pursues a course of studies abroad is 
not a guarantee for a good-functioning, stable, democratic system. For the V4 countries this 
is not a security question, but in some African states, and for example in North Korea, the 
actual leader continued his studies abroad, and after returning home and coming to power, 
he started to create or continue to operate a dictatorship.
Economic and social aspects
Regarding the economic impacts of migration, we must also separate the elements related 
to emigration and immigration. Immigration itself has also a double effect on the lives of 
the countries. Once we talk about immigration, we must take into consideration its positive 
and negative elements, which can also have a security aspect. Among these consequences, 
we must mention the effects experienced on the labour market. The most common fear of 
the public opinion is that the unemployment of immigrants increases the unemployment 
among the local population. Moreover, in Hungary, a poster campaign was carried on, one 
of its main message was: “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take Hungarian people’s job.” 
Whether this is the reality or not, it is not the task of this study to judge this, but the fact 
is that this – as the effect of this campaign – became a real fear in the Hungarian society. 
It should also be noted that among the arriving persons (asylum-seekers) during the crisis, 
only a few stayed in Hungarian territory for a longer time, and most of the cases, they did 
not speak the language, so they could hardly find a job.
Regarding the region, it should also be mentioned that the sectors dealing with labour 
shortages can benefit from the employment of immigrant labour force: if they have the 
appropriate qualification for the job (in case of positions requiring a higher qualification), 
or if they are willing to fill the position despite its underestimated nature, the so-called 3D 
jobs (dirty, dangerous, demeaning).
In Hungary, there is a special type of residency permit, which is called residency per-
mit issued on national economic interest. Third-country nationals (non-EEA nationals) can 
purchase a State Treasury Bond (Special Hungarian Government Bonds) of EUR 300,000, 
whereupon they can apply for a special residence permit. This is because the country has an 
economic interest in attracting wealthy investors – so they can enter and stay in the country. 
The validity of this residence permit is five years, but it can be extended for another five 
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years. 20 When making the decision on the bond, several foreign examples were taken into 
account, such as the Portuguese, Greek, Austrian or British ones.21
On the other side, from the point of view of the negative consequences, we must men-
tion the negative outcomes of the brain-drain phenomenon. Almost every Central European 
and V4 country face the challenges of the highly qualified workforce leaving the country. In 
Hungary, mainly the health sector and the IT sector are concerned, as, in most of the cases, 
employees do not feel that the level of pay or/and the social esteem is satisfying. With its 
almost 20 million members all over the world, the Polish diaspora is a significant factor. 
This is probably why the Polish Government launched a program which aims to reverse 
brain-drain, and in recent years, it has promised huge public investment into local indus-
tries, with an emphasis on tech and innovation. The Digital Poland 2014–2020 strategy is 
spending 10 billion € from the EU-financed Polish Development Fund. The Start in Poland 
program will help small and medium-sized enterprises with almost 630 million € into small 
and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups over the next years.22
The number of Slovaks working abroad has been increazing, and according to an 
estimation, more than 300,000 Slovaks work and 30,000 are studying abroad. During 
 recent years, in addition to the Czech Republic, more Slovaks are working in Germany and 
Austria. It is however concerning that only a low proportion of them consider returning 
back to Slovakia. In a survey conducted in 2015, only one quarter of the Slovaks studying 
abroad plan to live in Slovakia. In case of those working, this proportion is more alarming, 
only 9%. According to the survey, incentives to return home would be higher wages, order 
and prosperity, improvement of family situation, and the change of the political situation.23
The sector most affected by brain-drain and its consequences in the Czech Republic is 
the health sector. The head of the Czech Medical Council warned in 2016 that a brain-drain 
of doctors leaving for Western Europe left hospitals in a desperate situation. In 2015, 1000 
doctors graduated in the Czech Republic, and by the end of 2016, 209 had already left the 
country, while their number in Great Britain is increasing. In order to fix this problem, the 
Czech Government has no choice but to recruit from abroad, i.e. the further east (which 
causes problems in those sending states).24
The nature of economic mechanisms triggered by immigration depends on the social 
composition of immigrant groups, their qualifications, their family background, the attitude 
of the host society, etc. In all countries, and thus in the V4 countries, labour immigration 
can only be useful if the integration of foreign workers into the society, and the society’s 
20 The Hungarian Investment Immigration Programme. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Available: www.
mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/1A5BB49E-75C4-429D-A6E0-0D3E753838BC/0/ program_overview_EN.pdf 
(Accessed: 03.12.2017)  
21 Válasz a K/18336. számú írásbeli kérdésre: Melyik nemzetközi gyakorlatra hasonlít leginkább a magyar „Le-
telepedési Államkötvény” konstrukciója? Parlament.hu. Available: www.parlament.hu/ irom40/18336/18336-
0001.pdf (Accessed: 03.12.2017)
22 Shehadi, Sebastian (2016): Poland aims to reverse brain drain. FDi Markets Intelligence. Available: www.
fdiintelligence.com/Locations/Europe/Poland (Accessed: 05.12.2017)
23 Brain drain of Slovakia goes on. The Slovak Spectator. Available: https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20065888/ brain-
drain-of-slovakia-goes-on.html (Accessed: 05.12.2017)  
24 Warnings of ‘brain-drain’ in the Czech Republic as doctors leave for the UK and Germany. Telegraph. 
Available: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/czechrepublic/12196147/Warnings-of-brain-drain-
in-Czech-Republic-as-doctors-leave-for-UK-and-Germany.html (Accessed: 07.12.2017) 
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labour market is successful. Returning to the previously mentioned 3D jobs, we must note 
that – according to a research realized in 2013 – the high-skilled workers of the host country 
can benefit from the arriving of the low-skilled workers, because by the decrease of their 
relative proportion, their significance is growing.25
Statistical findings for the year 2016 published by Eurostat show the employment rates 
of native and foreign-born population. As we can see, the employment rates for native-born 
are usualy higher than for foreign-born people, and it is corresponding to the EU-average. 
However, Hungary is one of the 6 countries in the EU (along with Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom) where employment rates among the foreign-born pop-
ulation was higher in 2016 than among the native-born citizens. Among the foreign-bon 
population, there is a difference between EU and non-EU born citizens: the employment rate 
of non-EU-born are lower than those born on the territory of the EU. It is interesting to see 
that employment rates for non-EU-born citizens are higher in Poland, in the Czech Republic 
and in Slovakia (and, in addition in Slovenia, too) than the data for EU-born people. This rate 
is however below the EU-average in every V4 country, so we can say the integration of the 
non-EU citizens into the labour market – according to these data – exceeds the EU-average.26
Table 6.
Employment rates of native and foreign-born citizens, 2016
State Native-born (%) Foreign-born (%) of whichEU-born (%) non-EU-born (%)
EU-28 71.8 66 72.6 61.2
Hungary 71.4 75 78.3 68.4
Poland 69.3 65.9 64.8 66.3
Czech Republic 76.8 75.9 74.2 78.3
Slovakia 69.8 65.3 63.6 68.4
Source: Eurostat
Also, a country or society can be dismissive about immigrants because of fears concerning 
public safety. In almost all European countries this issue was raised right after the migra-
tion crisis in 2015, and in connection with the planned quota system. It is obvious that an 
unusual number of foreign people will raise the awareness of the hosting society, but we 
must be careful about whether this fear is well founded or not. The V4 countries refusing 
to accept asylum-seekers and conduct their procedures have at least one reason in common. 
They are afraid of the raising number of crimes committed by these hosted citizens. They 
care not only about the crimes against public order, but the fear of terrorism is also an im-
portant concern. The North European terror attacks further increase the countries’ fear of 
immigrants: for example, in Slovakia, which – according to the latest statistical findings – is 
hardly a destination to asylum-seekers, the actual political leadership is playing on fears 
25 Collier, Paul (2013): Exodus. How migration is changing our world. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
26 Eurostat – employment rates for native and foreign-born citizens, 2016. Eurostat. Available: http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_ labour_market_in-
dicators (Accessed: 01.12.2017)
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fueled by the Paris terrorist and sexual assaults in Cologne by gangs of men that included 
asylum-seekers.27
This is the reason for Poland for not accepting any single asylum-seeker. According 
to Jaroslaw Kaczynsky, “after recent events connected with acts of terror, Poland will not 
accept refugees because there is no mechanism to ensure security”.28
Summary
Both immigration and emigration have positive and negative effects on a country’s, or 
a society’s life and functioning. As seen above, the V4 countries are in a special position 
in Europe concerning migration, because of their history, geographic position, and the 
composition of migrants. The main security aspects of immigration can be discovered in 
the political, social and economic field. We cannot make a difference between these areas 
and impacts, since all of them affects security – even if in different ways.
Taking a look at the political aspect, we can summarize that immigration is a much 
bigger influencing factor than emigration, but the situation is actually perhaps under change, 
because governments are beginning to realize the risks of emigration (with special regard 
to the demographic and age composition and the labour market). However, immigration is 
actually one of the biggest concerns in international and national politics.
From a political point of view, the functioning and the dynamism of the political system 
is important and can include a security aspect: mainly the arriving of asylum seekers and 
the number and situation of refugees can have an influence on it. But emigration itself is also 
a potential source of insecurity: by the leaving young population, the countries’ demography 
and labour market will presumably experience some negative changes in this case.
Also, migration has an economic and social aspect too, as it is in a close contact with 
society and economy. Questions related to the employment, the economic utility, the inte-
gration of immigrants are in the center of interest in each culture. Therefore, immigration 
always has security aspects which need to be taken into consideration.
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The work was created in commission of the National University 
of Public Service under the priority project PACSDOP-2.1.2-
CCHOP-15-2016-00001 entitled “Public Service Development 
Establishing Good Governance.”
Good and strong governance must be built on up-to-date sci-
entific knowledge and college or university education. This 
research, whose local research centre is at the National Uni-
versity of Public Service, Faculty of Law Enforcement, Depart-
ment of Immigration and Nationality, focusing on migration 
dynamics as well as the social impacts in the background of 
migration and related public responsibilities properly meets 
these requirements.
The clearly defined objective of this research is to develop 
migration administration together with making recommenda-
tions that are directly connected to supporting the migration- 
related (administrative matters related to aliens as well as asy-
lum policies) tasks of public service and public administration 
in accordance with the international and European  Union re-
quirements. The research in the above-indicated subject stems 
from the preliminary hypothesis that migration, considering 
its current trend and dynamics, is an evolving phenomenon 
affecting individual states, societies and the development of 
migration-related regulations. Both desirable and undesirable 
manifestations of human migration simultaneously represent 
challenges for the countries of origin, as well as for the transit 
and host countries.
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